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 Chapter 1 introduces the “Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion” which to date has been 
loosely but persistently articulated by the Supreme Court (without use of the phrase itself). At its 
core, the Doctrine is a set of rules to identify and analyze certain categories of expression that 
fall outside the “Freedom of Speech” protected by the First Amendment. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 trace various disjointed roots of the unarticulated doctrine from the 
mists of history up until the Supreme Court’s first attempt to coalesce and synthesize disparate 
rulings into what had the appearance of a single doctrine, the landmark 1942 case Chaplinsky v. 
New Hampshire. 
Chapters 4 through 7 trace the development of the doctrine, while still unnamed, from 
Chaplinsky in 1942 to the verge of the Supreme Court’s next attempt, in 2010, at synthesizing 
the doctrine into a coherent and comprehensive articulation.  That 68-year period witnessed the 
evolution of the excluded categories articulated in Chaplinsky, the rise and fall of an additional 
category, the enduring recognition of more categories, the rejection of others, and methods 
developed by the Supreme Court to control the categorical boundaries.  Thus, Chapters 4 through 
7 travel the jurisprudential path from Chaplinsky to the verge of United States v. Stevens. 
Chapters 8 and 9 consider the two modern, somewhat comprehensive attempts by the 
Supreme Court to synthesize the various rules and holdings into a single, coherent doctrine:  
United States v. Stevens (2010) and United States v. Alvarez (2012). 
Chapter 10 features a proposal for a simplified, coherent approach to the modern 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion——determining what speech falls in the “First Amendment 
Free Zone” that is outside the freedom of speech protected by the Constitution. The chapter 
iv 
 
explains how a simplified approach would promote Speech Clause values and bring greater order 
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“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress 
of grievances.” 
--The First Amendment 




“[The First] [A]mendment, then, we may take it for granted, does 
not forbid the abridging of speech.  But, at the same time, it does 
forbid the abridging of the freedom of speech. It is to the solving of 
that paradox, that apparent self-contradiction, that we are 
summoned if, as free men, we wish to know what the right of 
freedom of speech is.” 
 
--Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 




 “The claim is not just that Congress may regulate [certain 
categories of speech] subject to the First Amendment, but that these 
[categories] are outside the reach of that Amendment altogether—
that they fall into a ‘First Amendment Free Zone.’” 
 
      --United States v. Stevens  







The First Amendment to United States Constitution commands that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”
1
  Since the 1920s, that constitutional limitation 
on the power of the federal government to restrict speech has been applied through the 
Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the states as well.
2
   
Despite their linguistic simplicity, those ten words have filled American constitutional 
history with dynamic conflict about their scope, their meaning, and their application to real-
world cases and controversies.  This dissertation focuses on one cluster of the many rules—a 
particular doctrine—that has guided the Supreme Court in interpreting and applying the Speech 
Clause throughout American history.  This doctrine has wide-ranging roots as ancient as pre-
Revolution English law and as recent as Elonis v. United States,
3
 decided June 1, 2015.  It is 
applied as a threshold matter—either explicitly or implicitly—in every case arising under the 
Speech Clause to determine “whether a speech act is covered at all by the First Amendment”
4
 or 
whether instead the speech at issue falls within a type of “category”
5
 that is excluded from First 
Amendment protection.  But despite this doctrine’s omnipresence, the Supreme Court itself has 
never given it a specific name, although the Court has colorfully described unprotected speech 
                                                          
1
 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2
 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the Speech Clause of 
the First Amendment to apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, part. 
rev’g Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), which had held the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states); 
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).  The incorporation of the Speech Clause to apply to the 
states is now settled law. 
3
 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015). 
4
 Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing In First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 
387 (2009).  
5
 The Supreme Court first used the phrase “classes of speech,” the predecessor to the modern term “categories,” in 
describing types or groupings of speech unprotected by the First Amendment in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571 (1942). 
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that is excluded from the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution as existing in a 
“First Amendment Free Zone.”
6
  
Claiming naming rights, this dissertation proposes that the Supreme Court should hone 
and formalize its approach to identifying speech that falls outside the protection of the Speech 
Clause, christening it “The Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.”
7
 Certainty and predictability in 
the scope of the First Amendment’s protections tend to protect Free Speech values by giving 
clear notice of the boundaries of the constitutional protection and thereby limiting self-
censorship and “chilling” effects.
8
  Thus, both jurisprudential and broader free-speech interests 
                                                          
6
 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010).  Chief Justice Roberts borrowed this phrase from Board of 
Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987).  In Jews for Jesus, Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor had used the phrase to refer literally to a physical space—an airport—as asserted to be a “First 
Amendment Free Zone.”  In Stevens, however, Chief Justice Roberts morphed the phrase into a reference to a 
conceptual space, not a physical location, and used it to describe speech that falls outside the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment. 
7
 The use of these three terms together—“doctrine,” “categorical,” and “exclusion”—to describe the jurisprudence in 
this area of First Amendment interpretation is the core contribution of this dissertation to the academic literature.  
Admittedly, the Supreme Court itself never has associated all three terms for these purposes.  Justices have 
referenced expression that falls outside the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment as “excluded” from 
constitutional protection.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 776 (1976) (referencing precedent that “has operated to exclude commercial speech from the protection 
afforded by the First Amendment to other types of communication”); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 
(2008) (“Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”).  
They also have referred to the “categorical” nature of this exclusion, although the term most commonly used in this 
context in conjunction with “categorical” is “approach.”  See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 400 
(1992) (“This categorical approach has provided a principled and narrowly focused means for distinguishing 
between expression that the government may regulate freely and that which it may regulate on the basis of content 
only upon a showing of compelling need. . . . The categorical approach is a firmly entrenched part of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”).  The Supreme Court never has referred to the categorical approach to identifying 
speech that falls outside First Amendment protection as a “doctrine,” but as this dissertation argues, it should.  
“Doctrine” is defined generally as “a principle, esp. a legal principle, that is widely adhered to.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 496 (7th ed. 1999).  As the Supreme Court has explained in a different context, a “doctrine” is a “set of 
rules for determining when past precedent should be applied to a case before the court.”  Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. 
v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 196 (1990).  As this dissertation describes, the Supreme Court’s approach to determining 
what categories of speech fall outside the protection of the First Amendment has developed to the point it constitutes 
“a legal principle that is widely adhered to” and is properly characterized as “a set of rules for determining when 
past precedent should be applied to a case before the Court.”  Thus, the Supreme Court should formalize its 
approach within the proposed name “Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion,” which accurately describes the 
jurisprudence.   
8
 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 774 (1996) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (noting “that First Amendment values generally are well served by categorizing speech protection 




would be advanced by the Supreme Court defining and articulating the categories of unprotected 
speech more concisely, consistently, and clearly.  
The Speech Clause Requires a Two-Step Analysis 
To minimize confusion, this discussion must begin by acknowledging the confused state 
of the nomenclature.  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence often describes as “categories” various 
groupings of speech for purposes of guiding which judicially created rule applies to which type, 
or “category,” of speech.  For example, the Court frequently has explained that speech 
categorized as “political” enjoys the highest level of protection from the Speech Clause, while 
speech categorized as “commercial” may enjoy a lesser protection, and still other types of “low 
value” speech may enjoy no protection at all and thus be considered “excluded” from the First 
Amendment altogether.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has grouped speech into distinct 
categories for the purpose of applying different First Amendment rules based who is doing the 
speaking or the place where the speaking is being done, and the Court has developed different 
doctrinal approaches to speech categorized as “speech acts” or “expressive conduct” as opposed 
to “pure speech.”  All of these are examples of the Supreme Court placing speech in “categories” 
for the purpose of applying rules to determine whether a government regulation of the speech in 
question can survive First Amendment scrutiny. 
The Supreme Court’s use of the word “category” and its variants, however, has been less 
than precise in its various Speech Clause applications, and that imprecision in language tends to 
muddy the understanding of the jurisprudence.  For example, the Supreme Court has referred to 





 but also has used the identical term to narrowly describe only those 
categories that are excluded from First Amendment protection.
10
  The Supreme Court has even 
used the same phrase to describe the concept that certain speech may be of such overwhelming 
value that the “categorical approach” requires, without further analysis, that such speech always 
be protected from certain types of government regulation, such as criminal prosecution.
11
 Thus, 
the Supreme Court has used the phrase “categorical approach” to describe the concept that 
certain speech is always protected, the concept that certain speech is never protected, and the 
concept that certain speech is sometimes protected, an inexact deployment of the phrase that 
understandably may leave the student of Supreme Court jurisprudence perplexed.  The Supreme 




The imprecise use of “category” and its variants obscures an important conceptual 
distinction within the jurisprudence.  Most of the time, when the Court (or any individual Justice) 
describes a “category” of speech, the purpose of doing so is to assist in explaining what First 
Amendment rule must be applied to the government regulation burdening that speech—is it 
                                                          
9
 See, e.g., id. at 775 (acknowledging “[t]he value of the categorical approach generally to First Amendment 
security”). 
10
 See, e.g., R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (“[A] limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”); id. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Fifty years ago, the Court articulated a 
categorical approach to First Amendment jurisprudence” in reference to Chaplinsky). 
11
 See Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (“Landmark urges as the dispositive answer 
to the question presented that truthful reporting about public officials in connection with their public duties is always 
insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the First Amendment. . . . We find it unnecessary to adopt 
this categorical approach to resolve the issue before us.”). 
12
 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 446 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our First Amendment 
jurisprudence has identified some categories of expression that are less deserving of protection than others—fighting 
words, obscenity, and commercial speech, to name a few.”).  This passage from Morse effectively illustrates the 
confused state of the doctrine and the tendency to intermingle the various meanings of the term “category” by 
mixing categories that are excluded from First Amendment protection—like fighting words and obscenity—with 
those that are protected in some manner by the First Amendment—like commercial speech); see also generally 
R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (acknowledging existence of “categorical approach” in reference the post-Chaplinsky cases but 




subject to strict scrutiny? Intermediate scrutiny?  Mere rational basis?
13
  As a practical matter, 
the test applied under the First Amendment often determines the outcome of the case, and the 
category into which the Court places the speech at issue determines which test applies.   
However, while rarely expressly acknowledged by the Supreme Court, every Speech 
Clause case necessarily involves a two-step analysis:  There exist both a threshold question and a 
tertiary question that must be answered.
14
  Before a court can reach the question of what First 
Amendment test applies, the court must determine whether the Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment is applicable to the speech in the case or controversy before it.
15
  Thus, the threshold 
question in every Speech Clause case necessarily is whether the First Amendment applies at all 
to the speech at issue.  If it does not, then the court’s role under the First Amendment in 
reviewing the government regulation at issue is at an end; if it does, then the court must address 
the tertiary question of how the Speech Clause applies to the regulation and speech at issue in the 
particular case.  Most of the time, the threshold question is not expressly addressed by the 
                                                          
13
 An example of the Supreme Court using the term “category” to describe a method of analysis within the First 
Amendment is Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (referencing “important First Amendment categories—‘content-based,’ ‘speaker-based,’ and ‘neutral’”). 
14
 On occasion, the Supreme Court in other Speech Clause contexts has explicitly recognized this two-step nature of 
the analysis.  For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 n.5 (1984), the 
Court explained that in expressive conduct cases it is necessary for a person challenging “assertedly expressive 
conduct to demonstrate that the First Amendment even applies.”  Similarly, in Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 U.S. 788, 
797 (1985), the Court concluded that to assess whether government restrictions on charitable fundraising in the 
government workplace “we must first decide whether the solicitation in the context of the [particular fundraising 
methods] is speech protected by the First Amendment, for, if it is not, we need go no further.”  
15
 In the context of categorical exclusion, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the necessity of this two-step analysis 
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 561-62 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“But to say the 
ordinance presents a First Amendment issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation.  
The plurality confuses the Amendment’s coverage with the scope of its protection.”). For a crisp example of a lower 
court articulating an analytical framework for all First Amendment speech cases that incorporates a threshold 
assessment of whether the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion applies, see Brayshaw v. City of Tallahassee, 709 F. 
Supp. 2d 1244, 1248 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the 
States by the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits Congress and the States from ‘abridging the freedom of speech.’ A 
challenge to a statute on First Amendment grounds requires that I first consider whether the speech or conduct is 
protected by the United States Constitution. If the answer is affirmative, I then consider whether the statute is 
unconstitutional on its face.  There are few categories of speech that are not protected by the First 
Amendment.”(citations omitted) (emphasis added)). 
6 
 
litigants or by the court because it is implicitly answered in the affirmative by all involved
16
—
regulations of political speech, for example, are universally accepted to be subject to Speech 
Clause protection.  Thus, in litigating political-speech cases it is unnecessary to expressly 
analyze the threshold question to establish that the Speech Clause applies to the government 
regulation of speech that is in dispute; the legal dispute in political-speech cases is always about 
the tertiary question of what First Amendment rule applies and how that rule applies to the 
speech at issue.  But in a minority of free-speech cases—a relatively small subset of the entire 
universe of Speech Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court—the threshold question of 
whether the Speech Clause applies at all to the speech at issue is, itself, the core issue in dispute 
in the case. 
The confusion spawned by imprecision is important because the two questions are 
different in nature; thus, a failure to distinguish between them analytically is a material 
shortcoming of both the jurisprudence and much of the academic literature.  The threshold 
question is binary in nature—either the Speech Clause applies to the speech at issue or it does 
not.
17
  The tertiary question, however, is open-ended, or “variable,” in nature.  There exist 
                                                          
16
 In this sense, this threshold question of whether the Speech Clause applies at all in any given case is analogous to 
subject matter jurisdiction—it is a threshold issue that must be satisfied in every case, but typically it is not in 
dispute.  Only when there is a basis for disputing its presence might the threshold question of whether the speech at 
issue falls within Speech Clause protection, like the threshold issue of whether the court has jurisdiction to decide 
the subject matter in dispute in the case, become the subject of the litigation.  Indeed, the analogy between the 
question of the Speech Clause applicability and subject matter jurisdiction is a close one—it is reasonable to think of 
the question of the Speech Clause’s application (or non-application) to the speech at issue in the case as a 
determination whether there is any federal question in dispute in the case; if the speech at issue is outside the 
protection of the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, then in a sense there is no federal constitutional question to 
be decided by the court. 
17
 For a contrary view, however, see R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383-84 (“We have sometimes said that these [excluded] 
categories of expression are “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech.” Such statements must be 
taken in context, however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing 
obscenity “as not being speech at all.” What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First 
Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not 
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for 
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”). 
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dozens, perhaps scores, perhaps hundreds of judicially made rules for applying the First 
Amendment to constrain government regulations of different types and circumstances of speech.   
Thus, the threshold question requires a fundamentally different sort of analysis than the 
tertiary question.  The binary nature of the threshold question (Does the Speech Clause apply, 
yes or no?) is conceptually and analytically different from the open-ended nature of the tertiary 
question (If the Speech Clause does apply, then how does it apply to this particular speech at 
issue?).  The important difference has been described as follows: 
Binary predictions and exposures are about well defined discrete events, with 
yes/no types of answers, such as whether a person will win the election, a single 
individual will die, or a team will win a contest.  We call them binary because the 
outcome is either 0 (the event does not take place) or 1 (the event took place). . . . 
For instance, we cannot have five hundred people winning a presidential election. 
Or a single candidate running for an election has two exhaustive outcomes: win or 
lose. . . . [By contrast,] ‘variable’ predictions and exposures, also known as 
natural random variables, correspond to situations in which the payoff is 




To illustrate the difference and its significance, consider a typical school examination.  The 
binary questions are true-false; the variable questions require short answers or perhaps even 
essays.  The student who answers true-false questions with lengthy and elaborate essays, or who 
responds to essay questions simply with “true” or “false,” would score poorly.  Thus is the need 
to distinguish binary questions from variable questions.  The fundamental difference not only 
stands to reason but also is mathematically demonstrable:  “The binaries are mathematically 
tractable, while the variable are much less so.”
19
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court generally has not expressly drawn that conceptual 
distinction between analysis of the binary threshold question in free speech cases (does the 
Speech Clause apply at all in this case?) and analysis of the open-ended, or “variable,” tertiary 
question that is the subject of most free speech cases (how does the Speech Clause apply to the 
speech at issue in this case?).  The Court certainly is not alone in improperly intertwining the 
analysis of binary questions with that of open-ended, or “variable,” questions: 
[B]ecause of the human tendency to engage in attribute substitution when 
confronted by difficult questions, decision-makers and researchers often confuse 
the variable for the binary. . . . The nub of the conceptual confusion is that 
although predictions and payoffs are completely separate mathematically, both the 
general public and researchers are under constant attribute-substitution temptation 





This failure to expressly distinguish the two concepts is reflected in the Court’s imprecise (and 
therefore sometimes confusing) use of language, particularly the term “category” and its variants, 
in Speech Clause cases.  The mushing together of what must by their nature be separate analyses 
of the two questions presented in Speech Clause cases is a phenomenon hardly unique to the 
Court.  As discussed immediately below, the scholarly literature also is replete with discussion of 
the “categorical approach” generally and often has not distinguished the use of the word 
“category” and its variants to describe the binary threshold analysis from its use to describe the 
tertiary open-ended, or variable, analysis.  
Thus, improved linguistic precision would contribute greatly to both the jurisprudence 
and the scholarship of the Speech Clause.  To borrow a phrase, this is an area of the law that 
would be advanced if the Supreme Court would say what it means and mean what it says.  By 
separating the language describing judicial analysis of the binary threshold question from that 
describing the variable tertiary question, it is likely more-precise reasoning would follow the 
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more-precise words.  The linguistic and conceptual differences between the two questions 
inherent in all Speech Clause cases would tend to become clearer and more precise, and thus the 
clarity and certainty of the law would be improved.  Coining and employing the phrase “Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion” to describe the rules and analyses related to the binary threshold 
question in Speech Clause cases, as this dissertation advocates, would advance that worthy 
purpose. 
Categoricalism v. Balancing 
In modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has developed two broad approaches to 
interpretation of the First Amendment’s command:  The balancing approach and the categorical 
approach.
21
  As one scholar described the history of the two: 
Decades ago, Justices [Hugo] Black and [Felix] Frankfurter waged a . . . battle in 
the First Amendment context, and the echoes of their struggle continue to 
reverberate in free speech doctrine. . . . Justice Frankfurter and the First 
Amendment balancers won most of their battles.  As a result, modern First 
Amendment doctrine is a patchwork of categorical and balancing tests, with a 




It has been argued persuasively that the fundamental difference between the approach of the 
balancers and that of the categoricalists is the distinction between viewing the law as an exercise 
in applying standards versus applying rules.  The First Amendment balancers prefer standards to 
be applied case-by-case; the categoricalists tend toward rules that are developed before any 
particular case or controversy presents itself.
23
  As one scholar has framed the distinction: 
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 In this context, the term “categorical approach” references generally the use of categories to assist in Speech 
Clause analysis and tends to include both the categorical approach of determining whether speech falls within the 
First Amendment and the categorical approach of determining what First Amendment rules applies to any particular 
speech.  As discussed above, however, the use of the term and its variants is imprecise and sometimes is used 
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 Blocher, supra note 4, at 375-76. 
23
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Approaches in State Constitutional Interpretation, 76 ALB. L. REV. 2027 (2012/2013); David L. Faigman, 
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The Justices of rules are skeptical about reasoned elaboration and suspect that 
standards will enable the Court to translate raw subjective value preferences into 
law.  The Justices of standards are skeptical about the capacity of rules to 
constrain value choice and believe that custom and shared understandings can 




In modern context, the struggle between the balancers and the categoricalists continues.  The 
standards-based approach of the Great Balancer, Justice Frankfurter, has been taken up by 
Justice Stephen Breyer, who tends to reject “strict categorical analysis” because he interprets 
precedent to mean “[u]ltimately the Court has had to determine whether the [challenged] statute 
works speech-related harm that is out of proportion to its justifications.”
25
  The rules-based 
approach of the Great Categoricalist, Justice Black,
26
 lives on in Justice Anthony Kennedy
27
 who 
argues that “[t]he vast realm of free speech and thought always protected in our tradition can still 
thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence to those categories and rules.”
28
 
 The difference between the balancing approach and the categorical approach has been 
aptly described: 
Generally, balancing approaches set the individual’s interest in asserting a right 
against the government’s interest in regulating it, attach whatever weights are 
appropriate for the context, and determine which is weightier.  In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Glass of the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (1992-1993); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA 
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24
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California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Black, J.).  To be an absolutist without 
categorically excluding some types of speech from First Amendment protection would necessarily result in the 
upholding of every asserted claim that the First Amendment should be applied to bar government regulation without 
resort to any discretion or judgment, thereby rendering the act of judging a nullity.  Thus, this dissertation recognizes 
and discusses only two approaches to interpreting and applying the Speech Clause of the First Amendment, 
balancing and categoricalism, even though some would describe the existence of three approaches:  balancing, 
categoricalism, and absolutism.  See, e.g., Irene Segal Ayers, Categorical Approach to Free Speech, at 
http://uscivilliberties.org/themes/3309-categorical-approach-to-free-speech.html. 
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 And, of course, in Justice Antonin Scalia.  
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 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544. 
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categoricalism prohibits this kind of weighing of interests in the individual case 
and asks only whether the case falls inside certain predetermined, outcome-
determinative lines.  Balancing therefore tends to collapse decisionmaking back 
into the direct application of the background principle or policy to a fact situation, 
whereas categorization binds a decisionmaker to respond in a determinative way 




To be sure, in actual jurisprudence this academic and intellectual distinction may prove a 
distinction without a difference.  In practice, the difference between the two approaches may be 
reduced to little more than a matter of timing as to when the balancing is conducted:  “When 
categorical formulas operate, all the important work in litigation is done at the outset.  Once the 
relevant right and mode of infringement have been described, the outcome follows, without any 
explicit judicial balancing of the claimed right against the government’s justification for the 
infringement.”
30
   
Like all approaches to interpreting and applying the Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment, the categorical approach has benefits and drawbacks.  On the one hand: 
In addition to being seen as more protective generally of free speech rights, the 
categorical approach is praised by its proponents for being protective of those 
speech rights most in danger:  the rights of unpopular or distasteful speakers.  The 
categorical approach is commended for providing principled, objective guidance 
to courts, for helping judges take a pro-speech stand against the popular will, and 
for providing speakers with notice and fair warning about when governments can 
restrict speech.  The categorical approach is also praised for bolstering the images 
of courts as dispensers of fair and equal treatment and for making judges less 




On the other hand: 
 
Opponents of categorical approaches, however, question the claimed objectivity 
of free-speech categories.  What seem to be fixed, consistent categories can often 
be manipulated to produce the desired outcome in the case.  Thus, liberal judges 
are more likely to classify as ‘content-based’ laws regulating sexual expression, 
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whereas conservative judges will often classify the same laws as ‘content-
neutral;’ conversely, liberal judges are more likely to categorize laws regulating 
abortion protesters as ‘content-neutral,’ whereas conservatives assign them to the 
‘content-based’ category of speech restrictions.  Critics of the categorical 
approach charge that it is mere labeling, that it is mechanical and formulaic, and 
that it is not adaptable to a changing world and new technologies.  Critics further 
complain that categories mask the real but unarticulated assessments of facts and 
policies that occur whenever judges decide speech cases.  To the extent such 





 Whatever the scholars may argue as benefits or drawbacks of each approach, there is no 
doubt that the Supreme Court continues to rely heavily upon the categorical approach in 
interpreting and applying the Speech Clause of the First Amendment. While it may be “tempting 
to characterize all categories of unprotected speech as mere relics of a less enlightened day,”
33
 
that is not a temptation to which the Supreme Court has succumbed. Nor should it. 
As discussed above, categories are employed by the Supreme Court for various and 
distinct purposes throughout its First Amendment jurisprudence. One author has gone so far as to 
categorize the categories—arguing that in applying the First Amendment, courts use categories 
for any of three purposes:  “Categorization as Coverage,” “Categorization as Classification 
(Subcategorization),” and “Categorization as Protection.”
34
  Another scholar has explained the 
diversity of First Amendment uses of categorical analysis: 
Normally, when people speak about the categorical approach, they are referring to 
the rules that give lesser protection to certain content based on its supposed lack 
of value.  There are also sets of categories relating to disfavored speaker (e.g., 




 Daniel A. Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 
917, 931 (2009). 
34
 This framework is proposed by Blocher, supra note 4, at 387-93.  He credits its development to Frederick 
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students, prisoners, soldiers, state employees) or settings (classrooms, employer 




Although “[c]ontemporary First Amendment opinions . . . are loaded with the rhetoric of 
balancing,”
36
 it remains true that “various forms of categoricalism . . . apply throughout First 
Amendment doctrine, often in tandem with balancing.”
37
  The result is that modern “First 
Amendment doctrine combines both approaches [balancing and categoricalism], but in different 
proportions within different categories of speech.”
38
  As one scholar has put it, this combined 
approach stands the test of reason because “categories may be rationalized as merely the 
precipitate of earlier balancing that always happens to come out the same way . . . .”
39
 
For example, there exist certain rules that apply to speech categorized as “political”
40
 but 
different rules govern if the speech falls within the “commercial” category.
41
  Certain rules 
govern regulation of speech by schoolchildren in a school setting
42
 and others apply to speech by 
public employees in a public work setting.
43
  There are rules for speech categorized as expressive 
conduct.
44
  Certain rules apply when the government seeks to restrict defamatory statements 
directed to public officials,
45
 and different rules govern for those directed at private persons.
46
  In 
the defamation context, the Supreme Court also distinguishes between the rules applicable for 
speech on matters of public concern and those of private concern.
47
  There are rules that apply if 
the speech is “false,” but it matters materially whether the false speech is political (fully 
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 given under oath in 
a government proceeding (unprotected),
51
 or merely designed to puff oneself up (protected).
52
  
The application of all these rules is interwoven within the categorical approach to the First 
Amendment—which rule applies is determined by which category a particular form of speech is 
placed into.  “The result is a complex tapestry of rules regarding speech restriction.”
53
   
This dissertation focuses on the evolution and development of one specific type of 
category:  Those categories of speech that are excluded from First Amendment protection.  This 
is the type of category Justice Byron White was describing when he wrote: 
“No one can doubt that, in any well-governed society, the legislature has both the 
right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech.  Libelous assertions may be, 
and must be, forbidden and punished.  So too must slander. . . . All these 
necessities that speech be limited are recognized and provided for under the 
Constitution.  They were not unknown to the writers of the First Amendment.  
That amendment, then, we may take it for granted, does not forbid the abridging 
of speech.  But, at the same time, it does forbid the abridging of the freedom of 
speech. It is to the solving of that paradox, that apparent self-contradiction, that 
we are summoned if, as free men, we wish to know what the right of freedom of 
speech is.”
54
   
 
As discussed above, this type of categorization relates to the threshold question in the inherent 
two-step Speech Clause analysis. Thus, categorical exclusion, as opposed to other categorical 
analysis, addresses a question that is fundamentally different in nature—binary, not variable—
than the wide range of questions addressed by other uses of categorization in Speech Clause 
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jurisprudence. The concept is demonstrated visually in Figure 1.  If one thinks of the universe of 
“speech” as a circle and the “freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment as a subset 
of that circle, then this dissertation focuses on the “First Amendment Free Zone” containing 
whatever speech lies in between the two.  The categories of speech excluded from the First 
Amendment are a method of describing the speech that falls outside the protected freedom of 
speech and therefore lie within the “First Amendment Free Zone.”  As shown in Figure 1, the 
categories of speech excluded from First Amendment protection are represented by the area that 




Figure 1: Conceptual relationship between constitutionally protected "Freedom of Speech" and the unprotected 




The 'First Amendment Free Zone' comprising 
the Categories of Unprotected Speech 
 
 
"Freedom of Speech" protected by the First 
Amendment 
The outer circle 
represents the entire 
universe of “speech” 




 Throughout the history of the Republic, courts have struggled with defining what speech 
lies in this “First Amendment Free Zone.” But the judicial approach has been largely ad hoc, ill 
structured, imprecise and dissatisfyingly erratic.  The fundamental question underlying the 
Supreme Court’s categorical exclusion of speech from the First Amendment, therefore, really 
comes down to this:  What speech lies in the “First Amendment Free Zone” that is outside the 
“freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution, and how do we know the answer to that 
question? 
* * * 
 
With that framework for analysis now established, attention now turns to Chapter 1:  The 




CHAPTER 1:  The Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion  
  
It long has been accepted in the law and in the society at large that certain types of speech 
or utterances, such as “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic,” do not enjoy the 
protection of the First Amendment.
55
  But to place that general notion, which has escaped the 
confines of the law and of the academy and made its way into common parlance, within the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence involving the Speech Clause, it is critical to understand this 
distinction:  The Supreme Court employs categories of speech throughout its First Amendment 
jurisprudence, but the fact that particular speech has been judicially placed in a “category” does 
not necessarily mean it is been placed in a category that is wholly excluded from First 
Amendment protection.  Thus, as discussed above in the Introduction, the overall categorical 
approach to applying the Speech Clause includes both the use of certain categories for analyzing 
speech within the First Amendment—political speech, commercial speech, student speech, 
expressive conduct, etc.—and the use of certain categories to describe speech wholly outside the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.  The overall categorical approach 
includes, but is not limited to, the subset of excluded categories. 
This dissertation focuses only on the subset—those categories of speech that are outside 
the protection of the First Amendment, referenced herein interchangeably as the “excluded 
categories” or the “unprotected categories” or, occasionally, as “what lies in the First 
Amendment Free Zone that is outside the freedom of speech protected by the Constitution,” an 
allusion to the visual representations of the concept in Figures 1 through 6 in this dissertation.  
These excluded categories exist to inform the threshold, binary question present in all Speech 
Clause cases:  Does the Speech Clause apply at all to the speech in dispute?  This dissertation 
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will consider the nature of these excluded categories, the characteristics or tests the Supreme 
Court applies to determine or describe their existence, the names or labels the Supreme Court has 
attached to each of them, and related issues such as the Supreme Court’s approach to applying 
them in specific cases or controversies.  Taken together, the collection of these various analyses 
and considerations involved in the Supreme Court’s determination that certain categories of 
speech may be proscribed by the government without offending the First Amendment are the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion—a doctrine that the Supreme Court long has applied, in 
practice though not in name, to conclude that certain types of speech or expression are excluded 
from the protection of the First Amendment. 
 To be sure, the Supreme Court itself has never invoked the phrase “Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion,” although since Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
56
 it has acknowledged that 
several “classes” or “categories” of speech may constitutionally be proscribed.
57
  Chaplinsky was 
the Supreme Court’s first attempt to articulate expressly and in what appears to be an intended 
comprehensive manner the collection of categories of unprotected speech previously identified 
by the Court.  In the sense that the Chaplinsky Court synthesized into a single recitation various 
types of speech previously held to be constitutionally unprotected, it is the founding case for the 
modern Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion—although it used no such terminology, and the 
underlying concept of exclusion by far predates it.   
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Part A:  The “First Amendment Free Zone” 
 
Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has been less than entirely consistent in how it 
characterizes speech that falls into an excluded category.  For example, it has famously stated 
that the “prevention and punishment” of such speech has “never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem,”
58
 a theme constantly repeated in the case law, and it has said the 
“protection of the First Amendment does not extend”
59
 to these excluded categories.  The 
Supreme Court has expressed that same concept in various shorthand, calling the excluded 
categories “unprotected,”
60
 “fully outside the protection of the First Amendment,”
61
 “not within 




 “outside the scope of 
Constitutional protection,”
64
 “categorically excluded from First Amendment protection,”
65
 
“categories of expression where content-based regulation is permissible,”
66
 “falling outside the 
First Amendment’s protective shield,”
67
 and even a “First Amendment Free Zone.”
68
  But as a 
point of caution, the Supreme Court paradoxically also has made clear that even speech within an 
excluded category is not “entirely invisible to the Constitution.”
69
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 While scholarly critics have argued that this Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion “risks 
ossification”
70
 and should be abandoned in favor of a more overtly balancing approach, that most 
certainly has not been the view of the Supreme Court.  To the contrary, the Supreme Court in 
recent years has reinvigorated the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, invoking it, to varying 
extents, to resolve at least five major First Amendment cases in the past five years.  The stage for 
this modern resurgence of the Doctrine was set in January 2010 when the Supreme Court—under 
the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts—opened a new era of reinvigorated application of 
traditional free speech principles in its jurisprudence.  That month, reversing precedent
71
 and 
striking down a statutory prohibition on certain campaign contributions in order, inter alia, to 
preserve the Free Speech rights of corporations, the Court declared in the sort of bold language it 
often deploys in asserting fundamental free-speech principles: 
When Government seeks to use its full power, including the criminal law, to 
command where a person may get his or her information or what distrusted source 
he or she may not hear, it uses censorship to control thought. This is unlawful. 




While the jury is still out on the Roberts Court’s First Amendment legacy—and even, perhaps, 
on its overall direction—there is little doubt the Roberts Court has developed a reputation for 
attention to, spirited discussion of, and general support for, free-speech freedoms.
73
   
So the natural question to accompany this modern First Amendment resurgence on the 
Supreme Court would be this:  Would this age of renewed vigor by the Roberts Court in 
enforcing constitutional limits on government’s power to restrict speech mark the end of the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion?  After all, if the Supreme Court’s trend favors limiting 
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government’s power to restrict speech, then a doctrine that does just the opposite—by placing 
certain government restrictions on speech outside the reach of the Constitution and, therefore, 
within the controlling power of government and outside judicial review—would seem 
counterintuitive, even archaic.  It stands to reason that “[f]rom the point of view of those who 
seek to maximize the protection of speech, the recognition of any categories of disfavored speech 
is unsettling.”
74
     
But any rumors of the Doctrine’s demise, to paraphrase Mark Twain, were vastly 
exaggerated.  Just as Justice Black—the First Amendment absolutist—was quick to invoke the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion,
75
 so the modern Roberts Court has reinvigorated the Doctrine 
alongside its growing reputation as a pro-Free Speech Court.  For the Roberts Court as for 
Justice Black, the need for a vigorous Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion is the same:  As courts 
move in the direction of First Amendment absolutism, it becomes increasingly necessary for 
them to define various expressions as excluded speech, “unprotected speech,” or “not speech” in 
order to maintain any capacity for predictability.
76
  The Doctrine functions as a sort of 
jurisprudential safety valve.  Without the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, an absolutist 
approach by the Supreme Court would inevitably lead to the absurd result that everything defined 
as speech must be constitutionally protected and everything claimed to be speech must be so 
defined.  Thus, there would be no incentive to avoid case-by-case litigation challenging every 
government regulation that proscribes, regulates or burdens in any way anything claimed to be 
speech.  Every utterance or expression would be presumed protected by the Constitution, and 
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only after a fact-specific determination might courts uphold a regulation.  There would be no 
predictive capacity in First Amendment speech law—only case-by-case adjudication.  This is no 
speculative concern:  It occurred between Roth v. United States in 1957 and Miller v. California 
in 1973 as the Supreme Court struggled to define obscenity, summarily reversing without 
explanation 31 lower court decisions
77
 on the subject during the intervening sixteen years.  That 
practice led an exasperated Chief Justice Warren Burger to declare the Supreme Court had 
assumed “the role of a supreme and unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, 
subjectively judging each piece of material brought before it. . . . That is not one of the purposes 
for which this Court was established.”
78
  Indeed, it is not—and applying the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion is one method the modern Supreme Court uses to avoid replicating that 
undesirable experience elsewhere in its Speech Clause jurisprudence. 
Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion has 
found perhaps more interest, more favor and more clarity in articulation on the Supreme Court 
since 2010 than ever before in First Amendment jurisprudence.  In the past five years, the 
Supreme Court has relied upon the Doctrine in deciding no fewer than five cases. In 2010, it 
decided videos showing cruelty and abuse of animals were not categorically unprotected;
79
 in 
2011, it held neither were violent video games
80
 or grotesque picketings of military funerals.
81
  
By 2012, the Supreme Court was applying categorical analysis to conclude liars who falsely 
claim military honors could not be punished by the government.
82
 In 2015, the Court resolved 
through statutory construction a dispute about the government’s power to prosecute Internet-
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based threats but two Justices would have reached the constitutional question of whether the 
threats involved were “true threats” unprotected by the First Amendment.
83
 
 The concentration of cases since 2010 articulating, elaborating upon and applying the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion is unprecedented in the Supreme Court’s history.  Far from 
“ossification,” the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion is undergoing unprecedented clarification, 
application and acceptance at the modern Supreme Court.  In United States v. Alvarez,
84
 for 
example, seven of the nine Justices—spanning the philosophical spectrum from Justices Samuel 
Alito and Clarence Thomas to Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—applied the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion in reaching their respective plurality and dissenting results.  
 Thus, the timing is appropriate for the Supreme Court to formalize its jurisprudence into 
a synthesized Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion and to define and articulate the categories of 
unprotected speech more concisely, consistently, and clearly.  As the Supreme Court comes to 
rely more frequently on application of the Doctrine, further clarity is desirable to address the 
recurring and unavoidable fundamental question: What speech lies in the “First Amendment Free 
Zone” that is outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution, and how do we 
know the answer to that question? 
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Part B: Common Characteristics of the Excluded Categories 
 
A categorical approach to excluding speech from the protection of the First Amendment 
necessarily begs the question:  What is the basis upon which a category of speech comes to be 
recognized by the Supreme Court as an excluded category?  Put another way, the essential 
question becomes:  What are the common characteristics of speech within the various excluded 
categories?  
To be sure, there is no single test the Supreme Court applies to determine whether a 
category of speech should be excluded from the First Amendment.  From an intellectual 
standpoint, the absence of such a test stands to reason: 
By and large, the Court has been reluctant to recognize new categories of 
unprotected speech.  This reluctance makes sense.  If the rules governing 
unprotected speech were readily malleable, they would in effect operate as 
standards and fail to provide clear guidance to future cases or clear guidance to 




The Supreme Court recently rejected in sharp terms the Government’s invitation to establish a 
“simple balancing test” to determine whether a category of speech should be excluded from the 
First Amendment, characterizing that “free-floating test” as “startling and dangerous.”
86
 
Rather than devising a test that can be applied to determine whether a category of speech 
should be designated as unprotected, the Supreme Court since Chaplinsky has from time to time 
articulated characteristics of the unprotected categories.  The Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged as much: 
[T]his Court has often described historically unprotected categories of speech as 
being of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
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morality. . . . [W]e noted that within these categories of unprotected speech, the 
evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, 
at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required, because the 
balance of competing interests is clearly struck. . . . 
 
But such descriptions are just that—descriptive.  They do not set forth a test that 
may be applied as a general matter to permit the Government to imprison any 
speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or unnecessary, or so long as an 
ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a statute’s favor.
87
     
 
Even in the absence of “a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the 
scope of the First Amendment,”
88
 it is possible to identify common characteristics shared by the 
excluded categories—i.e., those “descriptive” characteristics the Supreme Court referenced in 
the excerpt above.  There are four of those descriptive characteristics that tend to describe speech 
to which the Supreme Court has applied the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion. 
First, there must exist a historical practice of excluding the speech from First 
Amendment protection.  This speech is proscribable because, as the Chaplinsky Court termed it, 
“[its] prevention and punishment . . . has never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”
89
  The Supreme Court has variously referenced this concept as a “long . . . tradition of 
proscription,”
90
 “long-established . . . proscriptions,”
91
 or “historically unprotected.”
92
  The 
existence of such historical practice must be established by “persuasive evidence.”
93
 
In applying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the Supreme Court seeks to recognize 
unprotected categories of speech that have previously existed in the law rather than creating such 
categories by judicial action on a case-by-case basis.
94
 One might analogize the Supreme Court’s 
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self-identified role in this regard as similar to that of a paleontologist who cannot create new 
species of dinosaurs but who may, from time to time, discover new evidence of some long-ago 
species not previously identified.  Thus, “it cannot be said with certainty that the [already 
discovered excluded categories] are or will remain the only ones that are without First 
Amendment protection . . . .”
95
  
 There are three ways in which the Supreme Court has satisfied itself that an excluded 
category of speech satisfies this requirement for historical practice: 
Original meaning:  Like originalism generally, reliance upon original meaning to 
demonstrate a historical practice of exclusion involves looking to whether the Founding 
Generation considered a particular category of speech protected or whether the Constitution 
“never”
96
 barred its “prevention and punishment.”
97
  While “conditions in 1791 ‘do not 
arbitrarily fix the division between lawful and unlawful speech for all time,’”
98
  the presence at 
the Founding of a practice of proscription is strong evidence that a category of speech may yet be 
classified today as proscribable. “Throughout its history this [Supreme] Court has consistently 
recognized . . . ways in which constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an 
unlimited license to talk.”
99
  Perhaps the best articulation of the textual basis for this approach is 
from Justice Thomas’s dissent in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (“EMA”),
100
 
the violent video games case:  “As originally understood, the First Amendment’s protection 
against laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech’ did not extend to all speech.”
101
  Justice Thomas 
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noted that the “freedom of speech” referenced in the First Amendment was not considered by the 
Founding Generation to be so broad as to include all utterances.  “Laws regulating such 
[unprotected] speech do not ‘abridg[e] the freedom of speech’ because such speech is understood 
to fall outside ‘the freedom of speech.’”
102
  Thus, if the authors of the First Amendment 
considered particular categories of speech to be without constitutional protection, those 
categories must be speech falling outside the “freedom” they referenced in the First Amendment 
and therefore remain subject to government proscription.   
Longstanding practice:  In some applications, the Supreme Court has found the requisite 
historical practice of exclusion is satisfied by a showing of a “traditional categorical 
exception[]”
103
 even without proof that the tradition reaches back to 1791.  In effect, the 
Supreme Court has found that a practice of exclusion may be historical enough if evidence 
shows a “long . . . tradition of proscription”
104
 that nevertheless falls short of dating to the 
Founding Generation.  What such longstanding traditions that fall short of the Founding 
Generation lack in duration, however, the Supreme Court may insist be made up in proof of 
widespread acceptance.
105
  Exclusion of speech justified in this manner rests on the identification 
of a “historic and traditional categor[y] long familiar to the bar.”
106
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Tort law yields examples of “statements that were neither illegal nor tortious at the time 
of the [First] Amendment’s adoption” but that nonetheless fal[l] outside the First Amendment’s 
protective shield.” 
107
 As Justice Alito has noted: 
The right to freedom of speech has been held to permit recovery for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress by means of a false statement, even 
though that tort did not enter our law until the late 19th century.  [In addition,] . . . 
the Court concluded that the free speech right allows recovery for the even more 




It also “has long been assumed that the First Amendment is not offended by prominent criminal 
statutes with no close common-law analog”
109
—statutes that, therefore, could not have been 
contemplated by the Founding Generation. 
Piggybacking:  In a few circumstances, the Supreme Court has satisfied its requirement to 
show a historical practice of exclusion by closely tying a category of excluded speech to a 
separate category that otherwise satisfies the requirement.  In practice, this is essentially an 
exercise in “adjust[ing] the boundaries of an existing category of unprotected speech” to 
accommodate a new circumstance.
110
  In other words, if the Supreme Court cannot demonstrate a 
sufficient tradition of proscription for a newly excluded category itself, it may essentially 
conclude that the category is merely piggybacking on another “related and overlapping 
[excluded] category”
111
 whose historical roots already are established. 
The clearest example of this approach is the Supreme Court’s handling of child 
pornography.  Unable to show a tradition of proscription of visual depictions of child 
pornography that only “[i]n recent years” had developed into a “serious national problem,”
112
 the 
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Supreme Court instead emphasized how the characteristics of this new category of speech were 
consistent with other proscribable categories.  In New York v. Ferber,
113
 the Court emphasized 
the similarities between “child pornography” and proscribable “obscenity.”
114
  The Court in 
United States v. Williams
115
 later further emphasized that visual depictions of child pornography 
are “contraband” that can be banned under the established principle that “[o]ffers to engage in 
illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.”
116
 
Second, speech in a proscribable category inflicts harm.  The Chaplinsky Court 
introduced this characteristic as meaning words that “by their very utterance inflict injury.”
117
  
Characterized broadly, the government’s legitimate interest in preventing the infliction of 
“harm,” or of “evil,”
118
 is a common attribute of every excluded category.  For example, child 
pornography harms children; defamation harms the person whose reputation is defiled; obscenity 
harms morality in society generally; speech integrated with criminal conduct facilitates the 
harmful criminal act; and incitement causes harmful riots.  Indeed, one scholar has argued for a 
more expressly harm-based assessment of excluded categories: 
The Court could evaluate whether a category of speech works sufficiently 
substantial harm to be regulated in light of several factors:  (1) whether the speech 
has a materially—for example, physically or financially—negative impact on an 
individual or group; (2) whether the speech causes or is very likely to cause 
psychological or emotional distress or damage to an individual or group; (3) 
whether the speech is intimately tied to some other form of harm that is already 
within the government’s power to prevent; and (4) whether the group with which 
the speech is concerned . . . warrants special protection due to some special 
vulnerability.   
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These factors attempt to capture the various permutations of ‘harm’ that exist 




This, of course, stands to reason—what would be the constitutional justification for 
permitting government to proscribe harmless utterances?
120
  The Supreme Court inevitably takes 
into account the “legally cognizable harm associated with”
121
 speech when it applies the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  For example, visual depictions of child pornography may be 
proscribed because “[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a 
government objective of surpassing importance.”
122
  But, presumably because the ultimate 
responsibility for protecting First Amendment values is a judicial task, the Supreme Court has 
been willing to consider legislative or academic findings related to the harm caused by specific 
speech
123
 but has specifically reserved to itself the final assessment of whether “certain speech is 
too harmful to be tolerated.”
124
 
 Third, speech in an excluded category is deemed to be of relatively low value. The 
principle has been consistent since Chaplinsky’s formulation that “such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”
125
 Only speech of “trifling”
126
 value may properly be eligible for inclusion in an 
excluded category.  There has remained a strong sentiment on the Supreme Court—even if not 
always in the majority—that any prohibition that may be applied to any speech that in itself has 
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“serious literary, artistic, scientific, or medical value[] would violate the First Amendment” 
because any such burden on speech is “by definition, simply not ‘de minimis.’”
127
  Not all low 
value speech is unprotected, but all unprotected speech is deemed to be of low value. 
 Fourth, the excluded category itself must be, as Chaplinsky put it, a “well-defined and 
narrowly limited class[] of speech.”
128
  Those principles have remained constant in the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion as the Supreme Court has continued to insist that “a limited categorical 
approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment jurisprudence”
129
 and that laws 
proscribing categorically excluded speech must “sufficiently describe[] a category of 
material.”
130
  In applying the Doctrine, the Supreme Court continues to make clear that “[o]ur 
task is only to say whether or not such works constitute a ‘well-defined and narrowly limited 
class[] of speech. . . .”
131
  In modern application, the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion has come 
to include a variety of tools, discussed in Chapter 7, infra, the Supreme Court uses to ensure the 
categories remain “well-defined and narrowly limited.” 
* * * 
Each of the four characteristics above is a necessary, but by itself not a sufficient, 
condition indicating the existence of an excluded category.  A historical practice of exclusion is 
necessary, but evidence of historical practice alone cannot indicate the modern presence of an 
excluded category.  If it could, blasphemy still would be punishable by the government, as it was 
for the Founding Generation, and so would profanity, which was recognized as proscribable until 
as recently as 1942.
132
  Moreover, if a mere showing of historical practice sufficed to justify 
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exclusion, Justice Alito’s persuasive demonstration that George Washington’s army punished 
lies about military honors would have saved the Stolen Valor Act,
133
 and Justice Thomas’s 
showing that the Founding Generation customarily banned adults from communicating directly 
with other people’s children would have preserved California’s regulation of violent video 
games.
134
  But neither did. 
Nor is a mere showing of harm caused by speech or a demonstration of an utterance’s 
low value sufficient to justify its categorical exclusion.  The concepts of harm inflicted and value 
conveyed are, in fact, opposite sides of the same coin and, in that sense, are the weights on 
different sides of the same balancing scale.  Neither has much analytical meaning except when 
weighed against the other.  “[T]he fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient 
reason for suppressing it.”
135
  Moreover, the conclusion that mere narrowness of a category of 
speech is plainly insufficient to justify the government banning it needs no further explanation—
for example, a category of speech criticizing the President of the United States on matters related 
to particular taxes might be narrow but clearly would not be proscribable. 
Thus, the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion really is a product of balancing.  To be sure, 
“[t]he First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech 
that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”
136
  The Doctrine is not a 
function of “an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits”;
137
 rather, we might aptly describe it as the 
product of systematic balancing.  Within excluded categories, the Supreme Court has explained:  
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“‘[T]he evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at 
stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required,’ because ‘the balance of 
competing interests is clearly struck.’”
138
 As one scholar described it in discussing categorical 
analysis more generally: 
Categoricalism allows a judge to transform some background value into a rule 
that will govern all subsequent cases inside the category without any further 
reference to the background principle or value.  The creation of the category cuts 





Or in the words of another:  “[T]he surviving categories [of unprotected speech] may be 
rationalized as merely the precipitate of earlier balancing that always happens to come out the 
same way . . . . [O]nce the categories are established, further ad hoc balancing is cut off . . . .”
140
  
This notion that categories really are the now-predictable result of numerous long-concluded 
historical acts of balancing—just as fossils are the result of numerous long-dead historical life 
forms—is consistent with the Supreme Court’s strong and consistent insistence on a showing of 
historical practice as a precondition for applying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  
Returning to first principles, the Supreme Court has noted: 
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.  Our 
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis 
that some speech is not worth it.  The Constitution is not a document “prescribing 




The excluded categories, therefore, are tools that can assist courts, speakers and practitioners of 
the law to predict the outcome when government seeks to regulate certain types of speech, not a 
rigid doctrinal equation that when provided certain input inevitably produces certain output.  The 
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Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion operates to promote predictability and certainty but is cautious 
to maintain an element of flexibility, which is why the Supreme Court has made clear it “need 
not foreclose the future recognition of . . . additional [excluded] categories to reject . . . [a] highly 
manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”
142
 Thus, excluded categories may be 
understood, as one scholar has put it, to be “a kind of prepackaged strict scrutiny” or “shortcut 
applications of strict scrutiny.”
143
 
Whether understood as “prepackaged strict scrutiny” or otherwise, there is little doubt 
that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion has advantages for First Amendment values and for 
practitioners of the law: 
The positive function of the categories is clear.  Essentially, for some key 
government interests, the Court has given clear direction about which regulations 
are acceptable.  This provides useful guidance to the government, and more 
importantly, clear warning to speakers about what they may and may not say.  





At the same time, the Doctrine is no panacea. In many ways, it merely substitutes 
problems of defining the categories for problems of defining the standards.  “Categorization is 
the taxonomist’s style—a job of classification and labeling,”
145
 and the insistence on historical 
practice risks ossification. That is why the Supreme Court has for many years signaled its 
unwillingness to become tightly bound by a rigid application of categorical analysis.
146
  It also is 
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 To illustrate that point in practice, this chapter closes with consideration of how the 
Supreme Court has applied the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to recognize or establish a new 
excluded category for visual depictions of child pornography.  If the Supreme Court’s objective 
was to sustain laws regulating pornographic images created with real children, it could have done 
so in any one of at least three ways:   
First, the Supreme Court could have identified child pornography as a new, separate 
category of unprotected speech.  This is what the Supreme Court stated that it did in the line of 
child pornography cases,
148
 although, as shown in Chapter 6, Part C, it is doubtful that is in fact 
what it did.   
The problem with this approach is that it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
insistence that it merely identifies pre-existing categories of speech that have always been 
outside the First Amendment and then articulates them.  Because the technology to take 
photographs of actual pornographic acts involving children did not exist for more than a few 
decades prior to Chaplinsky—and the technology certainly was not at all widespread prior to 
Chaplinsky—it is not plausible to assert that there was a longstanding, pre-existing consensus 
that these sorts of visual depictions of pornographic acts involving real children were among the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
interests, in this case free speech rights versus privacy rights both of which are “plainly rooted in the traditions and 
significant concerns of our society,” id. at 533 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975)), 
and thus has been cautious in applying categorical analysis:  “Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this 
ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving 
anticipatorily.”  Id. at 532. 
147
 Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288. 
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 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765-66. 
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“well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which 
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
149
 
Second, the Supreme Court could have treated visual depictions of child pornography as a 
derivative of, or subcategory of, obscenity.  On its face, this approach would appear to have 
made sense and, in a historical context, it would seem to be consistent with the Chaplinsky 
Court’s articulation of the “lewd and obscene” as a category of speech outside the scope of First 
Amendment protection.  From a simple common-sense standpoint, it is reasonable to believe that 
most people—including most judges—would instinctive consider pornographic visual depictions 
of children to be “lewd and obscene.”   
The problem with this approach from a jurisprudential standpoint is that by the time the 
Supreme Court first confronted it in 1982,150 almost a decade had passed since the Court had put 
behind it the decades of struggle with defining “obscenity.”  Having finally settled on a 
definition of obscenity in 1973,151 after decades of wrangling, it is understandable that the 
Supreme Court would be loath to identify as “obscene” any material that falls outside the hard-
fought Miller definition of obscenity.152  To have done so would have been to invite more years 
of uncertainty and litigation to define the limits on any newly recognized subcategory of 
obscenity outside the Miller test.  Therefore, although it appears obvious that depictions of child 
pornography are “lewd and obscene,” the Supreme Court could not define them as such without 
reopening the decades-long struggle to define obscenity that was finally put to rest in Miller—
and the Supreme Court was, understandably, unwilling to do that. 
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
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 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. 747. 
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 See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
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 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761 (“It is irrelevant to the child [who has been abused] whether or not the material . . . has a 
literary, artistic, political or social value.  We therefore cannot conclude that the Miller standard is a satisfactory 
solution to the child pornography problem.” (citation omitted)). 
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Third, the Supreme Court could have treated visual depictions of child pornography as a 
subcategory of the proscribable category of speech integral to criminal conduct.  The problems 
with this approach are two-fold:  First, the Chaplinsky Court did not identify “speech integral to 
criminal conduct” as one of the excluded categories, so taking this approach would inevitably 
result in some amount of mental gymnastics.
153
  Second, the first time the Supreme Court 
grappled with how to handle regulation of visual depictions of child pornography it expressly 
referred to child pornography as a “category” of unprotected speech, implying that it is a 
freestanding category all its own.
154
   
Notwithstanding those analytical challenges, however, the Supreme Court seems to have 
settled on a framework that does, indeed, treat visual depictions of child pornography as an 
outgrowth of the Court’s jurisprudence related to the proscribable category of speech integral to 
criminal conduct.  This firming up of the Supreme Court’s approach became clearer in the Free 
Speech Coalition
155
 case, where the Court drew a clear line between depictions of actual acts of 
child pornography, which are outside the protection of the First Amendment, and virtual 
depictions that do not record actual acts, which receive First Amendment protection.  By the time 
the Supreme Court reached its third case regarding the regulation of visual depictions of child 
pornography, its view that this area of jurisprudence was an outgrowth of the category of speech 
integral to criminal conduct was sufficiently well-established that Justice Antonin Scalia was 
able to write dismissively that “[o]ne would think that this principle resolves the present case . . . 
.  The Eleventh Circuit, however, believed that the exclusion of First Amendment protection 
extended only to commercial offers to provide or receive contraband . . . . This mistakes the 
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 This category of speech integral to criminal conduct was first identified in 1949 by Giboney v. Empire Storage & 
Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949). 
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 See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, (2002). 
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rationale for the categorical exclusion”
156
—as if this were well-settled law that should have been 
clear to the litigants without the need to so much as file a case. 
* * * 
It is apparent that, in wrestling with the determination of what speech lies outside the 
constitutionally protected “freedom of speech,” the modern Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
developed identifiable characteristics, themes and attributes common to all the categories of 
unprotected speech.  But the Court’s need to answer the fundamental question—what speech lies 
in the “First Amendment Free Zone” that is outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the 
Constitution, and how do we know the answer to that question—by far predates the Supreme 
Court’s modern era.  Thus, Chapter 2 turns to the next task:  Tracing the path of jurisprudence 
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 Williams, 553 U.S. at 297-98 (citations, footnotes, and emphasis omitted). 
39 
 
CHAPTER 2:  All Roads Lead to Chaplinsky:  Early allusions to categorical exclusion 
 
Even before 1942 when it first attempted in Chaplinsky a comprehensive expression of 
the unprotected categories of speech that fall outside the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
long had recognized some of those categories in an ad hoc manner.  This fact is consistent with 
the Supreme Court’s oft-articulated view that it does not create categories of unprotected speech 
out of whole cloth but rather from time to time discovers those categories that long have existed 
and have been recognized by the law.  Of course, an alternative plausible explanation for 
Chaplinsky is that “[t]he idea that the low-value categories of speech have always existed, and 
always existed beyond the scope of constitutional concern, is a historical myth or what we might 
call an ‘invented tradition.’”
157
 
Regardless of whether Chaplinsky brashly created doctrine from whole cloth or merely 
synthesized earlier doctrine into a coherent whole, the fact remains that from the early days of 
the Republic, American courts were recognizing that constitutional protections for speech and 
for the press did not serve to shield all types of speech from legal or penal consequences.  The 
examples below in this section are intended to illustrate the general principles involved, not to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of the relevant pre-Chaplinsky jurisprudence. 
Defamation 
Defamation, and its components libel and slander, may be the oldest surviving category of 
speech long considered unprotected.  In Western civilization, since Moses brought the tablets 
down from Mount Sinai millennia ago, the Ninth Commandment has directed:  “Thou shalt not 
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 Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV 2166, 2168 (2015).  Despite arguing 
that the concept of categorical exclusion of speech from First Amendment protection was a fabrication of the New 
Deal Court and that the oft-repeated assertion that unprotected speech has deep historical roots “extend[ing] back to 
the ratification of the First Amendment” is a “myth,” Lakier acknowledges that the concept of categorical exclusion 
is today “widely accepted.” Id. at 2168. 
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bear false witness against thy neighbor.”
158
  A similar prohibition is found in almost every 
society because “[t]o originate or disseminate lies told about one’s neighbor is fundamentally an 
antisocial act, since it strikes at the heart of the social compact by undermining trust and 
cooperation.”
159
  By the early seventeenth century, it was widely accepted in England that 
defamation was a societal evil worthy of proscription.  As William Shakespeare wrote in 
Othello: 
Good name in man and woman, dear my lord, 
Is the immediate jewel of their souls. 
Who steals my purse steals trash; 
‘Tis something, nothing; 
‘Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 




Prohibitions on slander date at least to the early Anglo-Saxon kings, who proscribed it 
“not only to remedy the dishonor and personal insult it caused, but to preserve the peace by 
eliminating personal vendettas.”
161
  After the invention of the printing press, a separate doctrine 
prohibiting libel arose and, because the permanency of the printed word risked greater ongoing 
harm to reputation caused by wide dissemination and re-reading than did fleeting verbal slander, 
libel was both easier to prove and more likely to result in an award of damages.
162
  
The modern American common law that applies to government action seeking to punish 
defamatory speech is voluminous, but the basic principle has roots stretching back to the English 
law and incorporated into American law early in our Republic.  As early as 1788, for example, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had occasion to consider whether the newly codified 
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 Id. (see generally section on “English Common Law History”). 
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protections for speech and for the press in the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania precluded the arrest for contempt of a printer and publisher for commentary that 
impugned the integrity of the court itself.  The court concluded they did not.
163
  
Eleazer Oswald was the printer and publisher of the Independent Gazetteer.  In that 
capacity, he was engaged in the passionate debate of the day regarding the new federal 
Constitution.  He printed in his newspapers several anonymous articles criticizing the character 
of a schoolmaster named Andrew Browne, and Browne sued for libel.  The court imposed a 
requirement of bail over the objection of Oswald, and soon thereafter Oswald published in his 
newspaper under his own name an article criticizing the court’s handling of the case and 
asserting that the court was under the influence of Oswald’s political enemies with whom he had 
clashed regarding the new federal Constitution.
164
 Oswald unsuccessfully demanded a jury trial 
because “former prejudices should be found to operate against me on the bench.”
165
 
In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that the Pennsylvania 
Constitution affords citizens greater protection for speech and the press than did the law of 
England and that, as that protection is to be applied in principle to the case before it, “[h]ere the 
press is laid open to the inspection of every citizen, who wishes to examine the proceedings of 
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 Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 328 (Pa. 1788) (ordering the publisher to pay a fine, to serve one 
month in prison, and thereafter to remain imprisoned by the sheriff until the fine and costs were paid).  
164
 Id. at 319-320 (quoting from Eleazer Oswald’s published article that formed the basis for the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s decision as follows:  “But until the news had arrived last Thursday, that the ninth state had acceded 
to the new federal government, I was not called upon; and Mr. Page in the afternoon of that day visited me in due 
form of law with a writ.  Had Mr. Browne pursued me in this line, ‘without loss of time,’ agreeably to his lawyer’s 
letter, I should not have supposed it extraordinary—but to arrest me the moment the federal intelligence came to 
hand, indicated that the commencement of this suit was not so much the child of his own fancy, as it has been 
probably dictated to and urged on him by others, whose sentiments upon the new constitution have not in every 
respect coincided with mine.  In fact, it was my idea, in the first progress of the business, that Mr. Browne was 
merely the hand-maid of some of my enemies among the federalists; and in this class I must rank, his great patron 
Doctor Rush (whose brother is a judge of the Supreme Court) I think Mr. Browns’ conduct has since confirmed the 
idea beyond a doubt.”). 
165
 Id. at 320.  
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the government; of which the judicial authority is certainly to be considered as a branch.”
166
  
However, the Oswald Court also articulated in strong language, worthy of setting forth here at 
some length, its view that defamatory speech falls outside the protection of the law: 
[L]ibelling is a great crime, whatever sentiments may be entertained by those who 
live by it.  With respect to the heart of the libeler, it is more dark and base than 
that of the assassin, or than his who commits a midnight arson.  It is true, that I 
may never discover the wretch who has burned my house, or set fire to my barn; 
but these losses are easily repaired, and bring with them no portion of ignominy 
or reproach.  But the attacks of the libeler admit not of this consolation:  the 
injuries which are done to character and reputation seldom can be cured, and the 
most innocent man may in a moment be deprived of his good name, upon which, 
perhaps, he depends for all the prosperity, and all the happiness of his life.  To 
what tribunal can he then resort?  How shall he be tried, and by whom shall he be 
acquitted?  It is in vain to object, that those who know him will disregard the 
slander, since the wide circulation of public prints must render it impracticable to 
apply the actedote [sic] as far as the poison has been extended.  Nor can it be 
fairly said, that the same opportunity is given to vindicate, which has been 
employed to desame [sic] him; for many will read the charge, who may never see 
the answer; and while the object of accusation is publicly pointed at, the malicious 
and malignant author rests in the dishonorable security of an anonymous 
signature.  Where much has been said, something will be believed; and it is one of 
the many artifices of the libeler, to give to his charges an aspect of general 
support, by changing and multiplying the style and name of his performances.  
But shall such things be transacted with impunity in a free country, and among an 
enlightened people.  Let every honest man make this appeal to his heart and 




The Oswald Court then proceeded to explain that the Constitution’s protection for a free press 
was satisfied as long as the press (and presumably citizens as well) was free to publish its 
opinions but society also was allowed to criticize the press’s motives for its publications.
168
  The 
early case Respublica v. Oswald established by forceful language the principle that endures, 
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 Id. at 322. 
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 Id. at 324-25. 
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 Id. at 325 (“The true liberty of the press is amply secured by permitting every man to publish his opinions; but it 
is due to the peace and dignity of society to enquire into the motives of such publications, and to distinguish between 
those which are meant for use and reformation, and with an eye solely to the public good, and those which are 
intended merely to delude and defame.  The latter description, it is impossible that any good government should 
afford protection and impunity.”). 
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albeit in sharply limited form, to this day:  Defamatory speech lies outside the protection of the 
law of free speech. 
 Separated, as they were, by only three years, both Respublica v. Oswald and the federal 
Bill of Rights were products of the same era.  In codifying the five freedoms in the First 
Amendment, the Framers understood that those rights would sometimes be in tension with each 
other.  Allowing proscription of defamatory speech long has been viewed as an important 
doctrinal tool to manage the tension between the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech and its 
Freedom to Assemble: 
The essence of a defamatory statement is that it is understood, or capable of being 
understood, as lowering the reputation of the person about whom the statement is 
made.  Reputation, as it is used in this area of the law, means the estimation of a 
person’s character or worth in the eyes of the community.  If third persons tend to 
dissociate themselves from the person about whom the statement is made, then 
that person has been defamed.  We find here very real tension between freedom of 
association, or assembly, and freedom of speech:  one can actually impinge 
negatively on the other.  For example, if neighbors refuse to associate or come 
into contact with Mr. Jones because it has been rumored that he was HIV positive, 
Mr. Jones’ freedom of association has been infringed upon unless he can 
vindicate himself in some sort of forum.  The law court, as the social institution 
designed to test and find the truth, is obviously the vehicle for such vindication.  
The law has fashioned the civil action of defamation as a means of drawing the 




Permitting government proscription of defamatory speech, therefore, has deep historical roots in 
American law. 
Incitement 
A second category of low-value speech that has deep historical roots was highlighted in a famous 
United States Supreme Court case deciding whether a person who distributes information 
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encouraging disobedience to the World War I draft could be punished by the government.  The 
answer in Schenck v. United States was ‘yes.’
170
 
Charles T. Schenck was a general secretary of the Socialist Party, which had been 
meeting in Pennsylvania and developing actions to express its opposition to World War I in 
general and the draft in particular.  The evidence presented at trial showed that Mr. Schenck had 
printed about 15,000 leaflets and personally mailed them to persons who had received notices 
that they would be drafted.
171
  After reviewing the content of the leaflets, the Court concluded:   
“Of course the document would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some 
effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the 
draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.”
172
  The government charged Mr. 
Schenck with violating the Espionage Act by obstructing military recruitment and enlistment 
during wartime and with related violations for misuse of the mail system. 
Mr. Schenck’s defense asserted that his conduct was merely a form of expressing his 
opposition to the war and that this expression was protected by the First Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court disagreed.  In its opinion written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Supreme 
Court held that “[t]he question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
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 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
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 Id. at 50-51. The Supreme Court described the content of the leaflets as follows:  “The document in question 
upon its first printed side recited the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said that the idea embodied in it was 
violated by the conscription act and that a conscript is little better than a convict.  In impassioned language it 
intimated that conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity in the interest 
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measures such as a petition for the repeal of the act.  The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed ‘Assert 
Your Rights.’  It stated reasons for alleging that any one violated the Constitution when he refused to recognize 
‘your right to assert your opposition to the draft,’ and went on, ‘If you do not assert and support your rights, you are 
helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to 
retain.’  It described the arguments on the other side as coming from cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist 
press, and even silent consent to the conscription law as helping to support an infamous conspiracy.  It denied the 
power to send our citizens away to foreign shores to shoot up the people of other lands, and added that words could 
not express the condemnation such cold-blooded ruthlessness deserves, etc., etc., winding up, ‘You must do your 
share to maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people of this country.’” 
172
 Id. at 51. 
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circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring 
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”
173
  Because Mr. Schenck’s 
actions were taken during wartime,
174
 the Supreme Court reasoned, they were clearly intended, 
and were likely, to disrupt the war effort by causing recipients of the leaflet to not cooperate with 
the draft.  The timing of Mr. Schenck’s expression, and its likely effect on conduct that would 
itself violate the law, were the determining factors for the Supreme Court.
175
 Justice Holmes then 
illustrated the Supreme Court’s reasoning with a single, colorful phrase that has obtained a 
position of lore not only in American law but in popular culture as well:  “The most stringent 
protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing 
a panic.”
176
  The notion that “falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic” enjoys no 
constitutional protection is widely accepted.  While the Supreme Court continues to wrestle with 
application of that principle to various factual situations, the longstanding principle that speech 
that incites violence or lawlessness is unprotected is fully integrated into the law. 
Profanity 
The notion that profane speech enjoys no protection from the Constitution has deep roots 
in American tradition.  As far back as 1692, the provincial legislature in Massachusetts, in 
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 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205, 206 (1904)). Indeed, the Court expressly 
noted:  “We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular 
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176
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revising the colonial laws, included provisions rendering unlawful “profane swearing.”
177
  The 
nineteenth century jurisprudence of the various states is full of cases applying prohibitions on 
profanity to various factual circumstances and, in general, the courts were more concerned with 
the completeness of the pleadings and similar procedural matters than they were with whether 
constitutional protections for free speech barred or limited such prosecutions at all.  Two cases 
are illustrative of the wide acceptance of prosecutions for profanity in early American 
jurisprudence. 
In 1809, the North Carolina Supreme Court had occasion to decide whether profane 
swearing itself could be charged as an offense or whether only the result of such profane 
swearing—namely, the disturbance of those who hear it—could be charged.  Defendant Kirby 
“swore several oaths in the court-yard during the sitting of the Court, to the great disturbance and 
common nuisance of the citizens necessarily attending said Court.”
178
  The one-page opinion 
lacked analysis but simply concluded that when profane swearing is charged as a nuisance, it 
may be prosecuted as a nuisance.
179
  From the vantage point of twenty-first century America, this 
once-widespread approach of separating the punishment of the utterance of profane speech from 
the punishment of the offense caused to others who hear the profanity appears little more than a 
distinction without a difference. 
A second typical case from the early era is more explicit in articulating the religious basis 
for allowing the punishment of profane speech, which frequently was intertwined with 
blasphemy and with a government interest in policing the public morals or protecting 
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Christianity.  The Supreme Court of New York in 1811 affirmed the prosecution and conviction 
of Defendant Ruggles for stating:  “Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his mother must be a 
whore.”
180
  On appeal, the Defendant squarely presented the issue of constitutional protection for 
profanity when he argued that although he could have been prosecuted for his utterance in 
England, where Christianity was the official state religion, he could not be so prosecuted in New 
York because the state’s Constitution and laws did not adopt Christianity as an official state 
religion.
181
  The New York Supreme Court rejected his argument. 
Instead, after recounting at some length the deep historical roots of blasphemy 
prosecutions, profanity prosecutions, and similar government regulation of speech in England,
182
 
the New York court favorably commented on that English heritage because “[w]e stand equally 
in need, now as formerly, of all that moral discipline, and of those principles of virtue, which 
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 People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
181
 Id. at 291 (“[Defense counsel], for the prisoner, now contended, that the offence charged in the indictment was 
not punishable by the law of this state, though, he admitted, it was punishable by the common law of England, 
where christianity makes part of the law of the land, on account of its connection with the established church.  In 
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allows a free toleration to all religions and all kinds of worship.  The exception as to licentiousness, refers to 
conduct, not opinions.”). 
182
 Id. at 293-94 (“Such words, uttered with such a disposition, were an offence at common law.  In Taylor’s case, 
the defendant was convicted upon information of speaking similar words, and the court of K.B. said, that 
Christianity was parcel of the law, and to cast contumelious reproaches upon it, tended to weaken the foundation of 
moral obligation, and the efficacy of oaths.  And in the case of Rex v. Woolston, on a like conviction, the court said 
they would not suffer it to be debated whether defaming Christianity in general was not an offence at common law, 
for that whatever strikes at the root of christianity, tends manifestly to the dissolution of civil government.  But the 
court were careful to say, that they did not intend to include disputes between learned men upon particular 
controverted points.  The same doctrine was laid down in the late case of The King v. Williams, for the publication 
of Paine’s “Age of Reason,” which was tried before Lord Kenyon, in July, 1797.  The authorities show that 
blasphemy against God, and the contumelious reproaches and profane ridicule of Christ of the Holy Scriptures, 
(which are equally treated as blasphemy,) are offences punishable at common law, whether uttered by words or 
writings.  The consequences may be less extensively pernicious in the one case than in the other, but in both 
instances the reviling is still an offence, because it tends to corrupt the morals of the people, and to destroy good 
order.  Such offences have always been considered independent of any religious establishment or the rights of the 
church.  They are treated as affecting the essential interests of civil society.” (citations omitted)). 
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help to bind society together.”
183
  The court then proceeded to articulate the connection between 
protection of religion and regulation by the government of profane speech: 
Nothing could be more offensive to the virtuous part of the community, or more 
injurious to the tender morals of the young, than to declare such profanity lawful.  
It would go to confound all distinction between things sacred and profane; for, to 
use the words of one of the greatest oracles of human wisdom, “profane scoffing 
doth by little and little deface the reverence for religion;” and who adds, in 
another place, “two principal causes have I ever known of atheism—curious 




After these lengthy recitations, the New York court addressed the heart of the issue and found 
that the Constitution
185
 did not bar a prosecution for profane speech: 
Though the constitution has discarded religious establishments, it does not forbid 
judicial cognizance of those offences against religion and morality which have no 
reference to any such establishment, or to any particular form of government, but 
are punishable because they strike at the root of moral obligation, and weaken the 




While the language, the religious context, and the unabashed sectarian nature
187
 of the 
Ruggles decision seems terribly foreign from the vantage point of twenty-first century America, 
the opinion reflects the deep historical roots of excluding profane speech from the protection of 
the Constitution’s free speech guarantees.  Although modern case law has moved away from 
profanity per se as an excluded category, the basic principles permitting its punishment had not 
changed over the many years and it is, therefore, not surprising that the Chaplinsky Court in 1942 
                                                          
183




 The court was applying only the New York Constitution because this case predates the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
application of First Amendment free-speech protection to the states. The historical principle of profane speech 
falling outside the protection of constitutional guarantees, however, is the same. 
186
 Id. at 295. 
187
 Id.  Consider, for example, this excerpt from the court:  “Nor are we bound, by any expressions in the 
constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish indiscriminately the like 
attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the grand Lama; and for this plain reason, that the case assumes that we 
are a Christian people, and the morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the 
doctrines or worship of those impostors.” Id. 
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identified profanity as a category of speech historically considered to be outside the protection of 
the First Amendment. 
Blasphemy 
Historically, laws prohibiting profanity were closely akin to, and intertwined with, laws 
prohibiting blasphemy.  Early American case law is replete with blasphemy prosecutions, and 
throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century statutes proscribing 
blasphemous speech routinely were upheld by American courts.   
A typical example was the case of Thomas Jefferson Chandler, whose conviction for 
violating Delaware’s blasphemy statute was affirmed in 1837.  Mr. Chandler had publicly 
declared that “the virgin Mary was a whore, and Jesus Christ was a bastard” and was convicted 
by a jury.  The Delaware appellate court, using language that foreshadowed the reasoning of 
modern-day incitement, upheld the anti-blasphemy statute because blasphemy “is a gross offence 
against society on account of its tendency to disturb the public peace.”
188
  Similarly illustrative 
was the case of Abner Kneeland, the editor and publisher of the Boston Investigator newspaper, 
who in 1833 had published an article regarding “Universalists” that was found to be a “denial of 
God, his creation government, or final judging of the world, made willfully, that is, with the 
intent and purpose to calumniate and disparage him and impair and destroy the reverence due to 
him” in violation of the Massachusetts blasphemy statute.
189
  Even while affirming the 
blasphemy conviction, the Massachusetts court invoked language foreshadowing modern Speech 
Clause jurisprudence: 
The statute is not intended to prohibit the fullest inquiry and freest discussion for all 
honest and fair purposes, one of which is the discovery of truth; nor to prevent the simple 
and sincere avowal of disbelief in the existence and attributes of a supreme, intelligent 
                                                          
188
 See State v. Chandler, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 553, 553 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. of the Peace and Jail Delivery Of Del. 1837). 
189
 See Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 206 (1838). 
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being, upon suitable and proper occasions; nor to prevent or restrain the formation of any 
religious opinions or the profession of any religious sentiments whatever; but it is 
intended to punish a denial of God, made with a bad intent, and in a manner calculated to 




Thus, the Massachusetts court acknowledged what today would be called First Amendment 
values even while concluding they were not offended by the blasphemy prosecution of Mr. 
Kneeland.  Likewise, when Abner Updegraph declared in 1821 in Pennsylvania that “the Holy 
Scriptures were a mere fable: that they were a contradiction, and that although they contained a 
number of good things, yet they contained a great many lies,” he was subject to prosecution for 
blasphemy.
191
  But even at that early date, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was mindful that the 
new federal Constitution presented new issues when reviewing blasphemy laws: 
Is the act of 1700 [concerning blasphemy] inconsistent with the constitution? A law, 
enacted a century prior to the adoption of the federal constitution, when religious and 
civil tyranny were at their height; when the decrees of the church were accompanied by 
the terror of civil power; when enlightened notions of the rights of man were not so 
universally diffused, as at this day, when the spirit of the law gives freedom to all, 
whether Christian, Jew or Mohammedan.   
 
But if the act of 1700 be considered as still in force, do the expressions and the place and 




Thus, even quite early in the history of the United States, American courts had begun to question 
whether blasphemy laws could survive scrutiny under the new federal constitution.  They also 
had begun injecting language, such as “place and manner of their utterance,” that would find its 
way into the modern case law of the First Amendment. 
State governments continued bringing successful blasphemy prosecutions into the 
twentieth century.
193
  The Chaplinsky Court, of course, did not mention blasphemy among the 
                                                          
190
 Id.  
191
 See Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 Serg. & Rawie 394 (Pa. 1824). 
192
 Id. at 395 (emphasis original). 
193
 For an interesting case, see State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39 (Me. 1921) (overruled by State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 
(Me. 1980).  Mr. Michael X. Mockus delivered a lecture in the town of Rumford, Maine, and by all accounts his 
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unprotected categories of speech, thus suggesting that by 1942 the prevailing view found the 
First Amendment to deny government power to punish blasphemous speech.  It is notable, 
however, that despite long ago having been relegated to the sidelines of First Amendment 





While the United States Supreme Court in the middle part of the twentieth century would grapple 
at length with the definition of ‘obscenity,’ the basic principle that obscene expressive material 
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment has been largely unchallenged throughout 
American legal history.  Indeed, most of the early cases take as a given that obscene material 
may be regulated by the government and deal only with contested methods and facts as they arise 
in individual cases.   
A typical illustrative case is Grimm v. United States from the late nineteenth century.
195
  
William Grimm of St. Louis was a photographer who had numerous obscene photographs of 
“actresses.”
196
  He received a solicitation by United States mail inquiring whether he would sell 
those photographs and, if so, in what quantities and for what price.  He responded in the 
affirmative by return mail and also sent pricing information.
197
  Unfortunately for Mr. Grimm, 
the solicitation was from a postal inspector working undercover to investigate whether Mr. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
written presentation was tasteful and appropriate.  However, during the lecture, he delivered an extensive verbal 
aside denouncing God, the Bible, the Virgin Mary, the Holy Trinity and various other aspects of Christianity.  While 
the written presentation was delivered to the townspeople in English, the verbal aside was delivered in Lithuanian.  
Unfortunately for Mr. Mockus, somebody in the audience spoke his language, resulting in an eight-count indictment 
and conviction for violating the Maine blasphemy statute). 
194
 See, e.g., John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (declaring in 1980 the Maine blasphemy law unconstitutional); State v. West, 
362 A.2d 602 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970) (declaring Maryland blasphemy law unconstitutional); Kalman v. Cortes, 
723 F. Supp. 2d 766 (E.D. Penn. 2010) (declaring Pennsylvania blasphemy law unconstitutional). 
195
 Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604 (1895). 
196





Grimm was distributing obscene materials through the mail.  When Mr. Grimm responded to the 
inquiry, he was charged with violating a section of federal law that prohibited the sending of 
such material through the mail.
198
  He was convicted and appealed. 
As was typical in these pre-twentieth century cases, the United States Supreme Court in 
Grimm was not presented with any First Amendment challenge to the statute regulating the 
transmitting of obscene material.  Rather, the Supreme Court assumed the authority of the 
government to regulate obscenity and spent its focus in determining the sufficiency of the 
procedure the government used obtaining and presenting the grand jury’s indictment and 
prosecuting Mr. Grimm.  At issue was whether it was necessary for the obscene materials 
themselves to be included in the indictment itself or at least described in sufficient detail to allow 
a reviewing court to determine, from the fact of the pleading, whether the materials were in fact 
obscene.  In a reflection of the widespread view at the time that the Constitution was no 
impediment to the regulation of material deemed obscene, the Grimm Court found it sufficient 
that the materials were alleged to have been obscene.  “[I]t is held that it is unnecessary to spread 
the obscene matter in all its filthiness upon the record; it is enough to so far describe it that its 
obnoxious character may be discerned.”
199
 
The notion that “obscene” speech falls outside the scope of the First Amendment’s 
protection has deep roots in American jurisprudence. 
                                                          
198
 Id. at 605.  At the time, “Section 3893, Rev. St., as amended by section 2 of the act of congress of September 26, 
1888, c. 1039 (st Stat. 496), provide[d] that ‘every obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, . . . and 
every written or printed card, letter, . . . giving information, directly or indirectly, where or how, or of whom, or by 
what means any of the hereinbefore mentioned matters, articles, or things may be obtained or made, whether sealed 
as first-class matter or not, are hereby declared to be non-mailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails nor 
delivered from any post office nor by any letter-carrier; and any person who shall knowingly deposit, or cause to be 
deposited, for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be non-mailable matter, . . . shall, for each 
and every offence, be fined upon conviction thereof not more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned at hard labor 
not more than five years, or both, at the discretion of the court.’”  Id. 
199
 Id. at 608.  
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Speech As Part of Unlawful Conduct 
A final grouping of early cases suggests speech that is an integral part of unlawful 
conduct also long has been viewed as falling outside the protection of the First Amendment.  
“The most innocent and constitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a 
criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its innocence nor the Constitution is sufficient to 
prevent the punishment of the plot by law.”
200
  Indeed, this notion appears to have been so 
widely accepted that few early cases expressly articulate the principle; instead, the early cases 
accept this principled limit on the First Amendment’s scope as a given and refer to it only in 
passing as if there were no meaningful dispute about its existence. In one oft-cited early case, 
which no doubt would reach a different result today under modern First Amendment 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that publication of a newspaper article
201
 construed as 
“encouraging an actual breach of law”
202
 by advocating for public nudity and against persons or 
organizations that objected to a nudist community
203
  
                                                          
200
 Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 206 (1904). 
201
 Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 276-77 (1915) (describing the newspaper article as follows:  “The printed 
matter in question is an article entitled, ‘The Nude and the Prudes,’ reciting in its earlier part that ‘Home is a 
community of free spirits, who came out into the woods to escape the polluted atmosphere of priest-ridden, 
conventional society;’ that ‘one of the liberties enjoyed by the Homeites was the privilege to bathe in evening dress, 
or with merely the clothes nature gave them, just as they chose;’ but that ‘eventually a few prudes got into the 
community and proceeded in the brutal, unneighborly way of the outside world to suppress the people’s freedom,’ 
and that they had four persons arrested on the charge of indecent exposure, followed in two cases, it seems, by 
sentences to imprisonment. ‘And the perpetrators of this vile action wonder why they are being boycotted.’ It goes 
on: ‘The well-merited indignation of the people has been aroused.  Their liberty has been attacked.  The first step in 
the way of subjecting the community to all the persecution of the outside has been taken.  If this was let go without 
resistance the progress of the prudes would be easy.’ It then predicts and encourages the boycott of those who thus 
interfere with the freedom of Home, concluding: ‘The boycott will be pushed until these invaders will come to see 
the brutal mistake of their action and so inform the people.’”). 
202
 Id. at 277. The Washington state statute in question read as follows:  “Every person who shall willfully print, 
publish, edit, issue, or knowingly circulate, sell, distribute or display any book, paper, document, or written or 
printed matter, in any form, advocating, encouraging or inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or incite the 
commission of any crime, breach of the peace, or act of violence, or which shall tend to encourage or advocate 
disrespect for law or for any court or courts of justice, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.” Id. at 275-76. 
203
 Id. at 277.  The Supreme Court found:  “Thus by indirection, but unmistakeably, the article encourages and 
incites a persistence in what we must assume would be a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure; and the 
jury so found.” Id. 
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lays hold of encouragements that, apart from statute, if directed to a particular person’s 
conduct, generally would make him who uttered them guilty of a misdemeanor if not an 
accomplice or a principal in the crime encouraged, and deals with the publication of them 
to a wider and less selected audience.  Laws of this description are not unfamiliar.  Of 
course we have nothing to do with the wisdom of the defendant, the prosecution, or the 





Three subsequent cases decided in succession from 1938 through 1940 well-illustrate the 
Supreme Court’s approach to government regulation of speech intertwined with illegal conduct 
before Chaplinsky. 
A classic example is the Supreme Court’s decision in Lovell v. City of Griffin.
205
  In that 
case, Alma Lovell was convicted of violating a Griffin, Georgia, city ordinance that prohibited 
the distribution of literature without a permit.
206
  She specifically chose not to apply for the 
permit before distributing a pamphlet and magazine that set forth the gospel of the “Kingdom of 
Jehovah” because she “regarded herself as sent ‘by Jehovah to do His work’ and . . . such an 
application would have been ‘an act of disobedience to His commandment.’”
207
  The Supreme 
Court held the city ordinance facially unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment, but 
did so in part because the ordinance was not limited to regulating the distribution of literature 
“that is obscene or offensive to public morals or that advocates unlawful conduct.”
208
  This 
backhanded reference to speech integral to unlawful conduct is the only reference to that concept 
                                                          
204
 Id. at 277-78. 
205
 303 U.S. 444 (1938). 
206
 Id. at 447-48. The ordinance stated:  “‘Section 1.  That the practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, 
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free, or whether 
same are being sold, within the limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written permission from the City 
Manager of the City of Griffin, such practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the 
City of Griffin. ‘Section 2.  The Chief of Police of the City of Griffin and the police force of the City of Griffin are 
hereby required and directed to suppress the same and to abate any nuisance as is described in the first section of this 
ordinance.’” See id. at 447. 
207
 Id. at 448.  
208
 Id. at 451 (emphasis added). While the Lovell case sustained a facial First Amendment challenge to the local 
ordinance, the Supreme Court also implied that an “as applied” challenge would have failed as well because “[t]here 
is no suggestion that the pamphlet and magazine distributed in the instant case were of that character [i.e., obscene, 
offensive, or advocating unlawful conduct].” Id. 
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in the opinion, and its grouping without further analysis by the Supreme Court in the same 
reference with speech that is obscene or offensive to public morals suggests the Court viewed all 
of those types of speech as constitutionally similar—specifically, outside the protection of the 
First Amendment. 
One year later, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Lovell when it considered 
consolidated First Amendment challenges to separate local ordinances governing leafleting in 
New Jersey, California, Wisconsin and Massachusetts. In that case, Schneider v. State,
209
 the 
Supreme Court found each of the local ordinances to violate the First Amendment but in doing 
so clarified that governments do retain their police powers to protect the health, safety and 
welfare of citizens.  In the context of regulating leafleting, the Court offered hypothetical 
examples of where the constitutional boundary might lie between permissible uses of the police 
power and the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.
210
  Foreshadowing its future 
test applied under strict scrutiny that would require a government regulation of speech to be the 
“least restrictive means” to achieve the legitimate government purpose, the Schneider Court 
articulated the concept that a police power regulation that is general in nature but nonetheless 
burdens speech must be narrowly drawn to survive a First Amendment challenge.
211
  
                                                          
209
 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
210
 Id. at 160-61 (1939) (“Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep their communities’ 
streets open and available for movement of people and property, the primary purpose to which the streets are 
dedicated.  So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the 
street to impart information through speech or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of 
those using the streets.  For example, a person could not exercise this liberty by taking his stand in the middle of a 
crowded street, contrary to traffic regulations, and maintain his position to the stoppage of all traffic; a group of 
distributors could not insist upon a constitutional right to form a cordon across the street and to allow no pedestrian 
to pass who did not accept a tendered leaflet; nor does the guarantee of freedom of speech or of the press deprive a 
municipality of power to enact regulations against throwing literature broadcast in the streets.”). 
211
 Id. at 162 (“The motive of the legislation under attack . . . is held by the courts below to be the prevention of 
littering of the streets and, although the alleged offenders were not charged with themselves scattering paper in the 
streets, their convictions were sustained upon the theory that distribution by them encouraged or resulted in such 
littering.  We are of opinion that the purpose to keep the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to 
justify an ordinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to 
receive it.  Any burden imposed upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as an indirect 
56 
 
Turning its attention specifically to the New Jersey ordinance, which was enacted by the 
Town of Irvington, the Schneider Court noted that it rested on an additional justification not 
present in the other states’ ordinances.  Not only was the town motivated by the desire to reduce 
littering through the discarding of unwanted literature that might be distributed, but the town also 
expressed a desire to reduce door-to-door solicitations because some such solicitations were 
fraudulent.   
The Supreme Court rejected the particular approach that the Town of Irvington deployed 
to combat fraud—namely, a licensing scheme in which all door-to-door solicitors were required 
to obtain approval of the police department before soliciting and, as part of the license 
application, must provide evidence of ‘good character’ and obtain government approval of the 
content of the information he intended to distribute.
212
  But although rejecting the town’s 
particular method of regulation as unconstitutionally burdensome on speech, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the First Amendment does not bar the government from punishing fraud or other 
criminal acts that by definition involve speech.
213
  The line the Schneider Court drew was this:  
The risk of fraud could not be used by a government to justify a prior restraint on speech, but 
after the fact “[f]rauds may be denounced as offenses and punished by law.”
214
  This conceptual 
approach to punishing fraudulent speech after the fact foreshadowed the Supreme Court’s later 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consequence of such distribution results from the constitutional protection of the freedom of speech and press.  This 
constitutional protection does not deprive a city of all power to prevent street littering.  There are obvious methods 
of preventing littering.  Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.”). 
212
 Id. at 163-64. 
213
 Id. at 164 (“Conceding that fraudulent appeals may be made in the name of charity and religion, we hold a 
municipality cannot, for this reason, require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police 
authorities for their consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while others 
may not, be carried to the homes of citizens; some persons may, while others may not, disseminate information from 






rejection of prior restraints on publication in most cases and was, in the Schneider case, 
explained as follows:   
If it is said that these means are less efficient and convenient than bestowal of 
power on police authorities to decide what information may be disseminated from 
house to house, and who may impart the information, the answer is that 





Two years after deciding Lovell, and one year after Schneider, the Supreme Court was 
more explicit in its discussion of speech that is integral to criminal conduct falling outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.  In Thornhill v. Alabama,
216
 the Supreme Court rejected as 
facially unconstitutional an Alabama statute that was crafted to restrict picketing in front of a 
business during labor disputes.
217
  Byron Thornhill peacefully walked the picket line in a small 
group of picketers during a labor dispute with his employer, Brown Wood Preserving Company 
in Tuscaloosa County, Alabama.
218
  He was arrested and charged with violating § 3448 of the 
State Code of Alabama, which prohibited loitering and picketing in front of businesses.
219
  As in 
Lovell, the Court’s analysis focused on the First Amendment protection that was actually 
afforded to the conduct in the case before it and only referenced briefly and in passing the notion 
that the peaceful nature of the defendant’s conduct was relevant to its analysis.  But whereas in 
Lovell the Supreme Court made only a single, passing reference implying that non-peaceful 
conduct might not be afforded the same First Amendment protection, the Thornhill Court 
                                                          
215
 Id.  
216
 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
217
 Id. at 91-92 (1940). Section 3448 of the State Code of Alabama of 1923 read as follows:  “Loitering or picketing 
forbidden.—Any person or persons who, without a just cause or legal excuse therefor, go near to or loiter about the 
premises or place of business of any other person, firm, corporation, or association of people, engaged in a lawful 
business, for the purpose, or with intent of influencing, or inducing other persons not to trade with, buy from, sell to, 
have business dealings with, or be employed by such persons, firm, corporation, or association, or who picket the 
works or place of business of such other persons, firm, corporation, or associations of persons, for the purpose of 
hindering, delaying, or interfering with or injuring any lawful business or enterprise of another, shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor; but nothing herein shall prevent any person from soliciting trade or business for a competitive 
business.” See id.  
218
 Id. at 91.  
219
 Id. at 92-93. 
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referenced that concept repeatedly, noting as relevant to its decision the picketer’s “peaceful 
manner,’
220
 the fact that witnesses “heard no harsh words and saw nothing threatening”
221
 in the 
picketing, the fact that the picketer walked “slowly and peacefully”
222
 on the sidewalk in front of 
the business, “the peaceful character of [the picketers’] demeanor,”
223
 and the fact that they 
picketed “without annoyance or threat of any kind.”
224
 
The Thornhill Court then proceeded to articulate an early rule that would tend to 
distinguish constitutionally protected speech that results in action by the listeners from 
unprotected speech that is integral to criminal conduct that the state may prohibit.  For the 
Thornhill Court, the Constitution protected speech that is “peaceful and truthful” regardless of 
whether it may stir others to action.
225
  While that definition has long since been superceded by 
more precise definition, the principle expressly articulated by the Thornhill Court that the State 
may regulate certain speech in order to “preserve the peace and to protect the privacy, the lives, 
and the property of its residents” endures to this day.
226
   
                                                          
220
 Id. at 94. 
221
 Id. at 94-95. 
222
 Id. at 98. 
223
 Id. at 99. 
224
 Id. at 100. 
225
Id. at 104-05 (“Every expression of opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of inducing action in 
the interests of one rather than another group in society.  But the group in power at any moment may not impose 
penal sanctions on peaceful and truth discussion of matters of public interest merely on a showing that others may 
thereby be persuaded to take action inconsistent with its interests. Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can 
be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to 
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public opinion.”). 
226
 Id. at 105 (“The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace and to protect the 
privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted.  But no clear and present danger of destruction 
of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the 
activities of every person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes the facts of a labor dispute 
involving the latter.  We are not now concerned with picketing en masse or otherwise conducted which might 
occasion such imminent and aggravated danger to these interests as to justify a statute narrowly drawn to cover the 
precise situation giving rise to the danger.  Section 3448 in question here does not aim specifically at serious 
encroachments on these interests and does not evidence any such care in balancing these interests against the interest 




Thus was the state of the common law of speech the government may freely regulate, 
proscribe or punish prior to 1942.  The themes are familiar—defamation, incitement, profanity, 
obscenity, frauds and other speech intertwined with illegal acts all may be prohibited by 
government action without violating the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.  
But these ideas were disparate, arising separately and without any apparent doctrinal relationship 
or affiliation with each other.  They tended to be applied ad hoc by courts and not as part of a 
rational constitutional system of defining the limits of governmental power to regulate speech.  It 
was only after a Jehovah’s Witness named Walter Chaplinsky cursed in the face of the city 
marshal of Rochester, New Hampshire, that the United States Supreme Court would have 







CHAPTER 3:  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:  Four excluded categories in 1942 
 
If Walter Chaplinsky had smiled more and kept his temper in check, the most-cited case 
in the United States Supreme Court’s categorical approach to excluding speech from First 
Amendment protection might never have arisen. 
Mr. Chaplinsky apparently was dedicated to his faith as a Jehovah’s Witness.  As is 
common for persons of that faith, Mr. Chaplinsky worked to bear witness by distributing 
literature that described religious convictions.  On a Saturday afternoon, while the citizens of 
Rochester, New Hampshire, went about their business, Mr. Chaplinsky was in their town 
distributing his literature and, apparently, offering a bit of verbal commentary along with his 
handing out of paper.  The facts were these: 
Chaplinsky was distributing the literature of his sect on the streets of Rochester on 
a busy Saturday afternoon.  Members of the local citizenry complained to the City 
Marshal, Bowering, that Chaplinsky was denouncing all religion as a ‘racket’.  
Bowering told them that Chaplinsky was lawfully engaged, and then warned 
Chaplinsky that the crowd was getting restless.  Some time later a disturbance 
occurred and the traffic officer on duty at the busy intersection started with 
Chaplinsky for the police station, but did not inform him that he was under arrest 
or that he was going to be arrested.  On the way they encountered Marshal 
Bowering who had been advised that a riot was under way and was therefore 




And so it was that Walter Chaplinsky came to have his fateful encounter with Marshal Bowering 
that day.  It occurred when Mr. Chaplinsky and Marshal Bowering met “on the public sidewalk 
on the easterly side of Wakefield Street, near unto the entrance of the City Hall.”
228
 Mr. 
Chaplinsky’s exact motive is unknown.  Perhaps it was merely in his character to rebel against 
the authority of the police.  Or perhaps he was tired after a long day of interacting with the 
citizens of Rochester and simply dropped his manners.  Maybe something about Marshal 
                                                          
227
 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569-70 (1942). 
228
 Id. at 569. 
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Bowering’s mannerisms or demeanor got under Mr. Chaplinsky’s skin, or maybe Mr. 
Chaplinsky just didn’t think before opening his mouth.  But whatever the cause, upon seeing 
Marshal Bowering for the second time that day, while Mr. Chaplinsky was being escorted to the 
police station by a traffic cop, Mr. Chaplinsky exclaimed to Marshal Bowering:  “‘You are a God 




That plainspoken denunciation—apparently unwisely “said without a disarming 
smile”
230
—set in motion a chain of events that by 1942 would result in the United States 
Supreme Court doing what it never before had done:  Articulating in a succinct summary the 
unprotected categories of speech that lie outside the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment. 
Mr. Chaplinsky was charged with violating a city ordinance of Rochester that prohibited 
certain utterances of “derisive or annoying word[s]” in public places.
231
  Mr. Chaplinsky was 
convicted after a bench trial in Rochester municipal court and appealed.  He received a trial de 
novo before a jury in superior court and was convicted.  He appealed, and the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
232
 
In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court reached the important conclusion that 
the language of the New Hampshire code that Mr. Chaplinsky had been convicted of violating 
was, in fact, more restricted in application than a plain reading might suggest.  Although no 
                                                          
229
 Id.  “Chaplinsky’s version of the affair was slightly different.  He testified that when he met Bowering, he asked 
him to arrest the ones responsible for the disturbance.  In reply Bowering cursed him and told him to come along.  
[Chaplinsky] admitted that he said the words charged in the complaint with the exception of the name of the Deity.”  
Id. at 570. 
230
 Id. at 573. 
231
 Id. at 569. Chapter 378, Section 2, of the Public Laws of New Hampshire then stated:  “No person shall address 
any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor 
call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his presence and hearing with 
intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation.” See id. 
232
 Id. (citing State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (N.H. 1941)). 
62 
 
words in the code itself make clear that it applies solely to utterances that would tend to lead to 
violence or otherwise disrupt the peace, the New Hampshire Supreme Court essentially read such 
a requirement into the statute.
233
  The New Hampshire court framed the issued this way: 
The defendant admittedly called the Marshal a damned racketeer and Fascist, in 
exchange, as the defendant says, for the Marshal’s calling him a damned bastard.  Either 
appellation, applied directly to the other on the street, would clearly be a breach of the 
statute.  Neither would rise above the level of name-calling.  Neither party could expect 
the other to be persuaded by such language.  Neither remark qualifies as peaceful and 
truthful discussion of matters of public interest.  Each invited personal violence and 
disturbance of the peace, without any observable tendency to enable the by-standers to 
test the merits of the competitive ideas, if they were ideas.  We can see no relationship of 
such utterances to that freedom of speech which is so acutely desirable if free institutions 
are to be preserved.  Such face-to-face reviling is not remotely necessary in the debate of 
public questions.  It is not argument.  It has no persuasive power.  Its only power is to 
inflame, to endanger that calm and useful consideration of public problems which is the 
protection of free government.  Its tendency is to useless and dangerous disorder in which 




This authoritative interpretation of state law issued by the state’s highest court was critical to 
framing the issue that ultimately was presented to the United States Supreme Court—namely, 
whether the government may punish speech that provokes violence—because without it, it seems 
likely that the New Hampshire statute would have been stricken as an impermissibly broad 
regulation of speech. 
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 Id. at 573 (citing State v. Brown, 38 A. 731 (N.H. 1895), and State v. McConnell, 47 A. 267 (N.H. 1900)) (“On 
the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court declared that the statute’s purpose was to preserve the public 
peace, no words being ‘forbidden except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to 
whom, individually, the remark is addressed.  It was further said:  The word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms 
of what a particular addressee thinks. . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would be 
words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . The English language has a number of words and 
expressions which by general consent are ‘fighting words’ when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such words, as 
ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight.  So are threatening, profane or obscene revilings.  Derisive and 
annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they 
have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace. . . . The statute, as 
construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the 
addressee, words whose speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker—including ‘classical fighting 
words’, words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause violence, and other disorderly words, 
including profanity, obscenity and threats.” (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
234
 Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 759-60. 
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Under the New Hampshire Supreme Court’s rather imprecise yet critical test, Mr. 
Chaplinsky’s utterances might well have fallen outside the sweep of the state code if only he had 
uttered them with “a disarming smile,”
235
 thereby suggesting a less-strident intent to confront.  
But history is replete with small decisions, acts or omissions that, like the proverbial ripple upon 
the ocean, result in a giant wave far away.  And so, Walter Chaplinsky’s straight-faced utterance, 
and the significance that the New Hampshire Supreme Court inferred from his facial expression 
by noting a “face-to-face reviling” when it applied state law, presented the United States 
Supreme Court with the opportunity to decide Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, which would 
become the most-cited case in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court’s analysis of speech 
categories excluded from First Amendment protection.
236
 
In his appeal from the New Hampshire Supreme Court, Mr. Chaplinsky presented the 
United States Supreme Court with four issues:  Whether his conviction violated the 
constitutional protection for free speech; whether his conviction violated the constitutional 
protection for freedom of the press; whether his conviction violated the constitutional protection 
for freedom of worship; and whether his conviction violated the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment because the New Hampshire code was so vague that no person could be 
considered on notice of what conduct would run afoul of it.
237
 Remarkably, the Supreme Court 
disposed of all four issues in an opinion spanning only seven short pages.
238
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.  
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 Of the Supreme Court cases fairly characterized as predominantly about the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, 
Chaplinsky is the most-cited, but in the broader realm of First Amendment jurisprudence other Speech Clause cases 
far exceed it as a cited precedent.  For example, as of July 21, 2015, Westlaw listed 7,862 citing references for 
Chaplinsky, including 1,832 cases that cite it; by comparison, on the same date New York Times v. Sullivan, a 
prominent Speech Clause case that did not predominantly involve categorical exclusion, had 27,023 references 
including 6,380 cases that cite it.  Interestingly, both Chaplinsky and Sullivan were decided by the Supreme Court on 
March 9—exactly 22 years apart. 
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. 
238
 The Supreme Court flatly rejected Mr. Chaplinsky’s press, worship and general due process claims and focused 
most of its short opinion on the free-speech claim. 
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The United States Supreme Court ultimately affirmed Mr. Chaplinsky’s conviction, 
rejecting his free speech claim because the Court was “unable to say that the limited scope of the 
statute as thus construed [by the New Hampshire Supreme Court] contravenes the constitutional 
right of free expression.”
239
  Indeed, the Supreme Court viewed Mr. Chaplinsky’s utterances not 
as speech but as “conduct”
240
 and as “verbal acts,”
241
 foreshadowing concepts explored in later 
jurisprudence.  “Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellations ‘damn racketeer’ 
and ‘damn Fascist’ are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby 
cause a breach of the peace.”
242
 
Of course, the outcome of the State of New Hampshire’s prosecution of Walter 
Chaplinsky was not, in itself, of tremendous historical significance.  Nor was the United States 
Supreme Court’s dalliance with the concept that certain words, at least if uttered without smiling, 
might not be speech at all but instead were unprotected “conduct” or “verbal acts.”  Rather, the 
enduring importance of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chaplinsky was a single paragraph in 
which the Court articulated the constitutional rule it was applying: 
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at 
all times and under all circumstances.  There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd 
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—
those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate 
breach of the peace.  It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.  Resort to epithets or personal abuse is 
not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by 
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (“It is a statute narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct 














In that single paragraph lay the first attempt by the Supreme Court at a more-or-less 
comprehensive collection of the recognized categories of speech that lie outside protection of the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments. The opinion’s plain language makes clear that the Supreme 
Court was not attempting an exhaustive listing of every category of unprotected speech—thus, its 
language that the categories “include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . .”
244
  Curiously, the Supreme Court did not account for speech 
integral to criminal conduct among its articulated categories of unprotected speech even though, 
as noted earlier, it had considered cases raising that concept only a few years before deciding 
Chaplinsky.
245
  That single omission would form the basis for the largest expansion of the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion in the years after Chaplinsky—the addition to the Chaplinsky 
list of unprotected categories of an unprotected category of speech integral to unlawful conduct. 
Because it established a framework and collected and synthesized recognized categories 
of unprotected speech into a single exposition, Chaplinsky stands as the landmark case that first 
articulated anything in the nature of a Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, although it used no 
such term or phrase.  This development in the jurisprudence addressing the threshold Speech 
Clause question—what speech is in the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the 
“freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution, and how do we know the answer to that 
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 Id. at 571-72 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Id. at 572 (emphasis added). 
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Figure 2: Relationship between the constitutionally protected "Freedom of Speech" and the unprotected "First 
Amendment Free Zone" after Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire246 
 
 
As the pioneering case in this regard, Chaplinsky also begins a jurisprudential dialogue 
about the scope and nature of the Doctrine.  Chaplinsky is not without its scholarly critics,
247
 and 
the particular categories it recited soon would prove both underinclusive and overinclusive, but 
its significance for collecting and reciting them is beyond dispute.   
Thanks in part to the happenstance of Walter Chaplinsky’s unsmiling countenance, the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion was born. 
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 Compare Figure 1, supra.  From one figure to the next, the outer circle remains a constant, representing the entire 
universe of speech defined broadly. 
247
 See generally, e.g., Burton Caine, The Trouble with “Fighting Words”:  Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a 
Threat to First Amendment Values and Should Be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (2004). 
The "First Amendment Free Zone" comprises (1) 
"Lewd and obscene" speech, (2) "profane" 
speech, (3) "libelous" speech, and (4) "insulting 
or 'fighting' words" 




CHAPTER 4: From Chaplinsky to Stevens:  The evolution of Chaplinsky’s four categories 
 
During the almost seven decades between 1942 and 2010, the Supreme Court attempted 
nothing resembling a comprehensive articulation of the categories of speech excluded from First 
Amendment protection.  To be sure, during that period the Supreme Court from time to time 
included statements referencing the existence of a collection of unprotected categories.  A typical 
example was included in 1992 in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul:  
From 1791 to the present, . . . our society, like other free but civilized societies, has 
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is 
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.  We have recognized that 
the freedom of speech referred to by the First Amendment does not include a freedom to 
disregard these traditional limitations.  Our decisions since the 1960s have narrowed the 
scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for defamation and for obscenity, but a 





But no such reference to the framework of categorical analysis appeared, in context of its case, to 
be intended as a comprehensive exposition of that framework.  In other words, for sixty-eight 
years, the Supreme Court made no attempt to update Chaplinsky. 
The oft-quoted one-paragraph summary in Chaplinsky, therefore, remained the only 
comprehensive articulation of the unprotected categories of speech until the Supreme Court 
decided United States v. Stevens
249
 in 2010.  As will be discussed in Chapter 8, infra, Stevens in 
pertinent part may be considered an updating of the Chaplinsky doctrine to reflect developments 
over the sixty-eight years that intervened.  Thus, Chaplinsky and Stevens serve as jurisprudential 
bookends around a nearly seven-decade period of the Supreme Court’s development of its 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The R.A.V. Court proceeds 
to discuss, at length, the “fighting words” category in modern application as of 1992. 
249
 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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doctrine that identifies, as a threshold matter, whether the speech at issue in a First Amendment 
case falls within the protected freedom of speech or outside it. 
Despite attempting no comprehensive articulation, the Supreme Court during those seven 
decades was far from silent in developing its jurisprudence relating to categorically excluded 
speech.  To the contrary, this was a period of unprecedented growth and development of First 
Amendment free-speech law, and a portion of that development included the refinement of the 
role of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion in the context of First Amendment law more 
broadly.  From Chaplinsky to Stevens, the Supreme Court’s various refinements to the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion generally fell within one of three sorts:    
First, the Supreme Court identified and defined additional categories of unprotected 
speech that were not included in the Chaplinsky recitation.  This phenomenon will be discussed 
in Chapters 5 and 6, infra. 
Second, the Supreme Court articulated and applied various rules that operate to patrol the 
boundaries of the categories of unprotected speech.  The overall purpose of these rules, 
discussed in Chapter 7, infra, is ensuring that government regulations that properly may apply to 
categorically unprotected speech do not also improperly apply to other speech that enjoys 
constitutional protection. 
Third, the Supreme Court further refined the meaning and definitions of the four 
categories of unprotected speech articulated in Chaplinsky.  This chapter will focus on those 
refinements. It will not, of course, attempt to collect or explain every case relevant to each 
category during the 68-year period from Chaplinsky to Stevens—to do so would fill volumes—
nor even every relevant theme developed during that time.  Rather, each Part A-D below will 
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identify the major developments in that category and note certain landmark cases critical to 





Part A:  The lewd and obscene 
 
 In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court stated that “the lewd and obscene” was a category of 
unprotected speech.
250
  As early as 1964, however, the Supreme Court had reached the 
conclusion that “it is only ‘obscenity’ that is excluded from the constitutional protection.”
251
  By 
the time of Stevens, the Supreme Court made no reference to “lewd” speech being unprotected 
and, instead, mentioned only the exclusion for speech considered “obscene.”
252
 That narrowed 
description endures to this day.
253
  This facially minor linguistic change reflects two substantial 
doctrinal developments in the refinement of this unprotected category between 1942 and 2010:  
First, the definition of “obscene” itself was the subject of extensive consideration and 
development.  Second, the elimination of “lewd” as a descriptor of the category indicates a 
substantial narrowing of this category. 
 
Subpart I:  Defining “obscene” 
 Perhaps no single area of Speech Clause law received more attention from the United 
States Supreme Court between Chaplinsky and Stevens than did efforts to define constitutionally 
unprotected “obscenity.”  Between its first attempt to define obscenity in Roth v. United States
254
 
and the more enduring rule articulated in Miller v. California,
255
 the Supreme Court summarily 
reversed 31 convictions involving “materials that at least five members of the Court, applying 
their separate tests [for obscenity], found to be protected by the First Amendment,”
256
 and 
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
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 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 (1964). But see Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (government 
may regulate the sale to minors of materials containing nudity that would not be obscene to adults).  
252
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (listing “obscenity” but not “lewd”). 
253
 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (listing “obscenity” but not “lewd”); EMA, 131 
S. Ct. at 2733 (same). 
254
 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
255
 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
256
 Id. at 22 n.3. 
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decided numerous other cases after argument.  The Supreme Court was caught in a tension 
between two competing views of its appropriate role.  On the one hand, those advocating for the 
Supreme Court’s continued case-by-case involvement argued: 
We are told that the determination whether a particular motion picture, book, or 
other work of expression is obscene can be treated as a purely factual judgment on 
which a jury’s verdict is all but conclusive, or that in any event the decision can 
be left essentially to state and lower federal courts, with this Court exercising only 
a limited review such as that needed to determine whether the ruling below is 
supported by ‘sufficient evidence.’  The suggestion is appealing, since it would 
lift from our shoulders a difficult, recurring, and unpleasant task.  But we cannot 
accept it.  Such an abnegation of judicial supervision in this field would be 
inconsistent with our duty to uphold the constitutional guarantees.  Since it is only 
‘obscenity’ that is excluded from the constitutional protection, the question 
whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of 
constitutional law.  Such an issue, we think, must ultimately be decided by this 
Court.  Our duty admits of no substitute for facing up to the tough individual 




On the other hand, reviewing individual cases to determine whether the material at issue was 
constitutionally “obscene” threatened to transform the Supreme Court into “an unreviewable 
board of censorship for the 50 States, subjectively judging each piece of material brought before 
us.”
258
  Under this approach, there would be literally no end to the Supreme Court’s case-by-case 
application of the law to individual facts because the Supreme Court’s role essentially was 
reduced to viewing individual material and declaring whether it was obscene without apparent 
standards that were objectively manageable, a process that led Justice Potter Stewart famously to 
explain and declare:     
[C]riminal laws in this area [regulating obscenity] are constitutionally limited to 
hard-core pornography.  I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of 
material I understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and 
perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.  But I know it when I see it, 
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 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 187-88 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
258
 Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 n.3. 
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 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
72 
 
 This, then, is the essence of what Justice John Marshall Harlan called “the intractable 
obscenity problem.”
260
  The modern law of obscenity—the fundamental test to be applied in 
determining whether material falls outside the First Amendment’s protection—is contained the 
Roth-Miller line of cases. 
Roth v. United States (1957):
261
 In this landmark case, the Supreme Court consolidated 
similar appeals arising from New York and California.  The first appeal, Roth v. United States, 
arose out of a federal criminal prosecution in New York City in which a seller of obscene 
publications was convicted of violating a provision of federal law that barred the mailing of 
certain obscene materials.
262
  Samuel Roth operated a business in Manhattan through which he 
sold various books, photographs and magazines.  A federal jury convicted him on four counts of 
mailing obscene materials in violation of federal law, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction. The second case, Alberts v. California, arose from a prosecution in 
Beverly Hills municipal court.  David Alberts, who like Mr. Roth in New York ran a mail-order 
business selling various adult-oriented books and materials, was charged with a misdemeanor for 
keeping for sale obscene and indecent books in violation of California law.
263
  He was convicted 
at a bench trial, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal by the California appellate court of 
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 Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
261
 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
262
 Id. at 480. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, at the time stated:  “Every obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy 
book, pamphlet, picture, paper, letter, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character; and [e]very 
written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information, 
directly or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom, or by what means any of such mentioned matters, articles, or 
things may be obtained or made, . . . [i]s declared to be nonmailable matter and shall not be conveyed in the mails or 
delivered from any post office or by any letter carrier.  Whoever knowingly deposits for mailing of delivery, 
anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of 
circulating or disposing thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or disposition thereof, shall be fined not more than 
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” ) Id. at 479 n.1.   
263
 Id. at 481. The California statute, Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 311 (1955), at the time stated:  “Every person who 
willfully and lewdly, either:  . . . (3) Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for 
sale, or exhibits any obscene or indecent writing, paper, or book; or designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or 
otherwise prepares any obscene or  indecent picture or print; or molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any obscene 
or indecent figure; or, (4) Writes, composes, or publishes any notice or advertisement of any such writing, paper, 
book, picture, print or figure; . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 479 n.2.  
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proper jurisdiction.   Upon consolidating the two appeals, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he 
constitutionality of a criminal obscenity statute is the question in each of these cases”
264
 and 
described the question presented in categorical terms: 
The dispositive question is whether obscenity is utterance within the area of protected 
speech and press.  Although this is the first time the question has been squarely presented 
to this Court, either under the First Amendment or under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
expressions found in numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that 




By combining the federal-law case from New York with the state-law case from California, the 
Supreme Court created a vehicle by which it could make clear that the law governing obscenity 
applied, through the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment respectively, to states as 
well as to the federal government.
266
  
The Roth Court majority held that “obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech or press,”
267
 thereby confirming that portion of the framework articulated in 
Chaplinsky.  The Roth majority reached its conclusion after an extensive review of colonial and 
early post-Constitution law in the states demonstrating that at the time the First Amendment was 
drafted, it could not have been viewed as barring laws that regulated or prohibited obscenity.
268
  




Having declared obscenity a category of speech outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, the Roth Court then turned its attention to the ongoing struggle to define, as a 
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 Id. at 479. 
265
 Id. at 481 (footnote omitted). 
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 Id.  
267
 Id. at 485. 
268
 See id. at 482-84 & n.10-13 (detailed review of early authorities regarding obscenity); see also id. at 483 (“At the 
time of the adoption of the First Amendment, obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law, but there is 
sufficiently contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity, too, was outside the protection for speech and 
press.”); id. at 484) (“[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without 
redeeming social importance.”). 
269
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
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matter of constitutional law, precisely what obscenity is.  The Roth majority acknowledged that 
“sex and obscenity are not synonymous”
270
 and made clear that in order to protect First 
Amendment values and avoid the suppression of protected expression, it was “vital that the 
standards for judging obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press for 
material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”
271
  The Roth 
majority then discussed the evolution of the constitutional test to be applied: 
The early leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by 
the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.  Some 
American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and 
substituted this test:  whether to the average person, applying contemporary 
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole 
appeals to prurient interest.  The [early] test, judging obscenity by the effect of 
isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might well encompass 
material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as 
unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and press.  On the other 
hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the 




Thus, the Roth majority adopted as its test for determining whether material is obscene:  
“[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest.”
273
  In his concurrence, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren noted the difficulty of managing this test and wrote that “[t]he line 
dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or science is not straight and 
unwavering,”
274
 thus foreshadowing the tortured jurisprudence on this subject that would unfold 
in decades to come. 
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 Roth, 354 U.S. at 487. 
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 Id. at 488.  
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 Id. at 488-89 (citations omitted). 
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 Id. at 489. 
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 Id. at 495 (Warren, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice further articulated the concern that would trouble the 
Court in future years as it wrestled with defining obscenity:  “That there is a social problem presented by obscenity 
is attested by the expression of the legislatures of the forty-eight States as well as the Congress.  To recognize the 
existence of a problem, however, does not require that we sustain any and all measures adopted to meet that 
problem.  The history of the application of laws designed to suppress the obscene demonstrates convincingly that the 
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 The Roth decision stands for the proposition that obscene speech is categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment, a proposition that drew support from a majority of the 
Supreme Court.  But the difficulty in defining precisely what obscenity is as a matter of 
constitutional law would prove far more difficult.  The Roth Court faced no need to confront that 
difficulty in applying its announced principle of exclusion to specific material because the 
obscene nature of the material in the cases combined in Roth was undisputed and “[n]o issue is 
presented in either case concerning the obscenity of the material involved.”
275
  That was a stroke 
of good fortune for the Roth Court because the test it adopted would prove exceedingly difficult 
to manage in practice.   
Miller v. California (1973):
276
  For 16 years after handing down the Roth decision, the 
United States Supreme Court wrestled—mightily but unsuccessfully—with applying it.  It was 
well-established that obscene material enjoys no Constitutional protection, but how were courts 
to determine whether the material disputed in any given case is “obscene?” 
The Supreme Court struggled to find a single definition of obscenity that could command 
a majority of the court.
277
  This was the unsettled period of time during which the Supreme Court 
described itself as being “in the role of an unreviewable board of censorship for the 50 States, 
subjectively judging each piece of material brought before us.”
278
  It was during this unsettled 
time that Justice Stewart, perhaps in frustration, famously declared in his struggle toward a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
power of government can be invoked under them against great art or literature, scientific treatises, or works exciting 
social controversy.  Mistakes of the past prove that there is a strong countervailing interest to be considered in the 
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. 
275
 Id. at 481 n.8 (majority opinion). 
276
 413 U.S. 15.  
277
 See id. at 22-23 (describing this unsettled period between Roth and Miller, the Miller court wrote:  “Apart from 
the initial formulation in the Roth case no majority of the Court has at any given time been able to agree on a 
standard to determine what constitutes obscene, pornographic material subject to regulation under the States’ police 
power.  We have seen a variety of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of 
constitutional adjudication.  This is not remarkable, for in the area of freedom of speech and press the courts must 
always remain sensitive to any infringement on genuinely serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific expression.  
This is an area in which there are few eternal verities.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
278
 Id. at 23 n.3. 
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definition—“[I] know it when I see it . . .”
279
 —and Justice Harlan described the whole 
circumstance as “the intractable obscenity problem.”
280
 
This unsettled period ended with the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Miller.  In that 
case, for the first time since Roth, a majority of the Supreme Court agreed on a single test to be 
used to define the category of “obscenity” that is outside the protection of the First Amendment, 
the test that remains controlling today.  The Miller Court understood the importance of its 
decision: 
It is certainly true that the absence, since Roth, of a single majority view of this 
Court as to proper standards for testing obscenity has placed a strain on both state 
and federal courts.  But today, for the first time since Roth was decided in 1957, a 
majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to isolate ‘hard core’ 




The Miller case arose from a criminal prosecution in California in which Marvin Miller 
was convicted of violating California law
282
 by mailing to a restaurant in Newport Beach, 
California, unsolicited sexually explicit brochures advertising for sale various books.  The 
brochures, which were opened by the restaurant owner and his mother, contained various 
descriptive material, including sexually explicit pictures and drawings.
283
  The recipients of the 
material complained to the police.  Mr. Miller was charged, tried, convicted, and he appealed.  
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 Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).  To be more precise, Justice Stewart was making the point 
that he had concluded that the Roth exclusion of obscenity from the protection of the First Amendment should be 
limited to “hard-core pornography,” and it was to that phrase he applied his explanation “[I] know it when I see it . . 
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 Interstate Circuit, 390 U.S. at 704 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting). 
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 Miller, 413 U.S. at 29. 
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 The applicable California law, Cal. Penal Code §311 and §311.2(a), at the time stated, in pertinent part:  “Every 
person who knowingly:  sends or causes to be sent, or brings or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or 
distribution, or in this state prepares, publishes, prints, exhibits, distributes, or offers to distribute, or has in his 
possession with intent to distribute or to exhibit or offer to distribute, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
. .. ‘Obscene’ means that to the average person, applying contemporary standards, the predominant appeal of the 
matter, taken as a whole, is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, which 
goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of such matters and is matter 
which is utterly without redeeming social importance.” Miller, 413 U.S. at 18 n.1. 
283
 Id. at 18. 
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The Supreme Court vacated the conviction and used the opportunity to “formulate standards 
more concrete than those in the past.”
284
 
The Miller majority settled several important questions about obscenity and the First 
Amendment.  First, it reaffirmed the holding in Roth that obscenity is categorically outside the 
protection of the First Amendment.
285
  Second, it rejected the Supreme Court’s prior flirtation 
with requiring prosecutors to affirmatively show that material in question is “utterly without 
redeeming social value,” a prong in analysis that had arisen during the post-Roth period of 
uncertainty.
286
  Third and importantly, it established that obscenity is to be determined by 
applying “contemporary community standards,” which means that the standards will vary from 
community to community in different parts of the United States.
287
  Fourth, the Miller majority 
clarified that the definition of “obscene” material was, for First Amendment purposes, limited to 
material that is sexual in nature: 
[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such regulation [of obscenity] to 
works which depict or describe sexual conduct.  That conduct must be specifically 
defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.  A 
state offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the 
prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, 




                                                          
284
 Id. at 20. 
285
 Id. at 36. 
286
 Id. at 36-37. A plurality in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), would have required prosecutors to 
prove material alleged to be obscene was “utterly without redeeming social value.” Id. at 418 (plurality opinion); see 
also Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (“Thus, even as they repeated the words of Roth, the Memoirs plurality produced a 
drastically altered test that called on the prosecution to prove a negative, i.e., that the material was ‘utterly without 
redeeming social value’—a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof.”). 
287
 Miller, 413 U.S. at 32-34 (“It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as 
requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or 
New York City.  People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled 
by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.  As this Court made clear . . ., the primary concern with requiring a jury to 
apply the standard of ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ is to be certain that, so far 
as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its impact on an average person, rather than a 
particularly susceptible or sensitive person—or indeed a totally insensitive one. We hold that the requirement that 
the jury evaluate the materials with reference to ‘contemporary standards off the State of California’ serves this 
protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.” (citations and footnotes omitted)). 
288




Perhaps animated by an understandable desire to calm the confusion in how to handle obscenity 
cases that had pervaded the federal and state courts since Roth, the Miller majority then 
summarized and restated its newly established test for determining “obscenity” in 
straightforward terms aimed at practitioners: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:  (a) whether the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 




In a practical sense, the effect of Miller was to limit the definition of constitutionally 
unprotected “obscenity” to include only material that is considered “hard core pornography.”
290
  
The test adopted in Miller for that purpose remains in use today.  But the question then arises:  If 
only “hard core pornography” is constitutionally unprotected “obscenity,” then what is the 
meaning of the term “lewd” in Chaplinsky’s formulation of the category?  As the next section 
explains, material that may be “lewd” but is not “obscene” is subject to constitutional analysis 
within the First Amendment, not without. 
  
Subpart II:  Abandoning “lewd” 
The Chaplinsky Court described one category of speech lying outside First Amendment 
protection as “lewd and obscene,”
291
 but by the time of Stevens the Supreme Court was 
describing this same category only as “obscenity.”
292
 What happened to “lewd”? 
                                                          
289
 Id. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
290
 Id. at 27 (“Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of 
obscene materials unless these materials depict of describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically 
defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed.”). 
291
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  
292
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468. 
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It is notable that the Supreme Court has used a variety of terms to apply to speech that is 
lewd, including “indecent,” “vulgar,” “or offensive.”  It never has been clear whether the 
Supreme Court has viewed these terms all as describing similar speech that, for constitutional 
purposes, is interchangeable, or whether a more precise meaning was intended.  However, it is 
clear after Miller that speech considered “obscene” is separate and distinct, from a constitutional 
perspective, from that which is merely indecent, lewd, vulgar or offensive.  Miller made clear, 
for example, that “obscene” speech must be sexual in nature, while speech that is lewd, indecent, 
vulgar or offense may involve other subject matter.  Thus, it is not surprising that only five years 
after deciding Miller, the Supreme Court took up the issue of what government regulation may 
be constitutionally applied to speech that is “indecent but not obscene.”
293
  The Court has 
continued to wrestle with aspects of this distinction.
294
   
Since Miller, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding “indecent” or “lewd” material 
has evolved to the point that such material is now clearly not considered by the Court to be 
categorically excluded
295
 but instead is subject to analysis and some degree of protection under 
the First Amendment.  In a line of cases running through FCC v. Pacifica, to Bethel School 
District v. Fraser, to Sable Communications v. FCC, to Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court has 
made clear that “indecent” expression is subject to First Amendment protection—thus, it is not 
within a category of unprotected speech.
296
 That distinction was foreshadowed by the pre-Miller 
case Cohen v. California. 
                                                          
293
 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 729, 729 (1978). 
294
 See generally FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (holding that due process requires 
sufficient notice that broadcasts of “fleeting expletives” or “brief nudity” may be actionable).   
295
 It is reasonable to speculate that, having finally settled on the Miller test, the Court is loath to disturb it. This 
would explain the Supreme Court’s decision to narrow the category of materials covered by the categorical 
exclusion of obscenity to fit the test rather than further altering the Miller test to fit the facts of post-Miller cases. 
296
 This conclusion applies as a general matter to government regulation of lewd speech.  A different conclusion may 
apply when the government is in a different position, such as acting as a patron or administering grants.  See, e.g., 
Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
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Cohen v. California (1971):
297
  At the height of the War in Vietnam in the spring of 
1968, Paul Robert Cohen walked through the Los Angeles County courthouse wearing a jacket 
bearing the plainly visible words:  “Fuck the Draft.”
298
  He uttered no words and engaged in no 
misconduct other than wearing the jacket,
299
 and he later testified that he wore the jacket “as a 
means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the Vietnam War and the 
draft.”
300
  He was arrested, prosecuted and convicted of violating a California law that barred 
disturbing the peace by “offensive conduct.”
301
  His conviction was upheld by the California 
Court of Appeal, and the California Supreme Court declined review, effectively letting his 
conviction stand.  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
302
 
In reversing Mr. Cohen’s conviction, the Supreme Court applied categorical analysis
303
 to 
determine, as a threshold matter, whether the message on his jacket fell within the freedom of 
speech protected by the Speech Clause: 
[T]his case cannot be said to fall within those relatively few categories of 
instances where prior decisions have established the power of government to deal 
more comprehensively with certain forms of individual expression simply upon a 
showing that such a form was employed.  This is not, for example, an obscenity 
case.  Whatever else may be necessary to give rise to the States’ broader power to 
                                                          
297
 403 U.S. 15. 
298
 Id. at 16. 
299
 Id. (“The defendant did not engage in, nor threaten to engage in, nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in 
fact commit or threaten to commit any act of violence.  The defendant did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor 




 Id. at 16. California Penal Code § 415 read as follows:  “Every person who maliciously and willfully disturbs the 
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person, by loud or unusual noise, or by tumultuous or offensive conduct, or 
threatening, traducing, quarreling, challenging to fight, or fighting, or who, on the public streets of any 
unincorporated town, or upon the public highways in such unincorporated town, run any horse race, either for a 
wager or for amusement, or fire any gun or pistol in such unincorporated town, or use any vulgar, profane, or 
indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boisterous manner, is guilty of 
a misdemeanor, and upon conviction by any Court of competent jurisdiction shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for not more than ninety days, or by both fine and 
imprisonment, or either, at the discretion of the Court.” Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 n.1. 
302
 Id. at 17. 
303
 Most of the Cohen decision involved analysis of whether the message on Mr. Cohen’s jacket constituted 
unprotected “fighting words.”  That analysis is not pertinent here. 
81 
 





Thus, the Supreme Court by the time of Cohen had begun to distinguish between “obscenity” 
and other forms of similar expression, a distinction not contained within Chaplinsky’s “lewd and 
obscene” category of unprotected speech.  The Cohen Court then foreshadowed the rule that 
would become clear in the cases after Miller—that although “obscenity” was constitutionally 
unprotected, other offensive expressions were not:  “It cannot plausibly be maintained that this 
vulgar allusion to the Selective Service System would conjure up such psychic stimulation in 
anyone likely to be confronted with Cohen’s crudely defaced jacket.”
305
 
Thus, although Mr. Cohen invoked a “distasteful mode of expression,”
306
 his words must 
analyzed within the First Amendment, not without it.  While “obscenity” enjoyed no 
constitutional protection, it was clear after Cohen that other “distasteful” or “offensive” speech, 
including “vulgarity,” does. 
Only two years after deciding Cohen, the Supreme Court issued its Miller decision.  This 
discussion now continues with a line of post-Miller cases that make clear that unlike “obscene” 
speech, “lewd” speech, however linguistically described, falls within the First Amendment’s 
protection.   
FCC v. Pacifica (1978):
307
 Comedian George Carlin delivered a monologue titled “Filthy 
Words” to a live audience in California.  The monologue involved Mr. Carlin uttering various 
formulations of words that he expressly described as “the words you couldn’t say on the public, 
ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely wouldn’t say, ever.”
308
   
                                                          
304
 Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added). 
305
 Id. at 20. 
306
 Id. at 21. 
307
 438 U.S. 726.     
308
 Id. at 729. 
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Mr. Carlin’s monologue was electronically recorded, and sometime later a radio station in 
New York rebroadcast the audio of that monologue over the airwaves.  A citizen who heard the 
monologue broadcast over his car radio while riding with his young son sent a letter of complaint 
to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) objecting to the content of the broadcast.  
The FCC, upon investigation, concluded that the broadcast violated the provision of federal law 
prohibiting the use of “any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio 
communications.”
309
  The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed the FCC decision; however, while the three-judge panel voted unanimously to reverse 
they did so for three separate reasons and wrote three separate opinions.
310
  Thus, the matter was 
less than clear when it reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to review the case. 
The Supreme Court found that Mr. Carlin’s monologue did not satisfy the “prurient 
interest” prong of the Miller test for obscenity.  Therefore, Mr. Carlin’s monologue was not 
“obscene” within the meaning of Miller and could not be excluded from First Amendment 
protection by categorizing it as such.
311
  The Pacifica Court distinguished the facts of this case 
from its prior cases in which the Court had found obscenity and indecency to be essentially the 
same from a constitutional analysis standpoint.
312
   
The Pacifica Court then proceeded to look to the context of the communication in this 
case as well as to the value of the speech itself.  First, the Pacifica Court found that the fact the 
speech in this case was broadcast, rather than communicated in a less-intrusive manner such as 
by printing, justified additional government regulation even within the First Amendment.
313
  As 
                                                          
309
 Id. at 731 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)). 
310
 Id. at 733-34. 
311
 Id. at 740 (“Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal definition of ‘indecent’ merely refers to 
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.”). 
312
 Id. at 740-41.  
313
 Id. at 741 n.17. The Supreme Court identified “different constitutional limits on Congress’ power to regulate” 
different forms of communication.  For example, Congress has less power to regulate use of the mails, based on 
83 
 
the Supreme Court colorfully put this point: “We simply hold that when the Commission finds 
that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof 
that the pig is obscene.”
314
  Second, the Pacifica Court drew upon Chaplinsky
315
 and found that 
the “patently offensive references to excretory and sexual organs and activities” at issue in the 
Pacifica case “surely lie at the periphery of First Amendment concern.”
316
  The Court found 
significant the fact that the Commission’s order regulating the broadcast of Mr. Carlin’s 
monologue was aimed at the words used, not at the ideas conveyed.
317
  
Having identified these analytical points regarding context and the value of the speech 
itself, the Pacifica Court then wrote that the Constitution does not require an “absolute rule” that 
speech is either protected or unprotected.
318
  That conclusion allowed the Supreme Court to 
distinguish between obscenity, as defined by Miller, which is entirely outside the protection of 
the First Amendment, and obscenity’s close cousin, indecency, which may be regulated by the 
government but is “not entirely outside the protection of the First Amendment.”
319
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
content, than it does to regulate use of the airwaves, based on content. Id.; see also id. at 748 (reasoning that this 
distinction based on the method of communication is constitutionally sustainable for two reasons:  First, “[p]atently 
offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the 
privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an 
intruder.” (citation omitted)); see also id. at 749 (Second, “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even 
those too young to read” and the language at issue in this case “could have enlarged a child’s vocabulary in an 
instant.”).   
314
 Id. at 750-51. 
315
 Id. at 746 (“If there were any reason to believe that the Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue 
as offensive could be traced to its political content—or even to the fact that it satirized contemporary attitudes about 
four-letter words—First Amendment protection might be required.  But that is simply not this case.  These words 
offend for the same reasons that obscenity offends.  Their place in the hierarchy of First Amendment values was 
aptly sketched by Mr. Justice Murphy when he said:  ‘Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of 
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.” (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572) (footnotes omitted)). 
316
 Id. at 743. 
317
 Id. at 743 n.18 (“A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather 
than the content, of serious communication.  There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of 
less offensive language.”). 
318
 Id. at 744.  
319
 Id. at 746; see also id. at 747 (“[T]he constitutional protection accorded to a communication containing such 
patently offensive sexual and excretory language need not be the same in every context.  It is a characteristic of 
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The Pacifica Court began the now-familiar post-Miller process of separating the 
unprotected category of “obscenity” from protected (to some degree) speech that is merely 
“indecent.”  That distinction would become more pronounced in subsequent cases.   
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986):
320
  Matthew Fraser, a student at a 
Washington state public school, made a nominating speech before a school assembly of roughly 
600 students, many of whom were 14 years old, on behalf of another student seeking election to 
student government office. 
321
 Throughout his nominating speech, Mr. Fraser referred to his 
candidate “in terms of an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”
322
  Mr. Fraser 
delivered the speech despite having been advised in advance against doing so by at least two 
teachers, and he subsequently was disciplined by the school administration for violating a school 
disciplinary rule
323
 and suspended from school for three days.  With the support of his father, Mr. 
Fraser sued the school district claiming his First Amendment rights had been violated.  The 
federal district court found in his favor and awarded him monetary and injunctive relief.  The 




The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and held that school 
officials constitutionally could punish Mr. Fraser for his speech in this case.  The Fraser Court’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
speech such as this that both its capacity to offend and its ‘social value’ . . . vary with the circumstances.  Words that 
are commonplace in one setting are shocking in another.” (footnotes and citation omitted)). 
320
 478 U.S. 675.  
321
 The Fraser case is one of many that explore the separate issue of student-speech regulation.  It is included in this 
analysis only to make the general point that, in its approach to the regulation of indecency, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that the audience to which a particular indecent remark is made is relevant in the Court’s analysis; in 
Fraser, for example, the Court specifically noted that the fact the indecent remarks were delivered to a captive 
audience of schoolchildren was a consideration in the Court’s holding.  This dissertation does not delve further into 
the separate line of cases involving student speech. 
322
 Id. at 677-78. 
323
 Id. at 678. Bethel High School had in place at the time of the speech a disciplinary rule that stated:  “Conduct 
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, 
profane language or gestures.” Id. 
324
 Id. at 679-80. 
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reasoning, however, relied upon the special circumstances within a public school, not upon a 
categorical exclusion of Mr. Fraser’s speech from First Amendment protection.  Mr. Fraser’s 
speech was not declared “obscene,” but instead was described by the Court as “lewd, indecent, or 
offensive.”
325
  The Fraser Court relied heavily upon the fact that the indecent speech was 
delivered in a public school
326
 and the captive audience subjected to the speech included many 
children.
327
  Applying the First Amendment, the Fraser Court held that the school district “acted 
entirely within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions upon Fraser in response to his 
offensively lewd and indecent speech”
328
 because of “the obvious concern on the part of parents, 
and school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children—especially in a captive 
audience—from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech.”
329
  As an interesting 
part of its rationale, the Supreme Court noted that the rules of both houses of Congress prohibit 
the use of similar types of language during official debates:  “Can it be that what is proscribed in 
the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to regulate?”
330
 
                                                          
325
 Id. at 683. 
326
 Id. (“Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and 
offensive terms in public discourse.  Indeed, the ‘fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic 
political system’ disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly threatening to others.  Nothing in the 
Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that certain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to 
sanctions.  The inculcation of these values is truly the work of the schools. . .. The schools, as instruments of the 
state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates 
lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
327
 Id. at 684 (“This Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute 
interest of the speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may 
include children.”). 
328
 Id. at 685. 
329
 Id. at 684. 
330
 Id. at 681-82 (“In our Nation’s legislative halls, where some of the most vigorous political debates in our society 
are carried on, there are rules prohibiting the use of expressions offensive to other participants in the debate.  The 
Manual of Parliamentary Practice, drafted by Thomas Jefferson and adopted by the House of Representatives to 
govern the proceedings in that body, prohibits the use of ‘impertinent’ speech during debate and likewise provides 
that ‘[n]o person is to use indecent language against the proceedings of the House.’  The Rules of Debate applicable 
in the Senate likewise provide that a Senator may be called to order for imputing improper motives to another 
Senator or for referring offensively to any state.  Senators have been censured for abusive language directed at other 
Senators.  Can it be that what is proscribed in the halls of Congress is beyond the reach of school officials to 
regulate?” (citations omitted)). 
86 
 
 For purposes of this dissertation, the significance of Fraser is this:  The Supreme Court 
continued its post-Miller approach of separating the constitutionally unprotected “obscene” 
expression from that which is merely “lewd,” “vulgar,” “indecent,” or “offensive.”  While the 
Fraser Court allowed government regulation of the latter sort of speech on the facts of this case, 
it did so with reasoning applied within the confines of the First Amendment, not without. 
Sable Communications v. FCC (1989):
331
  Having gone to great lengths to emphasize 
that its holding in Pacifica was limited to the facts before it, and having similarly emphasized the 
unique nature of the school setting that gave rise to the dispute and ultimate holding in Fraser, 
the Supreme Court still was left with the more general issue of what test is to be applied when 
distinguishing regulation of unprotected obscenity from mere indecency that falls within the First 
Amendment’s scope.  In Sable, the Court began the process of clarifying that rule in a broader 
sense than had its prior cases.  While the Sable analysis picks up where the categorical approach 
in Pacifica left off, by the end of the Sable case the Supreme Court really had concluded that 
henceforth it would approach indecency cases from the standpoint of a balancing test rather than 
from the bright-line approach of categorical analysis.  Thus, Sable is included here for its role in 
making clear the departure of analyses applicable to categorically excluded “obscenity” on the 
one hand and constitutionally protected “indecency” and its kin on the other. 
The Sable case involved federal regulation of dial-a-porn services, through which 
individuals could place a call to a specified telephone number and, in exchange for a fee, hear 
various pornographic messages.  The case arose when a provider of these services brought an 
action for declaratory judgment that the federal regulatory statute was unconstitutional and 
sought an injunction preventing the government from enforcing it.  The federal district court 
upheld the federal statute to the extent that it banned dial-a-porn messages that were obscene but 
                                                          
331
 492 U.S. 115. 
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found the statute unconstitutional to the extent that it banned dial-a-porn messages that were 
indecent but not obscene.
332
  The Ninth Circuit was bypassed and the matter decided directly by 
the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court on both points.  The 
Supreme Court used this opportunity to reaffirm its bright-line rule that obscene material lies 
outside the protections of the First Amendment and that, therefore, obscene dial-a-porn messages 
may be banned by Congress.
333
  Turning its attention to the issue of indecent, but not obscene, 
dial-a-porn messages, the Court inched toward establishing a general rule that would assist it in 
future cases—and would not be limited only to narrow circumstances
334
 or to the facts of an 
individual case.
335
  In Sable, the Supreme Court issued the clear holding that “[s]exual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”
336
   
That bright-line rule goes beyond the Supreme Court’s previous, narrow holdings in 
Pacifica and Fraser.  In Pacifica, the Court found the material in question to be indecent but still 
subject to regulation because of the manner in which it was distributed (by daytime broadcast)—
a narrow holding.  In Fraser, the Court found the material in question to be indecent but still 
subject to regulation because of the place in which it was delivered (a school)—another narrow 
holding.  But in Sable, the Court found the material in question to be indecent without those sorts 
of limiting circumstances, making Sable a holding with broader application to future cases.   
                                                          
332
 Id. at 117-20. 
333
 Id. at 124 (“In contrast to the prohibition on indecent communications, there is no constitutional barrier to the ban 
on obscene dial-a-porn recordings.  We have repeatedly held that the protection of the First Amendment does not 
extend to obscene speech.”). 
334
 Such as the student speech at school assemblies at issue in Fraser, 478 U.S. 675. 
335
 Such as the Court’s emphatic narrowing of the holding in Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726. 
336
 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. 
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The Sable Court applied strict scrutiny
337
 to determine the validity of the regulation of 
indecent speech, inquiring whether a compelling government interest served by the regulation,
338
 
and whether the regulation was narrowly drawn to serve that interest?
339
  The Sable Court found 
that a compelling government interest was, indeed, served by the regulation of indecent dial-a-
porn messages
340
 but then found that the regulation was not sufficiently narrowly drawn to 
survive strict scrutiny because it unnecessarily burdened adults’ access to dial-a-porn services in 
the name of preventing children from accessing the same.
341
  “Because the statute’s denial of 
adult access to telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is 




Thus, in Sable the Supreme Court took a step toward creating a broader rule for 
considering future challenges to government regulation of indecent material.  Unlike obscenity, it 
was increasingly clear that indecent material would not be excluded from First Amendment 
protection. 
Reno v. ACLU (1997):
343
  The Supreme Court’s move toward invalidating statutes that 
regulate distribution of indecent, but not obscene, material, as signaled in Sable, was furthered in 
Reno v. ACLU.  By the time it decided ACLU case, the Supreme Court had effectively ended any 
                                                          
337
 Id. (“The Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a 
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”). 
338
 Id. (“We have recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-
being of minors.  This interest extends to shielding minors from the influence of literature that is not obscene by 
adult standards.”). 
339
 Id. (“The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to withstand constitutional scrutiny, it must do so by 
narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First 
Amendment freedoms.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
340
 Id. (“[T]he Government has a legitimate interest in protecting children from exposure to indecent dial-a-porn 
messages . . . .”). 
341
 Id. at 128 (“[T]he government may not reduce the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis in original)). 
342
 Id. at 131. 
343
521 U.S. 844. 
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attempt to resolve First Amendment disputes regarding indecent material through application of 
a categorical exclusion. 
In ACLU, the issue was a facial challenge to the Communications Decency Act (CDA) of 
1996.  That statute contained two statutory provisions intended to shield minors from “indecent” 
and “patently offensive” communications on the Internet.
344
  When the constitutionality of the 
CDA was challenged soon after its enactment, a special three-judge district court was convened 
to hear the dispute pursuant to special procedural provisions of the CDA.  All three judges held 
that the statute was facially invalid because it was substantially overbroad, although each of the 
three wrote a separate opinion emphasizing different aspects of the defects the panel found with 
the statute.
345
  Pursuant to a special appellate procedure in the CDA, the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear the case. 
The Supreme Court concluded that the CDA was an unconstitutionally overbroad 
regulation on free speech.  The ACLU Court severed from the statute the provisions banning 
dissemination of “obscene” materials to minors over the Internet and upheld those provisions as 
consistent with its longstanding conclusion that obscene material is outside of the protection of 
the First Amendment.
346
  Except for that narrow provision, however, the Court struck down the 
balance of the statute. 
The ACLU Court reaffirmed—in an almost casual manner—the direction signaled by the 
Sable Court of considering indecent material as being subject to First Amendment protection and 
then applying strict scrutiny to it.  After ACLU, it was clear that “obscenity” and “indecency” 
were subject to separate constitutional analyses, and in that sense the ACLU Court made clear 
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that the Chaplinsky formulation that both “lewd and obscene” materials were categorically 
excluded from First Amendment protection no longer was the view of the Supreme Court.   
* * * 
The cases above demonstrate the clear separation that has developed between the 
Supreme Court’s approach to regulation of “obscene” material and its approach to regulation of 
material that is variously described as “indecent,” “lewd,” “vulgar,” or with similar terms.  By 
the time of Stevens, the law was clear:  Obscenity lies outside the protection of the First 
Amendment, and the test for determining whether material is unprotected “obscenity” is set forth 
in Miller.  Other material that may be colloquially linked to obscenity, such as material that is 
indecent, lewd, vulgar, or the like, is not within the categorical exclusion.  As such, any 
regulation of that lewd but non-obscene material will be subject to scrutiny under traditional First 
Amendment rules, and unless it falls within some sort of “special rules” such as one regulating 
speech in schools or in public broadcasts, regulation of this sort of lewd but non-obscene 
material will be subjected to strict scrutiny. 
Thus, any Speech Clause case involving obscene speech is resolved at the threshold, 
binary question:  Obscenity is not part of the freedom of speech protected by the First 
Amendment, and thus a government proscription on obscene speech is constitutionally 
permissible.  By contrast, any case involving non-obscene material that is lewd, vile or of a 
similar nature may not be disposed of at the threshold question—such non-obscene speech is, as 
a matter of law, within the freedom of speech protected by the Speech Clause—and, therefore, 
the outcome of such cases turns on application of the open-ended, variable analysis of the second 
question:  How does the Speech Clause apply to the government regulation of the speech at 
91 
 
issue?  It is apparent Chaplinsky’s formulation that the categorical exclusion includes both the 





Part B:  The profane 
As discussed in Chapter 2, supra, the notion that “profane” speech is constitutionally 
unprotected has long historical roots, but those roots typically are intertwined with concepts of 
religion and with blasphemy.
347
  Even by 1942, when the Chaplinsky Court described “the 
profane” as a category of unprotected speech, it is unclear the Court really meant it.  If profanity 
truly were an unprotected category in 1942, then the Chaplinsky Court readily could have 
decided that Mr. Chaplinsky’s speech was unprotected because his exclaimed reference to a 
“God damned racketeer”
348
 was profane on its face.  Why extensively analyze whether Marshal 
Bowering, or anybody else, might be provoked by Mr. Chaplinsky’s outburst of “fighting words” 
if the facially profane nature of his words were truly sufficient to permit the government to 
punish their utterance? 
Since recognizing profanity as an unprotected category within the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion in Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has found no cases to which that 
category actually applied to save a government regulation.  For example, in Cohen v. California, 
the Supreme Court considered whether the expression “Fuck the draft” was constitutionally 
protected.  After disposing of any notion that such profanity might fall within either the 
unprotected category of obscenity
349
 or that of fighting words,
350
 the Supreme Court then stated 
the issue it was deciding:  “It is whether . . . the States, acting as guardians of public morality, 
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may properly remove this offensive word from the public vocabulary.”
351
  The Supreme Court’s 
answer:  No.  The Supreme Court declined to recognize the state’s authority to prohibit the 
offensive word merely because the idea being expressed could be expressed in a less-offensive 
manner, saying “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can forbid particular words 
without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.”
352
  That being so, 
“the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to 
the most squeamish among us.”
353
  Rather, the Court held, “we think it is largely because 
governmental officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution 
leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the individual.”
354
 
 While the Cohen Court never expressly analyzed Mr. Cohen’s expression as “profanity,” 
it is difficult to imagine a circumstance after Cohen in which a person could be punished by the 
government merely for uttering an “offensive word,” which by definition includes profanity.  
Soon after deciding Cohen, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment below in a New Jersey case 
involving an individual who had been convicted of disorderly conduct for addressing a public 
school board meeting while using, as the dissenting Justices obliquely expressed it, “the 
adjective ‘M05q F05q’ on four occasions, to describe the teachers, the school board, the town 
and his own country.”
355
  In that case, a minority of the Supreme Court clung to the view that 
“the exception to First Amendment protection recognized in Chaplinsky . . . extends to the 
willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an unwilling 
audience,”
356
 but that was not the majority view.  On remand, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
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 Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 904 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
356
 Id. at 905. 
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struck a middle ground, overturning the conviction but holding the statute “may remain in effect 
to the extent that it proscribes offensive language which is spoken loudly in a public place and is 
likely to incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace.”
357
 
Any remaining hope for the continued vitality of “profanity” as an unprotected category 
of speech soon was put to rest in 1973 in another case arising out of protest against the Vietnam 
War. 
Hess v. Indiana (1973):
358
  One year after deciding Cohen, the United States Supreme 
Court again confronted the constitutionality of a prosecution for use of profanity by a person 
objecting to the Vietnam War.  This time, unlike in Cohen, the profane word was actually 
spoken, not printed on a jacket for others to read.   
Gregory Hess was on the campus of the University of Indiana/Bloomington during an 
anti-war demonstration that involved people gathering in a campus street.  The sheriff arrived on 
the scene and began to clear the street itself, causing people to remove themselves to the 
sidewalks on either side.
359
  In response to this, Mr. Hess stated to the crowd in general and to 
nobody in particular:  “We’ll take the fucking street later” or “We’ll take the fucking street 
again.”
360
  The sheriff overheard Mr. Hess’s comment and arrested him for disorderly conduct.  
He was prosecuted in the city court of Bloomington and convicted; he was re-tried de novo in the 
district court and again convicted.  The Indiana Supreme Court upheld the conviction, finding 
that the defendant’s statement “was intended to incite further lawless action on the part of the 
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crowd in the vicinity of appellant and was likely to produce such action.”
361
  The United States 
Supreme Court agreed to hear his appeal. 
In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction because Mr. 
Hess’s profane speech was protected by the First Amendment.  The Supreme Court did not break 
new ground in this case, but the case is consequential for the almost dismissive manner in which 
the Supreme Court disposed of any assertion that Mr. Hess’s profanity in the context of this 
political protest could constitutionally be banned by the State of Indiana.  The Supreme Court 
expressly rejected any notion that Mr. Hess’s speech was obscene or constituted fighting words; 
consequently, the defendant’s words did not lie outside the protection of the First Amendment.
362
 
The Supreme Court then applied the Brandenburg test for incitement to the facts of this case and 
concluded, contrary to the Indiana Supreme Court, that the defendant’s profanity was not 
directed at causing any person to engage in “imminent lawless action” and instead “amounted to 
nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time.  This is not sufficient 
to permit the State to punish Hess’ speech.”
363
 
* * * 
Chaplinsky itself was the high water mark of the modern Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgement that “profane” speech may be categorically unprotected.  While that was true 
in the nineteenth century and before, it generally has not been so in the twentieth century or after.  
In that sense, the fading of “the profane” as an unprotected category effectively illustrates that a 
history of exclusion is a necessary, but it is not a sufficient, condition for recognition of a 
modern category of excluded speech.  While never expressly rejecting “the profane” as a 
                                                          
361
 Id. at 108 (citing Hess v. State, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973)).  
362
 Id. at 107-08. The Hess Court offered no analysis of “profanity” as an unprotected category, suggesting that 
category had by then been abandoned. 
363
 Id. at 108. 
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category, the Supreme Court has done so impliedly, holding that a statute applied to punish 
speech directed at a police officer that “plainly was profane” within the meaning of Chaplinsky 
nonetheless violated the First Amendment.
364
  Instead, the Supreme Court has quietly abandoned 
reference to “the profane” as an unprotected category of speech, and in cases testing government 
power to regulate profane speech has implicitly accepted that the answer to the threshold, binary 
question whether the Speech Clause applies is “Yes” and proceeded directly to the tertiary, 
variable question, “How so?”  That is why from the time of Chaplinsky to the time of Stevens, 
references to “the profane” as a constitutionally unprotected category of speech have vanished 
from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Nothing resembling “the profane” is included by the 
Supreme Court as an unprotected category in any of the five cases since 2010 that address the 





                                                          
364
 Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 136 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
97 
 
Part C:  The libelous 
The concepts involved here are not difficult.  Defamation is “[t]he act of harming the 
reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person.”
365
  Libel is “a defamatory 
statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp. writing but also a picture, sign, or electronic 
broadcast.”
366
  Slander is “a defamatory statement expressed in a transitory form, esp. speech.”
367
 
The sentiments animating “prevention and punishment”
368
 of defamation over the years 
are similarly ancient and nearly universal: 
[L]ibelling is a great crime, whatever sentiments may be entertained by those who live by 
it.  With respect to the heart of the libeller, it is more dark and base than that of the 





It is that last question—“To what tribunal can he then resort?”—that posits the rub.  While there 
is little serious disagreement that defamation is socially undesirable, the question that underlies 
all First Amendment Speech Clause jurisprudence—“What may the Government do about it?”—
is most difficult to answer in this context.  Thus, the most-litigated, and most-restricted, 
surviving category from Chaplinsky is “the libelous,” or defamation.  During the Chaplinsky to 
Stevens period, the proliferation of case law-generated rules applicable to various defamatory 
statements, by various persons, in various contexts or situations, is unsurpassed in First 
Amendment law.  In sum, the general evolution of modern jurisprudence related to libel and 
defamation has been toward developing rules to answer the tertiary question—how does the 
Speech Clause apply—and toward an implicit affirmative answer to the threshold question—
does the Speech Clause apply at all? 
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 A thorough examination of the modern common law of defamation would, by itself, fill a 
thick volume and would far exceed what is required or acceptable in the context of this 
dissertation.  But the Supreme Court has succinctly described the bottom line:  “Our decisions 
since the 1960s have narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exception[] for defamation 
. . . .”
370
  Notably, the Supreme Court states the excluded category is “narrowed,” not eliminated, 
and something thus remains part of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  Unlike “the profane,” 
the Supreme Court’s modern articulations of the categories of unprotected speech persist in 
mentioning “defamation.”
371
  This Part will focus on the basic concepts the Supreme Court has 
fashioned to accomplish that narrowing of the excluded category of defamation (as opposed to 
the numerous concepts that control the government’s ability to regulate various sorts of 
defamatory speech within the First Amendment).  To that end, this Part C will discuss three 
concepts:  “actual malice” in civil defamation (Subpart I), criminal defamation (Subpart II), and 
an assessment of what, if anything, remains of the excluded category (Subpart III). 
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Subpart I:  “Actual malice” in civil defamation 
The standard questions of the trade taught to every journalism student are who, what, 
when, where, why and how?
372
  How fitting it is, or how ironic, that the Supreme Court has 
accomplished its narrowing of the traditional excluded category for defamatory speech by a 
tightening of the answers to those questions.  The questions “when and where” the government 
may regulate defamatory speech remain analyzed within the First Amendment, through doctrines 
that permit time, place and manner restrictions.   
The Supreme Court has used the questions “who, what and why” to fashion tests that 
apply to different sorts of defamatory speech—again, analyzed within the First Amendment’s 
framework. The answer to who may have his or her defamatory speech proscribed by the 
government is reflected in modern doctrines related to public officials or public figures.
373
  The 
answer to what speech or why speech may be proscribable is reflected in modern doctrines 
regarding whether the content of speech involves matters of public concern.
374
   
But the contours of what remains of the narrow category of defamatory speech excluded 
from the First Amendment are revealed by the remaining question:  “How?”  How is the 
defamatory speech delivered?  If delivered with “actual malice,” then the speaker cannot seek 
protection from the First Amendment; but if delivered otherwise, the First Amendment will 
apply in some fashion.
375
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This concept that speech delivered with “actual malice”—indeed, that term itself—has 
roots in Kansas jurisprudence. In 1904, C. C. Coleman was a candidate seeking reelection as 
Kansas Attorney General.
376
  The Topeka State Journal, a newspaper published by Frank P. 
MacLennan,
377
 printed an article criticizing Mr. Coleman’s “official conduct in connection with 
a school fund transaction, making comment upon them and drawing inferences from them.”
378
  
Mr. Coleman filed suit in state court in Topeka, claiming statements in the article were false and 
libelous.  The state trial judge instructed the jury: 
“where an article is published and circulated among voters for the sole purpose of giving 
what the defendant believes to be truthful information concerning a candidate for public 
office, and for the purpose of enabling such voters to cast their ballot more intelligently, 
and the whole thing is done in good faith, and without malice, the article is privileged, 
although the principal matters contained in the article may be untrue in fact and 
derogatory to the character of the plaintiff, and in such a case the burden is on the 




The jury in Topeka found for the newspaper defendant, and Mr. Coleman appealed to the Kansas 
Supreme Court, claiming, inter alia, erroneous jury instruction.  After extensive discussion of the 
purposes, history and nature of the law governing defamation, the Kansas Supreme Court 
affirmed the trial court’s instruction and ruled in favor of the newspaper defendant, and in so 
doing penned this passage: 
In such a case [as a candidate for state attorney general suing a newspaper for publishing 
false statements about his official activities that the newspaper believed to be true] the 
occasion gives rise to a privilege qualified to this extent.  Any one claiming to be defamed 
by the communication must show actual malice, or go remediless.  This privilege extends 
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Thus, the Kansas courts as long ago as 1908—in settling a dispute arising from a newspaper’s 
criticism of a candidate for state attorney general in the 1904 election—articulated what remain 
the principal boundaries of the excluded category of defamatory speech:  The critical distinction 
between unprotected defamations uttered with “actual malice” and all other defamatory speech 
that enjoy some degree of constitutional protection.  The fundamental reasoning underlying the 
Coleman decision was this:  While the Constitution “takes for granted a law of libel” that “places 
injury to reputation on the same plane with injury to person and property, . . . [i]t is very clear 
that these words cannot . . . be given unlimited signification and force in all cases.  Where the 




Almost six decades after the Kansas Supreme Court decided Coleman, the United States 
Supreme Court would draw heavily upon its reasoning and would incorporate into First 
Amendment law the term “actual malice” in its landmark decision New York Times v. Sullivan 
and, later, Coleman’s constitutionally significant concepts of “public men” and “matters of 
public concern.”  This Subpart introduces this category-defining concept through a series of four 
landmark cases:  New York Times v. Sullivan, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., and Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
382
  Reviewing them demonstrates 
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that while considerable nuance has developed in the modern constitutional law of defamation, 
the one constant is that defamatory speech uttered with “actual malice” enjoys no protection in 
any application and thus remains categorically excluded from the First Amendment. 
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964):
383
  The single most important decision in 
development of the modern law of defamation came from this dispute arising out of the civil 
rights struggles of the 1960s.  The case arose when a group of civil rights supporters took out a 
March 29, 1960, full-page advertisement in the New York Times criticizing the conduct of 
various Alabama officials.  The Commissioner of Public Affairs in Montgomery, Alabama, Mr. 
L.B. Sullivan, whose duties included overseeing the city’s police department that had been 
criticized in the advertisement, filed suit claiming he had been libeled.
384
  There was no dispute 
that some of the statements in the advertisement, which had been titled “Heed Their Rising 
Voices,” were false.
385
  In the Alabama state trial court, the jury awarded Mr. Sullivan the full 
amount of damages he claimed—$500,000, although he “made no effort to prove that he suffered 
actual pecuniary loss as a result of the alleged libel”
386




The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide a single question:  “[T]he 
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to award 
damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.”
388
  
After disposing of ancillary issues and reviewing the important role First Amendment values had 
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played in American government, along with the long history of use of seditious libel laws to 
suppress criticism of the government, the Sullivan Court issued its crucial holding: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a 
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual 
malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 




Thus, as the Sullivan Court succinctly put it:  “We hold today that the Constitution delimits a 
State’s power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of 
their official conduct.”
390
  There was no dissent from the holding, although some Justices would 
have gone further than the “actual malice” standard to “completely prohibit”
391
 state regulation 
of a citizen’s speech criticizing government officials, a privilege that some Justices viewed as 
“absolute.”
392
   
The Sullivan decision stands for the foundational proposition that defamatory statements 
about the “official conduct” of a “public official” are constitutionally protected and do not fall 
within the excluded category of “the libelous,”
393
 or defamation—unless uttered with “actual 
malice.”  Sullivan is the most dramatic 1960s decision “narrow[ing] the scope of the traditional 
categorical exception[] for defamation.”
394
  But it left unanswered important questions about the 
scope of the post-Sullivan category of defamatory speech excluded from constitutional 
protection:  How broad is this concept of “public official,”
395
 or as the Coleman Court had 
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phrased it more broadly decades before, “public men”?
396
  And how broad is this concept of 
“official conduct,”
397
 or as the Coleman Court had phrased it more broadly, “matters of public 
concern”?
398
   
The remaining cases in this Subpart focus on the Supreme Court’s answers to those two 
questions to shed light on the overall scope of what remains as the narrowed, excluded category 
of defamation.
399
  As will be seen, the answers to those questions assist in analyzing government 
proscriptions on defamation within the First Amendment, but not without it.   
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (1967):
400
  As soon as the Sullivan Court issued the “new 
constitutional development”
401
 of requiring proof of actual malice before liability for defaming 
public officials on matters related to their official conduct, the Supreme Court commenced 
wrestling with how far that limiting principle extended in narrowing the traditional excluded 
category of defamation.  The definition of “public official” had to be clarified
402
 as did the 
application of the First Amendment to protect commentary on matters of “public interest” even 
when not involving a public official.
403
  The natural question became whether the First 
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Amendment protected only speakers who directed their defamation at public officials or whether 
similar speech directed at other “public figures” also was protected.  The answer, as indicated by 
the Curtis Publishing Court, was that both types of defamatory statement—that toward public 
officials or that toward other public figures—were constitutionally protected. 
The decision in Curtis Publishing arose from two consolidated cases.  One involved 
defamatory statements falsely accusing the University of Georgia athletic director, Wally Butts, 
who was employed by a private foundation and not by the state, of rigging a football game with 
Alabama.
404
  The second involved defamatory statements falsely accusing a retired Army 
general, Edwin Walker, who during his military career had led federal forces in integrating 
Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, of subsequently leading and encouraging a riot 
against federal marshals who were escorting James Meredith to integrate through his attendance 
the University of Mississippi.
405
  The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases “to consider the 
impact of [Sullivan] on libel actions instituted by persons who are not public officials, but who 




The splintered Curtis Publishing Court did not produce a model of clarity on the question 
of what standard should apply to the speech in question—the plurality fashioned a new rule 
separate from the Sullivan requirement,
407
 while Chief Justice Warren in concurrence would 
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would hold that a ‘public figure’ who is not a public official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood 
whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct 
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have applied the “actual malice” standard from Sullivan,
408
 Justice Black continued his advocacy 
for an absolutist reading of the First Amendment to bar all libel actions by public officials or 
public figures,
409
 and Justice William Brennan would have required “actual malice” but was 
unsure whether it had been shown on the available record.
410
 
But from the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, there was no 
disagreement among the members of the Curtis Publishing Court.
411
  As the plurality put it, “The 
modern history of the guarantee of freedom of speech and press mainly has been one of a search 
for the outer limits of that right.”
412
  In other words, where is the modern boundary of the 
category of defamatory speech excluded from First Amendment protection?  The Curtis 
Publishing plurality generally accepted the view that: 
From the point of view of deciding whether a constitutional interest of free speech 
and press is properly involved in the resolution of a libel question a rational 
distinction cannot be founded on the assumption that criticism of private citizens 
who seek to lead in the determination of . . . policy will be less important to the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by 
responsible publishers.”  Id.  That proposed rule did not long endure in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 
408
 Id. at 163-64 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result) (“To me, differentiation between ‘public figures’ and ‘public 
officials’ and adoption of separate standards of proof for each have no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment 
policy.  Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors are blurred. . . . In 
many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are 
now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and 
associations, some only loosely connected with the Government.  This blending of positions and power has also 
occurred in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless 
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas 
of concern to society at large.  Viewed in this context, then, it is plain that although they are not subject to the 
restraints of the political process, ‘public figures,’ like ‘public officials,’ often play an influential role in ordering 
society. . . . I therefore adhere to the New York Times standard in the case of ‘public figures’ as well as ‘public 
officials.’”).  Though not so in this case, Chief Justice Warren’s view eventually would carry the day. 
409
 Id. at 170-72 (Black, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part).  
410
 Id. at 172-74 (Brennan, J., concurring in result in part and dissenting in part). 
411
 The differences between the plurality and the various concurrences and dissents were on matters not bearing 
directly upon the modern boundaries of the excluded category of defamation. Nothing in the various concurrences or 
dissents is inconsistent with the plurality’s statements on this point.  
412
 Id. at 148 (plurality opinion). 
413
 Id. at 147-48 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (ellipsis in original). 
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Noting that both Mr. Butts and Mr. Walker were public figures at least for all relevant 
purposes,
414
 the Supreme Court then concluded “that libel actions of the present kind cannot be 
left entirely to state libel laws, unlimited by any overriding constitutional safeguard.”
415
 
In other words, whatever standard might ultimately be determined to apply within the 
First Amendment, Curtis Publishing established the principle that defamatory speech directed at 
the public conduct of public figures—like that directed at public officials—would enjoy First 
Amendment protection.
416
  Because such defamatory speech would be protected by the First 
Amendment, it no longer fell within the excluded category of defamation—unless uttered with 
“actual malice.”  Thus, the excluded category of wholly unprotected defamation had been further 
narrowed from its traditional scope. 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974):
417
  A decade after Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
declined to extend its requirement of proving “actual malice” to situations where a private person 
seeks to recover actual damages for defamation even if the subject matter was of public 
concern.
418
  But in doing so, the Supreme Court continued to “federalize” the law of libel,
419
 
which essentially is a different way of stating that the traditional excluded category of 
defamation continued to narrow.  For this dissertation’s purposes in understanding the 
                                                          
414
 The Curtis Publishing Court also foreshadowed the later distinction between general purpose public figures and 
limited purpose public figures.  See id. at 154-55 (“[B]oth Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of 
independent public interest at the time of the publications; both, in our opinion, would have been labeled ‘public 
figures’ under ordinary tort rules. Butts may have attained that status by position alone and Walker by his purposeful 
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quotation marks omitted)). 
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 Id. at 155. 
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 See also, e.g., Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc., v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (establishing that even 
objectively false assertions of fact, such as accusations of “blackmail,” not sufficient to establish liability of 
newspaper when speech directed toward public figure). 
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 418 U.S. 323. 
418
 Some voluntary act or set of acts generally are required to transform a private person into a public figure for First 
Amendment purposes. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (former wife of famous industrialist not a 
‘public figure’ for defamation law purposes merely because she married or divorced a ‘public figure’). 
419
 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 370 (White, J., dissenting). 
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development of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the significance of Gertz lies not in its 
conclusion but in its method, and the important analysis is not in Justice Lewis Powell’s majority 
opinion but in Justice White’s dissent. 
Elmer Gertz was a reputable attorney representing the family of a young man shot and 
killed in 1968 by a Chicago police officer named Richard Nuccio.  Robert Welch, Inc., was the 
corporate publisher of the John Birch Society’s monthly magazine, American Opinion.  When 
the officer was prosecuted for murder in connection with the shooting, the magazine published 
an article alleging that the officer’s prosecution was part of a “nationwide conspiracy to discredit 
local law enforcement agencies and create in their stead a national police force capable of 
supporting a Communist dictatorship.”
420
  Elmer Gertz had no involvement in the criminal trial; 
he represented the shooting victim’s family in a related civil suit.  Nonetheless, the American 
Opinion article, under the title ‘FRAME-UP: Richard Nuccio And the War On Police,” took Mr. 
Gertz to task: 
Notwithstanding petitioner’s remote connection with the prosecution of [Officer] 
Nuccio, respondent’s magazine portrayed him as an architect of the ‘frame-up.’  
According to the article, the police file on petitioner took ‘a big, Irish cop to lift.’  
The article stated that petitioner had been an official of the ‘Marxist League for 
Industrial Democracy, originally known as the Intercollegiate Socialist Society, 
which has advocated the violent seizure of our government.’  It labeled Gertz a 
‘Leninist’ and a ‘Communist-fronter.’  It also stated that Gertz had been an officer 
of the National Lawyers Guild, described as a Communist organization that 
‘probably did more than any other outfit to plan the Communist attack on the 
Chicago police during the 1968 Democratic Convention.’
421
 
   
Many of the published statements about Mr. Gertz were inaccurate, and the American Opinion 
editorial staff not only failed to verify asserted facts but also inserted a false editorial notation 
that the article’s writer had “conducted extensive research into the Richard Nuccio Case.”
422
   
                                                          
420
 Id. at 325 (majority opinion). 
421
 Id. at 325-26. 
422
 Id. at 327. 
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Mr. Gertz sued for libel.  The jury awarded him $50,000 in damages, but the district court 
set aside the jury verdict, holding that the Sullivan standard governed the case and that “actual 
malice” had not been proven.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the 
district court, relying on a recent Supreme Court case which it “read . . . to require application of 
the New York Times [v. Sullivan] standard to any publication or broadcast about an issue of 
significant public interest, without regard to the position, fame, or anonymity of the person 
defamed, and it concluded that respondent’s statements concerned such an issue.”
423
  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari “to reconsider the extent of a publisher’s constitutional 
privilege against liability for defamation of a private citizen.”
424
 
The Gertz Court framed the question presented this way:  “The principal issue in this case 
is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual 
who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against 
liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.”
425
  The Gertz Court’s less-than-satisfying 
answer:  Well, sort of. 
The Gertz Court engaged in explicit and transparent balancing of various interests.  It 
concluded that the state has a greater interest in protecting the reputation of private individuals 
than of public officials or public figures in part because private individuals had fewer 
                                                          
423
 Id. at 330-31 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)).  In Rosenbloom, a plurality of the 
Supreme Court seemed to hold that the Sullivan rule required a showing of actual malice by private plaintiffs if the 
defamatory statements related to any matter of public concern.  Rosenbloom itself was the high-water mark for the 
prophylactic rule it articulated, and its holding was effectively scaled back by Gertz. 
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 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325.  The Gertz Court’s description of the Rosenbloom decision offers a revealing snapshot of 
the Supreme Court’s struggle in the early 1970s to apply its still-new doctrine from Sullivan:  “This Court [in 
Rosenbloom] affirmed the decision below, but no majority could agree on a controlling rationale.  The eight Justices 
who participated in Rosenbloom announced their views in five separate opinions, none of which commanded more 
than three votes.  The several statements not only reveal disagreement about the appropriate result in that case, they 
also reflect divergent traditions of thought about the general problem of reconciling the law of defamation with the 
First Amendment.  One approach has been to extend the New York Times test to an expanding variety of situations.  
Another has been to vary the level of constitutional privilege for defamatory false hood with the status of the person 
defamed.  And a third view would grant to the press and broadcast media absolute immunity from liability for 
defamation.” Id. at 333. 
425
 Id. at 332.  
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opportunities for “self-help” when their reputation is tarnished by falsehoods.
426
  Moreover, 
unlike public officials or public figures, private individuals have done nothing to expose 
themselves to such risk to reputation.  “[P]rivate individuals are not only more vulnerable to 
injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”
427
 
However, instead of applying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion in the traditional 
manner to conclude that the Constitution commands no limitation on state power to punish 
private libels, the Gertz Court concluded that yet another set of rules should be fashioned as 
follows: 
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may 
define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.  This 





But the Gertz Court was not finished.  There was more to its new constitutional test for applying 
the First Amendment to defamations of private individuals: 
Our accommodation of the competing values at stake in defamation suits by 
private individuals allows the States to impose liability on the publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that 
required by New York Times [v. Sullivan]. . . . This conclusion is not based on a 
belief that the considerations which prompted the adoption of the New York Times 
[v. Sullivan] privilege for defamation of public officials and its extension to public 
figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of private individuals.  Rather, we 
endorse this approach in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest in 
compensating private individuals for injury to reputation.  But this countervailing 
state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury.  For the 
reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not permit recovery of 
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of 
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So the Gertz Court’s newly articulated constitutional test was this:  A private individual who is 
defamed may recover in a civil suit his actual damages on a showing of mere negligence, but if 
he seeks presumed or punitive damages he must show actual malice. Thus, although the Gertz 
majority “refus[ed] to extend the New York Times [v. Sullivan] privilege to defamation of private 
individuals,”
430
 it did not refuse to extend the protection of the First Amendment to such 
defamations.  What, then, remains of the excluded category of defamation after Gertz? 
Justice Harry Blackmun implied that something remained of the excluded category for 
defamation.  For him, the Gertz decision “fixes the outer boundary of the New York Times [v. 
Sullivan] doctrine and says that beyond that boundary, a State is free to define for itself the 
appropriate standard of media liability so long as it does not impose liability without fault.”
431
  
The reference to the “outer boundary” of the Sullivan principles implies that something lies 
beyond those boundaries, and presumably what lies beyond would be the remnants of the 
traditional excluded category of defamatory speech unprotected by the First Amendment.  With 
the benefit of hindsight, it now is apparent that what continued to lie fully outside the First 
Amendment after Gertz was defamatory speech uttered with actual malice. 
But Justice Blackmun stood alone in even this weak implication.  Justice William 
Douglas would have gone further than the majority and expressly applied the First Amendment 
to all government regulation of speech because “[t]he identity of the oppressor is, I would think, 
a matter of relative indifference to the oppressed.”
432
  Likewise with Justice Brennan, who 
concluded: 
[V]oluntarily or not, we are all ‘public’ men to some degree. Conversely, some 
aspects of the lives of even the most public men fall outside the area of matters of 
public or general concern.  Thus, the idea that certain ‘public’ figures have 
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 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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 Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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voluntarily exposed their entire lives to public inspection, while private 





From the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the most important portion 
of Gertz is the dissent of Justice White.  Justice White joined the Gertz majority, presumably 
because he concluded it correctly refused to extend the Sullivan decision to cover defamation of 
private individuals even related to matters of public concern.
434
  But he also filed a lengthy 
dissent that lamented the passing of the traditional, unprotected category of defamation in the 
post-Sullivan world: 
For some 200 years—from the very founding of the Nation—the law of 
defamation and right of the ordinary citizen to recover for false publication 
injurious to his reputation have been almost exclusively the business of state 
courts and legislatures. . . . The law governing the defamation of private citizens 
remained untouched by the First Amendment because until relatively recently, the 
consistent view of the Court was that libelous words constitute a class of speech 
wholly unprotected by the First Amendment, subject only to limited exceptions 




For Justice White, the Sullivan rule had made constitutional sense as a bulwark against 
oppressive government proscription of seditious libels, those directed toward the government or 
its officials.  But in his view, the liberal expansion of Sullivan principles after 1964 into other 
contexts, such as the defamation of private persons, had effectively ended the longstanding, 
traditional categorical exclusion for defamation by subjecting all defamation laws to scrutiny 
under the First Amendment: 
But now, using that Amendment as the chosen instrument, the Court, in a few 
printed pages, has federalized major aspects of libel law by declaring 
unconstitutional in important respects the prevailing defamation law in all or most 
of the 50 States. . . .   
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 See generally Bernard W. Bell, Judging in Interesting Times: The Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence of Justice 
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 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting). 
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As I see it, there are wholly insufficient grounds for scuttling the libel laws of the 
States in such wholesale fashion, to say nothing of deprecating the reputation 





This “federaliz[ing]” of “the traditional law of libel” would have an effect “immediately obvious 
and indisputable” 
437
 because “[t]hese are radical changes in the law and severe invasions of the 
prerogatives of the States.”
438
  In Justice White’s view, the Gertz Court was “yielding to the 
apparently irresistible impulse to announce a new and different interpretation of the First 
Amendment” and, in so doing, “the Court discards history and precedent in its rush to refashion 
defamation law in accordance with the inclinations of a perhaps evanescent majority of the 
Justices.”
439
  But Justice White was just getting started: 
The Court does not contend, and it could hardly do so, that those who wrote the 
First Amendment intended to prohibit the Federal Government, within its sphere 
of influence in the Territories and the District of Columbia, from providing the 
private citizen a peaceful remedy for damaging falsehood. . . .  
 
Scant, if any, evidence exists that the First Amendment was intended to abolish 
the common law of libel, at least to the extent of depriving ordinary citizens of 
meaningful redress against their defamers. . . .  
 
This Court in bygone years has repeatedly dealt with libel and slander actions 
[from federal jurisdictions] . . . [and] the opinions of the Court unmistakably 





In Justice White’s view, the Sullivan decision had been a watershed moment in that longstanding 
tradition of treating libel as an excluded category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment: 
The Court’s consistent view prior to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was that 
defamatory utterances were wholly unprotected by the First Amendment. . . . 
 
. . . . 
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The Court could not accept the generality of this historic view in New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan. . . .  
 
The central meaning of New York Times, and for me the First Amendment as it 
relates to libel laws, is that seditious libel—criticism of government and public 
officials—falls beyond the police power of the State.  . . . Simply put, the First 
Amendment did not confer a license to defame the [private] citizen.  
 
. . . . 
 
. . . But the Court [in Gertz] nevertheless extends the reach of the First 
Amendment to all defamation actions. . . .  
 
The [Gertz] Court proceeds as though it were writing on tabula rasa. . . . [but] [o]f 
course, the Court necessarily discards the contrary judgment arrived at in the 50 





Justice White concluded this fundamental shift in the law of libel, the shrinking of the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion as it relates to defamation, and the concurrent dramatic expansion of 
the First Amendment’s application not only had no historical root but would cause harm: 
The publication may be wholly false and the wrong to [the private citizen] 
unjustified, but his case will nevertheless be dismissed for failure to prove 
negligence or other fault on the part of the publisher.  I find it unacceptable to 
distribute the risk in this manner and force the wholly innocent victim to bear the 
injury . . . .  
 
It is difficult for me to understand why the ordinary citizen should himself carry 
the risk of damage and suffer the injury in order to vindicate First Amendment 
values by protecting the press and others from liability for circulating false 
information.  This is particularly true because such statements serve no purpose 
whatsoever in furthering the public interest or the search for truth but, on the 




Thus, for Justice White, the Sullivan decision was consistent with the history and 
purposes of the First Amendment because it stood against seditious libel and helped guarantee 
the freedom of all persons to criticize the government—a core First Amendment value.  But 
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extending Sullivan principles to cover private libels made no sense, and in so doing the Supreme 
Court, in Justice White’s view, had effectively abandoned any pretense that the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion continued to apply to defamatory speech.  Nine years later, the Supreme 
Court would accept one more opportunity to clarify its jurisprudence in this area, but clarity 
would remain elusive. 
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders (1985):
443
  This case addressed the remaining 
circumstance left open after Sullivan, Butts and Gertz:  What does the Constitution require when 
the government seeks to permit civil punishment of defamations of private persons related solely 
to matters of private concern?   
Because of a clerical error, Dun & Bradstreet, the credit reporting agency, improperly 
released false and defamatory confidential financial information that it incorrectly represented to 
pertain to Greenmoss Builders.  Greenmoss filed a defamation suit in Vermont state court 
seeking both compensatory and punitive damages.
444
  The trial court held that the Gertz rule 
applied and, therefore, Greenmoss Builders would have to prove Dun & Bradstreet acted with 
actual malice in order to recover punitive damages, a standard it could not meet in this case 
because of the inadvertent nature of the error.  The Vermont Supreme Court reversed, finding 
Gertz inapplicable.
445
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether this rule of 
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The Supreme Court determined that because “speech on matters of public concern . . . is 
at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection,”
447
 it follows that “speech on matters of purely 
private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”
448
  Thus, “[i]n light of the reduced 
constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public concern, we hold that the state 




  From the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, however, the importance 
of Dun & Bradstreet was its reasoning, not its outcome.  The three-justice plurality based its 
conclusion on the “reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters of public 
concern,”
450
 not on the absence of constitutional protection.  Indeed, the plurality expressly 
wrote that such private speech about private parties regarding private matters “is not totally 
unprotected by the First Amendment” although the constitutional protections “are less 
stringent.”
451
  Thus, the plain language of the plurality’s opinion implies that it considered but 
rejected applying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, opting instead to extend the First 
Amendment’s protection to this sort of private speech on private matters. 
This was simply too much for Chief Justice Burger, who after seeing how the Gertz 
analysis was applied in this case, even though not controlling the outcome, concluded that Gertz 
was “ill-conceived[] and . . . should be overruled.”
452
  Justice White renewed his criticism of the 
abandonment by Gertz of any remaining excluded category for defamatory speech unprotected 
by the First Amendment, characterizing that decision as having “seemingly left no defamation 
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actions free from federal constitutional limitations.”
453
  By the time of Dun & Bradstreet, Justice 
White had “c[o]me to have increasing doubts about the soundness of the Court’s approach and 
about some of the assumptions underlying”
454
 the Sullivan departure from traditional libel law.  
While he had joined the majority in Sullivan, and continued to believe that Sullivan itself was 
consistent with the First Amendment’s intended limitation on government power to dissuade 
criticism of itself, the extensions of the Sullivan principles since that case had caused him great 
concern because “New York Times Co. v. Sullivan was the first major step in what proved to be a 
seemingly irreversible process of constitutionalizing the entire law of libel and slander.”
455
  By 
the time of Dun & Bradstreet, Justice White “still believe[d] the common-law rules”—
specifically, the longstanding historical rule that defamation was a proscribable category of 
speech excluded from the protection of the First Amendment—“should have been retained where 
the plaintiff is not a public official or public figure.  As I see it, the Court undervalued the 
reputational interest at stake in such cases.”
456
 Like the Chief Justice, Justice White also would 
have overruled Gertz.  
* * * 
Thus, by the time of Dun & Bradstreet the broad contours of the First Amendment law of 
libel were as follows:  The First and Fourteenth Amendment prohibited states from authorizing 
public officials (Sullivan) or public figures (Butts) to prevail in civil defamation suits unless they 
could prove the defamatory statement was made with “actual malice,” defined as known falsity 
or reckless disregard for the truth.  If the plaintiff were a private person, civil recovery of actual 
damages was constitutionally permitted upon a showing of negligent defamation (Gertz); if the 
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 Id. at 766. 
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subject matter of the defamation were private in nature, punitive damages also could be 
recovered by a private plaintiff showing negligence (Dun & Bradstreet), but if the subject matter 
were of public concern then even a private plaintiff must show “actual malice” before punitive 
damages would be permitted (Gertz).  
It is difficult, indeed, to divine those somewhat complex rules from the pertinent fourteen 
words of the First Amendment—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press . . . .”
457
—or from the historical record that showed the wide acceptance 
of government authority to proscribe slander and libel at the time the First Amendment was 
adopted.  But, by the mid-1980s, such was the state of the newly “federalized” law of defamation 
after the Sullivan through Dun & Bradstreet decisions, and every component of traditional 
defamation law that was “federalized” necessarily was moved outside the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion.
458
  It was doubtful, after Dun & Bradstreet, whether any justice then 
sitting thought a categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection continued to attach to 
defamatory speech, whether libelous or slanderous.  Some, like Justice White and Chief Justice 
Burger, lamented that conclusion; others, like Justices Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Blackmun 
and John Paul Stevens, welcomed it but would have gone further to afford defamatory speech 
additional protection within the First Amendment.  Still others—the three-justice plurality of 
Justices Powell, William Rehnquist and Sandra Day O’Connor—merely described it.  
But the modern Supreme Court continues to list “defamation” as a category of 
unprotected speech.  The cleanest explanation for that is that “defamation” has become shorthand 
for “defamatory speech uttered with actual malice.”  If actual malice is proven in any of the 
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various permutations for which the Supreme Court has fashioned its intricate constitutional rules, 
the outcome is that the government may punish, or permit the punishment, of the defamatory 
speech. 
Does that rule remain true even if the government seeks to impose criminal liability for 
defamation?  The next Subpart will address that question.  
120 
 
Subpart II: Criminal defamation 
The modern First Amendment framework for analyzing government attempts to proscribe 
or punish defamatory statements, discussed in Subpart I, supra, was created in the context of 
civil liability by the Sullivan Court and its progeny.  From the standpoint of those courts, the risk 
of civil liability was “a form of regulation that creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly 
greater than those that attend reliance upon the criminal law.”
459
  On the other hand, it is 
conceivable that to the speaker the consequence of civil liability could be far less onerous than 
that of a criminal conviction.  That would certainly be true, for example, if a defamed public 
official civilly “sought no damages but only to clear his name.”
460
  Thus, the inherent risk of 
imprisonment—the ultimate power of the government to deny a citizen’s constitutionally 
protected liberty interests—renders criminal prosecutions for defamation fundamentally different 
from civil suits. 
The Supreme Court has decided three cases concerning the application of the First 
Amendment to criminal prosecutions for libel.  The first was decided before New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, and the other two were decided in quick succession after Sullivan.  The Supreme 
Court has not specifically addressed the Constitution’s limitations on state authority to impose 
criminal liability for defamation—i.e., to implicate a different sort of liberty interest by 
imprisoning a speaker—since 1966 but instead has left that question for determination by the 
lower courts in light of evolving constitutional and societal standards.  Therefore, this Subpart 
considers initially the Beauharnais-Garrison-Ashton line of Supreme Court cases addressing 
criminal libel.  It then turns to how the principles established by those cases have been applied by 
lower courts—federal circuits, federal district courts and state high courts—during the nearly 
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half century since the Supreme Court last decided a criminal libel case, a period of time during 
which the constitutional law of defamation more generally has evolved substantially.  
Section 1:  Criminal defamation in the Supreme Court 
Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952):
461
  This case, which upheld as valid an Illinois law in the 
nature of a criminal libel law, pre-dates both Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana.  To that end, it 
is “old law” and is now infrequently cited.  However, it remains good law to the extent that it is 
not in conflict with successor cases.  The principal proposition for which Beauharnais still stands 
is that criminal libel statutes that punish speech directed at groups of persons (as opposed to 
individuals) which are by nature composed of private individuals (as opposed to public officials 




In Beauharnais, the defendant, Joseph Beauharnais, was president of a Chicago 
organization named the White Circle League, which objected to racial integration in the city.  At 
issue was literature he distributed that called upon readers to “Preserve and Protect White 
Neighborhoods!” and that included the defamatory statement: “If persuasion and the need to 
prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the negro will not unite us, then the 
aggressions . . . rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will.”
463
  The 
city prosecutor in Chicago brought charges against Mr. Beauharnais alleging violation of a city 
ordinance that banned publication of “any lithograph” that portrayed “lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, or any race, color, creed or religion.”
464
  Mr. Beauharnais was convicted in municipal 
                                                          
461
 343 U.S. 250. 
462
 But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, holding that even private plaintiffs must show some amount of harm from the 
alleged defamation to support a successful action. 
463
 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 252.  
464
 Id. at 251 (quoting § 224a of Division 1 of the Illinois Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, c. 38, s 471, which 
read as follows:  “It shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to manufacture, sell, or offer for sale, 
advertise or publish, present or exhibit in any public place in this state any lithograph, moving picture, play, drama 
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court and fined $200.  He appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court, which upheld the conviction 
and noted that the underlying statute upon which the conviction rested was “a form of criminal 
libel law.”
465
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari “in view of the serious questions raised 
concerning the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on the power of a State to 
punish utterances promoting friction among racial and religious groups.”
466
 
The Supreme Court upheld the Illinois statute because it was narrowly drawn and was 
“directed at a defined evil.”
467
 Citing Chaplinsky, the Beauharnais Court found the Illinois 
statute to fall outside the protections of the First Amendment.  From the standpoint of the 
application of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to criminal libel laws, the Beauharnais 
Court’s key point was: 
The precise question before us, then, is whether the protection of ‘liberty’ in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a State from 
punishing such libels—as criminal libel has been defined, limited and 
constitutionally recognized time out of mind—directed as designated collectivities 
and flagrantly disseminated.  There is even authority, however dubious, that such 
utterances were also crimes at common law.  It is certainly clear that some 





Thus, the critical teaching of Beauharnais for the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion is 
that “criminal libel has been . . . constitutionally recognized time out of mind.”
469
  That 
assessment would appear to satisfy the then-decade-old Chaplinsky requirement that proscribable 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
or sketch, which publication or exhibition portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of 
citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, 
color, creed or religion to contempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots.”) . 
465
 Id. at 253 (citing Illinois v. Beauharnais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. 1951)). 
466
 Id. at 252. 
467
 Id. at 253 (“The statute before us is not a catchall enactment left at large by the State court which applied it.  It is 
a law specifically directed at a defined evil, its language drawing from history and practice in Illinois and in more 
than a score of other jurisdictions a meaning confirmed by the Supreme Court of that State in upholding this 
conviction.” (citations omitted)). 
468
 Id. at 258 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
469
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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speech has “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
470
  On this historical 
point,
471
 the dissent agreed that “as constitutionally recognized that crime [libel] has provided for 
punishment of false, malicious, scurrilous charges against individuals.”
472
  For the dissent, the 
narrow scope of historically permitted criminal libel punishments was constitutionally 
significant: 
This limited scope of the law of criminal libel is of no small importance.  It has 
confined state punishment of speech and expression to the narrowest of areas 
involving nothing more than purely private feuds.  Every expansion of the law of 
criminal libel so as to punish discussions of matters of public concern means a 





The themes that would arise in the civil law of defamation after Sullivan were thereby 
foreshadowed in the context of the criminal libel law at issue in Beauharnais.  Important to the 
Beauharnais Justices were the historical acceptance of criminal prosecutions for defamation, the 
distinction between public and private “feuds,” and whether the subject matter being discussed 
was a “matter of public concern.” 
 A dozen years after Beauharnais, the Sullivan Court would commence “federalizing” the 
civil law of libel in 1964.  That same year, the Supreme Could would consider the application of 
its new Sullivan approach in a criminal prosecution for libel arising out of Louisiana.  
   
                                                          
470
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). 
471
 Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 263 (“Every power may be abused, but the possibility of abuse is a poor reason to 
denying Illinois the power to adopt measures against criminal libels sanctioned by centuries of Anglo-American law.  
While this Court sits it retains and exercises authority to nullify action which encroaches on freedom of utterance 
under the guise of punishing libel.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
472
 Id. at 271-72 (Black, J., dissenting). 
473
 Id. at 272 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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Garrison v. Louisiana (1964):
474
  The Supreme Court issued its landmark ruling in New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan in March 1964.  Only eight months later, in November of the same 
year, it applied the Sullivan principles to criminal prosecutions for defamation. 
 In Garrison, a district attorney in Louisiana, Jim Garrison, embroiled in a funding 
dispute with judges on a district court, convened a press conference at which he made public 
remarks critical of the judges’ conduct.
475
  Criminal charges were brought against the district 
attorney under the Louisiana criminal libel statute.  The state trial court entered a conviction, and 
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.  The defendant appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court, which unanimously concluded: 
[W]e must decide whether, in view of the differing history and purposes of 
criminal libel, the New York Times rule also limits state power to impose criminal 
sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials.  We hold that it 
does.   
 
Where criticism of public officials is concerned, we see no merit in the argument 
that criminal libel statutes serve interests distinct from those secured by civil libel 




If anything, the Garrison Court concluded, the Constitution imposes a heavier burden on the 
state to justify criminal restrictions on speech than to sustain civil liability: 
It goes without saying that penal sanctions cannot be justified merely by the fact 
that defamation is evil or damaging to a person in ways that entitle him to 
maintain a civil suit.  Usually we reserve the criminal law for harmful behavior 
which exceptionally disturbs the community’s sense of security. . . . It seems 
                                                          
474
 379 U.S. 64.  
475
 Id. at 65-66 (reporting the district attorney’s comments as follows:  “The principal charges alleged to be 
defamatory were his attribution of a large backlog of pending criminal cases to the inefficiency, laziness, and 
excessive vacations of the judges, and his accusation that, by refusing to authorize disbursements to cover the 
expenses of undercover investigations of vice in New Orleans, the judges had hampered his efforts to enforce the 
vice laws.  In impugning their motives, he said:  ‘The judges have now made it eloquently clear where their 
sympathies lie in regard to aggressive vice investigations by refusing to authorize use of the DA’s funds to pay for 
the cost of closing down the Canal Street clip joints. . . . This raises interesting questions about the racketeer 
influences on our eight vacation-minded judges.’ ”). In the mid-1960s, the Louisiana criminal defamation statute 
also was used to protect the reputation of the state’s district attorneys.  See State v. Webster, 159 So. 2d 140 (La. 
1964) (ordering new trial for defendant convicted of criminal defamation for writing a letter to U.S. Attorney 
General Robert Kennedy accusing the district attorney of Iberia Parish of open lawlessness).  
476
 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 67 (footnote omitted). 
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evident that personal calumny falls in neither of those classes in the U.S.A., that it 
is therefore inappropriate for penal control, and that this probably accounts for the 





Moreover, the modern practice had trended away from using criminal sanctions to enforce public 
policies against defamation: 
[By the 1830s], preference for the civil remedy, which enabled the frustrated 
victim to trade chivalrous satisfaction for damages, had substantially eroded the 
breach of the peace justification for criminal libel laws.  In fact, in earlier, more 
violent, times, the civil remedy had virtually pre-empted the field of defamation; 
except as a weapon against seditious libel, the criminal prosecution fell into 
virtual desuetude.  Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel 
prosecutions lend support to the observation that under modern conditions, when 
the rule of law is generally accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, 
it can hardly be urged that the maintenance of peace requires a criminal 




Thus, the Garrison Court applied the same requirements to scrutinizing state restrictions 
on defamatory falsehoods under penalty of criminal sanction as it had applied in Sullivan to laws 
imposing civil liability.
479
  From the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, 
however, the language of Garrison offered more hope than Sullivan that at least some excluded 
category of defamatory falsehood would remain unprotected by the First Amendment because 
“[t]he use of calculated falsehood . . . would put a different cast on the constitutional question. . . 
. That speech [calculated to be false] is used as a tool for political ends does not automatically 
bring it under the protective mantle of the Constitution.”
480
 
It is possible to read Garrison as suggesting that the standard for criminal liability is in 
fact higher than for civil liability, but it also is possible to read Garrison to more expressly 
                                                          
477
 Id. at 69-70 (quoting Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 13, § 250.7, Comments, at 44 (1961)). 
478
 Id. at 69 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
479
 Id. at 74 (“We held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed a civil remedy only if he 
establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or true.  The reasons which led us so to hold in New York Times apply with no less force merely 
because the remedy is criminal.” (citation omitted)). 
480
 Id. at 75. 
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preserve the existence of some excluded category of defamatory speech.  The Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion survived Garrison, more clearly than it had Sullivan, at least insofar as the 
“calculated falsehood” is concerned:  “[T]he knowingly false statement and the false statement 
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.”
481
  Thus, if the 
government can prove a defamatory statement was uttered with actual malice, Garrison says the 
First Amendment does not bar criminal prosecution of the speaker. 
Ashton v. Kentucky (1966):
482
  Two years after deciding Sullivan and Garrison, the 
Supreme Court once again turned its attention to applying the First Amendment to a criminal 
prosecution for defamation.  Ashton remains the last time the Supreme Court has considered a 
state attempt to impose criminal liability for defamatory speech.  
In Ashton, a bitter labor dispute was brewing in Kentucky’s coal country.  Steve Ashton 
went to Hazard, Kentucky, to support the striking miners.  In that pursuit, he printed and 
distributed a pamphlet that made false and defamatory statements about the police chief, the 
sheriff, and the publisher of the local newspaper.
483
  Mr. Ashton was charged with the common 
law crime of libel, convicted, and sentenced to six months in prison and fined $3,000.  The 
Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.  Mr. Ashton appealed the conviction to the 
United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. 
The Supreme Court held that Kentucky’s common-law crime of libel was too vague to 
withstand the First Amendment requirements imposed two years earlier by Garrison.  From the 
standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the Ashton case is consequential for two 
narrow reasons:  First, Ashton confirms that Garrison was not an aberration and that the Supreme 
Court has not upheld a single criminal conviction for defamation in the post-Sullivan era.  
                                                          
481
 Id.  
482
 384 U.S. 195. 
483
 Id. at 196-97.  
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Second, Ashton includes a single passage, in dicta, that is intriguing for those who speculate 
about the constitutional future of criminal libel statutes:  “This kind of criminal libel ‘makes a 
man a criminal simply because his neighbors have no self-control and cannot refrain from 
violence.’”
484
   
  * * * 
 
Thus, the Ashton Court seemed disfavorably inclined toward any justification for criminal 
libel law that would rest upon an asserted need for prosecution in order to avoid violence, 
prevent breach of the peace, or otherwise provide a judicial avenue for preserving public order.  
Read together with the Garrison observation that “personal calumny” is “inappropriate for penal 
control,”
485
 this passage might lead one reasonably to conclude that no justification for the 
criminal punishment for libel would remain constitutionally persuasive to the modern Supreme 
Court:  Criminal prosecution is not justified as an alternative to violence between the parties 
(Garrison), and criminal prosecution would be similarly impermissible to prevent violence by 
third parties who might be incited by defamatory speech (Ashton).  That question, however, 
never has been squarely put to the Supreme Court, so it remains open.   
Since Garrison, challenges to criminal prosecutions brought under state defamation 
statutes have been resolved by the federal Courts of Appeal, by federal district courts, and by 
state appellate courts.  The lower courts have made explicit that the First Amendment analysis to 
be applied to criminal sanctions punishing defamatory speech is the same as that applied when 
reviewing civil sanctions.  At the same time, the absence of a Supreme Court pronouncement on 
a criminal defamation case for almost five decades leaves open the possibility that the 
                                                          
484
 Id. at 200 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 151 (Harvard Univ. Press 1954)). 
485
 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 70.  
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constitutional requirements of civil and criminal law as applied to defamation may in fact have 
diverged but that divergence simply has not yet been recognized by the Supreme Court.   
Because not all states that had criminal defamation statutes reacted immediately—or even 
swiftly—to the new requirements set forth in Garrison, prosecutions under pre-Garrison statutes 
continued for many years after Garrison was decided.  As a result, nuances in the law developed.  
Therefore, consideration must be given to trends and practices that have developed in the lower 
courts. 





Section 2:  Post-Garrison, in the federal circuits 
Four cases decided by the federal circuits illustrate the diversity of applications and 
varying approaches to criminal libel statutes in the half century since Garrison.  One of those 
cases found a prosecutor liable for authorizing a search warrant during a criminal libel 
investigation that the court concluded had no basis in post-Garrison law, a second upheld a 
Kansas criminal libel statute that was silent on “actual malice” because state rules of construction 
would impute that requirement to it, a third struck down a Puerto Rico criminal libel statute for 
absence of an ‘actual malice’ requirement, and a fourth struck down a federal criminal 
defamation statute as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad but stopped just short of declaring 
all criminal libel laws unconstitutional.  Those four decisions are considered below. 
Mink v. Knox (10th Cir. 2010):
486
  A student at the University of Northern Colorado, 
Thomas Mink, published an internet-based journal called The Howling Pig.  In this journal, the 
student created a fictitious character named “Junius Puke,” an ill-concealed reference to a local 
university professor whose actual name was Junius Peake.  The online journal published altered 
photographs of Professor Peake wearing dark sunglasses and a “Hitler-like mustache.” The 
fictitious character was given to saying things in language the real professor would be unlikely to 
use and expressing views inconsistent with those of the real Professor Peake.
487
 
The real Professor Peake, “who was not amused,”
488
 complained to the local police 
department, which began an investigation into whether a violation of the Colorado criminal libel 
                                                          
486
 613 F.3d 995. 
487
 Id. at 1008. Statements in the online journal attributed to the fictitious character Junius Puke include:  “This will 
be a regular bitch sheet that will speak truth to power, obscenities to clergy, and advice to all the stoners sitting 
around watching Scooby Doo,” “This will be a forum for the pissed off and disenfranchised in Northern Colorado, 
basically everybody,” “I made it to where I am through hard work, luck, and connections, all without a college 
degree,” “Dissatisfaction with a cushy do-nothing ornamental position led me to form this subversive little paper,” 
and “I don’t normally care much about the question of daycare since my kids are grown and other people’s children 
give me the willies[.]” Id. 
488
 Id. at 998. 
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statute had occurred.  No charges ever were filed against Mr. Mink.  However, as part of the 
criminal investigation a search warrant was executed on his residence based upon an affidavit 
prepared by police and reviewed by Deputy District Attorney Susan Knox.  Mr. Mink 
subsequently filed a federal civil rights lawsuit against Ms. Knox, and his claim turned, in 
relevant part, on whether the affidavit, even if true, asserted facts that could support a 
prosecution for criminal libel.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that it did not 
because the statements included in The Howling Pig that reflected on Professor Peake constituted 
parody that no reasonable person would have believed to be true assertions of fact.
489
  
Consequently, they could not—as a matter of law—damage the professor’s reputation or 
constitute a libel against him.
490
 From the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, 
the significance of Mink is this:  The Tenth Circuit noted that “[c]ivil and criminal libel cases are 
subject to the same constitutional limitations”
491
 and that Supreme Court precedent in civil cases 
“provides protection for statements such as parody, fantasy, rhetorical hyperbole, and 
imaginative expressions that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an 
individual.”
492
  “This provides assurance that public debate will not suffer for lack of 
‘imaginative expression’ or the ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ which has traditionally added much to the 
                                                          
489
 Id. at 1008-09. The Tenth Circuit found it “significant” that The Howling Pig writings contained the following 
disclaimer:  “The Howling Pig would like to make sure that there is no possible confusion between our editor Junius 
Puke and the Monfort Distinguished Professor of Finance, Mr. Junius “Jay” Peake.  Mr. Peake is an upstanding 
member of the community as well as an asset to the Monfort School of Business where he teaches about 
microstructure.  Peake is active in many community groups, married and a family man.  He is nationally known for 
his work in the business world, and has consulted on questions of market structure.  Junius Puke is none of those 
things and a loudmouth know-it-all to boot, but luckily he’s frequently right and so is a true asset to this 
publication.” Id. at 1009. 
490
 Id. at 1007 (“The test is not whether the story is or is not characterized as ‘fiction,’ ‘humor,’ or anything else in 
the publication, but whether the charged portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual 
facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which she participated.  If it could not be so understood, the charged 
portions could not be taken literally.” (quoting Pring v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982)). 
491
 Id. at 1005 n.7. 
492
 Id. at 1005 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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discourse of our Nation.”
493
  Thus, the Tenth Circuit in Mink applied post-Garrison civil libel 
principles to decide this criminal libel case. 
Phelps v. Hamilton (10th Cir. 1995):
494
  Anti-homosexual activists brought suit against 
the District Attorney of Shawnee County, Kansas, seeking invalidation of the state criminal 
defamation law.  The federal district court invalidated the statute.  The district attorney appealed, 
and the Tenth Circuit upheld the Kansas criminal defamation statute despite the failure of the 




The Tenth Circuit’s relied on state-law rules of statutory instruction to guide its 
application of First Amendment principles.  There was no dispute that the Kansas criminal 
defamation statute must include an actual malice standard; rather, at issue in this case was the 
factual question of whether the statute did, in fact, contain such a requirement.  The Tenth 
Circuit construed the Kansas statute to include an “actual malice” requirement despite the 
absence of those words in the statute
496
 because to do otherwise would cause “the unseemly 
result that the constitutionality of the statute would be determined by whether the challenge was 
brought in federal or state court.”
497
   
                                                          
493
 Id. at 1005 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)). 
494
 59 F.3d 1058. 
495
 The Kansas Legislature in 1995, the same year the Phelps case was decided, amended the state’s criminal 
defamation statute and expressly included in it an actual malice standard.  The statute was then codified at K.S.A. 
21-4004. 
496
 In this regard, Phelps stands virtually alone among the genre of cases in which inferior federal courts and state 
courts applied the Garrison rule to state criminal defamation statutes.  (But see generally People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 
935 (Colo. 1991) (en banc), in which the Colorado Supreme Court used similar reasoning to preserve that state’s 
criminal defamation statute against constitutional attack.)  As discussed infra at Section 4, the majority of state 
courts required state criminal defamation statutes to expressly include an actual malice standard in order to comply 
with Garrison and, if no such standard was included in the words of the statute, other courts struck down the statute 
as unconstitutional and left it to the respective state legislature to repair if it so desired.  It is notable that, although 
the Phelps court upheld the Kansas statute by reading into it an implicit requirement to prove actual malice when 
required by Garrison, the Kansas Legislature reacted soon after this decision to amend its statute by inserting into it 
an express actual malice requirement. 
497
 Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1073.  
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The Phelps case is notable because of its reliance on the state rules of statutory 
construction to read into a criminal libel statute the “actual malice” requirement.  Other courts 
presented with the same problem have refused to do so.
498
  This contrast shows how the Supreme 
Court’s silence on the constitutionality of criminal defamation laws for almost half a century has 
resulted in different applications of the same principles in different jurisdictions. 
Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat (1st Cir. 2003):
499
  A newspaper reporter, Tomás De Jesús 
Mangual, challenged the constitutionality of Puerto Rico’s criminal libel statute principally on 
the basis that it failed to incorporate the requirement that actual malice be proven in the context 
of defamatory statements made about public officials or public figures. 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals found the Puerto Rico statute unconstitutional 
because, inter alia, it did not include within its terms an “actual malice” requirement.  The 
contrast between the approach of the Tenth Circuit in Phelps and the First Circuit in Mangual is 
as stark as the difference between considering a statute on its face or as applied.
500
  The Mangual 
court struck down the Puerto Rico criminal libel statute because “on its face, [the statute] is 
constitutionally deficient, in that it does not require that the New York Times [v. Sullivan] and 
                                                          
498
 Compare Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991), with Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1073 n.24.  The Phelps court at 
footnote 24 expressly compared its approach with that of the Fitts court:  “The district court [in the Phelps case] also 
referred to Fitts v. Kolb, which noted that all state courts which have considered constitutional challenges to similar 
criminal defamation laws have invalidated them and ‘left the revisions to the state legislators.’ Moreover, the district 
court highlighted that Fitts refused to interpret the criminal defamation statute along the lines of South Carolina’s 
civil defamation law because that law has been judicially developed while its criminal counterpart has been the 
province of the legislature.  However, the district court failed to note two essential differences between Fitts and the 
instant case: (1) that, unlike Kansas courts, South Carolina courts have been hesitant to interpret statutes liberally to 
uphold them against challenge, and (2) that unlike Kansas, South Carolina lacked an interpretation of a prior statute 
that included the actual malice standard for matters of public concern.” Phelps, 59 F.3d at 1073 n.24 (citations 
omitted).  
499
 317 F.3d 45. 
500
 The difference is explained, in part, by the different rules of statutory construction applied by the different circuit 
courts.  The Mangual court was not persuaded by arguments that case law had effectively inserted an actual malice 
standard into the Puerto Rico criminal libel statute. 
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Garrison standard of actual malice be proven in order for a statement disparaging a public 
official or figure to be successfully prosecuted.”
501
 
Tollett v. United States (8th Cir. 1973):
502
  Ray Allen Tollett mailed eight postcards 
containing references to a former employee, and to the former employee’s wife, to the former 
employee’s new place of business.  The postcards contained assertions that the former employee 
engaged in homosexual conduct and that the former employee’s wife was a prostitute.  Federal 
prosecutors charged Mr. Tollett with violating a federal law prohibiting, inter alia, mailing 
letters that contained “defamatory” material written on the outside of the card or envelope where 
it could be seen by people other than the intended recipient.
503
  Mr. Tollett was convicted in the 
United States District Court, and he appealed on the ground the statute was unconstitutional. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the statute on the ground it was an 
overbroad content-based regulation of speech.
504
  To the extent the statute barred “libelous” and 
“defamatory” writings,
505
 the Eighth Circuit used this case to express its doubt that the criminal 
law is a constitutionally appropriate tool for imposing liability for defamatory speech.
506
  The 
                                                          
501
 Id. at 66 (emphasis added).  
502
 485 F.2d 1087. 
503
 Id. at 1088.  The federal statute read:  “All matters otherwise mailable by law, upon the envelope or outside cover 
or wrapper of which, or any postal card upon which is written or printed or otherwise impressed or apparent any 
delineation, epithet, term, or language of libelous, scurrilous, defamatory, or threatening character, or calculated by 
the terms or manner or style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of 
another, is nonmailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails nor delivered from any post office nor by any 
letter carrier, and shall be withdrawn from the mails under such regulations as the Postal Service shall prescribe.” Id. 
at 1088 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1948)). 
504
 Id. at 1091 (“The statute specifically punishes libelous, scurrilous, defamatory and threatening speech.  The penal 
provision is invoked only when the content of the words written on the outside of the envelope are words of this 
nature.  The statute does not bar the writing of all words on the outside of an envelope or postcard.  The government 
asserts that the prohibited language can be safely sealed in an envelope.  This fact has little relevancy to the issue at 
hand.  It would be judicial sophistry to deny that the government, under the statute, is in the business of directly 
censoring the content of the exposed writing.  The constitutionality of the statute must be measured in this light and 
not from the standpoint of merely regulating the form of the communication.”). 
505
 The case includes separate discussion of the statute’s prohibition on material that would be considered obscene.  
That is outside the scope of our discussion for purposes of this Part. 
506
 Id. at 1095-96 (“Thus, we conclude the only tenable basis upon which the government might justify a criminal 
libel act such as Sec. 1718 must relate to the claim that it serves as a supplement to the civil libel laws to protect the 
dignity of reputation of the individual.  However, we think this, too, is a weak and questionable basis for 
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court found that if the purpose of libel laws is to compensate damage to a person’s reputation, 
then 
“[t]he attempt to inject the government into such issues through the libel laws 
should be struck down as opposed to the fundamental nature of the system, [and if 
the purpose is] to protect against injury to a person’s feelings [then] . . . . A civil 
action for damages in this situation would have a minimal effect upon the 
operation of a system of free expression.  The government’s role is primarily that 




Having made clear its disfavor of the very concept of using the criminal law to punish 
defamation, however, the Eighth Circuit stopped short of striking down this statute on that 
ground and, instead, rested its decision on vagueness and overbreadth.
508
 
* * * 
 
As the cases above illustrate, the federal circuits have endeavored to apply the Sullivan 
and Garrison rules to laws that punish defamation with criminal sanctions.  The Tollett court, 
like Garrison, questioned the continued constitutional viability of criminal punishment for 
defamatory speech.  The Mangual court and the Phelps court took opposite approaches to the 
question of whether the “actual malice” requirement must be expressly written into the statute by 
the legislature or whether it could be inferred from the common law, even after Ashton abolished 
the common law of libel.  And the Mink court did not hesitate to apply post-Sullivan 
developments in the civil law of libel to the criminal libel case before it. 
Those sorts of subtle divergences and thematic developments by the federal circuits in the 
half century since Garrison was decided also are reflected in the post-Garrison federal district 
court decisions, as is shown in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
governmental intrusion into the delicate area of regulating expression.  For the true danger flows not from the 
governmental proscription of ‘bad’ language but from the damage to First Amendment freedoms in deterring the 
free exchange of the ‘good.’  Self-censorship through fear of criminal punishment can diminish the boundaries of 
original thought and expression of utilitarian emotions and idea.” (footnotes omitted)). 
507
 Id. at 1096 n.19 (quoting with approval THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 543 
(Random House 1970)) (emphasis omitted). 
508
 Id. at 1096.  
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Section 3:  Post-Garrison, in the federal districts 
In general, federal district court decisions applying the First Amendment to criminal 
defamation statutes are unremarkable because their application is either consistent with 
established law or results in an appeal for clarification by the circuit.  There are, however, 
three
509
 federal trial court decisions interpreting the post-Sullivan and post-Garrison view of the 
First Amendment law of defamation that deserve mention.  Two of the cases are notable because 
they are oft cited by other courts rendering opinions on the subject.
510
  The third case raises the 
interesting and unusual question whether the First Amendment analysis differs in any way if the 




 The two most-cited federal district court cases applying the post-Garrison rules to 
criminal libel statutes are Fitts v. Kolb
512
 and United States v. Handler.
513
   
                                                          
509
 A fourth group of related cases also is of interest but principally because they arose in the author’s home state of 
Kansas and because of their soap opera-like facts, not because of their doctrinal contributions.  See Thomas v. City 
of Baxter Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (2005).  In Thomas, newspaper writer Ronald O. Thomas published an 
editorial critical of the city clerk of Baxter Springs, Kansas.  He was charged in municipal court with criminal 
defamation pursuant to a city ordinance that was identical to the Kansas criminal defamation statute.  When the city 
prosecutor recused himself for conflict of interest but then failed to timely appoint a special prosecutor, the charges 
were dismissed for failure to prosecute, although the city expressly reserved the possibility of refiling.  Thomas filed 
an action in federal district court seeking to enjoin the prosecution on the ground that the criminal defamation 
ordinance was unconstitutional.  Id. at 1293-94.  The federal district court held that the Baxter Springs criminal 
defamation ordinance (and, therefore, the identical Kansas statute upon which it was based) was constitutional on its 
face.  The court applied the Tenth Circuit’s holding in Phelps v. Hamilton in concluding that the previous version of 
the statute, which had not by its terms included an “actual malice” requirement, was constitutional.  Since the 
legislature had amended the statute (and the ordinance had been amended as well) to include an express actual 
malice requirement, the Thomas court concluded that the statute was constitutional.  The Thomas court then 
proceeded to analyze and reject arguments that the statute (and ordinance) were unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague.  Thus, the post-Phelps Kansas criminal defamation statute was upheld against constitutional challenge.  Id. at 
1295-97.  See also How v. City of Baxter Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1300 (D. Kan. 2005); How v. City of Baxter 
Springs, 217 Fed. Appx. 787, 2007 WL 533881 (10th Cir. Feb. 22, 2007) (unpublished opinion). 
510
 See Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991), and United States v. Handler, 383 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 
1974). 
511
 Porter v. Kimzey, 309 F. Supp. 993 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (per curiam). 
512
 779 F. Supp. 1502 (D.S.C. 1991). 
513
 383 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Md. 1974).  
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Fitts v. Kolb (D.S.C. 1991):
514
  The Fitts decision is notable for its oft-quoted outstanding 
assembly of the history of criminal libel.
515
  The case arose when James A. Fitts, the publisher of 
                                                          
514
 779 F. Supp. 1502. 
515
 Because this may be the most thorough yet concise judicial summary of the long history of criminal libel, and if 
oft quoted by other courts, the history assembled in Fitts is quoted here extensively:  “Criminal libel is notoriously 
intertwined with the history of governmental attempts to suppress criticism.  The notion that expression may be 
penalized goes back at least as far as 880 A.D. when Alfred the Great decreed that ‘[i]f anyone is guilty of public 
slander, and it is proved against him, it is to be compensated with no lighter penalty than the cutting off of his 
tongue. . ..’  Throughout the centuries, criminal libel has experienced what one court has referred to as an 
‘ignominious history.’  One commentator has suggested that the law of defamation is ‘a forest of complexities, 
overgrown with anomalies, inconsistencies, and perverse rigidities.’ 
“In medieval England, prosecutions for libel were originally under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, but as 
early as 1275, the royal courts assumed jurisdiction over seditious libel, the branch of libel dealing with false 
statements about the affairs of the state and those who administered the government.  The most notorious example of 
the use of the criminal law to punish seditious libel occurred in the royal Court of Star Chamber.  There, truth was 
not a defense, and a defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the issue of whether the alleged statement was 
defamatory.  Eventually, the Star Chamber’s use of criminal libel was adopted by the common-law courts in 
England, which at least provided trials by jury. 
“The modern law of criminal libel is said to have its origin in De Libellis Famosis, which arose out of a libel in 
verse directed against the Archbishop of Canterbury, then deceased, and a living Bishop.  Lord Coke analyzed the 
principal points resolved:  ‘Every libel is made either against a private man, or against a magistrate or public person.  
If it be against a private man it deserves a severe punishment, for although the libel be made against one, yet it 
incites all those of the same family, kindred or society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to quarrels and 
breach of the peace, and may be the cause of the shedding of blood and great inconvenience; if it be against a 
magistrate, or other public person, it is a greater offense; for it concerns not only the breach of the peace, but also the 
scandal of Government; for what greater scandal of Government can there be than to have corrupt and wicked 
magistrates to be appointed by the King to govern his subject under him?’ 
“Thus, one of the principal rationales for punishing private libels was that they tended toward breach of the peace.  
A corollary to this proposition was that truth was irrelevant; in fact the true insult was considered more likely to give 
offense ‘for, as the woman said, she would never grieve to be told of her red nose if she had not one indeed.’ 
“In the colonies, the law of criminal libel was applied against critics of the Crown with equal ferocity.  A New York 
publisher’s attack of the colonial governors in 1735 led to the famous trial of John Peter Zenger.  Indicted for 
criminal libel, he was defended by Andrew Hamilton, who sought to have the jury pass on his defense of truth.  The 
royal judge denied this defense, but the jury disregarded the charge and acquitted Zenger.  Zenger’s case became a 
symbol of the oppressions of the Crown during the revolution. 
“With the establishment of independence, the states adopted new constitutions with guarantees of freedom of speech 
and the press, the first being that of Virginia in 1776.  By the opening of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, 
eleven states had such provisions embodied in their constitutions or bill of rights.  Such was the background of the 
First Amendment.  The free speech provisions of the federal and state constitutions were the subject of much debate 
among those who had enacted them, but it seems probable that one of the principal targets at which they were aimed 
was the law of seditious libel, that branch of criminal libel law which had been used to control criticism of the 
government. 
“Ironically, in 1798, less than a decade after ratification of the First Amendment, Congress passed the Alien & 
Sedition Act, which made it a crime, punishable by five years in prison and a $5,000 fine, to: ‘write, print, utter or 
publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States, or 
either house of the Congress . . . or the President . . . with intent to defame . . . or to bring them, or either of them, 
into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them or either or any of them, the hatred of the good people of the 
United States.’ 
“The Alien & Sedition Act was immediately and vigorously attacked as unconstitutional by Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison, and the Virginia legislature passed the famous Virginia Resolutions of 1798 condemning it, saying 
that the Act exercised: ‘a power not delegated by the Constitution, but, on the contrary, expressly and positively 
forbidden by one of the amendments thereto—a power which, more than any other, ought to produce universal 
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a newspaper in South Carolina, published a criticism of two state legislators.  He was charged 
with criminal libel pursuant to the South Carolina penal code and arrested. The charges later 
were dropped at the request of the two legislators.  Mr. Fitts sought a declaratory judgment that 
the South Carolina criminal libel statute was unconstitutional because it failed to require proof of 
actual malice as required by Sullivan and Garrison.
516
   
In interpreting the South Carolina criminal libel statute, the Fitts court, like the First 
Circuit in Mangual, interpreted the statute before it strictly.  This contrasts with the Tenth Circuit 
in Phelps, which interpreted the Kansas criminal libel statute liberally and in favor of its 
constitutionality.  The difference, as explained by the Phelps court, was the differing standards 
for statutory construction that prevailed in the respective jurisdictions.  Nonetheless, Fitts and 
Phelps generally represent the two different approaches to applying the post-Garrison 
requirement that criminal libel statutes obligate the state to prove “actual malice”:  Fitts insists 
the legislature expressly insert the “actual malice” requirement into the statute,
517
 while Phelps 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
alarm, because it is leveled against the right of freely examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication among the people thereon, which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every 
other right.’ 
“The Alien & Sedition Act expired of its own terms in 1800, and was never tested in a court; however, ‘the attack 
upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history.’  Thomas Jefferson pardoned those convicted under it, 
and Congress voted to repay fines levied under it.  John C. Calhoun, in an 1836 report, assumed that its invalidity 
was a matter ‘which no one now doubts.’ 
“Although the Act by its terms only applied to criticism of government itself, Madison left no doubt that he believed 
the same strictures applied to any attempt to punish criticism of public officials, or candidates for office.  In his 
report supporting the Virginia Resolutions, he wrote:  ‘[I]t is manifestly impossible to punish the intent to bring 
those who administer the government into disrepute or contempt, without striking at the right of freely discussing 
public characters and measures; . . . which, again, is equivalent to a protection of those who administer the 
government, if they should at any time deserve the contempt or hatred of the people, against being exposed to it, by 
free animadversions of their character and conduct.’ 
“Let it be recollected, lastly, that the right of electing members of the government constitutes more particularly the 
essence of a free and responsible government.  The value and efficacy of this right depends on the knowledge of the 
comparative merits of the candidates for public trust, and on the equal freedom, consequently, of examining and 
discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively.” Id. at 1506-08 (citations, internal quotation 
marks, and footnotes omitted). 
516
 Fitts, 779 F. Supp. at 1505-06, 1514. 
517
 Id. at 1511. 
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finds sufficient a judicial interpretation that a statute demands proof of “actual malice” 
notwithstanding the absence of those terms from its wording. 
United States v. Handler (D. Md. 1974):
518
  The Handler case arose when Wilfred 
Handler mailed a series of postcards containing critical and defamatory statements about former 
U.S. Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg
519
 and another member of the bar.  The government 
brought criminal charges against Mr. Handler under a federal statute prohibiting the printing of 
“libelous, scurrilous, defamatory or threatening” material on the exterior of mailable materials 
such that it is visible.
520
  Defendant challenged the constitutionality of the federal statute, which 
was “a sort of postal criminal libel statute.”
521
 
The Handler court struck down the federal statute in what would be an unremarkable 
opinion but for two matters.  First, Handler suggests that in addition to any other analyses, a 
court reviewing a criminal libel statute must ensure that the state convincingly shows an 
‘overriding and compelling state interest’ in the individual prosecution under review.
522
   
[E]ven if criminal libel statutes are constitutional in general, in any given case a 
court is required to weigh the purposes furthered by the particular statute against 
the particular restraints placed by that statute on expression, before that statute 
may be held to be constitutionally valid.
523
   
                                                          
518
 338 F. Supp. 1267. 
519
 Id. at 1269 (noting that one of the postcards contained this writing:  “Arthur J. Goldberg . . . is an habitual 
repugnant criminal—one of the most dangerous in the United States.  So is his wife.  Or else, to protect his own 
reputation for piety, Criminal Ex-Justice Goldberg makes it appear that his wife perpetrates certain of his despicable 
crimes.”). 
520
 Id. at 1269 n.1 (“All matter otherwise mailable by law, upon the envelope or outside cover or wrapper of which, 
or any postal card upon which is written or printed or otherwise impressed or apparent any delineation, epithet, term, 
or language of libelous, scurrilous, defamatory or threatening character, or calculated by the terms or manner or 
style of display and obviously intended to reflect injuriously upon the character or conduct of another, is 
nonmailable matter, and shall not be conveyed in the mails nor delivered from any post office nor by any letter 
carrier, and shall be withdrawn from the mails under such regulations as the Postal Service shall prescribe.  Whoever 
knowingly deposits for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable matter, or 
knowingly takes the same from the mails for the purpose of circulating or disposing of or aiding in the circulation or 
disposition of the same, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1718)). 
521








Obviously, if that case-by-case balancing approach were the prevailing law, then nothing would 
remain of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion in relation to criminal prosecutions for libel. 
Second, the Handler court appears to call into question the very concept of criminal libel 
statutes to the extent that they are justified “to punish an indigent who could not be reached by a 
civil judgment for damages.”
524
  The Handler court found that such a justification of the need for 
criminal remedies to punish libel “might possibly meet a ‘rational basis’ test” but would not 
“[rise] to the level necessary to meet the ‘compelling interest’ test applicable in cases involving 
restrictions on First Amendment protected speech.”
525
   
Neither of these legal concepts, broached in Handler, has been adopted by any federal 
court of appeals.  Because of Handler, however, these concepts have been articulated and remain 
available for consideration by future litigants who have an interest in advancing them to 
challenge criminal defamation statutes.  
Porter v. Kimzey (N.D. Ga. 1970):
526
 The third and final noteworthy federal district court 
decision arose when a Georgia state prison guard, Harold Porter, made critical and allegedly 
defamatory statements about state Department of Corrections officials.  In an unusual maneuver, 
criminal defamation charges were brought against Mr. Porter by the filing of a private complaint, 
not a filing of the district attorney.  Mr. Porter brought a pre-prosecution facial challenge to the 
Georgia criminal defamation statute in federal district court under a little-used provision of 






 309 F. Supp. 993. 
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federal civil-rights law that allowed a federal three-judge panel to hear challenges to and, when 
appropriate, to enjoin state prosecutions as being in violation of federal law.
527
   
The three-judge panel held that this was not a circumstance in which pre-prosecution 
federal review of a state criminal case was appropriate and declined to consider the matter on its 
merits.  The case would, therefore, be unremarkable except for an obscure passage in the panel’s 
ruling arising from the fact that these charges were brought by private complaint rather than a 
filing of the district attorney.  The panel wrote: 
[T]he arrest here is based upon a private warrant taken out by one citizen of the 
state against another.  It is not founded on an organized effort at law enforcement 
or harassment by public officials.  As such, the accused’s rights are amply 
safeguarded by Grand Jury action, by his ability to raise his constitutional issues 
in the state court, and by the many defenses available on the merits.
528
 
   
While the unusual circumstances of this case, and the history of federal involvement in 
Georgia to protect federal civil rights, counsel against reading too much into this opinion, it is 
conceivable that these judges saw a constitutionally significant distinction between a criminal 
complaint brought by the state itself through its employee-prosecutors and one, as here, brought 
by private citizens.  In that sense, Porter raises the question by analogy whether a constitutional 
distinction between private actions, including civil libel, and government actions, such as 
traditional criminal libel prosecutions, may still exist. 








                                                          
527
 Id. at 994-95.  The plaintiff claimed federal jurisdiction under Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).  
Because this dissertation is focused on First Amendment issues, not on federal jurisdiction issues, no further analysis 
of this jurisdictional issue will be made here. 
528
 Id. at 996. 
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Section 4:  Post-Garrison, in the state courts 
Because the bulk of criminal prosecutions are creatures of state law, state courts are the 
most prolific interpreters of the First Amendment’s limitations on the power of government to 
impose criminal sanctions on those who speak or publish defamatory falsehoods.  This Section 4 
will review a selection of cases in which state appellate courts have reviewed criminal 
prosecutions for defamation for compliance with the commands of the First Amendment.  The 
general result, of course, has been that state courts have struck down criminal defamation statutes 
that failed to meet the requirements of Garrison.    
However, two distinct approaches have emerged.  The majority approach has been for the 
court to strike down the state statute in its entirety and leave it to the legislature to reconstitute 
the statute in a manner conforming to the First Amendment if it so wishes.  This majority 
approach is akin to finding the statute unconstitutional on its face.  The minority approach has 
been to strike down only the portion of the state statute that violates the First Amendment and 
leave the remainder of the statute intact.  This minority approach is akin to finding the statute 
unconstitutional as applied. 
   
Survey of cases adopting the majority approach (striking down statute) 
For decades after Garrison, state courts grappled with applying its commands to state 
criminal defamation prosecutions.  Most of those statutes did not expressly include a requirement 
for proof of “actual malice.”  The majority of state courts, as illustrated by the cases below, 
struck down the offending statute in its entirety, leaving it to the legislature subsequently to 
decide whether to rewrite the statute to conform with Garrison’s commands.  In that sense, the 
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majority rule in state courts is in harmony with the line of cases described by the federal district 
court in South Carolina in Fitts,
529
 declining to repair a statutory defect by judicial construction. 
Commonwealth v. Armao (Pennsylvania 1972):
530
  Defendant Eugene Armao was the 
managing editor and Defendant Arnold Orsatti the publisher of a weekly newspaper. They 
published a front-page article regarding a different publication, a tabloid named ‘Observer’, 
under the headline:  “Liquor Trade Tabloid ‘Observer’ Linked to Operation of Notorious S.A. 
Club.”
531
 Defendants were charged in the Court of Common Pleas with criminal libel under 
Pennsylvania law, convicted at a bench trial, granted a new trial, convicted a second time at a 
jury trial, sentenced to fines and prison time, and the Superior Court affirmed without opinion.  
Defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
532
  The Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held the state’s criminal libel statute unconstitutional because it did not incorporate the 
actual malice standard required by the United States Supreme Court.
533
   
Weston v. State (Arkansas 1975):
534
  Joseph Weston was editor and publisher of the 
Sharp Citizen, a weekly newspaper in Arkansas.  He published an article under the headline:  
“Sharp Citizen makes a mistake in reporting story of Corning and discovers that narcotics racket 
                                                          
529
 Fitts, 779 F. Supp. 1502.  
530
 286 A.2d 626. 
531
 Armao, 286 A.2d at 627-28.  The alleged libelous statement was:  “The name James Buchanan, Associate Editor 
of the liquor trade tabloid ‘Observer’ (which wields considerable influence with members of the liquor industry and 
the Pennsylvania State Liquor Control Board) also appears as the President and Director of the notorious S.A. Club 
(Sports Alliance) at 212 South 13
th
 Street, while Mr. James Buchanan is also listed as a director of the CR Club 
(Club Revel, Incorporated) at 810-12 South Darien Street.  The S.A. Club has been well-known as a hangout for sex 
deviates.  It is housed in a building owned by COVE, Inc., with relatives of Frank Palumbo on the Board.” Id. 
532
 Id. at 628.  
533
 Id. at 632 (“The statutory language makes no provision for truth being an absolute defense.  Likewise, no 
recognition is given the reckless disregard and knowing falsity standard mandated by New York Times and Garrison.  
The Pennsylvania criminal libel statutes are only limited in their application to criticisms of ‘public officers’ or 
‘candidates’, but Rosenbloom clearly extends the First Amendment guarantees in this area to public issues and 
events of public of general interest.  Finally, as New York Times and Garrison strongly intimate ‘negligence’ is a 
wholly inappropriate concept in the area of freedom of speech and of the press.  Only a knowing falsity or reckless 
disregard of the truth are actionable in civil defamation.  It would violate all sound and fundamental principles of 
justice to have a merely negligent statement an occasion for the imposition of criminal penalties, and the First 
Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court forbids such a result.” (footnote omitted)).  
534
 Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1975). 
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flourishes in Clay County and Corning under direction of Sheriff Liddell Jones, an appointee of 
Governor Dale Bumpers.”
535
  Mr. Weston was charged with the criminal libel of Sheriff Jones 
and was convicted at a jury trial in the circuit court.  He was fined $4,000 and sentenced to three 
months in prison.  He appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
536
 
The Arkansas Supreme Court held the state criminal libel statute unconstitutional because 
it did not incorporate the Garrison requirements of truth being an absolute defense or of the 
necessity to prove actual malice when the criticism involves a public official.  The Arkansas 
Supreme Court cited Armao in declining to read into the statute the nonexistent language that 
would conform it to First Amendment requirements, and went further to hold that jury 
instructions, which correctly stated the law, were insufficient to save the defective statute, which 
did not.
537
   
Eberle v. Municipal Court (California Court of Appeals 1976):
538
  Paul Eberle, Shirley 
Eberle and Mickey Leblovic were charged in Los Angeles municipal court with criminal libel in 
violation of California law for expressions they made about actor Angie Dickinson.
539
  The 
defendants sought a writ of prohibition from the California Superior Court barring the municipal 
court from proceeding to hear the underlying criminal prosecution on the ground that the 
                                                          
535
 Id. at 413,  The body of the article went on to state:  “In the meantime, however, we also discovered that law 
enforcement in Clay County has dropped to a low level again under the direction of the present sheriff, Liddell 
Jones, appointee of Governor Dale Bumpers who took office following the passing away of Sheriff Pond.  It was 
Sheriff Liddell Jones and his deputies who made the threats of violence to witnesses of the death of Street Shaw.” 
Id. 
536
 Id. at 414. 
537
 Id. at 415-16. 
538
 127 Cal. Rptr. 594. 
539
 Id. at 596. The particulars of what they said or published are were not presented to the court, but the court did 
note that all parties conceded that Angie Dickinson was a public figure for purposes of criminal defamation analysis 
and went on to speculate about the harm she may have suffered as a result of the defamation:  “Although the 
substance of the alleged libel has not been submitted to this court for consideration at this stage in the proceedings, 
we note that with respect to well-known performers, such as the individual herein named, a broad range of material 
might be considered harmful or damaging to her professional career.  While not a public official, she is clearly a 
notable and well known public figure, as the trial court and both parties concede.” Id. at 596 n.2.   
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California criminal libel statute being applied was unconstitutional.  The Superior Court agreed 
and entered the writ of prohibition barring the prosecution.  The state appealed.
540
 
The California Court of Appeals applied Garrison and held the California criminal libel 
statute unconstitutional.  The California court followed the majority rule and struck down the 
entire statute rather than attempting to construe it in a manner that preserved some portions while 
striking others,
541
 explaining its decision to do so as follows:   
The exclusion of the objectionable portions of the California criminal libel 
statutes as mandated by New York Times [v. Sullivan] and Garrison, as 
hereinbefore discussed, requires a wholesale rewriting, and any attempt at 
draftsmanship on our part would transgress both the legislative intent and the 
judicial function.  It would constitute a flagrant breach of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.  This we refuse to do.
542
   
 
Gottschalk v. State (Alaska 1978):
543
  Alaska State Trooper Phillip Gilson responded one 
evening to a reported disturbance at the Fisherman’s Bar in Naknek and found George 
Gottschalk patronizing the establishment, at which time the two had a “disagreeable exchange of 
words.”
544
  The trooper then impounded Mr. Gottschalk’s truck for violations of various traffic 
safety laws.  The next day, when Mr. Gottschalk went to reclaim his truck from impoundment, 
he accused Trooper Gilson of stealing $250 from the truck’s glove compartment.  An 
investigation determined no money was stolen.  Mr. Gottschalk later recanted his accusation of 
theft and admitted that the $250 was never in the truck.
545
 
                                                          
540
 Id. at 596-97. 
541
 Interestingly, however, the California court did not cite as persuasive authority either the Pennsylvania court’s 
earlier decision in Armao or the Arkansas court’s decision in Weston.  We do not know, therefore, whether the 
California court was aware that it was participating in developing what would become the majority approach to 
reviewing state criminal defamation laws under the requirements of Garrison. 
542
 Id. at 600 (citation omitted).  
543
 575 P.2d 289.  
544
 Id. at 289. 
545
 Id. at 289-90. 
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Mr. Gottschalk was charged with, inter alia, violating Alaska’s criminal defamation 
statute for having falsely accused Trooper Gilson of a crime.
546
  Mr. Gottschalk was convicted 
and sentenced to a six-month jail sentence, four months of which were suspended, and a $500 
fine.
547
  Gottschalk appealed on the ground that the Alaska criminal defamation statute was 
unconstitutional. 
The Alaska Supreme Court struck down the Alaska criminal defamation statute as 
unconstitutional.  The court found the statute unconstitutional for failing to satisfy the Garrison 
requirements for proof of actual malice.  The Alaska court concluded it would be “improper for 
us to engage in the radical reconstruction necessary to save [the Alaska criminal defamation 
statute] from unconstitutionality.”
548
   
State v. Defley (Louisiana 1981):
549
  Joseph Defley, Jr., appeared at a public meeting and 
disparaged the job performance of a former school superintendent and a former school 
supervisor, both of whom were deceased, by calling them “drunkards.”  The state brought 
criminal defamation charges against Mr. Defley for his comments.  Mr. Defley filed a motion to 
quash the charges on the ground that applying the criminal defamation statute to punish speech 
directed at the job performance of public officials would be unconstitutional.  The trial court 
denied the motion to quash, ruling that “deceased public officials are entitled to the same 
protection from criminal defamation accorded private citizens.”
550
 
                                                          
546
 Id. at 290.  TheAlaska statute provided:  “Libel and Slander.  A person who willfully speaks, writes, or in any 
other manner publishes defamatory or scandalous matter concerning another with intent to injure or defame him is 
guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment in a jail for not less than six months 
nor more than one year, or by a fine of not less than $50 nor more than $500, or by both.  This section applies to an 
allusion to person or family, with intent to injure, defame or maliciously annoy the family.”  Id. at 290 n.1 (quoting 
Alaska Statute 11.15.310).  
547
 Id. at 289. 
548
 Id. at 296.  In reaching this conclusion, and following the developing majority rule, the Alaska Supreme Court 
cited the persuasive precedents of Armao (Pennsylvania), Weston (Arkansas), and Eberle (California).  
549
 395 So. 2d 759. 
550
 Id. at 760-61. 
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The Louisiana Supreme Court applied the Garrison rule and reversed the trial court.  The 
Louisiana Supreme Court required a showing of actual malice and held that requirement to 
persist even after the public official’s death. 
The deceased have no opportunity to counteract false statements and are unable to 
rebut defamatory allegations.  Their reputations, like those of private individuals, 
are thus vulnerable to injury.  However, one who in life accepts the 





State v. Powell (New Mexico Court of Appeals 1992):
552
  David William Powell was a 
professor at Western New Mexico University who made defamatory comments about the job 
performance of the university’s acting vice president for academic affairs.  The state charged 
Professor Powell with criminal libel under the New Mexico criminal libel statute.
553
  He was 
convicted in magistrate court and appealed to the district court, where the professor moved to 
dismiss the case on the ground that the New Mexico criminal libel statute was unconstitutional.  
The district court found the statute unconstitutional and dismissed the case.  The State of New 
Mexico appealed the dismissal.
554
 
The New Mexico Court of Appeals held the state criminal libel statute unconstitutional as 
applied, as here, to a public statement involving a matter of public concern.  The Powell court 
followed what by then had become the well-established majority rule and refused to read into the 
New Mexico criminal libel statute a requirement for the state to prove actual malice in order to 
sustain a conviction for public libel.
555
  The Powell court expressly acknowledged the emergence 
of two distinct approaches to applying the Garrison rule to state criminal defamation statutes, the 
                                                          
551
 Id. at 761 (citation omitted). 
552
 839 P.2d 139.  
553
 Id. at 141.  The statute read in its entirety:  “Libel consists of making, writing, publishing, selling or circulating 
without good motives and justifiable ends, any false and malicious statement affecting the reputation, business or 
occupation of another, or which exposes another to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation or disgrace.  Whoever 
commits libel is guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. (quoting N.M.S.A. 1978, Section 30-11-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984)).  
554
 Id. at 140. 
555
 Id. at 147. 
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majority rule of invalidating statutes that lack express requirements and the minority rule of 
construing statutes in a manner that satisfies Garrison.
556
  It followed the majority rule. 
State v. Helfrich (Montana 1996):
557
  Richard Helfrich distributed leaflets in Silver Bow 
County, Montana, that asserted an identified person had committed crimes.  The state filed, inter 
alia, criminal defamation charges against Mr. Helfrich in Justice Court, and he was convicted.  
Mr. Helfrich appealed his conviction to district court and moved to dismiss on the ground that 
the Montana criminal defamation statute was unconstitutional.  The district court denied the 
motion to dismiss, and Mr. Helfrich then entered a guilty plea conditioned upon his right to 
appeal on the issue of the statute’s constitutionality.
558
 
The Montana Supreme Court struck down the state’s criminal defamation statute as 
unconstitutional on its face 
559
 because it did not recognize truth as an absolute defense.  The real 
significance of Helfrich is its express recognition of the long line of cases it found persuasive.  
By the time of Helfrich, more than two decades after Garrison, the majority and minority 
approaches to applying Garrison had become settled law. 
Ivey v. State (Alabama 2001):
560
  In the late 1990s, State Senator Steve Windom was the 
Republican nominee for Lieutenant Governor of Alabama.  Melissa Myers filed a civil suit 
accusing Mr. Windom of soliciting prostitution and engaging in sexual misconduct.  Mr. 
Windom accused Ms. Myers, in cahoots with Garfield M. Ivey, of fabricating the whole story.  
                                                          
556
 Id.  In the former category, the Powell court places Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289; Weston v. State, 528 
S.W.2d 412; Eberle v. Municipal Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 594; and Commonwealth v. Armao, 286 A.2d 626.  In the 
latter category, the Powell court places People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935.   
557
 922 P.2d 1159. 
558
 Id. at 1160.   
559
 Id.  The statute at issue read, in pertinent part:  “(1) Defamatory matter is anything which exposes a person or a 
group, class, or association to hatred, contempt, ridicule, degradation, or disgrace in society or injury to his or its 
business or occupation.  (2) Whoever, with knowledge of its defamatory character, orally, in writing, or by any other 
means communicates any defamatory matter to a third person without the consent of the person defamed commits 
the offense of criminal defamation and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 6 months in the county 
jail or a fine of not more than $500, or both.”  Id. (quoting MCA 45-8-212). 
560
 821 So. 2d 937.   
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The State of Alabama then charged Mr. Ivey with, inter alia, criminal defamation.  He was tried, 
convicted and sentenced to 30 days in jail and a $500 fine.  Mr. Ivey appealed and the case was 
transferred to the Alabama Supreme Court.
561
   
The Alabama Supreme Court held the state’s criminal defamation statute unconstitutional 
because it failed to provide that when the speech was directed toward actions of a public official, 
such as Senator Windom, a constitutional conviction must include a showing of actual malice.
562
  
Following the majority rule, the Alabama Supreme Court declined to allow jury instructions to 
repair the constitutional flaw in the underlying criminal defamation statute and also declined to 
interpret the statute narrowly in a manner that effectively reads into it a requirement to prove 
actual malice where the words of the statute include no such requirement.
563
  
 I.M.L. v. State (Utah 2002):
564
  The I.M.L. court summarized the facts of the case as 
follows: 
In this case we consider the application of a law drafted more than one hundred 
years ago to the most modern of preoccupations—the Internet.  I.M.L., a high 
school student, was charged with criminal libel for creating an Internet web site 
on which he displayed disparaging comments about his teachers, classmates, and 
principal.  He moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute under which he was 
charged unduly burdens free speech and is unconstitutional on its face.  The 




The student, I.M.L., lodged an interlocutory appeal.  In a by-then familiar result, the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down the state criminal libel statute for failing to satisfy the commands of 
                                                          
561
 Id. at 938-40. 
562
 Id. at 949. 
563
 Id. at 948. The Ivey court engaged in a review of case law addressing the question of whether a court interpreting 
a criminal libel statute that does not by its terms require a showing of actual malice in prosecutions relating to 
speech directed at public persons or on matters of public concern.  While the Ivey court acknowledged that the Tenth 
Circuit in Phelps, supra, had allowed such an interpretation that reads such a requirement into a criminal defamation 
statute that does not expressly include it, it also demonstrated that that is the minority rule that had not been adopted 
in other jurisdictions.  Specifically, the Ivey court noted that Pennsylvania, Colorado, California and Arkansas had 
reached the opposite conclusion. 
564
 61 P.3d 1038. 
565
 Id. at 1040. 
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Garrison, particularly the requirement for proof of actual malice.  Following the majority rule, 
the I.M.L. court refused to apply a saving construction to the state’s criminal libel statute.
566
   
 
Survey of cases adopting the minority approach (upholding statute) 
A minority of state courts have applied a saving construction to their state’s criminal 
defamation statute and upheld it notwithstanding Garrison.  In that sense, the minority approach 
is similar to that taken by the Tenth Circuit in Phelps.
567
  However, the reason a state statute 
survives Garrison analysis is not always the same.  To the extent challenged statutes in these two 
cases were construed to apply only to private libels of private persons, they illustrate how the 
surviving, narrowed excluded category of defamatory speech may apply in the modern Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion. 
People v. Heinrich (Illinois 1984)
568
:  Defendant Paul Heinrich distributed leaflets stating 
that a private citizen in Illinois was “an unfit mother due to her promiscuity, deviate sexual 
behavior, illicit drug habit, and four pregnancies out of wedlock.”
569
  The leaflet stated that after 
giving birth to her first child, the woman had two abortions and a miscarriage.  The leaflet 
contained a picture of the woman along with her name, the name and address of the woman’s 
parents, and the name of the woman’s daughter.  The leaflet encouraged readers to contact local 
churches or the State of Illinois to help “protect the complainant’s ‘bastard child’ from her 
mother’s ‘deviate moral behavior.’”
570
 
                                                          
566
 Id. at 1048.  Interestingly, Utah had both a criminal libel statute, which was enacted before Garrison and which 
was under attack in this case, and also a criminal defamation statute, which was enacted post-Garrison and 
contained a requirement that the state prove actual malice.  In attempting to save the pre-Garrison criminal libel 
statute from constitutional attack, the State of Utah argued that the two statutes should be read together as both 
requiring proof of actual malice.  The Utah Supreme Court was not persuaded. 
567
 Phelps, 59 F.3d 1058. 
568
 470 N.E.2d 966. 
569
 Id. at 967.  
570
 Id. at 967-68. 
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The State of Illinois brought criminal defamation charges against Mr. Heinrich for the 
statements published in the leaflet.  Mr. Heinrich moved to dismiss, and the lower court found 
the Illinois criminal defamation statute unconstitutional and dismissed the case.  The State of 
Illinois appealed the dismissal.
571
 
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and upheld the state’s criminal defamation statute.   
First, the Heinrich court construed the Illinois criminal defamation statute
572
 to apply only to 
expressions that constitute fighting words.
573
  Therefore, the court reasoned, this criminal 
defamation statute did not need to satisfy the post-Garrison requirement for the state to prove 
actual malice because the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion as applied to fighting words, not to 
criminal defamation, governed this case.
574
  While that specific statutory construction is relevant 
only in Illinois as applied to Illinois law, it is notable that the Heinrich court, like the Tenth 
Circuit in Phelps,
575
 relied on state-specific methods of statutory construction to salvage the 
constitutionality of a criminal defamation statute.  In that manner, its approach was more akin to 
the developing minority approach than to the emerging majority rule. 
                                                          
571
 Id. at 967. 
572
 Id. at 968.  The pertinent element of the offense of criminal defamation in the Illinois statute stated:  “(a) A 
person commits criminal defamation when, with intent to defame another, living or dead, he communicates by any 
means to any person matter which tends to provoke a breach of the peace.”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ill. Rev. 
Stat. 1981, ch. 38, par. 27-1). 
573
 Id. at 970 (“Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or 
opinion safe-guarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that 
instrument.” (quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952) (emphasis omitted)). 
574
 Id. at 969.  In reaching this conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily on the comments to the Illinois 
statute, which expressly referred to the doctrines established by the United States Supreme Court in another case 
arising from Illinois law three decades earlier, Beauharnais, 343 U.S. 250.  The Illinois Supreme Court wrote:  
“Although the court in Beauharnais stated that libelous words were outside the protection of the first amendment, 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions evidence that the guarantees of the first amendment do place some limitation 
on the State’s power to proscribe defamation.  The extent of these limitations will be discussed below.  At this point, 
it suffices to note that the reference to Beauharnais in the committee comments to section 27-1 concerns the use 
‘fighting words’ not ‘libelous’ words.  Although Beauharnais has been criticized in regard to statements there 
concerning libel, the court’s position on ‘fighting words’ appears to have retained validity.” Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d at 
969 (citations omitted). 
575
 Phelps, 59 F.3d 1058.   
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Second, the Heinrich court concluded that because the complainant in this case was a 
private citizen, Garrison did not require a showing of actual malice.  The court expressly 
distinguished the facts of this case, involving libel directed at a private citizen about private 
matters, from the facts of other post-Garrison cases.
576
  The Heinrich court noted that, in 
Garrison, the United States Supreme Court “expressly reserved judgment on whether the defense 
of truth could be limited by the additional requirements of good motives and justifiable ends 
where the defamation was one in which the public had no interest.”
577
 The important holding in 
Heinrich is that state criminal defamation laws that do not otherwise satisfy the requirements of 
Garrison may nonetheless survive constitutional scrutiny if they are applied only to private 
defamations of private individuals regarding only matters of private, not public, concern.
578
  
People v. Ryan (Colorado 1991):
579
  Dennis Edward Ryan, a disgruntled former 
boyfriend, mailed copies of a fictitious “Wanted” poster referencing a woman he had previously 
dated to several businesses, bars and residences in a trailer court in Fort Collins, Colorado.  The 
poster contained the name and picture of the woman and stated that she was wanted for “fraud, 
conspiracy [sic] to commit fraud, various flimflam schemes, spouse abuse, child abuse-neglect, 
sex abuse, abuse of the elderly, prostitution, assault, larceny, theft of services, wage chiseling, 
[and] breach of contract.”
580
  Mr. Ryan was charged with violating the Colorado criminal 
                                                          
576
 Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d at 972 (finding that the trial court’s reliance on Weston v. State, 528 S.W.2d 412,  was 
misplaced because that case had involved defamation of a public official, its reliance on Eberle v. Municipal Court, 
127 Cal. Rptr. 594,  was misplaced because that case had involved a matter of public interest, and its reliance on 
Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, was misplaced because that case had involved defamation of a public official). 
577
 Id. at 971.  The Illinois Supreme Court went on to quote from footnote 8 in Garrison:  “We recognize that 
different interests may be involved where purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned; 
therefore, nothing we say today is to be taken as intimating any views as to the impact of the constitutional 
guarantees in the discrete area of purely private libels.”  Id. (citing Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8). 
578
 The constitutional law governing private libels has been further developed in the context of the civil law.  See, 
e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (private plaintiffs need not prove actual malice to obtain compensatory damages but must 
do so to obtain punitive damages); see also Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749. 
579
 806 P.2d 935 (en banc). 
580
 Id. at 936. The court further described the poster:  “The poster further stated that the victim ‘frequents local bars 





 and filed a pretrial motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the 
Colorado criminal defamation statute was unconstitutional.  The trial court found the statute to 
be unconstitutional because it lacked an actual malice standard as required by Garrison; the trial 
court then entered an order of dismissal.  The State of Colorado appealed.
582
 
The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the state’s criminal defamation statute by 
construing it narrowly.  The court found the statute “invalid only insofar as it reaches 
constitutionally protected statements about public officials or public figures on matters of public 
concern” and reinstated the criminal prosecution of Mr. Ryan because “[t]he statute remains 
valid to the extent that it penalizes libelous attacks under the facts of this case, where one private 
person has disparaged the reputation of another private individual.”
583
    
The notable aspect of Ryan is that the Colorado Supreme Court, foreshadowing the action 
of the Tenth Circuit four years later in the Phelps v. Hamilton case, construed a pre-Garrison 
criminal defamation statute in a manner that preserved it despite the absence in the statutory 
language of the Garrison-mandated requirement that the state prove actual malice.  The Ryan 
court read the Colorado statute to apply only to private libels that would be outside the scope of 
the explicit Garrison requirement of proof of actual malice.  In this manner, the Ryan court 
followed the minority view in which courts are willing to construe criminal defamation statutes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
multiple male customers,’ ‘often masquerades as peace workers, day care workers, cook, waitress, dancer,’ ‘has 
harbored various forms of VD,’ and is at ‘high risk for AIDS.’  In addition, the poster set forth the victim’s age, hair 
color, weight, height, eye color, birth date, and residence, and offered a $3,000 reward for ‘information leading to 
the criminal or civil prosecution’ of the victim.” Id.  
581
 Ryan, 806 P.2d at 936.  The statute stated, in relevant part:  “(1) A person who shall knowingly publish or 
disseminate, either by written instrument, sign, pictures, or the like, any statement or object tending to blacken the 
memory of one who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation of expose the natural defects 
of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, commits criminal libel.”  Id. 
(quoting § 18-13-105, 8B C.R.S. (1986)). 
582
 Ryan, 806 P.2d at 937. 
583
 Id. at 940-41.  
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in manners not obvious from the statutory language itself in order to save the statute from 
constitutional failure on its face. 
* * * 
On the whole, criminal prosecution for defamation no longer is preferred either in the United 
States or internationally,
584
 although criminal defamation laws continue to have their 
supporters.
585
 The Supreme Court long ago acknowledged the “preference for the civil 
remedy.”
586
  More than half a century ago, the Garrison Court implied as much by quoting with 
approval passages from commentators such as: “Usually we reserve the criminal law for harmful 
behavior which exceptionally disturbs the community’s sense of security. . . . It seems evident 
that personal calumny . . . is therefore inappropriate for penal control . . . .”
587
 And, similarly: 
Changing mores and the virtual disappearance of criminal libel prosecutions lend 
support to the observation that “. . .under modern conditions, when the rule of law 
is generally accepted as a substitute for private physical measures, it can hardly be 





                                                          
584
 See, e.g., IPI White Paper: Our Stand on Criminal Defamation, International Press Institute (Vienna, Austria), 
available at http://www freemedia.at/fileadmin/resources/application/IPI_White_Paper_Website_Version_Final.pdf 
(“International organisations and rights groups have long viewed civil defamation laws as legitimate avenues for the 
resolution of libel allegations, as long as the fines foreseen by such laws as punishment for defamation are not aimed 
at silencing journalists or news organisations, but solely at redressing the damage caused.  In a report to the UN 
Human Rights Council in 2010, the UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression asserted, ‘any attempt to 
criminalise freedom of expression as a means of limiting or censuring that freedom must be resisted’, and the 
rapporteur recommended that states ‘make civil liability proceedings the sole form of redress for complaints of 
damage to reputation.’”). 
585
 Consider, for example, the failed attempt by this author in 2003 to persuade the Kansas Senate to repeal the 
Kansas criminal defamation statute.  Despite what might have been a persuasive argument that the law “is an archaic 
statute whose use smacks of the tactics of repressive nations,” the Senate rejected the repeal effort by a wide margin, 
in part favoring the assertion that “without the threat of criminal prosecution, people with few assets could say 
whatever they wanted about someone else knowing it was unlikely they would be sued for damages.”  See Kansas 
Senate won’t budge on criminal-defamation law, The Associated Press (Feb. 19, 2003) (wire report), available at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/kansas-senate-wont-budge-on-criminal-defamation-law.   
586
 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 69. 
587
 Id. at 70 (quoting Model Penal Code, Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961, § 250.7, Comments, at 44.). 
588
 Id. at 69 (quoting first name Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 924 
(1963)) (footnote omitted). 
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Even before Garrison, the use of criminal prosecution as a remedy for defamation was in 
decline.
589
  Yet, Garrison left open the door for criminal prosecution of false and defamatory 
statements provided exacting constitutional requirements are satisfied, and such prosecutions do 
continue to occur both in the context of defaming private individuals
590
 and defaming public 
officials when actual malice is proven.
591
   
Since Garrison, however, lower courts have further questioned whether criminal 
prosecution is constitutionally appropriate at all as a remedy for the harm caused by false and 
defamatory statements.
592
  While it has generally been asserted that the constitutional 
requirements governing civil liability and criminal liability for false defamations have 
converged, the absence for half a century of Supreme Court cases addressing criminal 
defamation prosecutions renders that conclusion speculative.
593
  Because of the significant 
liberty interests implicated by criminal prosecution, it has been suggested that proof of actual 
malice may be constitutionally required in all criminal defamation prosecutions, even those 
involving private defamations, because: 
[w]hile it might be appropriate to subject the defamer of a private person to civil 
liability in the absence of actual malice, it is quite another matter to subject that 
                                                          
589
 See, e.g., Robert A. Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984 (1956) (A 
comprehensive study of criminal defamation prosecutions in the United States between 1920 and 1955 finding 58 
cases from 1920-29, 34 cases from 1930 through 1941, and only 18 from 1942 through 1955). 
590
 See, e.g., Heinrich, 470 N.E.2d 966; Ryan, 806 P.2d 935. 
591
 See, e.g., State v. Carson, 95 P.3d 1042, 2004 WL 1878312 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (unreported opinion) 
(sustaining the criminal defamation conviction of a newspaper publisher who published the defamatory falsehood 
that the mayor of Kansas City and her husband, a state judge, in fact resided outside Wyandotte County in violation 
of law). 
592
 See, e.g., Powell, 839 P.2d at 143 (“One message of Garrison is that criminal libel laws serve very little, if any, 
purpose.”); see also Gottschalk, 575 P.2d at 292 (“[O]ne final word should be said about the nature of the offense of 
criminal defamation.  Although one of its reasons for being was to prevent statements having a tendency to excite a 
violent response, that tendency is not generally regarded as an element of the offense.  It has become clear that the 
real interest being protected by criminal defamation statutes is personal reputation.  Whether that purpose justifies 
use of the criminal law has been questioned.” (footnoteomitted)). 
593
 The possibility that post-Sullivan developments in the constitutional requirements governing civil liability for 
false and defamatory statements may not apply in the criminal context was acknowledged by the New Mexico Court 
of Appeals in Powell, 839 P.2d at 143 (“[W]e have no explicit instructions from the Supreme Court regarding the 
extent of any constitutional privilege against criminal prosecution for defamatory statements involving matters of 
public concern when the defamed person is neither a public official nor a public figure.”). 
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same defamer to a conviction for criminal libel in the absence of any proof 
whatever that the statement was false or that the person making the statement 
either knew it to be false or, at a minimum, acted with reckless disregard of its 
truth or falsity.
594
   
 
The dissent in Ryan argued that the government should be constitutionally required to prove 
actual malice in all criminal defamation prosecutions regardless of whether the victim is a public 
official or figure or a private figure and regardless of whether the speech is on a matter of public 
concern or merely related to private issues
595
 in order to avoid the constitutionally impermissible 
risk that fear of criminal prosecution will chill protected speech.
596
   
  Thus, in modern practice, it is doubtful that any criminal prosecution for defamation 
would avoid scrutiny within the First Amendment, at least in the absence of the government 
proving actual malice.  It seems plausible to conclude that the modern excluded category of 
defamation may be invoked only with respect to civil liability.  In the realm of civil libel, it is 
highly likely all that remains of the excluded category is defamations uttered with actual malice; 
in the realm of criminal libel, that limitation on the excluded category is certain. The next 





                                                          
594
 Ryan, 806 P.2d at 942 (Quinn, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
595
 Id. at 941-44. 
596
 Id. at 942 (“A construction of statutory criminal libel that does not incorporate as essential elements of that crime 
the falsity of the statement and knowledge of its falsity, or at a minimum reckless disregard of truth or falsity, will 
inexorably induce silence as an alternative to avoiding entrapment in the amorphous and uncertain zone of 
criminality created by the statute.”). 
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Subpart III:  Does any excluded category for defamation remain? 
 The notion that New York Times v. Sullivan was a “new constitutional development”
597
 in 
the First Amendment law of defamation, including the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, is 
without question a substantial understatement.  Indeed, in the post-Sullivan era, it is reasonable 
to wonder:  Does anything remain of the tradition rule that libel is a category of speech excluded 
from the protection of the First Amendment? Or is it the case that all defamation cases now turn 
on analysis of the tertiary question—how the Speech Clause applies—and the implicit answer to 
the threshold question whether the Speech Clause applies at all is always “Yes”? 
 The Supreme Court itself has been less than clear about the answer to that question.  For 
example, in Sullivan, the majority wrote:   
Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of the peace, 
obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the 
repression of expression that have been challenged in this court, libel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations.  It must be measured by 
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.
598
   
 
The emphasized part of that passage, taken alone, would suggest that Sullivan ended the 
consideration of libel or defamation as an excluded category.  But the entirety of the passage 
leaves the matter muddled:  If libel is “like” the other stated categories of speech and thus “must 
be measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment,” does that mean that the other stated 
categories also are not excluded?  Surely this passage in Sullivan, without more, was not 
intended as a declaration that obscenity, for example, or advocacy of unlawful acts are no longer 
excluded categories.
599
   
                                                          
597
 Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 148. 
598
 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
599
 Perhaps a preferred reading of the above passage would lead to the conclusion that defamation, “like” obscenity 
and incitement, has been substantially narrowed by the Supreme Court in the decades since Chaplinsky but that 
something does indeed remain of the traditionally excluded category. 
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 Moreover, only eight months after deciding Sullivan, and before the end of 1964, the 
Supreme Court decided Garrison in which it stated that:  
the use of calculated falsehood . . . falls into that class of utterances which ‘are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed 
by the social interest in order and morality.’  Hence the knowingly false statement 





So the mixed signals were apparent from the dawn of the Sullivan era.  On the one hand, the 
Supreme Court seemed to suggest the traditional excluded category of defamatory speech 
unprotected by the First Amendment no longer existed; on the other hand, it seemed to suggest 
that the excluded category was narrowed but not abandoned. 
 In light of that seeming contradiction within Sullivan itself, as well as that between 
Sullivan and Garrison, what is the implication of Sullivan and its progeny on the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion as it relates to defamatory speech?   
It is apparent that the historic excluded category of defamation is broader than whatever 
remains today because the Supreme Court’s “decisions since the 1960’s have narrowed the scope 
of the traditional categorical exception[] for defamation.”
601
  To that end, it is clear that, at a 
minimum, defamatory statements about the official or public acts of public officials or public 
figures now enjoy First Amendment protection and are no longer excluded unless uttered with 
“actual malice.”
602
  Justice Brennan employed a double negative in concluding that the Gertz 
majority had further narrowed any remaining unprotected category for defamation:  “The Court 
does not hold that First Amendment guarantees do not extend to speech concerning private 
                                                          
600
 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
601
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
602
 Sulllivan, 376 U.S. 254; Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. 130. 
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persons’ involvement in events of public or general interest.”
603
  It may well be, as the holding in 
Dun & Bradstreet suggests, that some types of private statements about matters of private 
concern involving private persons—specifically, those uttered at least negligently—remain a 
category of defamatory statements excluded from First Amendment protection.  The concept 
would be consistent with the long-recognized view that “different interests may be involved 
where purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned.”
604
  However, even 
as it issued its holding, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality included this contradictory passage:  




 It is clear that Justice White, who participated in the Sullivan-Curtis Publishing-Gertz-
Dun & Bradstreet line of cases, sometimes in dissent, thought the effect of that line of cases was 
to eliminate defamation as an unprotected category.  From the standpoint of plain reason, Justice 
White’s analysis is persuasive.  It does, indeed, appear that both the effect of the prevailing 
opinions since Sullivan, as well as the intent of those opinions as indicated in their language, was 
to bring defamation and libel within the fold of the First Amendment, thus bringing to an end the 
traditional excluded category for defamation.  That seems particularly true with respect to 
limiting the government’s use of the criminal law to punish defamatory speech as evidenced by 
the absence of any criminal libel cases reaching the Supreme Court since Garrison (1964) and 
Ashton (1966). 
But if that was what really happened—and what really was intended to happen—by the 
Sullivan to Dun & Bradstreet line of cases, then why has the Supreme Court in subsequent cases 
persisted in identifying “libel” or “defamation” as an excluded category of speech?  It did so in 
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 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
604
 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 72 n.8. 
605
 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 760 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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Stevens in 2010, but curiously cited to Beauharnais—a pre-Sullivan, pre-Garrison case—as 
authority for that proposition.
606
 It did so again in Alvarez in 2012, but oddly cited to Sullivan 
and Gertz for that proposition.
607
 There would be no reason to continue to include defamation as 
an unprotected category if, indeed, the effect of Sullivan and its progeny were to bring all 
defamatory speech within the protection of the First Amendment.  Rather, if that were the effect, 
the Supreme Court should have simply stopped mentioning defamation in the list of unprotected 
categories, as it has done with profanity.  But that has not been the Supreme Court’s practice.  
Something different must be afoot. 
Thus, the most likely statement of the modern Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion as it 
applies to defamatory statements is this:  Although the Supreme Court has not prohibited 
criminal defamation laws and such prosecutions do still occur,
608
 it is questionable whether any 
criminal prosecution of defamatory statements would survive Supreme Court review today and it 
is nearly certain that any such review would be conducted within the First Amendment, not 
without it.  Thus, the likelihood—but not the currently expressed state of the law—is that 
criminal proscriptions on defamation no longer fall within the excluded category.   
                                                          
606
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (citing a pre-Sullivan and pre-Garrison case to support the proposition that a 
constitutionally unprotected category for defamatory speech remains).  
607
 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.  Even more curiously, Alvarez characterizes Sullivan as “providing substantial 
protection for speech about public figures” and Gertz as “imposing some limits on liability for defaming a private 
figure.”  Id.  It is peculiar that in support of the assertion that defamation remains an unprotected category, the 
Alvarez Court pointed to two cases that it expressly acknowledged as extending constitutional protection to 
defamatory statements.  It is almost as if Alvarez merely included defamation in the historical list of unprotected 
categories without actual thought or analysis. 
608
 Consider, for example, State v. Carson, 95 P.3d 1042, 2004 WL 1878312 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (unreported 
opinion).  David Carson and Edward Powers published a newspaper in Wyandotte County, Kansas, called The New 
Observer.  The Observer published allegations that Carol Marinovich, the mayor/CEO of the Unified Government of 
Wyandotte County, Kansas City, Kansas, and her husband, Ernest Johnson, a district court judge in Wyandotte 
County, actually resided outside of the county in violation of law.  The District Attorney filed criminal defamation 
charges against the defendants for those defamatory statements, and they were convicted at jury trial of seven counts 
of criminal defamation in violation of Kansas law.  Defendants appealed on the ground, inter alia, that the Kansas 
criminal defamation statute was unconstitutional.  The Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
Kansas criminal defamation statute and affirmed the conviction. 
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The excluded category for civil defamation today is far narrower than it was prior to New 
York Times v. Sullivan.  Even in cases involving defamatory statements about private persons 
solely on matters of private concern, the Supreme Court has brought itself only so far as to 
conclude that in such cases “[t]he role of the Constitution in regulating state libel law is far more 
limited.”
609
 For example, even within that narrow category, any remedy that goes beyond mere 
compensation for actual damages—i.e., punitive damages or criminal sanctions—is almost 
certain to attract scrutiny within the First Amendment, not outside it.   
The most likely surviving scope of any modern excluded category of defamation is that 
of the “calculated falsehood”—defamatory statements that are “knowingly false” or are “made 
with reckless disregard of the truth.”  Even then, courts impose a speech-protective set of tests to 
keep such an excluded category narrow.  To be subject to sanction, the speaker or publisher must 
be shown to have acted with a high degree of awareness that the statements were probably false 
and evidence must show that the speaker or publisher actually entertained serious doubts about 
the truth of the publication.
610
  Courts look toward the totality of the factual record in each case 
to determine whether the “actual malice” standard has been met,
611
 and of course anything 
analyzed under the “totality of the circumstances” is effectively being subjected to case-by-case 
balancing within the Constitution’s framework, not categorically excluded from the protection of 
the First Amendment.   
The precise boundaries of whatever rump category may remain have not been clearly 
determined, but it is clear that through various narrowing doctrines—such as concern about 
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 and an aversion to prior restraint in all applications
614
—the 
Supreme Court is inclined to keep any surviving unprotected category narrow indeed while 
simultaneously refusing to eliminate the intellectual possibility of its use.   
In a sense, proscribable defamation is to the modern Supreme Court what the “intractable 
obscenity problem” used to be:  The Supreme Court “know[s] it when [they] see it.”
615
  Thus, 
with defamation as with obscenity, the Supreme Court has been content to have laid down the 
principles and then for decades allowed the lower courts to apply them without Supreme Court 
review.  From the standpoint of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the historic category of 
defamation may be the ultimate example of speech that remains unprotected in principle but 
rarely if ever in practice.  That would explain why Justice Scalia chose defamation as his 
example to illustrative impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination in R.A.V.: “[T]he 
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of 
proscribing only libel critical of the government.”
616
 The result is a Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion, as applied to defamatory falsehoods, that is muddled in its articulation, applied 
conservatively in the lower courts, and perhaps awaiting the day—likely triggered eventually by 
some improvident lower court decision—when the Supreme Court must again wade into it to 
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answer the ultimate question:  In actual practice, does anything remain of the excluded category 
of defamatory speech? 
If the Supreme Court were to address that question today, the most likely answer would 
be this:  Only defamatory falsehoods published with “actual malice” —perhaps the alter ego of 
the “calculated falsehood” that Garrison recognized— may remain wholly excluded from the 
protection of the First Amendment, and even that statement is more likely true if the remedy 
sought against the speaker is civil rather than criminal in nature. In all other applications, the 
binary threshold Speech Clause question is bypassed—expressly or implicitly deemed satisfied 
and the Speech Clause applicable—and the defamatory speech at issue (along with the attempt to 
punish it) then is analyzed under the open-ended tertiary Speech Clause question—how does the 
Speech Clause apply in the case at hand? 













Part D:  The insulting or ‘fighting’ words 
 Of the four categories of unprotected speech articulated by the Chaplinsky Court, only 
one apparently was considered to require definition.  In Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court simply 
mentioned “the lewd and obscene,” “the profane,” and “the libelous” as unprotected categories.  
But for the fourth, the Supreme Court described the category as “the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words,” which it proceeded to define as “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend 
to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”
617
 Perhaps the Chaplinsky Court considered 
necessary this additional verbiage explaining the nature, or meaning, of “the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words” because that was the category it would apply in the case to affirm Walter 
Chaplinsky’s conviction for verbally accosting Marshal Bowering.  Or perhaps the further 
explanation and definition was required, in the Supreme Court’s view, because it is difficult to 
discern from the precedent available in 1942 either the source of the Chaplinsky Court’s 
terminology or its meaning.  This Part considers separately the two terms used by the Chaplinsky 
Court in describing this category:  “the insulting or ‘fighting’ words.” 
Insulting words:  The notion that “insulting” speech is proscribable by the government 
appears to have no established precedent, and after Chaplinsky the Supreme Court never 
subsequently used it to analyze a government regulation or included it in any articulation of 
unprotected categories of speech.
618
  It appears to have been a one-time anomaly in the 
jurisprudence inserted into the language of Chaplinsky for reasons unknown.  Perhaps the term 
“insulting” was merely intended as a modifier, further explaining what the Chaplinsky Court 
meant when it used the vague term “fighting words.”  Walter Chaplinsky’s face-to-face epithets 
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uttered to Marshal Bowering certainly were insulting words, but attaching that label to them does 
nothing to explain why the Constitution permits the government to proscribe their use.  The term 
“insulting words” is best viewed as redundant surplussage that conveys no identifiable 
independent meaning. 
Fighting words:  It appears the Chaplinsky Court adopted the term ‘fighting words’ solely 
from the construction of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in this case which, in upholding 
Mr. Chaplinsky’s conviction, wrote as follows: 
The word ‘offensive’ is not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee 
thinks. . . . The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would 
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight. . . . The English language 
has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are ‘fighting 
words’ when said without a disarming smile. . . . Such words, as ordinary men 




The New Hampshire Supreme Court proceeded to construe the statute at issue in Chaplinsky as 
doing: 
no more than prohibit[ing] the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach 
of the peace by the addressee, words whose speaking constitute a breach of the 
peace by the speaker—including ‘classical fighting words’, words in current use 





But the New Hampshire court, in use of the term ‘fighting words,’ did not appear to intend that 
term to describe a separate and distinct category of speech.  For example, the New Hampshire 
court described the term ‘fighting words’ to encompass “other disorderly words, including 
profanity, obscenity and threats.”
621
  Notable from this construction of the New Hampshire court, 
as compared with the United States Supreme Court’s construction of its categorical doctrine in 
Chaplinsky, are three points: 
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 First, the New Hampshire court apparently considered ‘fighting words’ to be a general 
description of why certain other types of expression were constitutionally proscribable—namely, 
that their utterance tends to result in unlawful conduct, particularly violence.  This is apparent in 
how the New Hampshire court used “fighting words” to encompass “profanity, obscenity and 
threats.”  Thus, for the New Hampshire court, “profanity” may be proscribed because it is a 
“fighting word”; likewise with “obscenity” and likewise with “threats.”  But in adopting the 
terminology, the United States Supreme Court without explanation reconfigured the relationship 
among the terms such that “profanity” and “obscenity” were positioned as individual categories 
of unprotected speech separate and distinct from “fighting words.”  The Supreme Court, it 
seems, conflated the description of the reasoning that justifies the category with the description 
of the category itself. 
 Second, the New Hampshire court expressly considered “threats” to by a type of 
unprotected “fighting word.”  The Chaplinsky Court, however, made no reference to “threats” in 
its articulation of the categories of unprotected speech.  That omission by the Chaplinsky Court 
would explain why “true threats” would later be recognized by the Supreme Court as an 
unprotected category, as discussed in Chapter 6, Part D, infra.  Essentially, the Supreme Court 
later was correcting a mere oversight of the Chaplinsky Court when it acknowledged “true 
threats” as unprotected speech. 
 Third, the New Hampshire court was focused on the statute’s purpose of prohibiting 
“conduct lying within the domain of state power,” namely a breach of the peace.  In that regard, 
the New Hampshire court rested its analysis on the historical authority of the government to 
regulate speech that is integral to criminal conduct, a category of unprotected speech not 
articulated by Chaplinsky but later recognized by the Supreme Court. 
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  In key aspects, therefore, it appears important details were simply lost in translation as 
the United States Supreme Court considered, interpreted and characterized—or 
mischaracterized—what the New Hampshire Supreme Court had said in State v. Chaplinsky.  
That mischaracterization reasonably explains why the United States Supreme Court has not 
invoked the “fighting words” doctrine since Chaplinsky itself in order to uphold a government 
regulation of speech.  “Fighting words” have often been discussed by the Supreme Court but 
rarely found to control the outcome of a case.  For example, in a line of cases involving 
expressive non-verbal conduct,
622
 the Supreme Court has repeatedly considered but declined 
designation of provocative expression as unprotected “fighting words.”  After the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the “fighting words” doctrine and decision not to apply it to control the cross-
burning incident in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, it is unclear whether the doctrine survives at all as a 
separate category of speech excluded from First Amendment protection.  There remains 
sufficient interest among at least some Justices that the doctrine of unprotected “fighting words” 
remains conceptually alive even if not commanding a majority of the Supreme Court to apply 
it.
623
  However, by the time of Stevens, the Supreme Court had stopped referring to “fighting 
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words” as a separate category of speech excluded from First Amendment protection and instead 
characterized the pertinent category in Stevens only as “incitement,”
624
 a narrower construction. 
 To be sure, that concept—the narrower notion that words inciting violence may be 
constitutionally proscribable—existed well before Chaplinsky.  As discussed in Chapter 1, supra, 
Justice Holmes’ famous declaration that the Constitution would not protect the speech of one 
who “falsely shout[s] fire in a crowded theater and causes a panic” dates to 1919.
625
  Only two 
years before Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court had rejected Connecticut’s attempt to prosecute 
Jehovah’s Witnesses for peacefully and respectfully proselytizing on New Haven city streets 
precisely because their speech and behavior did not incite others to violence: 
Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of 
information or opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a 
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.   
 
We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, no truculent 




Part of that passage was cited by the Chaplinsky Court, which clearly was mindful that 
“incitement” was intimately related to the concept of “fighting words.” 
 That narrower concept that speech may be proscribable because it incites violence retains 
favor with the modern Supreme Court.  Thus, “incitement” remains an articulated category of 
unprotected speech.  The reasoning behind that categorical exclusion is closely connected with 
the modern notion that speech integral to criminal conduct may be proscribed.   
 For the reasons describe above, this section discusses the development of the “fighting 
words” doctrine since Chaplinsky in two parts:  First, in Subpart I, it will trace the relatively 
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broad “fighting words” doctrine through R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which effectively ended it as a 
broad category.  Second, in Subpart II, it will trace the narrower incarnation of the “fighting 
words” doctrine post-R.A.V., characterized as “incitement,” which survives to this day. 
 
Subpart I: From Terminiello to R.A.V. 
 The existence of “fighting words” as an articulated category of unprotected speech was 
born with Chaplinsky.  This Subpart I traces the Supreme Court’s struggle with its potentially 
broad meaning and application through three cases:  Terminiello, Edwards and R.A.V. 
Terminiello v. Chicago (1949):627  Father Arthur Terminiello was a controversial priest 
from Birmingham, Alabama, held in disfavor by the Catholic Church.  Against the backdrop of 
the post-World War II conflict between “Fascists” and “Communists,” he was brought to 
Chicago by the Christian Veterans of America to deliver a speech against communism. Father 
Terminiello’s speech was publicized in advance, and the response—both positive and negative—
had been strong.  On the night of the speech, the Chicago auditorium was filled to capacity with 
more than 800 people crowding inside to hear Father Terminiello’s remarks.  Entering the 
auditorium, Father Terminiello had to pass through the large and unruly crowd that had gathered 
outside, mostly to protest against him.
628
  The Supreme Court described the 1,500 person 
crowd’s conduct outside the auditorium: 
Picket lines obstructed and interfered with access to the building.  The crowd 
constituted ‘a surging, howling mob hurling epithets at those who would enter and 
tried to tear their clothes off.’  One young woman’s coat was torn off and she had 
to be assisted into the meeting by policemen.  Those inside the hall could hear the 
loud noises and hear those on the outside yell, “Fascists, Hitlers!’ and curse words 
like ‘damn Fascists.’  Bricks were thrown through the windowpanes before and 
during the speaking.  About 28 windows were broken.  The street was black with 
people on both sides for at least a block either way; bottles, stink bombs and 
brickbats were thrown.  Police were unable to control the mob, which kept 
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breaking the windows at the meeting hall, drowning out the speaker’s voice at 
times and breaking in through the back door of the auditorium.  About 17 of the 




Aware of the size and nature of the mob outside, and the mixed views of the crowd 
inside, Father Terminiello delivered a lengthy, anti-semitic speech, including comments directed 
to the gathered mob: 
You know I have always made a study of the psychology, sociology of mob 
reaction.  It is exemplified out there. . . .  
 
. . . We will not be tolerant of that mob out there.  We are not going to be tolerant 
any longer.   
 
We are strong enough.  We are not going to be tolerant of their smears any longer.  
We are going to stand up and dare them to smear us.   
 
So, my friends, since we spent much time tonight trying to quiet the howling mob, 
I am going to bring my thoughts to a conclusion, and the conclusion is this.  We 
must all be like the Apostles before the coming of the Holy Ghost.  We must not 
lock ourselves in an upper room for fear of the Jews.  I speak of the Communistic 
Zionistic Jews, and those are not American Jews.  We don’t want them here; we 




The effect of Father Terminiello’s speech on the crowd, both inside and outside, was described 
by the Supreme Court: 
Evidence showed that it stirred the audience not only to cheer and applaud but to 
expressions of immediate anger, unrest and alarm.  One called the speaker a ‘God 
damned liar’ and was taken out by the police.  Another said that ‘Jews, niggers 
and Catholics would have to be gotten rid of.’  One response was, ‘Yes, the Jews 
are all killers, murderers.  If we don’t kill them first, they will kill us.’  The anti-
Jewish stories elicited exclamations of ‘Oh!’ and ‘Isn’t that terrible!’ and shouts 
of ‘Yes, send the Jews back to Russia,’ ‘Kill the Jews,’ ‘Dirty kikes,’ and much 
more of ugly tenor.  This is the specific and concrete kind of anger, unrest and 
alarm, coupled with that of the mob outside, that the trial court charged the jury 
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After the crowd became “angry and turbulent,”632 Father Terminiello was charged with 
violating a city ordinance that prohibited breach of the peace.633  He was tried and convicted in 
municipal court.  His conviction was affirmed by the Illinois appellate court and the Illinois 
Supreme Court.  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.634 
The Supreme Court overturned Father Terminiello’s conviction.  Although the lower 
courts had concluded that the provocative speech constituted unprotected “fighting words”
635
 
within the meaning of Chaplinsky, the Terminiello majority expressly declined to reach that 
question of whether the speech was “outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees.”
636
  Thus, 
in this early post-Chaplinsky case, the Supreme Court began what would become a longstanding 
practice of acknowledging the existence of the ‘fighting words’ doctrine but then finding reason 
to conclude it did not apply to the case before the Court.   
In this case, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction on First Amendment grounds, 
but did so by applying general, somewhat amorphous First Amendment principles.  The 
Terminiello majority included this passage, which is oft cited:   
[A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.  
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, 
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.  
Speech is often provocative and challenging.  It may strike at prejudices and 
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance 
of an idea.  That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless 
protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a 
clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. There is no room under our Constitution for 
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a more restrictive view.  For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas 
either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.637   
 
The Terminiello dissent saw matters differently.  Justice Robert H. Jackson would have 
upheld the conviction as punishing only proscribable “fighting words:” 
A trial court and jury has found only that in the context of violence and disorder 
in which it was made, this speech was a provocation to immediate breach of the 
peace and therefore cannot claim constitutional immunity from punishment.  
Under the Constitution as it has been understood and applied, at least until most 




The proscribable nature of Father Terminiello’s speech, in Justice Jackson’s view, arose from its 
tendency to incite violence: 
Rioting is a substantive evil, which I take it no one will deny that the State and the 
City have a right and a duty to prevent and punish.  Where an offense is induced 
by speech, the Court has laid down and often reiterated a test of the power of the 
authorities to deal with the speaking as also an offense. . . . In this case the 
evidence proves beyond dispute that danger of rioting and violence in response to 
the speech was clear, present and immediate.  If this Court has not silently 
abandoned this long standing test and substituted for the purposes of this case an 





But Justice Jackson was in the minority.  The Supreme Court found no “fighting words” 
present in the virulent speech delivered by Father Terminiello.  It is difficult to harmonize the 
Chaplinsky Court’s conclusion that Walter Chaplinsky’s brief calling of Marshal Bowering a 
“God damned Fascist” constituted unprotected fighting words while Arthur Terminiello’s long-
winded diatribe clearly designed, in part, to whip a large and unruly crowd into a frenzy, and 
observed to result in violence, did not.  Terminiello, therefore, was an early signal that the 
Supreme Court was reluctant to apply its newly articulated “fighting words” doctrine to control 
the outcome of cases before it.   
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That same reluctance will be apparent in the next case, which presents the question 
whether “fighting words” might be present when civil rights protesters gather on a South 
Carolina sidewalk.  
Edwards v. South Carolina (1963):640  After declining to uphold Arthur Terminiello’s 
conviction as unprotected “fighting words,” the Supreme Court’s approach to peaceful protests 
in Edwards v. South Carolina was unsurprising.  The case is mentioned here only briefly to 
confirm the Supreme Court’s approach. 
In 1961, a group of African American high school and college students gathered at the 
South Carolina state Capitol and walked peacefully and respectfully about the grounds to 
demonstrate their opposition to state laws that disadvantaged African Americans.  After being 
asked by police to leave the area, they declined and instead continued to peacefully demonstrate, 
at that point breaking into song including the Star Spangled Banner.  At that point, many were 
arrested and a total of 187 of the protesters were charged and convicted in a magistrate’s court of 
the common law crime of breach of the peace.  The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the 
convictions, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.641 
The Supreme Court concluded that the arrest and conviction of these protesters violated 
their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, including the right to free speech.642  As the 
Edwards Court noted, “The circumstances in this case reflect an exercise of these basic 
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form.”643   
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 The Edwards Court drew upon the Terminiello majority’s general language regarding the 
First Amendment but made no reference to “fighting words.”  In this case, the protesters “were 
convicted upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions which they were 
peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority of the community to 
attract a crowd and necessitate police protection.”644  Noting that the state may not “make 
criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views,” the Edwards Court noted that “the courts 
of South Carolina have defined a criminal offense so as to permit conviction of the petitioners if 
their speech ‘stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of 
unrest.  A conviction resting on any of those counts may not stand.’”645 
Significantly, the Edwards dissent concluded that government regulation was justified 
because the protesters’ actions threatened to cause violence.  The dissent hearkened back to 
Cantwell v. Conneticut’s
646
 formulation that “[w]hen clear and present danger of riot, disorder, 
interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, 
or order, appears, the power of the state to prevent or punish is obvious.”
647
  The dissent would 
have upheld the convictions based on evidence that hundreds of demonstrators “were being 
aroused to a ‘fever pitch’ before a crowd of some 300 people who undoubtedly were hostile”
648
 
and that the demonstrations “tended directly to immediate violence.”
649
 
The significance of Edwards is what it did not include.  Although the case turned on 
whether the speech in question could be proscribed because it tended to incite violence—with the 
majority concluding Edwards involved no speech of that sort, and the dissent concluding it did—
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neither the majority nor the dissent invoked the “fighting words” doctrine.  Indeed, the dissent 
reaches back to pre-Chaplinsky days, drawing its analytical framework from Cantwell, a pre-
“fighting words” case. 
By 1961, therefore, it appears that the “fighting words” doctrine as formulated in 
Chaplinsky had faded from use.  Thirty years later, in reviewing a conviction for burning a cross 
in Minnesota, the Supreme Court would squarely address the continued validity of “fighting 
words” as a broad, categorical exclusion of speech from First Amendment protection. 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992):
650
  A juvenile, identified only by the initials “R.A.V.,” 
participated in the burning of a makeshift cross on the lawn of an African American family in St. 
Paul, Minnesota.  The juvenile was prosecuted under a city ordinance forbidding bias-motivated 
crimes.
651
  The trial court granted R.A.V.’s motion to dismiss because the ordinance was 
unconstitutional, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, upheld the ordinance, and 
reinstated the prosecution on the basis that the ordinance did nothing more than regulate 




The Supreme Court found the ordinance to violate the First Amendment and, in so doing, 
cast serious doubt upon the continued viability of “fighting words” as a category of unprotected 
speech.  Even accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s conclusion that the ordinance regulated 
only “fighting words,”
653
 the R.A.V. majority nonetheless subjected the ordinance to First 
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 505 U.S. 377.   
651
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380. The St. Paul ordinance read, in pertinent part:  “Whoever places on public or private 
property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or 
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on 
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” 
Id. (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)). 
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 Id. at 380-81. 
653
 Id. at 381 (“[W]e accept the Minnesota Supreme Court’s authoritative statement that the ordinance reaches only 
those expressions that constitute ‘fighting words’ within the meaning of Chaplinsky. . . . Assuming, arguendo, that 
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Amendment analysis as a content-based restriction on speech.  Even while reaffirming that “a 
limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence,”
654
 the R.A.V. Court imposed the new requirement that even within the universe of 
fighting words “[t]he government may not regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—
towards the underlying message expressed.”
655
  In other words, in the R.A.V. majority’s view, the 
government may proscribe all fighting words but it may not proscribe only some fighting words 
that it disfavors.  It is truly difficult to grasp how this approach is at all related to categorical 
exclusion doctrine except in name.  Indeed, four dissenting Justices described the majority’s 
reproach as a “rejection of the Court’s categorical analysis.”
656
 
The difference between the R.A.V. majority’s description of the “fighting words” doctrine 
and the dissent’s description is striking.  For the majority: 
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech or that the protection of the First 
Amendment does not extend to them.  Such statements must be taken in context, 
however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated 
shorthand characterizing obscenity as not being speech at all.  What they mean is 
that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, 
defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
all of the expression reached by the ordinance is proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, we nonetheless 
conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted speech solely on the 
basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”). 
654
 Id. at 383. 
655
 Id. at 386. 
656
 Id. at 406 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
657
 Id. at 383-84 (majority opinion) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted); see also Heidi Kitrosser, 
Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 875 (2005) (“The [R.A.V.] Court’s conclusion is illogical if 
the Court continues to make the assumption, which it purports to make, that free speech value reliably can be 
deemed absent or overwhelmingly outweighed in the realm of unprotected speech.  The Court’s conclusion makes 
sense, however, if one begins with the premise that unprotected speech categories are a necessary evil—that they are 
important and valid tools of free speech doctrine, but that there are reasons not fully to trust the judgments that they 
embody.  From this perspective, one can proceed reasonably to the conclusion that the use of categorization must be 
contained and that content-distinction principles have some role to play in the realm of unprotected speech.”). 
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The R.A.V. majority sought to characterize “fighting words” as describing only the mode of 
delivering a message, not the content of the message itself: 
In other words, the exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First 
Amendment simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected 
features of the words are, despite their verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ 
element of communication.  Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound 
truck:  Each is, as Justice Frankfurter recognized, a ‘mode of speech; . . . both can 
be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim upon the First 
Amendment.  As with the sound truck, however, so also with fighting words:  The 





 By contrast, for the R.A.V. dissent: 
 
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category of 
speech because the content of that speech is evil but that the government may not 
treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First Amendment; 
the content of the subset is by definition worthless and undeserving of 
constitutional protection.
659
   
 
The dissent proceeded to re-assert the traditional concept of the categorical approach to analysis 
of speech restrictions:  “A prohibition on fighting words is not a time, place, or manner 




 The essential difference is this:  The dissent viewed speech categorically excluded from 
the First Amendment as unprotected from government regulation; the majority viewed regulation 
of speech categorically excluded as subject to further judicial review. In other words, the dissent 
answered the binary threshold question in the Speech Clause analysis “no” (the First Amendment 
does not protect this speech), while the majority answered the threshold question “yes” and thus 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386. 
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 Id. at 401 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).  The concurring Justices also would have 
struck down the ordinance but would have done so on the established basis that it is overbroad, not on the new basis 
articulated by the majority. 
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 Id. at 408-09. 
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proceeded to the variable, tertiary question (how does the First Amendment apply to this 
speech?) 
The majority’s new approach is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s stated basis for 
categorical exclusion, namely that excluded speech has deep historical roots that put it outside 
the Constitution’s protection.  That fundamental rationale for categorical exclusion cannot 
coexist with the R.A.V. approach; speech cannot be both historically unprotected by the 
Constitution and also subject to judicial protection, in this case the application of strict scrutiny 
based on content-based discrimination. 
Overall, R.A.V. stands as a substantial departure from the traditional manner of applying 
the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion and leaves uncertain whether “fighting words” remain a 
viable category within the framework of speech categorically excluded from First Amendment 
protection.  The fact that subsequent cases, such as Stevens, articulating the various categories of 
unprotected speech tend to omit “fighting words” is a potent indication that it is no longer a 
viable, stand-alone category.
661
   
After R.A.V., a more precise way of characterizing the concept that underlies the 
categorical exclusion of “fighting words” from constitutional protection is the narrower notion 
that only “incitement” is unprotected.  Therefore, attention must be given to the incitement cases. 
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 But see Justice Alito’s dissent in Snyder v. Phelps—he would have permitted tort liability for the Westboro 
picketers because their speech constituted unprotected fighting words.  562 U.S. at 472 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Subpart II:  Post-R.A.V., the category is narrowed to “incitement” 
Since R.A.V., Supreme Court majorities have declined to articulate “fighting words” 
among the unprotected categories of speech excluded from First Amendment protection.  
Instead, cases such as Stevens and Alvarez have referred to the excluded category more narrowly 
and precisely as “incitement,” not “fighting words.”   
As described above, the concept that “incitement”—speech that tends to provoke 
immediate violence or lawless action—is unprotected by the First Amendment has historical 
roots deeper than Chaplinsky.  The concept was famously recognized in Schenck and later 
acknowledged in Cantwell.  The Chaplinsky Court may have injected confusion into the matter 
by substituting the effect of an expression—“fighting words” that provoke a fight—for one of the 
underlying categories, “incitement.”  In any event, the line of cases focused narrowly on 
government regulation of speech that “incites” to violence or lawless action continued soon after 
Chaplinsky.  On the whole, these cases have permitted the government greater regulatory latitude 
than have the broader “fighting words” cases.  To demonstrate, this Subpart will consider a line 
of three cases:  Feiner, Harisiades, and Brandenburg. 
Feiner v. New York (1951):
662
  On March 8, 1949, Irving Feiner climbed upon a wooden 
box on a street corner in Syracuse, New York, to announce to a crowd that the location of a 
meeting that evening, regarding race relations, was being moved from its planned location to a 
local hotel.  Mr. Feiner used a loudspeaker, and about 75 people, some black and some white, 
gathered to hear him speak.  His comments ranged far and wide, including commentary on 
contemporary issues and criticism of President Truman, the American Legion, the Mayor of 
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  During the roughly 30 minutes he spoke, he included statements such 
as: 
“Mayor Costello (of Syracuse) is a champagne-sipping bum; he does not speak 
for the negro people. 
 
. . . . 
 
“President Truman is a bum. 
 
“The American Legion is a Nazi Gestapo. 
 





As Mr. Feiner continued to speak, some in the crowd became restless.  His call for equal rights 
“stirred up a little excitement.”
665
  The police were summoned, and officers present “heard and 
saw angry mutterings, pushing, shoving and milling around, and restlessness.”
666
  About 20 
minutes into Mr. Feiner’s speech, one man in the crowd said to the police officers, “If you don’t 
get that son of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself.”
667
   
 At that point, the police officers intervened, and the Feiner Court described the officers’ 
conduct in some detail: 
Because of the feeling that existed in the crowd both for and against the speaker, 
the officers finally ‘stepped in to prevent it from resulting in a fight.’  One of the 
officers approached the petitioner [Mr. Feiner], not for the purpose of arresting 
him, but to get him to break up the crowd.  He asked petitioner to get down off the 
box, but the latter refused to accede to his request and continued talking.  The 
officer waited for a minute and then demanded that he cease talking.  Although 
the officer had thus twice requested petitioner to stop over the course of several 
minutes, petitioner not only ignored him but continued talking.  During all this 
time, the crowd was pressing closer around the petitioner and the officer.  Finally, 
the officer told petitioner he was under arrest and ordered him to get down from 
the box, reaching up to grab him.  Petitioner stepped, announcing over the 
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 Id. at 316-17. 
664
 Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
665
 Id. at 317 (majority opinion). 
666
 Id. at 324 (Black, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
667
 Id. at 330 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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microphone that ‘the law has arrived, and I suppose they will take over now.’  In 
all, the officer had asked petitioner to get down off the box three times over the 




 Mr. Feiner was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.  The bill of particulars 
described his misdemeanor unlawful conduct as follows:  
By ignoring and refusing to heed and obey reasonable police orders issued at the 
time and place mentioned in the Information to regulate and control said crowd 
and to prevent a breach or breaches of the peace and to prevent injury to 
pedestrians attempting to use said walk, and being forced into the highway 




Mr. Feiner was convicted at a bench trial.  His conviction was affirmed by the County Court and 
the New York Court of Appeals.  The United States Supreme Court granted review.
670
 
 Rejecting a First Amendment challenge, the Supreme Court affirmed Mr. Feiner’s 
conviction.  Two important points can be gleaned from the brief opinion. 
 First, the Feiner majority rejected the First Amendment challenge because it found Mr. 
Feiner’s speech to constitute “incitement to riot” that is constitutionally unprotected.  The critical 
passage: 
We are well aware that the ordinary murmurings and objections of a hostile 
audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker, and are also mindful of the 
possible danger of giving overzealous police officials complete discretion to break 
up otherwise lawful public meetings.  A State may not unduly suppress free 
communication of views, religious or other, under the guise of conserving 
desirable conditions.  But we are not faced here with such a situation.  It is one 
thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of 
unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the 
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are 
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 Id. at 317-18. 
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 Id. at 318-19. 
670
 Id. at 316. 
671
 Id. at 320-21 (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The findings of “the imminence of greater disorder coupled with petitioner’s deliberate defiance 




Second, although Feiner was decided nine years after Chaplinsky, it drew heavily upon 
the incitement teaching of Cantwell and not upon the fighting words teaching of Chaplinsky.  
The Feiner majority and both dissents all cited to and quoted from Cantwell in support of their 
conclusions.  The only mention of Chaplinsky is in Justice Douglas’s dissent, in which he 
distinguishes it:  “A speaker may not, of course, incite a riot any more than he may incite a 
breach of the peace by the use of ‘fighting words.’  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.  But this 
record shows no such extremes.”
673
 
Thus, within the first decade after Chaplinsky, a pair of cases decided only two years 
apart provide a sharp contrast.  On the one hand, in deciding Terminiello in 1949, the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to invoke the “fighting words” doctrine to permit the government to punish 
Father Terminiello’s speech that agitated a crowd of thousands to break windows and otherwise 
actually engage in violence.  On the other hand, in deciding Feiner only two years later, the 
Supreme Court allowed the punishment of a speech to 75 people that was, at most, mildly 
agitating to some of them and did so because Mr. Feiner’s speech constituted “incitement to 
riot.”   
 It was clear that “incitement” was a doctrine that found a more favorable welcome on the 
post-Chaplinsky Supreme Court than did “fighting words.”  That would remain true the year 
after Feiner was decided, when the Supreme Court confronted a case involving aliens alleged to 
be affiliated with the Communist Party. 
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 Id. at 331 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952):
674
  One year after allowing the State of New York to 
punish Mr. Feiner’s street-corner speech because of its tendency to incite a riot, the Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment does not bar deportation of resident aliens who advocate for 
the violent adoption of Communism.  The United States sought to deport three aliens—Mr. 
Harisiades, from Greece; Mr. Mascetti, of Italy; and Mrs Coleman, of Russia—all of whom had 
at one time been members of the Communist Party.  “The ultimate question in these three cases 
is whether the United States constitutionally may deport a legally resident alien because of 
membership in the Communist Party which terminated before enactment of the Alien 
Registration Act, 1940.”
675
  Most of this consolidated case revolves around matters unrelated to 
freedom of speech, but the First Amendment argument briefly considered by the Supreme Court 
is relevant here. 
The Supreme Court rejected First Amendment protection and allowed the deportations to 
proceed.  “The [First Amendment] claim is that in joining an organization advocating overthrow 
of government by force and violence the alien has merely exercised freedoms of speech, press 
and assembly which that Amendment guarantees to him. . . . We think the First Amendment does 
not prevent the deportation of these aliens.”
676
  In briefly analyzing the First Amendment claim, 
the Supreme Court offered a clear distinction between speech that constitutes “incitement to 
violence,” which is constitutionally unprotected, and that which merely “is advocacy of political 
methods,” which is shielded by the First Amendment: 
The assumption [by Mr. Harisiades] is that the First Amendment allows Congress 
to make no distinction between advocating change in the existing order by lawful 
elective processes and advocating change by force and violence, that freedom for 
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 Id. at 581. 
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the one includes freedom for the other, and that when teaching of violence is 




The Harisiades Court rejected the notion that that Constitution forbids the government from 
distinguishing between protected advocacy of change and unprotected incitement to violence: 
Our Constitution sought to leave no excuse for violent attack on the status quo by 
providing a legal alternative—attack by ballot.  To arm all men for orderly 
change, the Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the electorate by 
press, speech and assembly.  This means freedom to advocate or promote 





In rejecting Mr. Harisiades’ First Amendment claim, the Supreme Court then made clear that 
“advocacy” is constitutionally different from “incitement”: 
True, it often is difficult to determine whether ambiguous speech is advocacy of 
political methods or subtly shades into a methodical but prudent incitement to 
violence. . . . We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins upon us the duty, 




 Thus, by 1952—ten years after deciding Chaplinsky—the Supreme Court had twice 
upheld government proscriptions on speech as constitutionally permissible because the speech 
constituted “incitement.”  In both cases, it did so with little or no reference to Chaplinsky’s 
“fighting words”—Harisiades never cites Chaplinsky, and Feiner did so only when the dissent 
sought to distinguish it.  While “fighting words” doctrine foundered out of the gate, “incitement” 
doctrine was alive and well. 
 But any categorical exclusion from constitutional protection for speech that incites 
violence is narrow.
680
  The Harisiades Court left open the question of just how narrow: 
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 This dissertation has chosen Harisiades as the case to most clearly illustrate the effect of anti-Communism on 
speech regulation during the pre-Brandenburg era because of its succinct description of the First Amendment issues.  
However, other cases of the era are more oft-cited.  See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) 
(upholding against First Amendment challenge prosecution of conspiracy to organize the Communist Party of the 
United States and to overthrow government of the United States); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) 
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Communist Governments avoid the inquiry [into where protected advocacy ends 
and unprotected incitement to violence begins] by suppressing everything 
distasteful.  Some would have us avoid the difficulty by going to the opposite 
extreme of permitting incitement to violent overthrow at least unless it seems 




Seventeen years after concluding that Mr. Harisiades’ support for violent overthrow of the 
government constituted unprotected “incitement to violence,” the Supreme Court did indeed 
limit the “incitement” doctrine to those situations involving “imminent lawless action.”  The case 
involved another emotional topic—a Ku Klux Klan rally in Ohio. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969):
682
  Clarence Brandenburg was a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan in Ohio and a publicity hound.  He invited a television news crew to attend a Klan rally on 
an Ohio farm, and the crew filmed the proceedings including various statements by Mr. 
Brandenburg and others related to organizing for the advancement of their unsavory political and 
cultural views.
683
  Based on those films, the State of Ohio brought a criminal prosecution against 
Mr. Brandenburg alleging violations of the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act.
684
  Ohio rested its 
prosecution, in part, on the fact that a similar Criminal Syndicalism Act in California had been 
upheld decades earlier by the United States Supreme Court in Whitney v. California.
685
  Mr. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(limiting application of statute upheld in Dennis), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 
(1978). 
681
 Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). 
682
 395 U.S. 444. 
683
 Id. at 446  The full text of the filmed speech, which was uttered by Mr. Brandenburg while wearing Klan regalia, 
stated:  “This is an organizers’ meeting.  We have had quite a few members here today which are—we have 
hundreds, hundreds of members throughout the State of Ohio.  I can quote from a newspaper clipping from the 
Columbus, Ohio, Dispatch, five weeks ago Sunday morning.  The Klan has more members in the State of Ohio than 
does any other organization.  We’re not a revengent organization, but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme 
Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance 
taken.  We are marching on Congress July the Fourth, four hundred thousand strong.  From there we are dividing 
into two groups, one group to march on St. Augustine, Florida, the other group to march into Mississippi.  Thank 
you.” Id. 
684
 Id. at 444-45  The Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibited, in pertinent part, “advocat(ing) . . . the duty, 
necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing 
industrial or political reform” and also barred “voluntarily assembl(ing) with any society, group, or assemblage of 
persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines off criminal syndicalism.”  Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2923.13). 
685
 274 U.S. 357 (1927), overruled in part by Brandenburg, 395 U.S. 444. 
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Brandenburg was convicted, and his conviction was upheld on appeal by the Ohio appellate 
court and the Supreme Court of Ohio.
686
  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court reversed Mr. Brandenburg’s conviction and 
struck down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act as an unconstitutional infringement on the right 
of free speech and of assembly.  The Brandenburg Court expressly overruled Whitney v. 
California.
687
  In doing so, the court noted the substantial evolution in the law of the First 
Amendment in the 40 years since Whitney was decided and concluded that the general teaching 
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence in those four decades was that speech 
such as Mr. Brandenburg’s was protected. 
The Brandenburg Court then articulated the controlling test for determining whether 
speech constituting “incitement” may be proscribed without running afoul of the First 
Amendment: 
These later decisions [since Whitney] have fashioned the principle that the 
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to 
forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where 
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is 
likely to incite or produce such action. . . . [T]he mere abstract teaching . . . of the 
moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not 
the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.  A 
statute which fails to draw this distinction impermissibly intrudes upon the 
freedoms guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  It sweeps within 





The main proposition of Brandenburg is the critical constitutional distinction between protected 
speech that merely advocates for violence or lawlessness and unprotected speech that is intended 
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 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445. 
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 Id. at 449 (“[W]e are here confronted with a statute which, by its own words and as applied, purports to punish 
mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the 
described type of action.  Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  
The contrary teaching of Whitney v. California, supra, cannot be supported, and that decision is therefore 
overruled.” (footnote omitted)). 
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 Id. at 447-48 (emphasis added) (citations, internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
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to incite or produce “imminent lawless action.”
689
  As the passage above shows, to fall within the 
narrow category of unprotected incitement of violence or lawlessness, speech must be shown to 
satisfy a two-part test:  (1) It must be intended to incite imminent lawless action, and (2)  it must 
be likely to actually result in such imminent lawless action.   
Thus, Brandenburg represents a significant narrowing of the unprotected category of 
speech constituting “incitement” to violence or, more particularly, to “imminent lawless action.”  
The Brandenburg test remains the law today, and when cases such as Stevens or Alvarez state 
that “incitement” is categorically unprotected, what they are referencing is speech that meets the 
test of Brandenburg. 
* * * 
 
 In modern jurisprudence, the Supreme Court seems largely to have excised “fighting 
words” from the list of unprotected categories of speech and instead substituted the narrower 
term “incitement,” by which it means speech that is intended to produce “imminent lawless 
action” and that is likely to actually result in such action.  The notion that “incitement” is 
historically unprotected speech has deep roots reaching earlier than Chaplinsky to cases such as 
Cantwell and Schenck.  Given that “incitement” both predates and follows Chaplinsky as a 
judicially recognized category of unprotected speech that has been relied upon to sustain 
government regulation, and that in contrast the only case that has actually upheld a government 
regulation as being unprotected “fighting words” is Chaplinsky itself, a sound argument can be 
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made that Chaplinsky simply got it wrong.  The better description of the unprotected category 
long has been, and remains, “incitement,” not “fighting words.” 
 But, of course, there is the exception that proves the rule.  Even as the Supreme Court, on 
the whole, had quietly abandoned the terminology “fighting words” in favor of “incitement,” one 
justice has argued recently that the “fighting words” doctrine should be considered alive and well 
and should be invoked.
690
  This Chapter 4 will close, therefore, with a description of that valiant 
but failed effort by Justice Alito in a 2011 case arising from the actions of a Topeka, Kansas, 
church that pickets military funerals.  
Snyder v. Phelps (2011):
691
  Albert Snyder is the father of Marine Corps Cpl. Matthew 
Snyder, who was killed while serving in Iraq.  During the funeral of Matthew Snyder, members 
of the Topeka-based Westboro Baptist Church, led by the Phelps family, engaged in pre-
arranged, peaceful protests on public land about 200 feet from the funeral procession in 
accordance with all requirements of local authorities.  The signs they held contained deeply 
offensive assertions about the state of American morality, objections to homosexuality, and at 
least a few references that clearly were directed at Mr. Snyder.  Albert Snyder filed a tort action 
against members of the church claiming, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, where the funeral was held, 
awarded a multi-million dollar judgment to Mr. Snyder.  The Phelps appealed, and the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed upon holding that the Phelps’ speech in this 
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 Justice Alito’s categorical approach also ran counter to prevailing academic analysis of the cases, both before and 
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The Supreme Court found the Phelps protesters’ speech in this case to be on a matter of 
public concern and, therefore, the protesters were entitled to First Amendment protection.  As a 
result, the Supreme Court refused to allow tort liability to attach to the picketers’ conduct on the 
facts of this case.   
The majority opinion, which was signed by eight Justices, is not particularly informative 
in the context of this dissertation’s discussion of fighting words because its analysis and holding 
are based on different, mostly unrelated First Amendment doctrines. The majority expressly 
declined to apply the fighting words doctrine, citing a finding in the lower courts that there is “no 
suggestion that the speech at issue falls within one of the categorical exclusions from First 
Amendment protection, such as those for obscenity or ‘fighting words.’”
693
  Clearly, however, 
the fighting words doctrine is in the background of this decision.  In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Breyer makes clear that he would not stop his analysis of the facts of this case merely 
upon finding that the Phelps protesters’ speech related to a matter of public concern.  He then 
proceeds to offer a hypothetical and references the ‘fighting words’ doctrine to acknowledge that 
“in some circumstances the use of certain words as means would be similarly unprotected.”
694
   
The dissent of Justice Alito, however, finds no such need to avoid the application of the 
fighting words doctrine—to the contrary, Justice Alito applies it and, based upon that doctrine, 
reaches a conclusion opposite the majority.  In a classic application of the doctrine, it matters not 
for Justice Alito that the Phelps picketers may have a First Amendment right to their speech 
because “[i]t does not follow . . . that they may intentionally inflict severe emotional injury on 
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private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by launching vicious verbal attacks that 
make no contribution to public debate.”
695
  Justice Alito then expressly invoked the Chaplinsky 
fighting words doctrine:   
This Court has recognized that words may “by their very utterance inflict injury” 
and that the First Amendment does not shield utterances that form “no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social 
interest in order and morality.”
696
   
 
Justice Alito would have found that the words of the Phelps picketers went “far beyond 
commentary on matters of public concern” and “specifically attacked Matthew Snyder” who was 
a “private figure.”
697
  In light of that specific attack on Cpl. Snyder, Justice Alito found it 
irrelevant that some of the Phelps speech related to a matter of public concern and that all of it 
occurred in a public place:  “Neither classic ‘fighting words’ nor defamatory statements are 
immunized when they occur in a public place, and there is no good reason to treat a verbal 
assault based on the conduct or character of a private figure like Matthew Snyder any 
differently.”
698
  In other words, Justice Alito would find that the fighting words uttered by the 
Phelps protesters in this case should be categorically excluded from the protection of the First 
Amendment. 
The Snyder case is notable, for purposes of this dissertation, for the manner in which the 
three groups of Justices handle the fighting words doctrine.  The Snyder majority entirely avoids 
a fighting words analysis because the record below suggests that fighting words are not at issue 
in this case.  Justice Breyer, in concurrence, avoids a fighting words analysis because, in his 
view, the holding in this case is narrow and it is not necessary to reach fighting words analysis—
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 Id. at 464 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Note the similarity in language to Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, which Justice 
Alito later expressly cites. 
696
 Id. at 465 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
697
 Id. at 470.  
698
 Id. at 472.  
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but he acknowledges that fighting words might be applicable in a similar circumstance, just not 
in this case.  But Justice Alito, in dissent, believes a fighting words analysis is precisely the right 
analysis to make, does so, and based upon that analysis reaches a conclusion opposite that of the 
majority.   
So the fighting words doctrine remains alive and well as recently as the 2011 Snyder 
case—even if not predictably applied.  This sequence of three cases in successive years is 
notable:  In 2010, the Stevens Court offered the most comprehensive articulation since 
Chaplinsky of the categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment, and “fighting 
words” were not mentioned.  One year later, in 2011, the Snyder Court grappled with the Phelps 
picketers from Westboro Baptist Church, and all nine Justices acknowledged “fighting words” as 
a potential factor in deciding the case, although only Justice Alito in dissent actually would have 
applied the “fighting words” doctrine to control the outcome.  A year after that, in 2012, the 
Supreme Court decided Alvarez, the “Stolen Valor” case, and again attempted an apparently 
comprehensive articulation of the unprotected categories—this time, the list again included 
“fighting words.” 
Perhaps it is coincidence.  Perhaps it is imprecise research or articulation.  Or, perhaps, 
thanks to the Westboro Baptist Church, the doctrine that “fighting words” enjoy no First 
Amendment protection has been resurrected and restored to a viable position within the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion. 
* * * 
 
 For the reasons described throughout this Chapter 4, the nearly seven decades between 
Chaplinsky and Stevens saw the Supreme Court substantially refine, and generally narrow, the 
four excluded categories it first had collected and articulated in Chaplinsky.  By the time of 
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Stevens in 2010, the four excluded categories gathered and articulated in Chaplinsky had been 
effectively narrowed to three—“profane” speech had been quietly dropped from the list—and 
each of those three had been substantially narrowed compared with its 1942 concept.   
But those changes to the Chaplinsky categories were not the only jurisprudential 
development relevant to the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion between 1942 and 2010.  As seen 
in Chapters 5 and 6, infra, by the time of Stevens other factors outside the scope of the 
Chaplinsky categories must be considered to see what speech falls within the “First Amendment 




CHAPTER 5: The rise and fall of “commercial speech” as an excluded category 
 
 Before a decade had passed, the Supreme Court articulated two additional unprotected 
categories that were not mentioned in Chaplinsky.  One of those new post-Chaplinsky 
categories, speech integral to criminal conduct, would prove enduring and is the subject of 
extensive discussion in Chapter 6.  The other, commercial speech, would prove fleeting.  The 
notion that commercial speech was an unprotected category was announced by the Supreme 
Court less than five weeks after Chaplinsky’s four unprotected categories were published.
699
  By 
the end of the Supreme Court term in 1942, therefore, it appeared that five categories of 
unprotected speech had been discovered—the four set forth in Chaplinsky plus the subsequent 
“commercial speech” category.   
From the beginning, however, the apparent inclusion of “commercial speech” in the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion was peculiar.  For example, it was odd, indeed, that the 
Chaplinsky Court—the same Court that obviously had considered the categorical approach in 
some depth and had defined unprotected categories of speech as having, as one characteristic, 
long historical acceptance—omitted any reference to commercial speech as an unprotected 
category, yet only a month later discovered its existence.  How did the Supreme Court, with the 
same members sitting on both cases, miss “commercial speech” in March but discover it in 
April?  That inexplicable peculiarity in the origin of “commercial speech” as an unprotected 
category proved a harbinger of trouble to come for this category.  This chapter traces the rise 
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 The spring of 1942 was monumental for the categorical approach to First Amendment analysis.  Chaplinsky 
(articulating four unprotected categories) was argued February 5 and decided March 9.  Valentine v. Chrestensen, 




and fall of the Supreme Court’s treatment of “commercial speech” as an unprotected category 




Part A:  The rise 
 
Valentine v. Chrestensen (1942):
700
  F.J. Chrestensen was a Floridian who had purchased 
a retired submarine from the United States Navy.  He transported his submarine to various 
locations around the country, where he charged admission to allow the public to see it.  In 1940, 
Mr. Chrestensen brought his submarine to New York City and moored it at a pier in the East 
River; his intention was to make money by charging New Yorkers for the privilege of visiting his 
submarine.  Mr. Chrestensen prepared a leaflet advertising the availability of his submarine for 
public visitation upon the payment of a required admission fee and began to have the leaflet 
distributed to people on the streets of New York.  That is how Mr. Chrestensen came to know 
Lewis J. Valentine, who at the time was the New York City police commissioner.  When 
Commissioner Valentine became aware of Mr. Chrestensen’s leaflets, he advised Mr. 
Chrestensen that their distribution violated § 318 of the New York City Sanitary Code,
701
 which 
prohibited distribution on the city’s streets of commercial and business advertising materials.
702
  
But the police commissioner also advised Mr. Christensen “that he might freely distribute 
handbills solely devoted to ‘information or a public protest.’”
703
 
 So Mr. Christensen, apparently a clever man, set out to protest the city’s treatment of his 
effort to bring his submarine to New Yorkers.
704
  He revised his leaflet into a two-sided 
                                                          
700
 316 U.S. 52.  
701
 The sanitary code read as follows:  “Handbills, cards and circulars.  No person shall throw, cast or distribute or 
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising 
matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a front yard or court yard, or on any stoop, or in the 
vestibule or any hall of any building, or in a letter-box therein; provided that nothing herein contained shall be 
deemed to prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United States postal service, or 
prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers regularly sold by the copy or by annual subscription.  This 
section is not intended to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising 
matter.” Id. at 53 n.1 (quoting Sanitary Code, City of New York § 318). 
702
 Id. at 52-53 (narrating facts of the case). 
703
 Id. at 53. 
704
 Id. at 52-53. Mr. Christensen had been required to dock his submarine at a state-owned wharf on the East River, 
not at one owned by the city. 
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document.  On one side remained the original commercial advertisement for tours of his 
submarine, although he toned it down by removing the express reference to payment of an 
admission fee.  On the reverse side, he added new content “protest[ing] against the action of the 
City Dock Department in refusing [Mr. Christensen] wharfage facilities at a city pier for the 
exhibition of his submarine . . . .”
705
  The new content on the reverse side of the flyer contained 
no commercial advertising.  Mr. Christensen then showed a proof of his revised leaflet to city 
officials, who were not impressed.  “The Police Department advised that distribution of a bill 
containing only the protest would not violate § 318, and would not be restrained, but that 
distribution of the double-faced bill was prohibited.”
706
 
 That’s when Mr. Christensen went to court.  He filed suit in federal district court seeking 
to enjoin Commissioner Valentine from enforcing § 318 of the Sanitary Code of the City of New 
York to prevent Mr. Christensen from distributing his advertising/protest leaflets.  The district 
court favored Mr. Christensen and granted the injunction, and the Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed.  The question presented to the United States Supreme Court was:  “[W]hether the 
application of the ordinance to the respondent’s activity was, in the circumstances, an 
unconstitutional abridgement of the freedom of the press and of speech.”
707
 
 The Supreme Court noted that it had “unequivocally” held that public streets are a proper 
forum for public discourse and that the government may not “unduly burden” or prohibit the 
communication of information or spreading of opinion on the streets, but the Court then 
proceeded to distinguish commercial advertising as being unprotected by those “unequivocal” 
holdings: 
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 Id. at 54. 
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We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on 
government as respects purely commercial advertising.  Whether, and to what 
extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what 
extent such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of use, are 
matters for legislative judgment.  The question is not whether the legislative body 
may interfere with the harmless pursuit of a lawful business, but whether it must 
permit such pursuit by what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference 
with, the full and free use of the highways by the people in fulfillment of the 




The Supreme Court then held that since Mr. Christensen’s leaflets were “commercial 
advertising,” New York could constitutionally prohibit their distribution on its streets.
709
   
 Even at the time it was delivered, the Chrestensen decision was peculiar.  The Supreme 
Court had declared in Chaplinsky that categories of unprotected speech necessarily had deep 
historical roots—they had “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”
710
—and yet 
when the Court only a month later declared the existence of another unprotected category it did 
so without any effort to show a historical basis for the exclusion of commercial speech from First 
Amendment protection.  Chrestensen contains no analysis attempting to show a history of 
accepted government prohibitions on commercial speech, no citation to any prior case in which 
the Supreme Court had excluded commercial speech from constitutional protection, and no 
reference to any scholarly assessment or any other external analysis that might imply a historical 
basis for the Chrestensen Court’s declaration.  Indeed, even the language the Chrestensen Court 
used does not imply a historical basis.
711
  The Chrestensen Court—which was composed of the 
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 Id. at 54-55. 
709
 The Supreme Court summarily rejected the argument that because the reverse side of Christensen’s leaflet 
contained non-commercial material the leaflet in its entirety should be judged by a non-commercial standard.  Id. at 
55 (“It is enough for the present purpose that the stipulated facts justify the conclusion that the affixing of the protest 
against official conduct to the advertising circular was with the intent, and for the purpose, of evading the 
prohibition of the ordinance. If that evasion were successful, every merchant who desires to broadcast advertising 
leaflets in the streets need only append a civic appeal, or a moral platitude, to achieve immunity from the law’s 
command.”).  
710
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added). 
711
 In the key paragraph summarily asserting that commercial speech is categorically unprotected, the Chrestensen 
Court contrasted the “freedom of communicating information and disseminating opinion”—which the “[t]his court 
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same nine Justices who only five weeks earlier had decided that Walter Chaplinsky’s cursing to 
the face of a New Hampshire police office enjoyed no constitutional protection—did not even 
cite to or otherwise reference the Chaplinsky decision. 
 Despite the weak footings upon which the Supreme Court rested its newfound conclusion 
that commercial speech was categorically unprotected by the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court would once again—but only once—use similar categorical reasoning to deny First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech restricted by a local ordinance.  The case, Breard 
v. City of Alexandria, arose a decade after the Chrestensen decision and reached the Supreme 
Court in 1951.   
Breard v. City of Alexandria (1951):
712
  At issue was a so-called “Green River 
Ordinance” in the city of Alexandria, Louisiana.  Jack Breard was a regional representative for a 
Pennsylvania company called Keystone Readers Service, Inc.  His job was to sell subscriptions 
for nationally known magazines and to do so through door-to-door solicitations.  He engaged in 
soliciting by leading a small team of door-to-door solicitors from town to town, where they 
would knock on the doors of residents and offer to sell them magazine subscriptions.
713
  At one 
point, Mr. Breard’s team of solicitors came to Alexandria, Louisiana, where their sales practices 
ran afoul of the local Green River Ordinance, which prohibited the practice of door-to-door sales 
unless the homeowner specifically invited the solicitation at his doorstep.
714
  Mr. Breard was 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
has unequivocally held” to be constitutionally protected—with “purely commercial advertising”—which “[w]e are 
equally clear” falls outside the Constitution.  Chrestensen, 316 U.S. at 54.  The language used in the former is past 
tense and references holdings, which taken together at least imply a history of jurisprudence supporting the 
assertion, even though none is cited or expressly referenced; by contrast, the language used in the latter is present 
tense and makes no reference, express or implied, to holdings or anything else other than the Supreme Court’s raw 
assertion within the Chrestensen opinion itself. 
712
 341 U.S. 622. 
713
 Id. at 624. 
714
 Id. at 624-25 The Alexandria ordinance read as follows: “Section 1.  Be it ordained by the council of the city of 
Alexandria, Louisiana, in legal session convened that the practice of going in and upon private residences in the City 
of Alexandria, Louisiana by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise 
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arrested, prosecuted and convicted of violating the ordinance.  He moved to quash the 
prosecution on the ground, inter alia, that the local ordinance violated the First Amendment’s 
protection of freedom of speech and of the press.
715
  His argument was rejected by the trial court, 




The United States Supreme Court rejected Mr. Breard’s First Amendment claims because 
“[o]nly the press or oral advocates of ideas could urge this point.  It was not open to the solicitors 
for gadgets or brushes.”
717
  Deploying a puzzling analysis that essentially argued “on-the-one-
hand, on-the-other-hand” without ever explaining why the hand chosen was constitutionally 
preferable, the Supreme Court wrote: 
This kind of distribution is said to be protected because the mere fact that money 
is made out of the distribution does not bar the publications from First 
Amendment protection.  We agree that the fact that periodicals are sold does not 
put them beyond the protection of the First Amendment.  The selling, however, 




The Breard majority found that “commercial feature” of door-to-door magazine sales sufficient 
to protect the Alexandria ordinance from First Amendment attack: 
It would be, it seems to us, a misuse of the great guarantees of free speech and 
free press to use those guarantees to force a community to admit the solicitors of 
publications to the home premises of its residents.  We see no abridgment of the 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
not having been requested or invited so to do by the owner or owners, occupant or occupants of said private 
residences for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise and/or disposing of 
and/or peddling or hawking the same is declared to be a nuisance and punishable as such nuisance as a 
misdemeanor.” Id. 
715
 Mr. Breard also raised arguments under the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause that are not relevant 
here. 
716
 Id. at 625.  
717
 Id. at 641. 
718
 Id. at 641-42 (footnotes omitted). 
719
 Id. at 645.  
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Years earlier, the Supreme Court had held that the First Amendment barred application of a 
similar Ohio ordinance regulating door-to-door soliciting when the solicitors were distributing 
information advertising a religious meeting.  The Breard majority acknowledged that precedent 
but distinguished Martin v. Struthers
720
 because the religious information being distributed there 
was not aimed “solely at commercial advertising”: 
As no element of the commercial entered into this free solicitation [at issue in 
Martin v. Struthers] and the opinion was narrowly limited to the precise fact of 
the free distribution of an invitation to religious services, we feel that it is not 




The conclusion that upholding the Alexandria ordinance against First Amendment attack 
because it regulated commercial speech was “not necessarily inconsistent” with precedent was 
hardly a ringing endorsement for the constitutional test applied by the Breard Court.  Indeed, 
even as the Breard Court invoked language that seemed to apply the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion to the commercial speech involved in this case, three factors make clear that Breard 
was at best a weak attempt. 
First, the Breard Court never cites to or references Chrestensen, the landmark case that 
had declared commercial speech an unprotected category.  Breard also does not cite to or 
reference Chaplinsky.  It is difficult to conceive how the Supreme Court could have thought it 
was conducting a categorical analysis of commercial speech without reference to the landmark 
case holding that commercial speech is an excluded category or the landmark case describing the 
overall categorical approach. 
Second, the three Justices who dissented in Breard did so forcefully.  Two dissented for 
reasons relating to the Commerce Clause
722
 and having no relevance here, but the other two-
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 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
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 Breard, 341 U.S. at 643. 
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 squarely targeted the majority’s interpretation of the First Amendment, 
characterizing the majority’s holding as “a revitalization of the judicial view which prevailed 
before this Court embraced the philosophy that the First Amendment gives a preferred status to 
the liberties it protects.”
724
  The dissenters continued with language for the time unusually 
forceful but today commonplace in First Amendment jurisprudence: 
It is my belief that the freedom of the people of this Nation cannot survive even a 
little governmental hobbling of religious or political ideas, whether they be 
communicated orally or through the press.   
 
The constitutional sanctuary for the press must necessarily include liberty to 
publish and circulate.  In view of our economic system, it must also include 
freedom to solicit paying subscribers.  Of course homeowners can if they wish 
forbid newsboys, reporters or magazine solicitors to ring their doorbells.  But 
when the homeowner himself has not done this, I believe that the First 
Amendment, interpreted with due regard for the freedoms it guarantees, bars laws 
like the present ordinance which punish persons who peacefully go from door to 




This brief dissent by Justice Black in Breard reflected a view of the First Amendment that later 
would prevail in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  The Supreme Court would go no further 
than Breard in experimenting with the notion that commercial speech was excluded from all 
protection under the First Amendment.   
Third, the Breard majority by its own concluding language makes clear that what it was 
in fact doing was applying a balancing test, not a categorical exclusion.  After distinguishing 
various prior cases, the majority concluded that the constitutionality of the City of Alexandria 
ordinance at issue in Breard “turn[s] upon a balancing of the conveniences between some 
householders’ desire for privacy and the publisher’s right to distribute publications in the precise 
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 Justice Douglas joined both dissents.  
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way that those soliciting for him think brings the best results.”
726
  The Breard majority then 
proceeded to describe at some length the annoyance a homeowner would experience when 
interrupted by a knock at the door and the asymmetrical economic power between the 
homeowner and the corporate entity that had hired Breard’s door-to-door sales team to solicit for 
them.
727
  Taken as a whole, this language suggests that the Breard majority may have been 
motivated less by a principled judicial philosophy of the First Amendment and more by a very 
human annoyance at door-to-door peddlers. 
Breard was the second, and final, case in which the Supreme Court used, or purported to 
use, the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to uphold a law or ordinance proscribing commercial 
speech.  While subsequent cases acknowledged the language of categorical exclusion as it related 
to commercial speech and then distinguished the speech at issue in those cases as not “purely 
commercial,”
728
 those cases never again relied on the categorical exclusion for commercial 
speech as the basis for deciding the case. If Chrestensen was both the origin and the high water 
mark of the inclusion of commercial speech within the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, 
Breard was its last gasp.  The remaining cases in this line are those that dismantle this all-but-
stillborn category. 
  
                                                          
726
 Id. at 644 (majority opinion). 
727
 Id. at 644-45 (“This makes the constitutionality of Alexandria’s ordinance turn upon a balancing of the 
conveniences between some householders’ desire for privacy and the publisher’s right to distribute publications in 
the precise way that those soliciting for him think brings the best results.  The issue brings into collision the rights of 
the hospitable housewife, peering on Monday morning around her chained door with those of Mr. Breard’s 
courteous, well-trained but possibly persistent solicitor, offering a bargain on culture and information through a joint 
subscription to the Saturday Evening Post, Pic and Today’s Woman.  Behind the housewife are many housewives 
and homeowners in the towns where Green River ordinances offer their aid.  Behind Mr. Breard are ‘Keystone’ with 
an annual business of $5,000,000 in subscriptions and the periodicals with their use of house-to-house canvassing to 
secure subscribers for their valuable publications, together with other housewives who desire solicitors to offer them 
the opportunity and remind and help them, at their doors, to subscribe for publications.  Subscriptions may be made 
by anyone interested in receiving the magazines without the annoyances of house-to-house canvassing.  We think 
those communities that have found these methods of sale obnoxious may control them by ordinance.”). 
728
 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976) (collecting cases). 
202 
 
Part B:  The fall 
Almost as soon as the Chrestensen rule was announced, the Supreme Court began 
struggling with its application and meaning.
729
  Only three years after deciding Chrestensen, the 
Supreme Court in deciding the application of the First Amendment to labor regulations changed 
course and spoke as if Chrestensen’s categorical rule had never been announced: 
The idea is not sound therefore that the First Amendment’s safeguards are wholly 
inapplicable to business or economic activity.  And it does not resolve where the 
line shall be drawn in a particular case merely to urge . . . that an organization for 
which the rights of free speech and free assembly are claimed is one ‘engaged in 




Six years later, the Supreme Court whipsawed back toward Chrestensen’s categorical reasoning 
and decided Breard.  If Breard was the Supreme Court’s final application of the categorical 
exclusion of commercial speech announced in Chrestensen, it was only the start of four-decade 
criticism of both Chrestensen itself and the doctrine for which it stood. In 1959, Justice 
Douglas—who had joined the majority in deciding Chrestensen—wrote about that decision:  
“The ruling was casual, almost offhand.  And it has not survived reflection.”
731
  In its 1964 
landmark decision New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court’s majority effectively 
rejected the categorical exclusion announced in Chrestensen:  “That the Times was paid for 
publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers 
and books are sold.”
732
  And in 1974, Justice Brennan noted about Chrestensen:  “There is some 
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 See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 110 (1943) (“Situations will arise where it will be difficult to 
determine whether a particular activity is religious or purely commercial.  The distinction at times is vital.”); see 
also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943) (“The state can prohibit the use of the street for the distribution of 
purely commercial leaflets, even though such leaflets may have ‘a civil appeal, or a moral platitude’ appended.  
They may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the 
handbills invite the purchase of books for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek 
in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes.” (citation omitted) (quoting Chrestensen, 
316 U.S. at 55)). 
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 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945). 
731
 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
732
 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.  
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doubt concerning whether the ‘commercial speech’ distinction announced in Valentine v. 
Chrestensen . . . retains continuing validity.”
733
  Only one year after Justice Brennan wrote those 
words of doubt, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to remove any remaining uncertainty 
about the continued validity of Chrestensen. 
Bigelow v. Virginia (1975):
734
  The question whether commercial speech still could be 
considered categorically excluded from First Amendment protection squarely reached the 
Supreme Court in 1975 in Bigelow v. Virginia.  Jeffrey Bigelow was the managing editor of the 
Virginia Weekly, a self-styled “underground newspaper”
735
 published in and around the college 
town of Charlottesville and particularly distributed on campus.  The newspaper published a paid 
advertisement from a New York organization that promoted the availability of legal abortion 
services in New York.
736
  The State of Virginia charged Mr. Bigelow with violating a Virginia 
statute that made it a misdemeanor to “encourage . . . the procuring of abortion . . . .”
737
  Mr. 
Bigelow was convicted in the County Court, convicted again upon trial de novo in the Circuit 
Court, and his conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
738
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 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
734
 421 U.S. 809. 
735
 Id. at 811 n.1. 
736
 Id. at 811. The advertisement stated:  “UNWANTED PREGNANCY LET US HELP YOU Abortions are now 
legal in New York.  There are no residency requirements.  FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED 
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST Contact WOMEN’S PAVILION 515 Madison Avenue New York, 
N.Y. 10022 or call any time (212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650 AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL.  We will make all arrangements for you and help you with information and counseling.” Id. 
737
 Id. at 812-13. At the time the advertisement was published in Bigelow’s newspaper, the Virginia statute read:  “If 
any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other 
manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”   Id. at 
812 (quoting Va. Code. Ann. § 18.1-63 (1960)). The statute soon thereafter was modified by the Virginia 
Legislature. Id. 
738
 Id. at 813-14.  The Virginia Supreme Court actually considered the case twice—once before the United States 
Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade and again after remand from the Supreme Court with instructions to 
consider in light of Roe v. Wade.  The Virginia court’s opinion remained unchanged after remand; thus, the 




 The Virginia Supreme Court “rejected Bigelow’s First Amendment claim.  This, the court 
said, was a commercial advertisement and, as such, may be constitutionally prohibited by the 
state, particularly where, as here, the advertising relates to the medical-health field.”
739
  The 
Virginia Supreme Court also held that Mr. Bigelow lacked standing to pursue a First 
Amendment claim because he “lacked a legitimate First Amendment interest, inasmuch as his 
activity was of a purely commercial nature.”
740
 
 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.  After finding that Mr. Bigelow had 
standing to press the First Amendment claims, the Supreme Court reached the core issue before 
it: 
The central assumption made by the Supreme Court of Virginia was that the First 
Amendment guarantees of speech and press are inapplicable to paid commercial 
advertisements.  Our cases, however, clearly establish that speech is not stripped 
of First Amendment protection merely because it appears in that form.   
 
The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper had 
commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not 
negate all First Amendment guarantees.  The State was not free of constitutional 
restraint merely because the advertisement involved sales or solicitations, or 
because appellant was paid for printing it, or because appellant’s motive or the 
motive of the advertiser may have involved financial gain.  The existence of 
commercial activity, in itself, is not justification for narrowing the protection of 




While stopping short of expressly overruling Valentine v. Christensen, the Bigelow Court 
proceeded to expressly narrow Chrestensen substantially: 
[T]he Supreme Court of Virginia[] relies on Valentine v. Chrestensen, where a 
unanimous Court, in a brief opinion, sustained an ordinance which had been 
interpreted to ban the distribution of a handbill advertising the exhibition of a 
submarine. . . . But the holding is distinctly a limited one:  the ordinance was 
upheld as a reasonable regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising 
could be distributed.  The fact that it had the effect of banning a particular 
handbill does not mean that Chrestensen is authority for the proposition that all 
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 Id. at 815 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
741
 Id. at 818 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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statutes regulating commercial advertising are immune from constitutional 
challenge.  The case obviously does not support any sweeping proposition that 
advertising is unprotected per se.   
 
This Court’s cases decided since Chrestensen clearly demonstrate as untenable 




It is notable that the Bigelow Court then observed with approval the existence of the categorical 
approach to excluding certain speech from First Amendment protection.
743
  Clearly, the Bigelow 
Court’s objection was not directed to the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion as a whole; rather, it 
objected specifically to the inclusion of commercial speech as one of the excluded categories.  
The Bigelow Court summarized its holding: 
We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their assumptions that 
advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection. . . . 
 
. . . To the extent that commercial activity is subject to regulation, the relationship 
of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others, to be considered in 
weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental interest alleged.  
Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection.  The 
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make 
it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.  
 
. . . Regardless of the particular label asserted by the State—whether it calls 
speech ‘commercial’ or ‘commercial advertising’ or ‘solicitation’—a court may 
not escape the task of assessing the First Amendment interest at stake and 
weighing it against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation.  The 
diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech 




On the conclusion that commercial speech is not categorically excluded from First 
Amendment protection, if not on the outcome in this case, the United States Supreme Court in 
Bigelow appeared unanimous.
745
  It is unclear why the Bigelow Court stopped short of overruling 
                                                          
742
 Id. at 819-20 (citations and footnote omitted). 
743
 Id. at 819 (“Although other categories of speech—such as fighting words, or obscenity, or libel, or incitement, 
have been held unprotected, no contention has been made that the particular speech embraced in the advertisement 
in question is within any of these categories.” (citations omitted)). 
744
 Id. at 825-26. 
745
 Id. at 832 (“As the Court recognizes, ante, at 2231-2232 a purely commercial proposal is entitled to little 
constitutional protection.”) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 836 (“Since the statute in question is a ‘reasonable 
206 
 
Chrestensen outright and instead sought only to narrowly limit its meaning.  But any remaining 
ambiguity would be eliminated only a year later. 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Consumer Council (1976):
746
  The case that finally, and 
expressly, put an end to the Supreme Court’s flirtation with “commercial speech” as an 
unprotected category within the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion came one year after the 
decision in Bigelow and also arose out of Virginia. The Commonwealth of Virginia had 
attempted to prohibit pharmacists from advertising the prices at which they sell various 
prescription pharmaceuticals,
747
 a practice deemed desirable by the Commonwealth to protect the 
integrity of pharmacy as a profession.
748
 The statute was challenged by consumers and retail 
purchasers of pharmaceuticals as violating the First Amendment, and the Supreme Court was 
required—as a threshold matter—to decide whether the statute was subject to analysis under the 
First Amendment or whether it fell wholly without the Constitution’s protection because it 
regulated only commercial speech.  The Supreme Court was aware that only a year earlier it had 
addressed this question, but perhaps because Bigelow related to the constitutionally, politically 
and socially difficult issue of abortion services, the Supreme Court decided it advisable to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation that serves a legitimate public interest,’ ante, at 2234, I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia.”). 
746
 425 U.S. 748. 
747
 Id. at 750.  The pertinent section of the challenged statute read as follows:  “Any pharmacist shall be considered 
guilty of unprofessional conduct who (1) is found guilty of any crime involving grave moral turpitude, or is guilty of 
fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of registration; or (2) issues, publishes, broadcast by radio, or otherwise, or 
distributes or uses in any way whatsoever advertising matter in which statements are made about his professional 
service which have a tendency to deceive or defraud the public, contrary to the public health and welfare; or (3) 
publishes, advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, 
premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any 
drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.” Id. at 750 n.2 (quoting § 54-524.35 of the Virginia Code 
Annotated (1974)) (emphasis added). 
748
 Id. at 769-70 (“It appears to be feared that if the pharmacist who wishes to provide low cost, and assertedly low 
quality, services is permitted to advertise, he will be taken up on his offer by too many unwitting customers.  They 
will choose the low-cost, low-quality service and drive the ‘professional’ pharmacist out of business.  They will 
respond only to costly and excessive advertising, and end up paying the price.  They will go from one pharmacist to 
another, following the discount, and destroy the pharmacist-customer relationship.  They will lose respect for the 
professional because it advertises.  All this is not in their best interests, and all this can be avoided if they are not 
permitted to know who is charging what.”). 
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address the continued viability of the categorical exemption for commercial speech more 
thoroughly in this case involving less-volatile subject matter: 
Last Term, in Bigelow v. Virginia, the notion of unprotected “commercial speech” 
all but passed from the scene. . . . We rejected the contention that the publication 
was unprotected because it was commercial.  [Valentine v.] Chrestensen’s 
continued validity was questioned and its holding was described as “distinctly a 
limited one” that merely upheld “a reasonable regulation of the manner in which 
commercial advertising could be distributed.” . . .  
 
Some fragment of hope for the continuing validity of a “commercial speech” 
exception arguably might have persisted because of the subject matter of the 
advertisement in Bigelow. . . .  
 
Here, in contrast, the question whether there is a First Amendment exception for 
“commercial speech” is squarely before us.  Our pharmacist does not wish to 
editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political.  He does not wish 
to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations 
even about commercial matters.  The “idea” he wishes to communicate is simply 
this:  “I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.”  Our question, then, 
is whether this communication is wholly outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.
749
   
 
The Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court then began its analysis by articulating “several 
propositions that already are settled or beyond serious dispute”: 
It is clear, for example, that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection 
because money is spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or 
another.  Speech likewise is protected even though it is carried in a form that is 
‘sold’ for profit, and even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or 




The Supreme Court then proposed that the test for whether commercial speech could be 
regulated by the government necessarily involved some assessment of the content of the 
communication but that declaring all speech with commercial content outside the Constitution’s 
boundaries was too much: 
If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection, 
therefore, it must be distinguished by its content.  Yet the speech whose content 
                                                          
749
 Id. at 760-61 (citation omitted). 
750
 Id. at 761 (citations omitted). 
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deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject.  No 
one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevented from being heard on the 
subject of whether, in general, pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their 
advertisement forbidden.  Nor can it be dispositive that a commercial 
advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a fact.  Purely factual matters of 




Having set the stage, the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court then articulated a test for whether 
speech is categorically exempted from the First Amendment’s protection:
752
 
Our question is whether speech which does no more than propose a commercial 
transaction is so removed from any exposition of ideas and from truth, science, 
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the 
administration of Government, that it lacks all protection.  Our answer is that it is 
not.
753
   
 
With that, the Supreme Court effectively put an end to Valentine v. Christensen as useful 
authority upon which courts could rely to analyze restrictions on commercial under the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion.  But the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court was not done; it proceeded 
to explain why commercial speech was to be considered to enjoy constitutional protection at 
some level and was not categorically excluded from the First Amendment.  The Court offered 
four reasons: 
 First, the fact that a speaker’s purpose may be “purely economic” would “hardly 
disqualif[y] him from protection under the First Amendment.”
754
  From the standpoint of 
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 Id. at 761-62. 
752
 Thirty-four years later, in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, the Supreme Court would reject the notion that 
there is a “test” that may be applied to determine whether a category of speech is to be exempted from First 
Amendment protection.  Rather, the Supreme Court would conclude that any “test” such as this is merely descriptive 
of what has “historically” been exempted.  
753
 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (citations omitted). 
754
 Id. at 762-63 (“Focusing first on the individual parties to the transaction that is proposed in the commercial 
advertisement, we may assume that the advertiser’s interest is a purely economic one.  That hardly disqualifies him 
from protection under the First Amendment.  The interests of the contestants in a labor dispute are primarily 
economic, but it has long been settled that both the employee and the employer are protected by the First 
Amendment when they express themselves on the merits of the dispute in order to influence its outcome.  We know 
of no requirement that, in order to avail themselves of First Amendment protection, the parties to a labor dispute 
need address themselves to the merits of unionism in general or to any subject beyond their immediate dispute.  It 
was observed in Thornhill that the practices in a single factory may have economic repercussions upon a whole 
region and affect widespread systems of marketing.  Since the fate of such a single factory could as well turn on its 
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whether the First Amendment applies, it is simply irrelevant whether a speaker is financially 
motivated. 
 Second, individual persons who receive commercial speech—the listeners—may have an 
interest in the message that is every bit as great as, if not greater than, their interest in hearing 
political or other speech.
755
 
 Third, society as a whole has in interest in receiving at least certain types of commercial 
messages, and a categorical exclusion would thwart efforts to distinguish commercial messages 
with broad societal value from those without such value.
756
  
 Fourth, the free enterprise system requires that individual economic actors have access to 
the information they need to make informed economic choices.  Because the United States 
economy rests on a system of free enterprise, and since one of the functions of government is to 
properly regulate that system, ensuring the free flow of commercial information to individual 
economic decision makers—who also are the voters who choose the government that in turn 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
ability to advertise its product as on the resolution of its labor difficulties, we see no satisfactory distinction between 
the two kinds of speech.” (citations, internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)). 
755
 Id. at 763-64 (“As to the particular consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information, that interest 
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most urgent political debate.  Appellees’ case in 
this respect is a convincing one.  Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest 
are the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.  A disproportionate amount of their income tends to be spent on 
prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their 
scarce dollars are best spent.  When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is charging what 
becomes more than a convenience.  It could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of basic 
necessities.” (footnote omitted)). 
756
 Id. at 764-65 (“Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.  
Even an individual advertisement, though entirely ‘commercial,’ may be of general public interest.  The facts of 
decided cases furnish illustrations:  advertisements stating that referral services for legal abortions are available; that 
a manufacturer of artificial furs promotes his product as an alternative to the extinction by his competitors of fur-
bearing mammals; and that a domestic producer advertises his product as an alternative to imports that tend to 
deprive American residents of their jobs.  Obviously, not all commercial messages contain the same or even a very 
great public interest element.  There are few to which such an element, however, could not be added.  Our 
pharmacist, for example, could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his 
own and those of a competitor as proof.  We see little point in requiring him to do so, and little difference if he does 
not.” (citations omitted)). 
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regulates the free enterprise system—really is a close cousin, if not an alter ego,
757
 of political 
speech.  “[E]ven if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten 
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say that the free flow of [commercial] 
information does not serve that goal.”
758
 
* * * 
 
 In 1942, in deciding Valentine v. Christensen, the United States Supreme Court 
consumed four pages in the United States Reports to establish the idea that “commercial speech” 
is a category wholly excluded from the protection of the First Amendment.
759
  Coming as it did 
only five weeks after the Supreme Court’s landmark categorical-analysis case Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, and yet not mentioning Chaplinsky, “[t]he ruling was casual, almost offhand.”
760
  
But it persisted for more than 30 years as a notion available to courts reviewing the 
constitutionality of government restrictions on commercial speech.  When its end finally came, 
the Supreme Court in 1975 deployed 17 pages of analysis
761
 to limit it and another 52 pages to 
repudiate it in 1976.
762
  Even then, the Supreme Court did not bring itself to use the term 
“overruled” in connection with Christensen until 1991.
763
  Thus, the “offhand” concept that 
                                                          
757
 Id. at 765 (footnote omitted) (“Moreover, there is another consideration that suggests that no line between 
publicly ‘interesting’ or ‘important’ commercial advertising and the opposite kind could ever be drawn.  
Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as 
to who is producing and selling what product, ffor what reason, and at what price.  So long as we preserve a 
predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be made through 
numerous private economic decisions.  It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be 
intelligent and well informed.  To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.  And if it is 
indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system, it is also indispensable to the 
formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.” (citations and footnotes 
omitted)). 
758
 Id. at 765 (footnotes omitted). 
759
 Christensen, 316 U.S. at 52-55. 
760
 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring).  
761
 Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809-26 (Parts I-III). 
762
 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748-70 (Parts I-III). 
763
 See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 n.1 (1991) (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court in the 
preceding 20 years had overruled prior decisions and characterizing Virginia Board of Pharmacy as “overruling” 
Chrestensen). Payne was death penalty case having nothing to do with free speech issues. 
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emerged in a mere four pages when the Supreme Court allowed New York to enforce its ban on 
street distribution of advertising leaflets against an eccentric chap who wanted tourists to visit his 
decommissioned submarine endured for 49 years and required a total of 69 pages of negative 
assessment from the Supreme Court in an abortion case
764
 and a drug-pricing case
765
 before 
finally being acknowledged as “overruled” in a footnote in a death penalty case.
766
  The First 
Amendment does, indeed, invite strange bedfellows. 
 Thus was the end of the ill-fated attempt by the Supreme Court to classify “commercial 
speech” as an unprotected category of speech governed by the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion.  To be sure, commercial speech even today in many applications receives lesser 
constitutional protection than other types of speech such as political or religious speech, but the 
Supreme Court has reached the conclusion that commercial speech—unless it is false, 
misleading or deceptive or otherwise integral to unlawful conduct as discussed in Chapter 6 
below—must be analyzed within the framework of the First Amendment not excluded entirely 
from constitutional protection.    
 Even as it presided over the long, slow decline of the doctrine that “commercial speech” 
was an unprotected category, the Supreme Court reiterated that other categories of speech—
including at least one category not articulated in Chaplinsky—were indeed outside the scope of 
the First Amendment’s protection.  The contrast between the failure of “commercial speech” as a 
post-Chaplinsky category and the successful rooting of another new post-Chaplinsky category is 
stark and was foreshadowed in the Supreme Court’s cases.
767
  Chapter 6, therefore, will discuss 
                                                          
764
 See Bigelow, 421 U.S. 809. 
765
 See Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748. 
766
 See Payne, 501 U.S. 808. 
767
 For example, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm’n, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), was characterized by the 
Supreme Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749 (“There [in Pittsburgh Press] the Court upheld an 
ordinance prohibiting newspapers from listing employment advertisements in columns according to whether male or 
female employees were sought to be hired.  The Court, to be sure, characterized the advertisements as ‘classic 
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the second major new excluded category in the post-Chaplinsky era:  Speech that is itself part of 







                                                                                                                                                                                           
examples of commercial speech,’ and a newspaper’s printing of the advertisements as of the same character.  The 
Court, however, upheld the ordinance on the ground that the restriction it imposed was permissible because the 
discriminatory hirings proposed by the advertisements, and by their newspaper layout, were themselves illegal.”  
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
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CHAPTER 6: “Speech as part of unlawful conduct” recognized as an excluded category 
 
Viewing the almost 75 years since Chaplinsky as a whole, the clearest and most enduring 
expansions of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion have involved the relationship of the First 
Amendment to speech that is intertwined with unlawful conduct.  While at least one other 
excluded category has come and gone during that time,
768
 and the four categories recognized by 




 the Supreme Court has by 
contrast not only recognized but expanded and rather often applied the excluded category of 
speech as part of unlawful conduct in order to permit the government to proscribe or regulate 
speech.  In other words, this is the one category of proscribable speech that has grown and 
remained wider, not shrunk and become narrower, since Chaplinsky.  Nonetheless, this category 
remains “a well-defined and narrowly limited class[] of speech”
771
 and the Supreme Court 
certainly has declined invitations further to expand it.   
There is a certain irony that Chaplinsky itself never articulated this category,
772
 although 
to be sure there is a close intellectual relationship between the reasoning that allows the 
government to proscribe “fighting words” that constitute incitement and that which justifies the 
proscription of speech integral to criminal conduct.
773
  “Fighting words” were said in Chaplinsky 
                                                          
768
 See Chapter 5, supra (“The rise and fall of ‘commercial speech’ as a category”). 
769
 See Chapter 4, Part B, supra (“The profane”). 
770
 See Chapter 4, supra (“From Chaplinsky to Stevens: The Evolution of Chaplinsky’s four categories”). 
771
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. 
772
 The Chaplinsky categories “include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fighting’ 
words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”  Id. at 
572.  Of course, by stating the unprotected categories “include” the four listed, Chaplinsky implied that its list was 
not necessarily exhaustive.  
773
 Notably, the Chaplinsky Court merely listed three of its articulated categories, but with respect to the fourth—
‘fighting words’—the Court apparently felt the need to define the term by adding the defining phrase “those which 
by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”  Perhaps the Supreme Court 
added that definition because the meaning of the phrase ‘fighting words’ was not obvious, but it is also reasonable to 
speculate that the Court may have added that phrase because the real concept it intended to express was broader than 
mere ‘fighting words’ that ‘incite’ but instead more akin to speech that is part of criminal conduct such that it results 
in ‘breach of the peace.’ 
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to include those that “tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,”
774
 and the narrower 
formulation of that category that survives—incitement—has been refined by the Supreme Court 
to apply only to speech “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely 
to incite or produce such action.”
775
  That sounds remarkably similar to the rationale for allowing 
government proscription of speech integrally related to criminal conduct, which has as its “sole, 
unlawful immediate objective”
776
 to produce unlawful action.  That close relationship is well-
illustrated by the Supreme Court’s approach to flag burning, which will be discussed in this 
chapter. 
Of course, the concept itself has roots far earlier than Chaplinsky.  Long before 1942, the 
Supreme Court had held speech that is itself part of unlawful conduct does not enjoy the 
protection of the First Amendment.
777
  Although the analysis on this point was not extensive, the 
Supreme Court had foreshadowed more than a century ago that there were at least two distinct 
types of speech intertwined with unlawful conduct that may fall outside the First Amendment’s 
scope: 
First, untruthful statements about otherwise lawful activities may be unprotected.
778
  The 
government may prohibit or regulate speech if it is part of “schemes or devices for obtaining 
money or property of any kind by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises.”
779
  As is apparent from the Supreme Court’s phrasing, particularly the connection to 
                                                          
774
 Id. at 572.  
775
 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
776
 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502. 
777
 See Chapter 2, supra; see also Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2024-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing history of 
government proscriptions of threatening speech since eighteenth century England). 
778
 Presumably, untruthful statements about unlawful activities also would be unprotected.  The key to this first type 
of speech intertwined with unlawful conduct is not only that it is untruthful but that it is intended to defraud, a 
necessary though not sufficient attribute for proscription.  See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 
516 (1904) (“[T]he misrepresentation of existing facts is not necessary to a conviction . . . .  The significant fact is 
the intent and purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306 (1896)). 
779
 Coyne, 194 U.S. at 505, 516. 
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“obtaining money or property,” this sort of unprotected speech is necessarily a type of 
commercial speech,
780
 although it may be proscribed because it is false and fraudulent and not 
merely because it is commercial.  In the post-Chaplinsky world, this type would come to be 
described as deceptive or misleading speech aimed at defrauding, and the intent of the speaker 
would become a critical part of the constitutional analysis.
781
  As will be seen below, this is the 
Read Magazine—Virginia Board of Pharmacy—Central Hudson line of cases. 
Second, even truthful
782
 statements that are part of advancing illegal activities may be 
unprotected.  “[T]he misrepresentation of existing facts is not necessary to a conviction under a 
statute applying to ‘any scheme or artifice to defraud.’”
783
  This type of speech is not necessarily 
commercial in nature, although it may be.  In the post-Chaplinsky world, it would come to be 
described as speech integral to criminal conduct.  Although the First Amendment case law 
related to this type of speech—unlike the case law related to fraud—rarely expressly demands 
intent as part of the Constitution’s requirement, intent would implicitly but necessarily be 
required because the associated criminal conduct requires the state to prove criminal intent.  As 
will be seen below, this is the Giboney—Pittsburgh Press line of cases that are inherently 
commercial and also includes the child pornography cases, which may or may not be commercial 
in nature, and the true threats cases, which typically are not commercial in nature. 
                                                          
780
 Compare, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion) (false statements that “do not seem to have been 
made to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to privileges” are protected by the First Amendment). 
781
 See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 620 (2003).  In upholding the 
State of Illinois’ attempt to apply its general anti-fraud law to a charitable solicitor who misstated material 
information, including the portion of each dollar contributed that would go to the charitable purpose, the Supreme 
Court stated that “false statement alone does not subject a fundraiser to fraud liability” and found it important to the 
constitutional analysis that under Illinois law, “to prove a defendant liable for fraud, the complainant must show that 
the defendant made a false representation of a material fact knowing that the representation was false; further, the 
complainant must demonstrate that the defendant made the representation with the intent to mislead the listener, and 
succeeded in doing so.” Id. 
782
 Presumably, untruthful statements about illegal activities also could be proscribed.  The key to this type of speech 
is that it is about illegal activities, a necessary though not sufficient attribute for its proscription. 
783
 Coyne, 194 U.S. at 516.  Despite the Supreme Court’s use of the term “defraud” in this context, this type of 
proscribable speech intertwined with unlawful conduct really describes non-commercial speech.  The key words in 
the Court’s formulation are “scheme” and “artifice,” not “defraud.”  
216 
 
Part A:  Fraud 
 
To fall within the unprotected category of “fraud,” speech must not only be false, 
deceptive or misleading and intended to defraud, but it also must relate to a commercial or 
financial matter.  As the Supreme Court later would make clear in rejecting a statute that 
criminalized lies about having received the Congressional Medal of Honor, the government may 
not rely upon the “fraud” exception to the First Amendment to prohibit or punish false 
statements that are not made “to secure employment or financial benefits or admission to 
privileges reserved for those who had earned the Medal.”
784
  A government prohibition on false 
speech that is “entirely without regard to whether the lie was made for the purpose of material 





 the notion that the government may regulate—punish or even 
prohibit—speech that is fraudulent in nature has deep roots in American jurisprudence.  “[T]he 
First Amendment does not shield fraud.”
787
  Those roots extend earlier than Chaplinsky, and 
even in the years immediately before Chaplinsky the Supreme Court was actively applying this 
notion to allow the government to prohibit or punish fraudulent speech.
788
  Congress could 
prohibit “use of the mails for the purpose of fraud or deception,” and “[i]t has never been 
supposed that the exclusion of these articles denied to their owners any of their constitutional 
rights.”
789
  So it is curious, indeed, that Chaplinsky makes no mention of fraud or anything 
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 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (plurality opinion). 
785
 Id. at 2547. 
786
 See Chapter 2, supra. 
787
 Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612. 
788
 See Chapter 2, supra. 
789
 Coyne, 194 U.S. at 507-08. The latter of these two quotations actually referred in the opinion to “a long list of 
prohibited articles dangerous in their nature, or to other articles with which they may come in contact; such, for 
instance, as liquids, poisons, explosives, and inflammable articles, fatty substances, or live or dead animals, and 




similar to it in its articulation of the categories of speech that fall outside First Amendment 
protection. 
One reasonable—although unprovable—explanation for this omission is that it simply 
never occurred to the Chaplinsky Court that it might be necessary to explain because it was so 
obvious.  If neither commercial speech—which, five weeks later in Chrestensen the Supreme 
Court would declare unprotected by the First Amendment—nor speech that is part of criminal 
conduct—such as that declared unprotected seven years later in Giboney—enjoyed any 
protection, then in the context of the times, perhaps the Chaplinsky Court viewed those 
conclusions as so self-evident that it was unnecessary to state or explain them. 
In any event, the Supreme Court was silent in Chaplinsky both on the Constitution’s 
effect on government power to regulate commercial speech and on its power to regulate speech 
that is part of criminal conduct.  Starting with that reality, it may be perfectly understandable that 
the Chaplinsky Court said nothing about fraudulent speech—which is, of course, both 
commercial speech and speech that is part of unlawful conduct.  Why would it even occur to 
anybody that the First Amendment might cover such a thing? 
But that silence in Chaplinsky, whatever its cause, did not accurately reflect the state of 
the law, either then or subsequently.  As the Supreme Court has somewhat recently summarized 
the law regarding prohibition or punishment of fraudulent speech, “What the First Amendment 
and our case law emphatically do not require . . . is a blanket exemption from fraud liability for a 
[person] who intentionally misleads [to obtain money].”
790
  Starting soon after Chaplinsky, the 
Supreme Court made clear that its longstanding and enduring view remained valid:  The 
Constitution does not prohibit government from prohibiting, punishing or otherwise regulating 
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 Madigan, 538 U.S. at 621 (emphasis added). 
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fraudulent speech. To illustrate that point, consider the development of the law in a line of three 
post-Chaplinsky cases: 
Donaldson v. Read Magazine (1948):
791
  Six years after deciding Chaplinsky, the 
Supreme Court was presented with a test of the First Amendment’s application to the 
government’s power to punish or prohibit fraudulent speech.  An investigation by the Postmaster 
General had revealed that Read Magazine and its related entities were conducting a Hall of Fame 
“[P]uzzle [C]ontest [that] was a scheme or device for obtaining money through the mails by 
means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises” in violation of federal 
law.
792
  As authorized by statute, the Postmaster entered a fraud order that stopped the flow of 
fraudulent solicitations outbound through the mail and also the flow of responses and money 
returning through the mail.  Read Magazine sued the Postmaster claiming, inter alia, that their 
game was speech protected by the First Amendment and that the Postmaster’s fraud order 
disrupting their game was an unconstitutional act of censorship.  After years of wrangling in the 
courts below about the scope of the fraud order, a revision and narrowing of that order by the 
Postmaster, and a preliminary trip to the Supreme Court on a different issue in this case, the First 
Amendment question finally was presented to the Supreme Court in 1948.
793
 The question was 
whether the federal statutes granting authority for the Postmaster’s fraud order “authorize a prior 
censorship and thus violate the First Amendment.”
794
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 333 U.S. 178. 
792
 Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
793
 Id. at 180-83. 
794
 Id. at 189. 
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The Supreme Court reviewed the lengthy history of statutes authorizing government 
actions to prevent fraudulent use of the mails.
795
  Based upon that review, the Supreme Court 
concluded: 
All of the foregoing statutes, and others which need not be referred to specifically, 
manifest a purpose of Congress to utilize its powers, particularly over the mails 
and in interstate commerce, to protect people against fraud.  This governmental 
power has always been recognized in this country and is firmly established.  The 
particular statutes here attacked have been regularly enforced by the executive 
officers and the courts for more than half a century.  They are now a part and 




Although the Read Magazine Court never cited to or otherwise referenced Chaplinsky, its 
analysis above is consistent with the Chaplinsky notion that “[t]here are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been 
thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
797
  The Read Magazine Court proceeded to reject 
the “contention that the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press 
include complete freedom, uncontrollable by Congress, to use the mails for perpetration of 
swindling schemes.”
798
  The Court considered and rejected an argument that the anti-fraud order 
was an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, concluding that “[i]ts future effect is merely to 
enjoin the continuation of conduct found fraudulent” and “it only keeps respondents from getting 
the money of others by false pretenses and deprives them of a right to speak or print only to the 
                                                          
795
 Id. at 189-90 (“In 1872 Congress first authorized the Postmaster General to forbid delivery of registered letters 
and payment of money orders to persons or companies found by the Postmaster General to be conducting an 
enterprise to obtain money by false pretenses through the use of the mails.  In the same statute Congress made it a 
crime to place letters, circulars, advertisements, etc., in the mails for the purpose of carrying out such fraudulent 
artifices or schemes.  In 1889 Congress declared ‘non-mailable’ letters and other matters sent to help perpetrate 
frauds.  In 1895 the Postmaster General’s fraud order powers were extended to cover all letters or other matters sent 
by mail.  And Congress has passed many more statutes, such, for illustration, as the Securities Act of 1933 and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, to protect people against fraudulent use of the mails.” (citations 
omitted)). 
796
 Id. at 190 (emphasis added). 
797
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (emphasis added). 
798
 Read Magazine, 333 U.S. at 191. 
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extent necessary to protect others from their fraudulent artifices.”
799
 While the narrowness of the 
anti-fraud order and the fact that it did not unnecessarily burden any of Read Magazine’s 
operations other than those determined to be fraudulent were important to the Court’s analysis—
thus, foreshadowing the First Amendment “overbreadth” analysis the Supreme Court would 
much later adopt—the essence of Read Magazine is categorical analysis in the spirit of 
Chaplinsky.  It stands for the proposition that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion holds 
fraudulent speech to be categorically unprotected by the First Amendment.   
But what, precisely, constitutes “fraudulent” speech for First Amendment purposes?  The 
Supreme Court would turn its attention to refining its language and analysis on that point almost 
three decades later in a challenge to Virginia’s authority to prohibit pharmacists from advertising 
the prices at which they sell prescription drugs. 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Consumer Council (1976):
800
  In striking down the 
Virginia statute barring prescription pharmaceutical price advertising, as discussed in Chapter 
5,
801
 the Supreme Court did not intend to bar all government regulation of commercial speech or 
even to insist that all commercial speech required constitutional protection.
802
 Even as the 




 425 U.S. 748. 
801
 See Chapter 5, Part B, supra. 
802
 The Virginia Board of Pharmacy  majority explained at length its intention that certain types of commercial 
speech would remain subject to government regulation—perhaps extensive regulation—and did so in a footnote that 
perhaps better reflects the Supreme Court’s unease about its overall holding than articulates a new rule that can be 
readily applied.  Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 (“In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First 
Amendment protection, we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms.  There are 
commonsense differences between speech that does ‘no more than propose a commercial transaction,’ and other 
varieties.  Even if the differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject 
to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is necessary to 
insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.  The truth of commercial 
speech, for example, may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political 
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service 
that he himself provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else.  Also, commercial speech may be 
more durable than other kinds.  Since advertising is the Sine qua non of commercial profits, there is little likelihood 
of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.  Attributes such as these, the greater objectivity and 
hardiness of commercial speech, may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing 
the speaker.  They may also make it appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or 
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Supreme Court abandoned the notion that a constitutional line existed between unprotected 
commercial speech and other speech that enjoyed First Amendment protection it sought to draw 
a new line between types of commercial speech:  Those that were constitutionally protected and 
those that were not.  The Supreme Court was mindful, for example, that if its holding were 
interpreted broadly it would “call[] into immediate question the constitutional legitimacy of 
every state and federal law regulating false or deceptive advertising.”
803
  Therefore, the Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy Court went out of its way to make clear that the case before it presented no 
“claim that prescription drug price advertisements are forbidden because they are false or 
misleading in any way”
804
 and the Court was not addressing that question.  Mindful of the door it 
was casting open by abandoning a bright-line categorical bar on applying the First Amendment 
to commercial speech, the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court’s majority narrowly stated the 
question is was deciding: 
What is at issue is whether a State may completely suppress the dissemination of 
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that 
information’s effect upon its disseminators and its recipients.  Reserving other 




The majority described those “other questions” it was “[r]eserving” as follows: 
 
We stress that we have considered in this case the regulation of commercial 
advertising by pharmacists.  Although we express no opinion as to other 
professions, the distinctions, historical and functional, between professions, may 
require consideration of quite different factors.  Physicians and lawyers, for 
example, do not dispense standardized products; they render professional Services 
of almost infinite variety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.  
They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints.” (citations omitted)). 
803
 Id. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
804
 Id. at 771 (majority opinion). 
805
 Id. at 773 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
806
 Id. at 773 n.25 (emphasis added). 
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Under the new constitutional dividing line in Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the government still 
might permissibly “require that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such 
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being 
deceptive.”
807
  Thus, the new constitutional boundary between protected commercial speech that 
is truthful and unprotected commercial speech that is false in a way that renders it misleading or 
deceptive was justified: 
to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is 
unimpaired.  The truth of commercial speech, for example, may be more easily 
verifiable by its disseminator than, let us say, news reporting or political 
commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seek to disseminate information 
about a specific product or service that he himself provides and presumably 
knows more about than anyone else. . . .  
 





Chief Justice Burger noted with approval that the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court “wisely 
leaves these issues to another day.”
809
  So it is a fair assessment to conclude that the Court was 
uneasy about the new constitutional lines it was drawing and, therefore, attempted to proceed 
cautiously.   
 Thus, even as it abandoned the old distinction between non-commercial speech protected 
by the First Amendment and commercial speech that, as a category, was unprotected, the 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy majority set out to draw a new boundary for the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion.  In the majority’s view, not all commercial speech falls outside the First 
Amendment’s scope; only some does.  The new boundary essentially subdivided the erstwhile 
category of “commercial speech” into two groups:  (a) unprotected commercial speech that 
remained outside the protection of the First Amendment because it was deceptive, false or 
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 Id. at 771 n.24. 
808
 Id. at 771 n.24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
809
 Id. at 775. 
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misleading and (b) all other commercial speech, which enjoyed at least some level of First 
Amendment protection. 
 Through this new line-drawing exercise, the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court 
articulated what were in effect two new groupings of speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  The first grouping is commercial speech that is deceptive or misleading: 
Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own 
sake.  Obviously, much commercial speech is not provably false, or even wholly 
false, but only deceptive or misleading.  We foresee no obstacle to a State’s 
dealing effectively with this problem.  The First Amendment, as we construe it 
today, does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream of commercial 




The second grouping is commercial speech in which “the transactions proposed in the forbidden 
advertisements are themselves illegal in any way.”
811
   
Clearly, both of these types of speech have logical roots in Giboney’s concept that 
“speech integral to criminal conduct” falls outside the protection of the First Amendment, 
although they do not necessarily fit neatly into Giboney’s analysis.  For that reason, the Virginia 
Board of Pharmacy Court’s articulation of the new constitutional boundary, which protects some 
types of commercial speech but not others, was a substantial development in the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion.  It appears that the Supreme Court at the time understood the 
jurisprudential earthquake its decision would cause, and that was addressed in tidy contrast by 
comparing the concurring opinion of Justice Stewart and the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Rehnquist. 
 Justice Stewart embraced the Virginia Board of Pharmacy majority’s shrinking the 
universe of potentially unprotected speech by shifting the constitutional boundary line away from 
the unprotected commercial speech/protected non-commercial speech distinction and moving it 
                                                          
810
 Id. at 771-72 (citations and footnote omitted) 
811
 Id. at 772. 
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instead to an unprotected false and deceptive commercial speech/protected all other commercial 
speech distinction.  To emphasize that the majority’s decision should not be interpreted to 
“preclude such governmental regulation” of “false or deceptive advertising,”
812
 he analyzed at 
length the rationale for the new constitutional boundary line.  After drawing upon the Supreme 
Court’s precedents regarding libel and defamation,
813
 Justice Stewart explained: 
The principles recognized in the libel decisions suggest that government may take 
broader action to protect the public from injury produced by false or deceptive 




The nature of commercial falsehoods, he continued, rendered them different from falsehoods that 
might be uttered or printed during the course of political debate or discussion of other matters of 
societal importance.
815
  That difference was critical in assessing how the values protected by the 
First Amendment were to be applied to commercial falsehoods as opposed to noncommercial 
falsehoods.  The key point is that there exist “important differences between commercial price 
and product advertising, on the one hand, and ideological communication on the other.”
816
  
Justice Stewart proceeded to explain those differences between the nature of “ideological 
communication,” where the Constitution requires that tolerance for falsehood be greater in order 
                                                          
812
 Id. at 776 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
813
 Id. at 777 (“The Court has on several occasions addressed the problem posed by false statements of fact in libel 
cases.  Those cases demonstrate that even with respect to expression at the core of the First Amendment, the 
Constitution does not provide absolute protection for false factual statements that cause private injury.  In Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., the Court concluded that there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.  As the Court 
had previously recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, however, factual errors are inevitable in free debate, 
and the imposition of liability for erroneous factual assertions can dampe(n) the vigor and limi(t) the variety of 
public debate by inducing self-censorship.  In order to provide ample breathing space for free expression, the 
Constitution places substantial limitations on the discretion of government to permit recovery for libelous 
communications.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
814
 Id. at 777. 
815
 Id. at 777-78 (“In contrast to the press, which must often attempt to assemble the true facts from sketchy and 
sometimes conflicting sources under the pressure of publication deadlines, the commercial advertiser generally 
knows the product or service he seeks to sell and is in a position to verify the accuracy of his factual representations 
before he disseminates them.  The advertiser’s access to the truth about his product and its price substantially 
eliminates any danger that governmental regulation of false or misleading price or product advertising will chill 
accurate and nondeceptive commercial expression.  There is, therefore, little need to sanction some falsehood in 
order to protect speech that matters.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
816
 Id. at 779. 
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to avoid chilling or improperly punishing protected speech, and “commercial price and product 
advertising,” where the Constitution permits the government to forbid and punish falsehoods. 
On the one hand:  
Ideological expression, be it oral, literary, pictorial, or theatrical, is integrally 
related to the exposition of thought—thought that may shape our concepts of the 
whole universe of man.  Although such expression may convey factual 
information relevant to social and individual decisionmaking, it is protected by 
the Constitution, whether or not it contains factual representations and even if it 
includes inaccurate assertions of fact.  Indeed, disregard of the “truth” may be 
employed to give force to the underlying idea expressed by the speaker.  Under 
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea, and the only way that 




In contrast, on the other hand: 
 
Commercial price and product advertising differs markedly from ideological 
expression because it is confined to the promotion of specific goods or services.  
The First Amendment protects the advertisement because of the information of 
potential interest and value conveyed rather than because of any direct 
contribution to the interchange of ideas.  Since the factual claims contained in 
commercial price or product advertisements relate to tangible goods or services, 
they may be tested empirically and corrected to reflect the truth without in any 
manner jeopardizing the free dissemination of thought.  Indeed, the elimination of 
false and deceptive claims services to promote the one facet of commercial price 
and product advertising that warrants First Amendment protection—its 





Thus, in the view of Justice Stewart, any government regulation of “ideological communication,” 
even if such communication is false or deceptive, risks thwarting values protected by the First 
Amendment; by contrast, government regulation that reduces the amount of false and deceptive 
commercial information in the marketplace actually promotes First Amendment values.     
 Justice Rehnquist, by contrast, viewed the changed constitutional boundary with less 
intellectual affection.  He was unpersuaded by the premise that commercial speech, on the 
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 Id. at 779-80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Id. at 780-81 (citations omitted). 
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whole, should be afforded more constitutional protection than it had historically been given.
819
  
He articulated the majority’s new boundary as permitting that “legislatures may prohibit false 
and misleading advertisements, and may likewise prohibit advertisements seeking to induce 
transactions which are themselves illegal” and then criticized the majority for abandoning the 
“effort to draw a bright line between ‘commercial speech’ on the one hand and ‘protected 




In this case, however, the Court has unfortunately substituted for the wavering 
line previously thought to exist between commercial speech and protected speech 
a no more satisfactory line of its own—that between “truthful” commercial 
speech, on the one hand, and that which is “false and misleading” on the other.  
The difficulty with this line is not that it wavers, but on the contrary that it is 
simply too Procrustean to take into account the congeries of factors which I 
believe could, quite consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 





Justice Rehnquist readily acknowledged the longstanding difficulty in drawing a bright 
constitutional line between commercial and noncommercial speech, but in his view the reality 
that such a line is “difficult to draw” did not justify abandoning that effort and replacing it with a 
similarly difficult line-drawing exercise between commercial speech that is protected and 
deceptive or false commercial speech that is not.
822
  Further criticizing the majority’s new test as 
creating “second-class First Amendment rights” for commercial speech, Justice Rehnquist 
                                                          
819
 Id. at 787 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Court insists that the rule it lays down is consistent even with the view 
that the First Amendment is primarily an instrument to enlighten public decisionmaking in a democracy.  I had 
understood this view to relate to public decisionmaking as to political, social, and other public issues, rather than the 
decision of a particular individual as to whether to purchase one or another kind of shampoo.  It is undoubtedly 
arguable that many people in the country regard the choice of shampoo as just as important as who may be elected to 
local, state, or national political office, but that does not automatically bring information about competing shampoos 
within the protection off the First Amendment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
820




 Id. at 787-88. 
227 
 
proceeded to offer hypothetical examples of commercial advertisements that would be protected 
by the Constitution unless the state could show that they are “actually untruthful or misleading”: 
“Pain getting you down?  Insist that your physician prescribe Demerol.  You pay a little 
more than for aspirin, but you get a lot more relief.” 
 
“Can’t shake the flu?  Get a prescription for Tetracycline from your doctor today.” 
 





In Justice Rehnquist’s view, the proper regulation of commercial statements like those above is 
better left to state legislatures than to courts. He did not “believe that the First Amendment 
mandates the Court’s ‘open door policy’ toward such commercial advertising.”
824
 
 In the context of understanding the Supreme Court’s doctrine that “fraud” is categorically 
excluded from First Amendment protection, the importance of Virginia Board of Pharmacy is 
that even as the Supreme Court finally abandoned its long defense of the doctrine that 
“commercial speech” is categorically excluded, it preserved in practical effect the exclusion of 
certain types of commercial speech—the deceptive or that which promotes illegal conduct.  The 
Supreme Court accomplished that outcome with reasoning that more closely resembles Giboney 
than Chrestensen.  As shall be seen, that reasoning would be further applied in subsequent cases 
to make clear that the Constitution does not prohibit the government from punishing fraud. 
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980):
825
  Four 
years after deciding Virginia Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court had occasion to elaborate 
on its approach to policing the newly declared boundary line between commercial speech that is 
constitutionally protected and false or deceptive commercial speech that is not.  The dispute 
arose from the Mideast oil embargo and energy crisis of the early 1970s.  In response to that 
                                                          
823
 Id. at 786, 788. 
824
 Id. at 790. 
825
 447 U.S. 557. 
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national emergency, the New York State Public Service Commission, which regulates public 
utilities, adopted a prohibition on any electric utility advertising that “promot[es] the use of 
electricity.”  The Commission justified its prohibition as being necessitated by the energy crisis; 
without sufficient fuel or energy sources to meet electric demand, it was essential that demand 
for energy not be increased, especially during the winter when the need for home heating was at 
its peak.  Years later, however, when the energy crisis had passed, the Commission extended its 
prohibition on “promotional-advertising intended to stimulate the purchase of utility services.”
826
  
It did so to promote the national policy of energy conservation and to avoid producing additional 




Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation, an electric utility subject to the 
Commission’s ban on promotional advertising, filed suit challenging the advertising restriction 
on First Amendment grounds.  The state trial court upheld the Commission’s restriction as did 
the intermediate appellate court and the New York Court of Appeals.
828
  Applying a balancing 
test, the Court of Appeals “concluded that the governmental interest in the prohibition 
outweighed the limited constitutional value of the commercial speech at issue.”
829
  Thus, the case 
when presented to the United States Supreme Court was one in which no categorical analysis had 
been conducted. 
The Supreme Court struck down the promotional advertising ban as a violation of the 
First Amendment.  After summarizing the status of the law regarding commercial speech,
830
 the 
                                                          
826
 Id. at 559. 
827
 Id. at 559-60. 
828
 Id. at 560-61. 
829
 Id. at 561. 
830
 Id. at 561-62 (“The First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects 
commercial speech from unwarranted governmental regulation.  Commercial expression not only serves the 
economic interest of the speaker, but also assists consumers and furthers the societal interest in the fullest possible 
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Central Hudson Court concluded that “[t]he Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to 
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.  The protection 
available for particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression and of 
the governmental interests served by its regulation.”
831
 The Court then made clear that what it 
meant by the “nature . . . of the expression” included, in part, a continuing application of the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to commercial speech that was deceptive or misleading: 
The First Amendment’s concern for commercial speech is based on the 
informational function of advertising.  Consequently, there can be no 
constitutional objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not 
accurately inform the public about lawful activity.  The government may ban 
forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it or 
commercial speech related to illegal activity.  
 
[However,] [i]f the communication is neither misleading nor related to unlawful 




Thus, the Central Hudson Court reinforced that there exist two subsets of commercial speech—
that which is deceptive or misleading even if related to lawful activities and that which is related 
to unlawful activities—that are categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.  It is 
that categorical exclusion that allows the government to “ban” those types of speech with “no 
constitutional objection.” 
The Central Hudson majority then announced a four-pronged test it would apply to 
determine whether any government regulation of commercial speech would survive a First 
Amendment challenge: 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
dissemination of information.  In applying the First Amendment to this area, we have rejected the highly 
paternalistic view that government has complete power to suppress or regulate commercial speech.  People will 
perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and the best means to that end is to open the 
channels of communication rather than to close them.  Even when advertising communicates only an incomplete 
version of the relevant facts, the First Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no 
information at all.” (citations, internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted)). 
831
 Id. at 562-63 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
832
 Id. at 563 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.  At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive 
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the 
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is 




In relation to the Constitution’s lack of protection for fraud, the Central Hudson test essentially 
codifies the new boundary drawn by the Virginia Board of Pharmacy Court by confirming that 
commercial speech that is deceptive or misleading or that relates to unlawful activity falls 
outside the protection of the First Amendment.  It is notable, however, that the Central Hudson 
Court described this boundary line as “at least” excluding such speech, leaving open the 
possibility that there are other types of commercial speech that fall outside the First 
Amendment’s scope.  For all other commercial speech, the Central Hudson Court establishes a 
form of balancing test that requires some form of heightened scrutiny.
834
 
 The Central Hudson majority’s articulation of a four-part test for evaluating restriction of 
commercial speech spawned significant disagreement on the court.  Two separate opinions, each 
concurring in the judgment but criticizing the majority’s new test and its application in this case, 
were filed.  But the most direct criticism came from the dissent filed by Justice Rehnquist, who 
reiterated the dramatic change in doctrine that Virginia Board of Pharmacy had ushered in by 
extending the First Amendment
835
 to provide at least some level of protection to all commercial 
                                                          
833
 Id. at 566.  
834
 Central Hudson itself was decided based upon the final three prongs of this four-part test because the speech 
involved was not alleged to be misleading or deceptive or to involve unlawful conduct.   
835
 Id. at 584 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Prior to this Court’s recent decision in Virginia Pharmacy Board v. 
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council . . . commercial speech was afforded no protection under the First Amendment 
whatsoever.”  (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
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Justice Rehnquist lamented that the Virginia Board of Pharmacy rule had “unlocked a 
Pandora’s Box” by protecting commercial speech on par with “traditional political speech:”
837
 
The line between “commercial speech,” and the kind of speech that those who 
drafted the First Amendment had in mind, may not be technically or intellectually 
easy one to draw, but it surely produced far fewer problems than has the 




After elaborating upon his reasoning as to why the Supreme Court should not have abandoned 
the bright-line constitutional boundary between “commercial speech” and “protected speech,”
839
 
Justice Rehnquist punctuated the essential reasoning of his argument:  “[I]n a democracy, the 
economic is subordinate to the political, a lesson that our ancestors learned long ago, and that our 
descendants will undoubtedly have to relearn many years hence.”
840
 
* * * 
 
 Thus, it is well-established that fraudulent speech—lies told for economic gain—receives 
no protection from the First Amendment.  While the Supreme Court would continue to grapple 
after Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson with the question of what amount of 
protection should be afforded to that subset of commercial speech that falls within the First 
Amendment’s protective umbrella, those two cases made clear that a consensus had developed 
                                                          
836
 Id. at 593. 
837




 Id. (“[T] he world of political advocacy and its marketplace of ideas, there is no such thing as a ‘fraudulent’ idea:  
there may be useless proposals, totally unworkable schemes, as well as very sound proposals that will receive the 
imprimatur of the ‘marketplace of ideas’ through our majoritarian system of election and representative government.  
The free flow of information is important in this context not because it will lead to the discovery of any objective 
‘truth,’ but because it is essential to our system of self-government.  [By contrast, t]he notion that more speech is the 
remedy to expose falsehood and fallacies is wholly out of place in the commercial bazaar, where if applied logically 
the remedy of one who was defrauded would be merely a statement, available upon request, reciting the Latin 
maxim ‘caveat emptor.’”). 
840
 Id. at 599. 
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that commercial speech that is deceptive or misleading is constitutionally unprotected under the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  The rationale for this remaining categorical exclusion has 
roots far deeper in the doctrine that renders unprotected that speech closely intertwined with 
violations of the law than in the doctrine of commercial speech itself.  In other words, the 
remaining categorical exclusion of false and misleading commercial speech after Central 
Hudson resembles more closely the accepted reasoning of Giboney and its progeny than the 
repudiated reasoning of Chrestensen. 
 In addition to allowing the government to prohibit and punish fraudulent speech, the 
Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Central Hudson cases also contemplate a second type of speech 
that would remain unprotected by the First Amendment, namely speech that is itself related to 
illegal conduct or proposing illegal transactions.  This second type of unprotected speech differs 
from fraud because it need not be false or misleading in order to be proscribable, nor must it 
necessarily involve commercial speech.  As we shall see below, the attributes of this second type 
are more readily understood by analysis under the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press line of cases 
allowing government prohibitions of speech, whether or not commercial and whether or not 





Part B:  Speech proposing criminal acts 
 
 The idea that speech integrally intertwined with criminal conduct becomes proscribable 
under the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion has deep roots in American jurisprudence.
841
  
Speech need not be false and fraudulent to be proscribable under this principle; rather, it may be 
enough that the underlying conduct is properly classified as criminal, or at least as unlawful.  The 
very concept of a categorical exclusion for speech integral to criminal conduct has received 
scholarly disapproval and has been rejected as “a poor basis for analyzing speech restrictions,”
842
 
but there is no doubt the Supreme Court continues to acknowledge and apply a categorical 
exclusion of this sort.  Regardless of whether scholars think they should use it, the fact is the 
Justices do. 
In the same decade it decided Chaplinsky, in which it articulated four categories of 
speech outside the protection of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court seemed to recognize a 
fifth category.  The Supreme Court held that “it has never been deemed an abridgement of 
freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was 
in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or 
printed.”843  With that, the excluded category of “speech integral to criminal conduct,” which the 
Supreme Court previously had signaled to be outside the First Amendment’s scope,844 was 
squarely recognized.  However, the Supreme Court would continue to grapple with the difficult 
intersection of speech and unlawful conduct even after recognizing, in principle, the excluded 
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 See Chapter 2, supra. 
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 Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct:  Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-
Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1326 (2005). 
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 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502.   
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 For example, in Lovell, 303 U.S. at 451, the Court had suggested that speech that advocates “unlawful conduct” 
may be outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
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category of speech integral to criminal conduct.845  This wide-ranging area of the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion has been refined and focused significantly in the decades since 
Chaplinsky, but the basic principle has not changed.  As Justice Holmes put it many years ago: 
I do not doubt for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify 
punishing persuasion to murder, the United States constitutionally may punish 
speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it 
will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.846 
 
The landmark case articulating this principle in the modern, post-Chaplinsky era reached 
the Supreme Court before the 1940s ended.  While specific applications and outgrowths of this 
excluded category have been developed by the Supreme Court, and will be discussed later in 
Parts C and D of this chapter related to child pornography and true threats, the basic principle 
was established in Giboney and Pittsburgh Press. 
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949):
847
  A labor dispute in Kansas City, 
Missouri, resulted in the Supreme Court’s first expansion of its Chaplinsky list of categories.  
The Ice and Coal Drivers and Handlers Local Union No. 953 represented local drivers who 
delivered ice door-to-door in Kansas City, and the union had attempted—but largely failed—to 
persuade all of its non-union competitors who also delivered ice door-to-door to join the union.  
To further its efforts, the union devised a strategy to make it impossible for non-union drivers to 
                                                          
845
 Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s articulation of this ongoing problem of the regulation of speech that 
is interwoven with unlawful conduct two decades after Chaplinsky in O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (“[E]ven on the 
assumption that the alleged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First 
Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally 
protected activity.  This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.  To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which 
must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms:  compelling; substantial; subordinating; 
paramount; cogent; strong.  Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to 
the furtherance of that interest.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
847
 Giboney, 336 U.S. 490.  
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sell ice in the Kansas City market—thereby forcing all delivery drivers either to join the union 
or to go out of business—by seeking from ice wholesalers in the city agreements not to supply 
ice to non-union drivers.  All but one wholesaler in the Kansas City market agreed; the lone 
holdout was Empire Storage and Ice Company (“Empire”).
848
 
 To break Empire’s resistance, union members, including Joseph Giboney, began 
picketing in front of Empire’s place of business.  The picketers carried placards making clear that 
“the avowed immediate purpose of the picketing was to compel Empire to agree to stop selling 
ice to nonunion peddlers.”
849
  Confronted with difficult options,
850
 Empire chose to respond to 
the picketing by filing suit in Missouri state court challenging the picketing as part of an illegal 
scheme to violate a Missouri statute that barred certain “combinations in restraint of trade.”
851
 
Empire sought an injunction to bar the picketing.  The state trial court enjoined the picketers 
from “placing pickets or picketing around or about the buildings” of Empire.
852
  The Missouri 
Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the picketers’ argument that their picketing was 
constitutionally protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments “because the picketers 
publicized only the truthful information that appellee was selling ice to peddlers who are not 
members of the said defendant union.”
853
  The Missouri Supreme Court also found that “the 
purpose of the picketing was to force Empire to become a party to such [illegal] combination,”
854
 
in violation of state criminal law. 
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 Id. at 493 (“In this dilemma, Empire was faced with three alternatives:  It could continue to sell ice to nonunion 
peddlers, in which event it would be compelled to wage a fight for survival against overwhelming odds; it could stop 
selling ice to nonunion peddlers thereby relieving itself from further conflict with the union, in which event it would 
be subject to prosecution for crime and suits for triple damages; it could invoke the protection of the law.  The last 
alternative was adopted.”). 
851
 Id. at 491 n.1. 
852
 Id. at 494. 
853
 Id. at 493-94 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
854
 Id. at 494. 
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 The picketers appealed to the United States Supreme Court and presented the question, as 
Justice Black framed it: “[C]oncerning the constitutional power of a state to apply its antitrade 
restraint law to labor union activities, and to enjoin union members from peaceful picketing 




The Supreme Court held that on the facts of this case it was clear the picketing was but 
one element in a “single and integrated course of conduct” that violated Missouri’s restraint of 
trade law.
856
  The picketers’ efforts “peacefully to publicize truthful facts about a labor dispute” 
could not, on the record of this case, “be treated in isolation.”
857
  But instead of deciding this 
case simply on the facts and record presented, the Supreme Court then went further and 
articulated a broader rule:  “It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for 
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in 
violation of a valid criminal statute.  We reject the contention now.”
858
  After acknowledging 
that it was “mindful of the essential importance to our society of a vigilant protection of freedom 
of speech and press,” the Supreme Court expanded its test to make explicit that “[s]tates cannot 
consistently with our Constitution abridge those freedoms to obviate slight inconveniences or 
annoyances.”
859
  But the Giboney Court then proceeded to explain in detail why the picketers’ 
placards themselves—the signs bearing words that constituted the actual speech that was at issue 
in this case—were not constitutionally protected: 
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 Id. at 491-92 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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 Id. at 498 (“Thus all of appellants’ activities—their powerful transportation combination, their patrolling, their 
formation of the picket line warning union men not to cross at peril of their union membership, their publicizing—
constituted a single and integrated course of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri’s valid law.  In this 
situation, the injunction did not more than enjoin an offense against Missouri law, a felony.”). 
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 Id.  
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 Id. (emphasis added). 
859
 Id. at 501-02.  
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[P]lacards used as an essential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an 
important public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state control.  
Nor can we say that the publication here should not have been restrained because 
of the possibility of separating the picketing conduct into illegal and legal parts.  
For the placards were to effectuate the purposes of an unlawful combination and 
their sole, unlawful immediate objective was to induce Empire to violate the 
Missouri law by acquiescing in unlawful demands to agree not to sell ice to 
nonunion peddlers.  It is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were 
as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing.  But it has never 
been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of 
conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or 
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.  Such an 
expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press 
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in 





Thus, Giboney stands for the proposition that a category of speech that is “an integral part 
of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute” is outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.  Statutes proscribing or governing that category of unprotected speech are reviewed 
under the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  The Giboney Court never acknowledged or 
described the relationship, if any, between the category of unprotected speech it identified and 
the four categories articulated only seven years earlier in Chaplinsky, although the Giboney 
Court was, of course, mindful of the existence of Chaplinsky and apparently saw no conflict 
between the two decisions.
861
 The Giboney rule certainly was consistent with the pronouncement 
in Chaplinsky that the “prevention and punishment” of certain categories of speech “has never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem;”
862
 the Giboney Court acknowledged that 
factor by finding important to its constitutional analysis that “[t]he Missouri policy against 
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 Id. at 502 (citations omitted). 
861
 Giboney mentions Chaplinsky only once and then only in passing as part of a string citation.  Giboney, 336 U.S. 
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restraints of trade is of long standing and is in most respects the same as that which the Federal 
Government has followed for more than half a century.”
863
  
 The Giboney Court also tied its newly articulated category to historical roots by spending 
considerable attention on distinguishing the pre-Chaplinsky case Thornhill v. Alabama from the 
situation presented in Giboney—and, ultimately, finding the constitutional rules applied in both 
cases to be in harmony.  In the Giboney Court’s view, the principal difference between the two 
cases—which both involved First Amendment challenges to laws used to suppress picketing—
was that the ordinance struck down in Thornhill was “so broad that [it] could not only be utilized 
to punish conduct plainly illegal but could also be applied to ban all truthful publications of the 
facts of a labor controversy.”
864
 By contrast, the picketers in Giboney were “doing more than 
exercising a right of free speech or press[;] [t]hey were exercising their economic power together 
with that of their allies to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of 
trade.”
865
  In other words, the very purpose of the Thornhill ordinance was to suppress speech, 
while the burden on picketers’ speech imposed by the Giboney law was an incidental application 
of the law’s broader and valid purpose.
866
 
 It should be noted that Giboney’s reasoning has been criticized as imprecise and 
unilluminating.  One respected author has critiqued Giboney’s reasoning and constitutional 
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 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502 (emphasis added). 
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 Id. at 498-99.  
865
 Id. at 503. 
866
 Indeed, it is clear that the Giboney Court viewed the dispute before it as one framed principally as a power 
struggle between two different entities—the union and the state—each seeking primacy in the regulation of trade 
and economics, not of speech.  Id. at 504 (“While the State of Missouri is not a party in this case it is plain that the 
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provided for enforcement of its rule by sanctions against union members who cross picket lines.  We hold that the 
state’s power to govern in this field is paramount, and that nothing in the constitutional guaranties of speech or press 






 and concluded that we should “reject Giboney as a guide to modern free speech law.”
868
 In 
his view, the utility in Giboney is in great part an outgrowth of labor law, not free speech law, 
and Giboney really stands for the narrow proposition that picketing is subject to lesser protection 
under the First Amendment than other forms of expression.
869
 
Whether one views Giboney as a groundbreaking intellectual development in the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion or merely as a somewhat feeble-minded footnote in the law of 
labor relations, the fact remains that it has been oft-cited by the courts—including by the United 
States Supreme Court—for the proposition that there exists a category of speech integral to 
criminal conduct that falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.  In the years since 
deciding Giboney, the Supreme Court has rhetorically buttressed Giboney as standing for the 
notion that the government may punish speech that is “brigaded with illegal action.”
870
  As we 
see throughout this chapter, Giboney is—rightly or wrongly—the common ancestor of the 
modern Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion that excludes from First Amendment protection 
speech closely intertwined with illegal conduct, including fraud, true threats, or child 
pornography. 
The rather broad and somewhat ill-defined concern that justified Giboney—that a 
contrary rule would make “practically impossible” the enforcement of legitimate laws against 
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“conspiracies deemed injurious to society”
871
—would be honed by the Supreme Court over the 
years.  But the most important refining of the general rule came a quarter century later in 
connection with a dispute involving the contents and placement of classified advertisements in a 
Pittsburgh newspaper; in that case, the Supreme Court made clear that speech proposing a 
transaction that was itself unlawful fell squarely within the Giboney rule. 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm’n on Human Relations (1973):
872
  Two years before it 
began in Bigelow the express dismantling of the “commercial speech” exception to the First 
Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld the application of a Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, non-
discrimination ordinance to forbid a local newspaper to publish classified “help wanted” 
advertisements in columns separated by gender. While a cursory reading of this decision would 
understandably leave the reader with the impression that it is about the commercial speech 
doctrine, in fact its enduring contribution to First Amendment law lies in its application of the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to speech proposing illegal transactions. 
 The Pittsburgh Press had a practice of printing paid “help wanted” advertisements either 
in a column captioned “Male Help Wanted (or “Jobs—Male Interest”), “Female Help Wanted 
(or “Jobs—Female Interest”), or “Male-Female Help Wanted” (or “”Male-Female”).
873
  
Employers who placed advertisements in this sex-segregated manner ran afoul of a local anti-
discrimination ordinance,
874
 and in 1969 the National Organization for Women filed a complaint 
with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations accusing the Pittsburgh Press of illegally 
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 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 502. 
872
 Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. 376 
873
 Id. at 379. 
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 Id. at 378  (quoting §8 (e) of the ordinance, which made it unlawful “[f]or any ’employer,’ employment agency 
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aiding employers in this practice.
875
  The Commission “ordered Pittsburgh Press to cease and 
desist such violations and to utilize a classification system with no reference to sex.”
876
 The 
Commission’s order was narrowed but generally upheld by the lower Pennsylvania state courts, 
and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.
877
 
In agreeing to review the case, the United States Supreme Court noted the “narrowness of 
the recognized exceptions to the principle that the press may not be regulated by the 
Government.  Our inquiry must therefore be whether the challenged order falls within any of 
these exceptions.”
878
  The Supreme Court eventually concluded that the Commission’s order 
did, indeed, fall within a First Amendment exception that permitted it to stand—but not the 
exception urged upon it.  The Commission had invoked Valentine v. Chrestensen and urged the 
Supreme Court to sustain the order on the reasoning that “this regulation is permissible because 
the speech is commercial speech unprotected by the First Amendment.”
879
  As a threshold 
matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the challenged ordinance, and the order issued 
pursuant thereto, did not threaten to “muzzl[e]” the newspaper,
880
 a conclusion that likely was 
important in the Supreme Court’s ultimate holding that the ordinance and order survived 
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employment agency or labor organization, to aid . . . in the doing of any act declared to be an unlawful employment 
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 Id. at 380. 
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 Id. at 380-81. 
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 Id. at 382. 
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 Id. at 384. 
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institutional viability.  As the press has evolved from an assortment of small printers into a diverse aggregation 
including large publishing empires as well, the parallel growth and complexity of the economy have led to extensive 
regulatory legislation from which the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity.  Accordingly, this Court 
has upheld application to the press of the National Labor Relations Act; the Fair Labor Standards Act; and the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.  Yet the Court has recognized on several occasions the special institutional needs of a 
vigorous press by striking down laws taxing the advertising revenue of newspapers with circulations in excess of 
20,000; requiring a license for the distribution of printed matter; and prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of 
leaflets.  But no suggestion is made in this case that the Ordinance was passed with any purpose of muzzling or 
curbing the press.  Nor does Pittsburgh Press argue that the Ordinance threatens its financial viability or impairs in 
any significant way its ability to publish and distribute its newspaper.  In any event, such a contention would not be 
supported by the record” (citations, internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
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constitutional challenge.  The Supreme Court engaged in analysis of the “commercial speech” 
exclusion first articulated in Chrestensen and concluded that the classified advertisements at 
issue in this case are “classic examples of commercial speech.”
881
   
The Pittsburgh Press Court then proceeded to reject various arguments about why the 
circumstances of this case should remove the newspaper’s actions in accepting and printing the 
advertisements “from the category of commercial speech.”
882
  In light of the rather extensive 
discussion of Chrestensen and the then-existing doctrine that commercial speech was 
categorically exempted from First Amendment protection, it is understandable that even the 
Chief Justice concluded that the Pittsburgh Press decision “represents . . . a disturbing 
enlargement of the ‘commercial speech’ doctrine.”
883
   
The better reading of the Pittsburgh Press decision, however, is that it is not about the 
constitutional status of commercial speech at all—despite the decision’s somewhat extensive 
discussion of that doctrine.  The better reading revealed itself after the Pittsburgh Press argued 
that if the commercial speech doctrine applied then the Supreme Court should rule that 
Chrestensen was wrongly decided and that commercial speech should receive constitutional 
protection.  In response to this point, the Pittsburgh Press majority wrote: 
Whatever the merits of this contention may be in other contexts, it is unpersuasive 
in this case.  Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity, it is 
illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance.  We have no doubt that a 
newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden to publish a want ad proposing a 
sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes.  Nor would the result be different if the 
nature of the transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned 
‘Narcotics for Sale’ and ‘Prostitutes Wanted’ rather than stated within the four 
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The Pittsburgh Press majority then made clear that it considered the placement of the 
employment advertisements at issue in this case to be illegal sex-based discrimination: 
The illegality in this case may be less overt, but we see no difference in principle 
here. . . . 
 
. . . The Commission and the courts below concluded that the practice of placing 
want ads for nonexempt employment in sex-designated columns did indeed ‘aid’ 
employers to indicate illegal sex preferences.  The advertisements, as embroidered 
by their placement, signaled that the advertisers were likely to show an illegal sex 




In Pittsburgh Press, the Court gave lip service to the existence of a commercial speech 
exclusion but in fact did not rely upon it at all—perhaps knowing that the doctrine soon would be 
abandoned, as it was only two years later.  Rather, the importance of Pittsburgh Press is that the 
Supreme Court neatly pivoted from an assertion that the challenged speech fell outside the First 
Amendment’s protection because it was commercial to a conclusion that it was unprotected 
because it was part of conduct that was illegal.  This, then, is the heart of the Pittsburgh Press 
rule: 
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary 
commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental 
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial 
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid 




The Pittsburgh Press decision, therefore, is an outgrowth of the Giboney principle that 
speech integral to criminal conduct may be proscribed by the government.  That is why, as 
quoted immediately above, the government may constitutionally impose a “restriction” on 
speech that is “incidental” to an “activity” that “itself is illegal.”  To be sure, the Pittsburgh 
Press majority apparently did not view its decision in those terms; the majority opinion never 
cites or otherwise references Giboney although it repeatedly cites the soon-to-be-repudiated 
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Valentine v. Chrestensen and includes an extensive discussion of commercial speech doctrines.  
Indeed, the only reference to Giboney in the entirety of the Pittsburgh Press decision is a passing 
reference in the dissent of Justice Douglas offered solely for the purpose of distinguishing it.
887
  
But in later years, the Supreme Court would often refer to Giboney and Pittsburgh Press together 
as representing the general proposition that speech proposing a transaction that is itself illegal 
may not be protected by the First Amendment.  This constitutional rule happened to arise in 
Pittsburgh Press in the context of commercial speech, but as will be discussed in Parts C (child 
pornography) and D (true threats) of this chapter, this categorical exclusion does not necessarily 
require that the speech involved be commercial in nature.  Of course, as discussed in Part A 
(fraud) of this chapter, that fact the speech integral to illegal activity happens to be commercial 







                                                          
887
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Part C:  Visual depictions of child pornography 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that visual depictions of child pornography 
created with the use of real children fall within the “First Amendment Free Zone” that is outside 
the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution.  While that outcome is morally 
unassailable and is consistently reflected in an unbroken line of the Supreme Court’s cases, the 
doctrinal reasoning upon which it rests has been difficult to articulate.  Is “child pornography” 
really a separate and distinct category of unprotected speech as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
stated? 
Unlike “fraud,” speech in this unprotected category need not be untruthful, deceptive or 
misleading—to the contrary, the very fact that the visual depiction truthfully represents actual 
child abuse is one of the essential reasons for its exclusion.  Moreover, while part of the rationale 
for denying First Amendment protection to these visual depictions of child pornography is a 
strong governmental interest in eliminating the market demand for such films and images, and 
therefore eliminating the demand to abuse children in order to create the visual depictions, there 




As discussed above in Chapter 1, the Supreme Court could have taken any one of at least 
three doctrinal approaches to declaring visual depictions of child pornography unprotected by the 
Constitution.
889
  The Supreme Court itself has most often referred to “child pornography” as a 
separate and distinct category of unprotected speech.
890
 That doctrinal construction is 
problematic because “child pornography” was never recognized as an unprotected category 
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before Chaplinsky; indeed, the “serious national problem” arising “[i]n recent years” of “the 
exploitive use of children in the production of pornography”
891
 that has animated the Supreme 
Court since New York v. Ferber really is a function of twentieth century photographic and 
communications technology.  Therefore, it was impossible for the Supreme Court to conclude in 
Ferber that excluding from First Amendment protection visual depictions of child pornography 
has “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”
892
 by pointing to historical 
practice—and it made no attempt to do so.   
But this abandonment in Ferber of the traditional mooring to historical practice that the 
court has scrupulously required in other contexts has rendered its child pornography 
jurisprudence subject to misinterpretation or intellectual criticism.  For example, while the 
Supreme Court saw no problem declaring proscribable images that capture actual child abuse it 
sharply recoiled at the suggestion it should do the same for images of actual animal abuse and 
rejected the government’s invitation to do so as “startling and dangerous”
893
—even though 
neither circumstance presented “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of 
a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”
894
  Purely from the standpoint of 
First Amendment doctrine, there is no articulable distinction that explains these two quite 
different outcomes—the only difference is the unique, obvious and understandable revulsion and 
universal societal opprobrium that attaches to the sexual abuse of children. 
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude—even if it cannot be empirically proven—that what 
actually happened in the cases regarding visual depictions of child pornography is this:  The 
Supreme Court first reached the conclusion that such depictions should not enjoy First 
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Amendment protection and then set about devising an articulable reason for that outcome.  That 
speculative conclusion about the Supreme Court’s motivation and process would explain the 
doctrinal anomaly that results from considering “child pornography” as a distinct category of 
unprotected speech created by Ferber in 1982 without any “tradition of proscription.”
895
  That 
speculation is buttressed by the Supreme Court’s later explanation that in Ferber, it had “made 
clear” that child pornography “presented a special case.”
896
  Consider these two contrasting 
upshots of the approach selected by the Supreme Court: 
On the one hand, declaring “child pornography” to reside in a separate, distinct category 
of speech without constitutional protection has the doctrinal benefit of absolving the Court of any 
need to harmonize the outcome in child pornography cases with others that are arguably similar.  
Child pornography is constitutionally unprotected, the circular reasoning would go, because 
“child pornography” is an unprotected category.  It is easy for the Supreme Court to reject 
subsequent efforts to extend that reasoning to other proposed categories because by definition it 
would not apply.  For example, visual depictions of animal abuse would not enjoy First 
Amendment protection akin to visual depictions of child abuse, the reasoning would go, because 
they obviously are not part of the unprotected category of child pornography. 
On the other hand, the doctrinal drawback of the Supreme Court’s abandonment of its 
usual requirement that any newly discovered categories demonstrate a “tradition of 
proscription”
897
 is that it invites analogy from future advocates.  If visual depictions of child 
abuse could be excluded from First Amendment protection without any demonstration of 
historical exclusion, the reasoning would go, then why not visual depictions of animal cruelty?  
Or why not some other future category if the opprobrium were sufficient? 
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Thus, from a doctrinal standpoint, it may be preferable to consider child pornography not 
as a new and separate category of unprotected speech but rather as a specific application of the 
longstanding category of speech integral to criminal conduct.  This doctrinal approach would 
explain the exclusion of child pornography from First Amendment protection by Ferber in 1982 
as part of the well-established Giboney-Pittsburgh Press principle that, as demonstrated above, 
has deep pre-Chaplinsky roots in American jurisprudence.  In this application the “speech,” in 
the form of visual depictions of child pornography, is integral to the criminal conduct, the 
underlying acts of child abuse performed on real children. 
In any event, one thing is certain:  The “tradition of proscription” for visual depictions of 
child pornography extends at least as far back as 1982, when the Supreme Court considered the 
First Amendment implications of the State of New York prosecuting Paul Ferber for selling films 
that contained pornographic images of children.  Since that inception, the body of law excluding 
from First Amendment protection visual depictions of child pornography that is created by 
recording actual unlawful acts involving real children has grown ever more solid.  The line of 
Supreme Court cases upholding government proscription of speech in the form of visual 
depictions of child pornography involving real children is unbroken from Ferber through 
Osborne and Williams, and the reasoning that visual depictions of child pornography are 
constitutionally unprotected because of their inherent connection to the underlying crime of child 
abuse was buttressed by Free Speech Coalition. 
New York v. Ferber (1982):
898
  The Supreme Court first determined that visual 
depictions of child pornography fall into a category of speech unprotected by the First 
Amendment in this 1982 case, the Supreme Court’s “first examination of a statute directed at and 
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limited to depictions of sexual activity involving children.”
899
  The case arose after Paul Ferber, 
the operator of a sexually oriented bookstore on Manhattan Island, sold to an undercover officer 
two films “devoted almost exclusively to depicting young boys masturbating.”
900
 At that time, 
New York state law contained three relevant prohibitions.  First, it prohibited use of a child in 
the making of child pornography.
901
  Second, it prohibited the knowing dissemination of child 
pornography that is “obscene” as that term had come to be defined through years of First 
Amendment litigation.
902
  Third, it prohibited the knowing dissemination of child pornography 
that was not “obscene.”
903
  All three prohibitions constituted felony crimes.
904
 
 Mr. Ferber was prosecuted for violating both of the statutory prohibitions on 
dissemination of child pornography, but the jury acquitted him of the counts related to 
disseminating obscene pornographic materials.
905
  Therefore, his only conviction was for the act 
of disseminating films containing visual depictions of children engaged in sexual acts that a jury 
determined not to be obscene.  Although the maximum penalty for this conviction could have 
                                                          
899
 Id. at 753. 
900
 Id. at 751-52. 
901
 Id. at 750-51 The New York statute read in pertinent part:  “‘A person is guilty of the use of a child in a sexual 
performance if knowing the character and content thereof he employs, authorizes or induces a child less than sixteen 
years of age to engage in a sexual performance or being a parent, legal guardian or custodian of such child, he 
consents to the participation by such child in a sexual performance.’  A ‘[s]exual performance’ is defined as ‘any 
performance or part thereof which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age. §263.00(1).  
‘Sexual conduct’ is in turn defined in §263.00(3):  ‘ ‘Sexual conduct’ means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, 
deviate sexual intercourse, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the 
genitals.’ ‘A performance is defined as ‘any play, motion picture, photograph or dance’ or ‘any other visual 
representation exhibited before an audience.’ §263.00(4).”  Id. (quoting New York Penal Law §263.05).  
902
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751.  The prohibition on distributing child pornography that was “obscene” was contained in 
the New York Penal Law § 263.10. 
903
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751 (“At issue in this case is § 263.15, defining as a class D felony:  ‘A person is guilty of 
promoting a sexual performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or 
promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.’  To ‘promote’ is 
also defined:  ‘‘Promote’ means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, lend, mail, deliver, transfer, 
transmute, publish, distribute, circulate, disseminate, present, exhibit, or advertise, or to offer or agree to do the 
same.’  § 263.00(5).”). 
904
 Id. at 750-51. 
905
 Id. at 752. 
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been seven years in prison, Mr. Ferber was sentenced to only 45 days.
906
  Mr. Ferber challenged 
his conviction on the ground that the material he disseminated was protected under the First 
Amendment; the trial court rejected that argument and the Appellate Division affirmed the 
conviction.  But the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the state statute barring 
dissemination of child pornography that is not obscene—the statute under which Mr. Ferber was 
convicted—violated the First Amendment because it would “prohibit the promotion of materials 




 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and a single question was presented:  
“To prevent the abuse of children who are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial 
purposes, could the New York State Legislature, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit 
the dissemination of material which shows children engaged in sexual conduct, regardless of 
whether such material is obscene?”
908
  As a case of first impression, and perhaps foreshadowing 
the mindset with which the Justices approached this dispute, the Supreme Court began its inquiry 
“with the question of whether a State has somewhat more freedom in proscribing works which 
portray sexual acts or lewd exhibitions of genitalia by children.”
909
  While acknowledging the 
“dangers of censorship inherent in unabashedly content-based laws” and noting that “[l]ike 
obscenity statutes, laws directed at the dissemination of child pornography run the risk of 
suppressing protected expression by allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy,” 
the Supreme Court answered its own threshold question in the affirmative:  “States are entitled to 
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greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic depictions of children.”
910
  The Supreme Court 
articulated five reasons that led it to this conclusion: 
  First, “[i]t is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in 
‘safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor’ is ‘compelling’”.
911
  “The 




 Second, “[t]he distribution of photographs and films depicting sexual activity by juveniles 
is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children in at least two ways.  First, the materials 
produced are a permanent record of the children’s participation and the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by their circulation.  Second, the distribution network for child pornography must be 




 Third, “[t]he advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive 




 Fourth, “[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of 
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.  We consider 
it unlikely that visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or lewdly exhibiting their 
genitals would often constitute an important and necessary part of a literary performance or 
scientific or educational work.”
915
 
                                                          
910
 Id. at 756. 
911
 Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)). 
912
 Id. at 757. 
913
 Id. at 759 (footnote omitted). 
914
 Id. at 761. 
915
 Id. at 762-63. 
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 Fifth, “[r]ecognizing and classifying child pornography as a category of material outside 
the protection of the First Amendment is not incompatible with our earlier decisions.”
916
 
 The Supreme Court used eight pages in the United States Reports to elaborate on these 
five justifications for concluding that “States are entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of 
pornographic depictions of children.”  But the groundbreaking opinion in Ferber—the only post-
Chaplinsky opinion to articulate a new category of unprotected speech without any reference to 
pre-Chaplinsky historical roots—raises numerous interesting observations and points that were 
not expressly stated by the Court: 
First, four separate opinions were filed in Ferber, and five Justices—a majority of the 
Court—apparently felt the need to express their views separate from the majority.
917
  This 
splintering likely reflects the delicate constitutional ground upon which the Justices understood 
they were treading, and it appears to reflect a deep division on the Supreme Court about whether 
child pornography that might somehow involve “material with serious literary, scientific, or 
educational value,”
918
 a concept borrowed from the law governing obscenity, should be subject 
to government regulation.  The majority declined to adopt that distinction and concluded that 
obscenity analysis was inapplicable: 
The Miller [obscenity] standard, like all general definitions of what may be 
banned as obscene, does not reflect the State’s particular and more compelling 
interest in prosecuting those who promote the sexual exploitation of children.  
Thus, the question under the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the 
issue of whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the 
production of the work.  Similarly, a sexually explicit depiction need not be 
                                                          
916
 Id. at 763. 
917
 In addition to Justice White’s majority opinion, Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion; Justices Brennan 
and Marshall filed an opinion concurring in the judgment; and Justice Stevens filed an opinion concurring in the 
judgment.  In addition, Justice Blackmun concurred in the result without filing any opinion.  Thus, while all nine 
Justices agreed that New York could punish Paul Ferber for his actions, five Justices—Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, 
Blackmun and O’Connor felt the need to do so for reasons that in some manner differed from Justice White’s 
majority. 
918
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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“patently offensive” in order to have required the sexual exploitation of a child for 
its production.  In addition, a work which, taken on the whole, contains serious 
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless embody the hardest 
core of child pornography.  It is irrelevant to the child [who has been abused] 
whether or not the material . . . has a literary, artistic, political or social value.  We 





Justice O’Connor wrote separately to emphasize her view that even a demonstration that 
such value existed would not provide a constitutional shield for child pornography: 
The compelling interests identified in today’s opinion suggest that the 
Constitution might in fact permit New York to ban knowing distribution of works 
depicting minors engaged in explicit sexual conduct, regardless of the social value 
of the depictions.  For example, a 12-year-old child photographed while 
masturbating surely suffers the same psychological harm whether the community 
labels the photograph “edifying” or “tasteless.”  The audience’s appreciation of 
the depiction is simply irrelevant to New York’s asserted interest in protecting 




Indeed, in Justice O’Connor’s view, attempting to draw a line between child pornography with 
“serious literary, scientific, or educational value,” which might be constitutionally protected, and 
that without such value, which the government could ban, would exacerbate any encroachment 
on the First Amendment by further injecting the government into a case-by-case assessment of 
which depictions have substantive merit and which do not.
921
  Justice O’Connor seemed 
concerned that anything less than a categorical First Amendment exclusion could draw the courts 
into a never-ending assessment of “protected” versus “unprotected” child pornography as it had 
been drawn into a decades-long attempt to separate the “obscene” from that which is not.  She 
wanted no part of that. 
                                                          
919
 Id. at 761 (alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
920
 Id. at 774-75 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
921
 Id. at 775 (“An exception for depictions of serious social value, moreover, would actually increase opportunities 
for the content-based censorship disfavored by the First Amendment” whereas the categorical exclusion of visual 
depictions of child pornography from First Amendment protection “attempts to protect minors from abuse without 
attempting to restrict the expression of ideas by those who might use children as live models.”). 
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By contrast, Justices Brennan and Marshall wrote separately from the majority, despite 
concurring the judgment,
922
 for reasons precisely opposite those of Justice O’Connor.  In their 
view, the categorical exclusion announced in the majority opinion was constitutionally 
undesirable because it would result in no constitutional shield for any visual depictions of child 
pornography, unlike those in this case, that might have “serious literary, artistic, scientific, or 
medical value”: 
[I]n my view application of [the New York statute] or any similar statute to 
depictions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic, 
scientific, or medical value, would violate the First Amendment . . . The First 
Amendment value of depictions of children that are in themselves serious 
contributions to art, literature, or science, is, by definition, simply not “de 
minimis.”  At the same time, the State’s interest in suppression of such materials 
is likely to be far less compelling. . . . In short, it is inconceivable how a depiction 
of a child that is itself a serious contribution to the world of art or literature or 
science can be deemed “material outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.”
923
      
 
Sharing concerns similar to those of Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Stevens would have 
brought visual depictions of child pornography within the protective umbrella of the First 




Despite this strong disagreement about the doctrinal reasoning, there was not dissent 
from the outcome in Ferber.  The Justices were unanimous in favoring the result:  The State of 
New York could, without violating the First Amendment, punish Paul Ferber for selling films 
depicting child pornography.  The majority reached that conclusion by relying on the Doctrine of 
                                                          
922
 Justices Brennan and Marshall would have upheld the statute but left open the possibility for future “as applied” 
challenges if it were applied to visual depictions of child pornography that had “serious literary, artistic, scientific, 
or medical value.”  Id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Their concurrent basis for upholding the statute:  
“[T]he State has a special interest in protecting the well-being of its youth.  This special and compelling interest, and 
the particular vulnerability of children, afford the State the leeway to regulate pornographic material, the promotion 
of which is harmful to children, even though the State does not have such leeway when it seeks only to protect 
consenting adults from exposure to such material.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
923
 Id. at 776-77 (citations omitted). 
924
 Id. at 777-81 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
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Categorical Exclusion but without drawing upon or incorporating concepts from the First 
Amendment law of obscenity and expressly noted that “[t]he test for child pornography is 
separate from the obscenity standard enunciated in Miller. . . .”
925
 
Second, it is clear from the language used that the Ferber Court intended to create, and 
thought it was creating, a new category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment—visual 
depictions of “child pornography.”  The majority described its action: 
When a definable class of material, such as that covered by [the New York statute 
at issue], bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children engaged in 
its production, we think the balance of competing interests is clearly struck and 





After further referencing the “category of child pornography which, like obscenity, is 
unprotected by the First Amendment,”
927
 the majority then characterized its holding in the 
language of categorical analysis:  “We hold that [the New York statute at issue] sufficiently 
describes a category of material the production and distribution of which is not entitled to First 
Amendment protection.”
928
  Justice Stevens, who did not share the majority’s view that visual 
depictions of child pornography should be categorically excluded from First Amendment 
protection,
929
 characterized the majority’s opinion as referencing a “category of nonobscene 
child pornography that New York may legitimately prohibit”
930
 and as “[h]aving defined that 
category [of speech that may be prohibited] in an abstract setting.”
931
 And he refers to the 
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 Id. at 764 (majority opinion). 
926
 Id. (emphasis added). 
927
 Id. (emphasis added). 
928
 Id. at 765 (emphasis added). 
929
 Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasis added) (“Although I disagree with the Court’s position 
that such speech is totally without First Amendment protection, I agree that generally marginal speech does not 
warrant the extraordinary protection afforded by the overbreadth doctrine.” (emphasis added)). 
930
 Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
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“category of speech that is covered by the New York statute”
932
 as being of low value.  It 
appears that all Justices involved in the Ferber case thought the rule being laid down by the 
majority was one that visual depictions of child pornography were categorically excluded from 
First Amendment protection; there is no indication that any Justice viewed the effect of the 
opinion differently.  
Third, it is unclear why the Ferber Court’s majority thought it necessary to articulate a 
new category—child pornography—along with the five justifications, noted supra, for that 
category.  While it is clear the Ferber Court considered visual depictions of child pornography to 
fall outside the established category of obscenity, it is equally clear the Court considered those 
depictions to fall within the established category of speech incidental to criminal conduct: 
The advertising and selling of child pornography provide an economic motive for 
and are thus an integral part of the production of such materials, an activity illegal 
throughout the Nation.  “It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional 
freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an 




After noting that the very “act of selling these materials is guaranteeing that there will be 
additional abuse of children,”
934
 the Ferber Court noted that any burden on the First Amendment 
resulting from a prohibition on dissemination of child pornography was no greater than the 
burden on the First Amendment from prohibiting the production of the child pornography in the 
first instance by enforcing general laws against child labor rather than laws targeted specifically 
at combating child pornography.
935
  In either scenario, the government ban results in no 
dissemination of visual depictions of child pornography, either because they never are created or 
                                                          
932
 Id. at 781. 
933
 Id. 761-62 (majority opinion) (quoting Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498 (footnote omitted). 
934
 Id. at 761 n. 13. 
935
 Id. at 762 (“We note that were the statutes outlawing the employment of children in these films and photographs 
fully effective, and the constitutionality of these laws has not been questioned, the First Amendment implications 
would be no greater than that presented by laws against distribution:  enforceable production laws would leave no 
child pornography to be marketed.” (footnote omitted)). 
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because they are created but not disseminated.  The Supreme Court then noted that in this case 
effectively combating the underlying illegal conduct—namely, the sexual abuse of children for 
the purpose of creating visual depictions of child pornography that can be marketed—has been 
determined by legislatures to require restrictions on the dissemination of those visual depictions 
after they are produced: 
[T]here is no serious contention that the legislature was unjustified in believing 
that it is difficult, if not impossible, to halt the exploitation of children by 
pursuing only those who produce the photographs and movies.  While the 
production of pornographic materials is a low-profile, clandestine industry, the 
need to market the resulting products requires a visible apparatus of distribution.  
The most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be 
to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on 




The Ferber Court then noted the holding in Giboney that speech incidental to criminal conduct is 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection and further noted the application of that 
rule in Pittsburgh Press, from which the Ferber Court quoted approvingly: 
Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordinary 
commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental 
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial 
activity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid 




Unlike the Court’s analysis of why the Roth-Miller approach to obscenity did not control 
the outcome in Ferber, there is no critique by any Justice of applying the Giboney-Pittsburgh 
Press approach to speech incidental to criminal conduct.  Nor does Ferber make any attempt to 
distinguish those cases.  Indeed, the Ferber Court seems satisfied that the Giboney-Pittsburgh 
Press rule squarely applies.  So it is puzzling, indeed, why the Court saw application of the 
Giboney-Pittsburgh Press exclusion from the First Amendment of speech incidental to criminal 
conduct as only one factor of five it articulated to justify the creation of a new category of 
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 Id. at 759-60. 
937
 Id. at 762 n.14. 
258 
 
excluded speech, namely visual depictions of child pornography.  It would seem that the 
Giboney-Pittsburgh Press rule should have controlled the outcome in Ferber and that its 
application to the Ferber facts alone should have been sufficient to resolve the case without 
manufacturing a new category and, therefore, new doctrine. 
Fourth, the similarity of the Ferber rule—that visual depictions of child pornography are 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection to the previously recognized categories 
of speech integral to criminal conduct—and fraud is buttressed by the Ferber Court’s assessment 
that criminal intent is required for liability in a child pornography distribution case.  “[C]riminal 
responsibility [for disseminating child pornography] may not be imposed without some element 
of scienter on the part of the defendant.”
938
  That requirement of the presence of a guilty mind is 
part of the Supreme Court’s analysis in allowing government prohibition of deceptive or 
fraudulent commercial speech
939
 and also part of its analysis permitting government prohibition 
of speech that is integral to criminal conduct.
940
  The common requirement of criminal intent 
makes the newly declared category of child pornography that much more akin to the previously 
existing categories of fraud and speech incidental to criminal conduct and makes the new 
category that much more difficult to distinguish from the latter. 
Fifth, the Ferber Court’s decision to declare child pornography to be a new, separate 
category rather than part of the existing Giboney category is particularly peculiar because this 
new category—unlike every other one the Supreme Court has recognized—has no historical 
roots.  Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court had adhered to its evaluation that the “well-defined 
and narrowly limited classes of speech” that fall outside the First Amendment were those that 
                                                          
938
 Id. at 765. 
939
 See generally Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003). 
940
 See generally Giboney, 336 U.S. 490.  Obviously, the underlying criminal conduct—a necessary precondition to 
which the prohibited speech must be incidental—requires an element of criminal intent. 
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“have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
941
  The Ferber Court quotes that 
formulation from Chaplinsky, but never analyzes or applies it to explain how the Ferber 
situation might satisfy it.  That formulation generally has meant that any new categories 
recognized as without the First Amendment must be, as the Supreme Court later would put it, 
“part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”
942
 Indeed, the entire 
framework of analyzing categorical exclusion was rooted in the notion that the Supreme Court 
was not free to make up categories as it saw fit but was, instead, limited in part by the historical 
approach of excluding any particular type of speech. 
But in Ferber, the Supreme Court abandoned that requirement of demonstrating the 
historical roots of the category it declared excluded from First Amendment protection.  The 
Ferber Court acknowledged that it was only “[i]n recent years [that] the exploitive use of 
children in the production of pornography has become a serious national problem.”
943
  The 
opinion is wholly devoid of any asserted historical basis for government banning or regulating 
visual depictions of child pornography, and of course the Ferber Court was mindful that 
developments in technology by the time of Ferber were making child pornography a far more 
intractable problem than ever before in history.
944
  The Ferber Court also understood that those 
technological changes—even changes as simple as the ability to mass-produce and distribute 
traditional magazines with relatively little capital investment—had made both the production and 
dissemination of child pornography far easier, and the Ferber Court clearly was troubled that the 
exploding volume of child pornography was also producing a corresponding explosion in child 
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 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
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 EMA, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
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 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749 (emphasis added). 
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 Id. at 759 n.10 (“[P]ornography poses an even greater threat to the child victim than does sexual abuse or 
prostitution.  Because the child’s actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt him in future years, 
long after the original misdeed took place.  A child who has posed for a camera must go through life knowing that 





  It appears that the Ferber Court’s profound concern about the extent and the 
nature of the relatively new problem of mass-marketed child pornography effectively trumped its 
otherwise rigid adherence to the Chaplinsky formulation that any categories of speech identified 
as falling outside the protection of the First Amendment have deep and identifiable historical 
roots.  The best the Ferber Court could muster, in a jurisprudential tip of the hat to the 
Chaplinsky requirement of historical exclusion, was the assurance that this new “recogni[tion] 
and classif[ication of] child pornography as a category of material outside the protection of the 
First Amendment” was “not incompatible with our earlier decisions.”
946
  Hardly a dispositive 
formulation. 
Sixth, the Supreme Court reached its conclusion that visual depictions of child 
pornography should be recognized as a category of speech that is excluded from First 
Amendment protection by applying a balancing test.  It is unusual indeed for the Supreme Court 
to expressly employ a balancing test to determine whether a category exists, but once the Court 
abandoned the critical Chaplinsky limitation of historical exclusion it was left to find some 
different, articulable rationale for recognizing child pornography as an unprotected category.  It 
is this reasoning process, if nothing else, that makes Ferber unique in the Supreme Court’s 
categorical approach to identifying speech excluded from the First Amendment. 
The Ferber Court formulated the balancing test as follows:  “[W]ithin the confines of the 
given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
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 Id. at 749 n.1 (“[C]hild pornography and child prostitution have become highly organized, multimillion dollar 
industries that operate on a nationwide scale.  One researcher has documented the existence of over 260 different 
magazines which depict children engaging in sexually explicit conduct.  Such magazines depict children, some as 
young as three to five years of age . . .. The activities featured range from lewd poses to intercourse, fellatio, 
cunnilingus, masturbation, rape, incest and sado-masochism.  In Los Angeles alone, police reported that 30,000 
children have been sexually exploited.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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 Id. at 763 (emphasis added). 
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interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”
947
  Taken as a 
whole, the Ferber opinion shows the Supreme Court weighing two factors against each other: 
On the one hand, the Ferber Court weighed the significant harm done to children by 
disseminating visual depictions of child pornography.
948
 “The legislative judgment, as well as the 
judgment found in the relevant literature, is that the use of children as subjects of pornographic 
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”
949
  The fact 




On the other hand, the Ferber Court weighed the relatively slight burden on the First 
Amendment if government is allowed to ban such dissemination.  “The value of permitting live 
performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is 
exceedingly modest, if not de minimis.”
951
  Noting that any ideas being conveyed by depictions 
of children in sexual circumstances could as readily be accomplished by simulated images or by 
using adult actors who looked like younger children, the Ferber Court concluded that there is not 
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 Id. at 763-64. 
948
 Id. at 757 (“[T]here has been a proliferation of exploitation of children as subjects in sexual performances.  The 
care of children is a sacred trust and should not be abused by those who seek to profit through a commercial network 
based upon the exploitation of children.  The public policy of the state demands the protection of children from 
exploitation through sexual performances” (quoting legislative findings accompanying passage of New York statute 
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949
 Id. at 758; see also id. at 758 n.9 (collecting scientific literature describing how child pornography harms 
children). 
950
 Id. at 756-57 (“It is evident beyond the need for elaboration that a State’s interest in safeguarding the physical 
and psychological well-being of a minor is compelling.  A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the 
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens.  Accordingly, we have sustained 
legislation aimed at protecting the physical and emotional well-being of youth even when the laws have operated in 
the sensitive area of constitutionally protected rights.  In Prince v. Massachusetts,  the Court held that a statute 
prohibiting use of a child to distribute literature on the street was valid notwithstanding the statute’s effect on a First 
Amendment activity.  In Ginsberg v. New York, we sustained a New York law protecting children from exposure to 
nonobscene literature.  Most recently, we held that the Government’s interest in the well-being of its  youth justified 
special treatment of indecent broadcasting received by adults as well as children” (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
951
 Id. at 762. 
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“any question here of censoring a particular literary theme or portrayal of sexual activity.”
952
  
Therefore, “[t]he First Amendment interest is limited to that of rendering the portrayal somewhat 
more ‘realistic’ by utilizing the photographing of children.”
953
 
As the Supreme Court balanced those two factors—the weighty harm caused to children 
by child pornography and the slight imposition on the First Amendment of banning its 
dissemination—it was mindful of the nature of the marketplace for child pornography.
954
  The 
evidence showed that the government was unlikely to significantly alleviate the harm to children 




Seventh, the Court was mindful that a national consensus had emerged that preventing 
dissemination of child pornography was necessary to protect children.  It noted that twenty states 
“prohibited the dissemination of material depicting children engaged in sexual conduct 
regardless of whether the material is obscene,” fifteen states “prohibit the dissemination of such 
material only if it is obscene,” and twelve states “prohibit only the use of minors in the 
production of the material.”
956
  “[V]irtually all of the States and the United States have passed 
legislation proscribing the production of or otherwise combating ‘child pornography.’”
957
  “We 
shall not second-guess this legislative judgment. . . . That judgment, we think, easily passes 
muster under the First Amendment.”
958
 
It is reasonable to conclude that the Ferber Court found comfort in the existence of this 
contemporary national consensus as a sort of surrogate for Chaplinsky’s required historical basis 
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 Id. at 763 n.11 (collecting evidence that mere prosecution of those who produce child pornography unlikely to 
prevent the harm to children). 
955
 Id. at 760. 
956
 Id. at 749 n.2 (collecting state laws). 
957





for categorically excluding visual depictions of child pornography from the First Amendment’s 
protection, a requirement from which the Supreme Court strayed in this case.  Both 
characteristics—either long historical acceptance or a broad contemporary national consensus—
are similar in that they reflect clear social rejection of the speech at issue coupled with a societal 
willingness to abandon its constitutional protection.  While those factors are not, alone, sufficient 
to justify excluding speech from the First Amendment’s protection—if they were, all unpopular 
speech could be rendered unprotected—they are one relevant factor underlying the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence defining the excluded categories. 
Eighth, since the Supreme Court takes great pains to explain why its obscenity doctrine 
does not control the outcome in Ferber, it is somewhat ironic that the actual test the Ferber 
Court applied to generate the unprotected category of child pornography resembles its obscenity 
doctrine in at least one vital respect:  Both involve an element of “I know it when I see it.”
959
  
The balancing test applied by the Ferber Court to explain its child pornography category—that 
“the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at 
stake”
960
—could as easily justify excluding from First Amendment protection almost any type of 
speech that is of slight value and results in great societal revulsion.  Indeed, if that were the 
actual test for discovery of a new category of unprotected speech, the Supreme Court almost 
certainly would have applied it 28 years later to justify excluding horrific “animal crush” and 
other animal cruelty videos from the First Amendment’s shield; instead, the Supreme Court in 
the “animal crush” case sharply rejected the government’s similar balancing test as “startling and 
dangerous.  The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories 
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of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”
961
  A more 
likely explanation for what really was happening in Ferber is this:  The Justices were 
unanimously abhorred by the nature and scope of the “serious national problem”
962
 of child 
pornography, saw no reason to apply the First Amendment to impede or block the national 
consensus favoring certain efforts to address that problem, and thus fabricated a new category of 
unprotected speech to allow action consistent with that national consensus.  As for the proper 
legal rationale to apply in order to reach that outcome, well, one might conclude that they knew 
it when they saw it. 
Ninth, it is worth observing that the Ferber Court coupled its recognition of a new 
category with a strong recitation of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  Even as the 
Ferber Court recognized the new, unprotected category of visual depictions of child 
pornography, it immediately noted that the category was subject to close policing: 
There are, of course, limits on the category of child pornography which, like 
obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment.  As with all legislation in this 
sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the 
applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed.  Here, the nature of 
the harm to be combated requires that the state offense be limited to works that 
visually depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.  The category of 




Indeed, the lengthy discussion of the overbreadth doctrine in Ferber seems somewhat out of 
place since not a single Justice concluded that it operated in this case to prohibit the government 
regulation at issue.  The fact that the Ferber Court discussed overbreadth at such length suggests 
that the Supreme Court understood that having unmoored itself from Chaplinsky’s requirement 
that unprotected categories have historical roots, it might be opening the door to numerous other 
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requests to declare whole categories of speech outside the First Amendment’s scope.  Perhaps 
the Supreme Court wanted to signal that it had no intention of doing so and was willing to deploy 
the “strong medicine”
964
 of overbreadth analysis to prevent its more permissive approach to the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion from getting out of hand. 
 Overall, Ferber stands as one of the landmark cases in the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion.  It is the only post-Chaplinsky case to have fabricated a new category of unprotected 
speech, expressly acknowledging that it was doing so.  It is the only case to identify a category of 
unprotected speech that has no demonstrated historical roots.  It is perhaps the strongest 
articulation of the continued vitality of categorical exclusion in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century.  As discussed below, its approach of categorically excluding regulations related to child 
pornography from the protection of the First Amendment continues to be followed, and although 
the Ferber Court spoke in terms of the “commercial” nature of the trade in visual depictions of 
child pornography, it soon would become clear that the Supreme Court’s doctrine holding that 
child pornography is without First Amendment protection did not rest on the presence of 
“commercial speech.” 
 As Clyde Osborne of Columbus, Ohio, would discover less than a decade later, merely 
possessing the forbidden images would permit criminal prosecution without affront to the First 
Amendment.  
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 Id. at 769 (“The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to established 
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Osborne v. Ohio (1990):
965
  In recognizing visual depictions of child pornography as 
speech categorically excluded from the First Amendment, the Ferber Court allowed the 
government to prohibit or regulate their “production and distribution” without running afoul of 
the First Amendment.
966
  But is the Supreme Court’s placement into the “First Amendment Free 
Zone” of visual depictions of child pornography sufficient to prevent the First Amendment from 
barring government actions that prohibit or regulate the mere possession of visual depictions of 
child pornography?  What if that possession is accomplished entirely within the confines of one’s 
own home and with no commercial purpose or connection?   
Eight years after deciding Ferber, the Supreme Court was presented with that question 
about Ferber’s scope. At the home of Clyde Osborne in Columbus, Ohio, police executed a valid 
search warrant and discovered four photographs of a nude male teenager in sexually explicit 
poses.
967
  The photographs were seized from an album in a desk drawer in Mr. Osborne’s 
bedroom, and there was “no evidence that the photographs had been produced commercially or 
distributed.”
968
  The State of Ohio prosecuted Mr. Osborne for possessing child pornography in 
violation of state law, and he was convicted.
969
  The state appellate courts upheld his conviction, 
and the United States Supreme Court granted Mr. Osborne’s request to review the case. 
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 Id. at 139. 
969
 Id. at 106-07.  The Ohio statute at issue read, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(A) No person shall do any of the 
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prosecutor, judge, or other person having a proper interest in the material or performance.  (b) The person knows 
that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state 
of nudity and to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.” Id. 
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While several issues were presented,
970
 the central question was the scope of the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion for visual depictions of child pornography:  How broad was the excluded 
category announced in Ferber?  The key question was “whether Ohio may constitutionally 
proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography.”
971
  The answer to that question, the 
Supreme Court held, is “Yes.”  In reaching that conclusion, the Supreme Court focused once 
again, as it had in Ferber, on the significant harms that the creation of child pornography causes 
to children:  “It is also surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the 
production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby 
decreasing demand.”
972
  Once again applying a balancing test, as it did in Ferber, the Supreme 
Court seemed persuaded that the need for state authority to prohibit possession of child 
pornography in order to address “the child pornography problem” was, in part, made greater by 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ferber: 
Given the importance of the State’s interest in protecting the victims of child 
pornography, we cannot fault Ohio for attempting to stamp out this vice at all 
levels in the distribution chain.  According to the State, since the time of our 
decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven 
underground; as a result, it is now difficult, if not impossible, to solve the child 




The Osborne Court also reiterated its continued focus on several factors or concerns that had 
animated the Ferber Court.  For example, the Osborne Court found comfort in the fact that 19 
states had “found it necessary to proscribe the possession of this material,”
974
 a similar approach 
to the Ferber Court’s observation that a national consensus favoring government regulation or 
prohibition of child pornography had developed.  The Osborne Court also noted that the rule it 
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was adopting would further the interest, expressed in Ferber, in minimizing ongoing harm to 
victims from the existence of images: 
[T]he materials produced by child pornographers permanently record the victim’s 
abuse.  The pornography’s continued existence causes the child victims 
continuing harm by haunting the children in years to come.  The State’s ban on 





Furthermore, the Osborne Court reasoned, “encouraging the destruction of these materials is also 
desirable because evidence suggests that pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other 
children into sexual activity.”
976
  Like the Ferber Court, the Osborne Court found it 
constitutionally significant that the State was required to prove Mr. Osborne’s criminal intent and 
that mere innocent possession of the visual depictions of child pornography would not have been 
enough to avoid First Amendment protection.
977
  The Osborne Court then made crystal clear that 
the nature of the interests it was balancing in this case were critical to its conclusion:  “Given the 
gravity of the State’s interests in this context, we find that Ohio may constitutionally proscribe 
the possession and viewing of child pornography.”
978
 
The Osborne case is significant in the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion because it 
makes clear that the Supreme Court’s approach to First Amendment analysis in child 
pornography cases more closely resembles its Giboney analysis of speech integral to criminal 
conduct rather than its Roth/Miller analysis of obscenity.  The Osborne Court quotes favorably 
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 Id. at 115 (“The Ohio Supreme Court also concluded that the State had to establish scienter in order to prove a 
violation of [the Ohio law at issue] based on the Ohio default statute specifying that recklessness applies when 
another statutory provision lacks an intent specification.  The statute on its face lacks a mens rea requirement, but 
that omission brings into play and is cured by another law that plainly satisfies the requirement laid down in Ferber 
that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter.” ( citation omitted) 
978
 Id. at 111. 
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from Giboney and applies its reasoning
979
 while taking pains to distinguish its reasoning in 
Miller and rejecting Mr. Osborne’s invitations to apply Miller-based reasoning.
980
  The Osborne 
Court specifically rejected Mr. Osborne’s argument that precedent from obscenity law should 
control the outcome in this case.  In Stanley v. Georgia,
981
 a pre-Ferber case, the Supreme Court 
had held that even though obscenity as a category of speech was outside the protection of the 
First Amendment, the Constitution nonetheless bars the government from prohibiting the 
possession and viewing of obscene materials in the privacy of a private home.
982
  The Osborne 
Court made clear that child pornography was constitutionally different from obscenity “because 
the interests underlying child pornography prohibitions far exceed the interests justifying the 
Georgia law at issue in Stanley.”
983
  The Osborne Court described the constitutionally significant 
differences between obscenity and child pornography: 
In Stanley, Georgia primarily sought to proscribe the private possession of 
obscenity because it was concerned that obscenity would poison the minds of its 
viewers.  We responded that ‘[w]hatever the power of the state to control public 
dissemination of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally 
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.’  
The difference here is obvious:  The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest 
in regulating Osborne’s mind.  Rather, Ohio has enacted [the statute at issue] in 
order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to destroy a market for 




After Osborne, it is clear that the Supreme Court considers child pornography to be a 
greater “evil” than obscenity because of the actual harm it causes, directly or indirectly, to 
children.  It also considers the expressive value of visual depictions of child pornography so 
slight, and the harm to children that state regulation seeks to prevent so weighty, that balancing 
                                                          
Id. at 110. The discussion of Giboney is contained in the portion of the opinion related to categorical analysis; Miller 
is not even mentioned in that portion. 
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 Id. at 109 (citations omitted). 
270 
 
the interests involved results in a more permissive application of First Amendment protections.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court is willing to allow the government greater leeway to regulate or 
prohibit various conduct related to visual depictions of child pornography—possession as well as 
production and distribution—provided the government can demonstrate that its actions are a 
“reasonable”
985
 step to reduce or eliminate the substantial harm to children. Overall, by the time 
it decided Osborne the Supreme Court clearly viewed any activity related to visual depictions of 
child pornography as much more closely intertwined with criminal conduct, and therefore 
subject to a Giboney exception from the First Amendment, than like “the intractable obscenity 
problem.”
986
  But as the Supreme Court later would observe, “The broad authority to proscribe 
child pornography is not . . . unlimited.”
987
  In two subsequent cases, the Supreme Court would 
turn its attention to more clearly defining the boundaries of this unprotected category of speech. 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002):
988
  Concerned about the effect of rapid 
technological advances since Ferber on enabling the trade in visual depictions of child 
pornography, Congress enacted prohibitions on images that “appear[] to be”
989
 of real children 
engaged in pornographic acts and on advertising that “conveys the impression”
990
 the image is of 
real children engaged in pornographic acts.  These new prohibitions, contained in the Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), were aimed at “virtual child pornography”—
generated entirely by computers and never involving any real child in its production—and 
“youthful adult pornography”
991
—involving the depiction of actual conduct by youthful-looking 
adult actors who appear to be minors. A coalition of adult-entertainment industry representatives, 




 Miller, 413 U.S. at 16 (referencing Justice Harlan’s famous reference to “the intractable obscenity problem”). 
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publishers of books about nudity, a painter who specialized in nude subjects, and a photographer 
specializing in taking nude photographs, filed suit in federal court in California arguing that the 
CPPA amendments were sufficiently broad as to punish their various lawful enterprises, 
“chilling them from producing works protected by the First Amendment.”
992
 The district court 
rejected the First Amendment challenge.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed and found the challenged 
provisions of the CPPA facially invalid.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 The Supreme Court struck down the two challenged provisions of the CPPA because the 
case “provides a textbook example of why we permit facial challenges to statutes that burden 
expression.”
993
  Although “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act 
repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people,”
994
 the Supreme Court reasoned, “[t]he 
prospect of crime . . . by itself does not justify laws suppressing protected speech.”
995
 “The 
Constitution gives significant protection from overbroad laws that chill speech within the First 
Amendment’s vast and privileged sphere.”
996
  The Free Speech Coalition Court noted that 
“virtual” images of child pornography fell outside the previously recognized and constitutionally 
unprotected category of visual depictions of child pornography: 
The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of 
speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced 
with real children.  While these categories may be prohibited without violating the 
First Amendment, none of them includes the speech prohibited by the CPPA.  [A 
dissenting judge below] recognized this to be the law and proposed that virtual 
child pornography should be regarded as an additional category of unprotected 
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 Id. at 245. 
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After concluding that the challenged CPPA provisions could not be properly read to prohibit 
only “obscene” speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s protection, the Free Speech 
Coalition Court turned its attention to comparing the First Amendment implications of virtual 
child pornography with those of visual depictions of child pornography produced through the use 
of real children.  The Free Speech Coalition Court first explained the reasoning behind the 
categorical exclusion identified in Ferber: 
Where the images are themselves the product of child sexual abuse, Ferber 
recognized that the State had an interest in stamping it out without regard to any 
judgment about its content. The production of the work, not its content, was the 
target of the statute.  The fact that a work contained serious literary, artistic, or 




Drawing upon language closely reminiscent of Giboney’s exclusion from First Amendment 
protection of speech integral to criminal conduct, the Free Speech Coalition Court then noted 
that the real child pornography considered in Ferber enjoyed no constitutional protection 
because the “acts” it recorded “were intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children.”
999
  In 
Ferber, “the speech had what the Court in effect held was a proximate link to the crime from 
which it came”
1000
 because Ferber involved a government prohibition on “speech that itself is 
the record of sexual abuse.”
1001
 
 The Supreme Court reasoned that the rationale of Ferber was absent when no real 
children were involved in the making of the visual depictions that the government sought to 
proscribe because the speech at issue in Free Speech Coalition “records no crime and creates no 
victims by its production.”
1002
  The concern that justified the Ferber rule that the government 
may constitutionally ban child pornography “was based upon how it was made, not on what it 
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999
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  Indeed, the Ferber Court had specifically contemplated virtual child 
pornography and youthful adult pornography in its analysis: 
[T]he [Ferber] Court recognized some works in this category [of child 
pornography] might have significant value but relied on virtual images—the very 
images prohibited by the CPPA [and being challenged in Free Speech 
Coalition]—as an alternative and permissible means of expression:  “[I]f it were 
necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the statutory age who perhaps 
looked younger could be utilized.  Simulation outside of the prohibition of the 
statute could provide another alternative.”  Ferber, then, not only referred to the 
distinction between actual and virtual child pornography, it relied on it as a reason 
supporting its holding.  Ferber provides no support for a statute that eliminates 




In defense of the CPPA provisions, the government advanced several theories of how the 
prohibited speech—virtual child pornography or youthful adult pornography—was connected to 
criminal conduct and, therefore, should be subject to regulation.  But the Supreme Court rejected 
each of them.  “The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient 
reason for banning it”
1005
 and “[t]he government may not prohibit speech because it increases the 
chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefinite future time.’”
1006
  The Supreme 
Court explained that the facts presented in Free Speech Coalition are fundamentally different 
from the facts presented in Ferber, and the difference is constitutionally significant: 
There is here no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy.  The Government 
has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that might 
encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse.  Without a 
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit 





The Free Speech Coalition Court then reached its ultimate conclusion: 
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The Government may not suppress lawful speech as the means to suppress 
unlawful speech.  Protected speech does not become unprotected merely because 
it resembles the latter.  The Constitution requires the reverse. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
In sum, [the challenged statutory provision] covers materials beyond the 
categories recognized in Ferber and Miller, and the reasons the Government 
offers in support of limiting the freedom of speech have no justification in our 




 The Free Speech Coalition case, therefore, begins to define the outer limits of the post-
Chaplinsky unprotected category of visual depictions of child pornography.  Because Ferber’s 
new excluded category of child pornography is closely related to the historical category of 
speech integral to criminal conduct, there must be an underlying criminal act involved in the 
production of the pornographic images of children before the First Amendment’s protection will 
yield.  “In the case of the material covered by Ferber, the creation of the speech is itself the 
crime of child abuse,” but in Free Speech Coalition “there is no underlying crime at all.”
1009
  The 
government’s interest in protecting children, which justified the First Amendment exception 
articulated in Ferber, is absent or at least substantially diminished in Free Speech Coalition 
where visual depictions prohibited by the government “record[] no crime and create[] no victims 
by its production.”
1010
  Thus, the Ferber exclusion is not available when “the speech is neither 
obscene nor the product of sexual abuse” and, in those cases, visual depictions of child 
pornography “do[] not fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.”
1011
  The teaching of 
Free Speech Coalition is that “the distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual 
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conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or photographic or other 
visual reproduction of live performances, retains First Amendment protection.”
1012
 
United States v. Williams (2008):
1013
  If the Free Speech Coalition Court prevented the 
government from enforcing prohibitions on virtual or simulated child pornography that did not 
involve the use of real children in its creation, the Williams Court made clear that a defendant 
who intended to participate in the market for child pornography created with real children but in 
truth no real children were involved could still be subjected to criminal prosecution.  
The practical effect of the Supreme Court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, coupled 
with the explosive advancement in information technology over the 1990s and 2000s, was that 
the very rationale for the categorical exclusion of visual depictions of child pornography from 
First Amendment protection was at risk of being undermined.  When the Free Speech Coalition 
Court held that virtual images of child pornography were constitutionally protected because the 
weighty concern about real harm to real children was absent, and when the rapid growth of the 
Internet made visual depictions of child pornography far more readily available and also made it 
increasingly difficult to distinguish actual depictions from virtual depictions, the government 
expressed concern “that limiting the child-pornography prohibition to material that could be 
proved to feature actual children . . . would enable many child pornographers to evade 
conviction.”
1014
  In response, Congress enacted a new statute, the PROTECT Act, aimed at 
dissuading the same “pandering and solicitation” of child pornography that was the subject of the 
                                                          
1012
 Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65). 
1013
 553 U.S. 285. 
1014
 Id. at 290 (emphasis omitted). 
276 
 
Child Pornography Protection Act of 1996 but intended to avoid the constitutional defects the 
Free Speech Coalition Court had identified in that prior act.
1015
 
Michael Williams ran afoul of the new PROTECT Act when he met an undercover Secret 
Service agent, masquerading as “Lisa n Miami,” in an Internet chat room.  In the course of a 
back-and-forth exchange, Mr. Williams posted a “hyperlink that, when clicked, led to seven 
pictures of actual children, aged approximately 5 to 15, engaging in sexually explicit conduct and 
displaying their genitals.”
1016
  The government then obtained a search warrant and searched Mr. 
Williams’s home, “where agents seized two hard drives containing at least 22 images of real 
children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, some of it sadomasochistic.”
1017
  Mr. Williams 
was charged with violating the PROTECT Act and pled guilty, reserving the right to challenge 
the constitutionality of the pandering conviction. The federal district court rejected his 
constitutional argument and sentenced Mr. Williams to prison. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
pandering conviction, holding that portion of the PROTECT Act unconstitutional.  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.
1018
  Although the questions presented in the appeal involved 
overbreadth and vagueness,
1019
 the Supreme Court nonetheless used the Williams opinion to 
further clarify the nature and scope of the category of speech involving visual depictions of child 
pornography that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment. 
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “obscene speech—sexually explicit 
material that violates fundamental notions of decency—is not protected by the First 
Amendment.”
1020
  It then acknowledged that its approach to defining the relationship between 
child pornography and the First Amendment had been developed “[o]ver the last 25 years”—
language confirming that child pornography was a newly created category of unprotected speech 
and not entirely consistent with the Chaplinsky formulation that unprotected categories had 
“never” been thought protected by the First Amendment.  This relatively new category of child 
pornography, the Williams Court explained, was in fact a “related and overlapping category” 
with obscenity.
1021
  The Williams Court then summarized the First Amendment doctrine 
applicable to the government’s authority to proscribe visual depictions of child pornography at 
the time it considered the Williams case: 
Over the last 25 years, we have confronted a related and overlapping category of 
proscribable speech:  child pornography.  This consists of sexually explicit visual 
portrayals that feature children.  We have held that a statute which proscribes the 
distribution of all child pornography, even material that does not qualify as 
obscenity, does not on its face violate the First Amendment.  Moreover, we have 
held that the government may criminalize the possession of child pornography, 





After construing the terms of the statute, the Williams Court explained why the PROTECT Act’s 
prohibition on pandering in child pornography was permissible under the First Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court concluded the Eleventh Circuit had incorrectly analyzed the unprotected category 
of visual depictions of child pornography as an outgrowth of the commercial speech doctrine, 
protected at some level by the First Amendment.
1023
  “This mistakes the rationale for the 






 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
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 Id. at 297-98 (“The Eleventh Circuit, however, believed that the exclusion of First Amendment protection 
extended only to commercial offers to provide or receive contraband:  ‘Because [the statute] is not limited to 
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categorical exclusion,” the Supreme Court explained, because the excluded category of visual 
depictions of child pornography “is based not on the less privileged First Amendment status of 
commercial speech . . . .”
1024
  In other words, the universe of visual depictions of child 
pornography that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment is not limited to those that 
are used for or connected with a commercial purpose—all child pornography is unprotected.  
“[N]oncommercial proposals to engage in illegal activity have no greater protection than 
commercial proposals to do so.”
1025
  The Williams Court then explained that despite the 
“overlapping” nature of child pornography and obscenity, the reason child pornography as a 
category is not protected—whether or not it is obscene, and whether or not it is commercial in 
nature—is that the First Amendment does not protect speech that is integral to criminal conduct: 
Offers to engage in illegal transactions are categorically excluded from First 
Amendment protection.  One would think that this principle resolves the present 
case, since the statute criminalizes only offers to provide or requests to obtain 
contraband—child obscenity and child pornography involving actual children, 




In addition to describing visual depictions of child pornography as “contraband”
1027
 that is by 
definition illegal, the Williams Court cited Pittsburgh Press and Giboney as principal authority 
for the preceding proposition.  In other words, the Williams Court viewed allowing the 
government to prohibit pandering or soliciting for the exchange of visual depictions of child 
pornography as conduct the government may prohibit for the same reason it could prohibit 
advertisements to engage in unlawful employment discrimination or picketing to compel 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
commercial speech but extends also to non-commercial promotion, presentation, distribution, and solicitation, we 
must subject the content-based restriction of the PROTECT Act pandering provision to strict scrutiny . . . .’”) 
(brackets and ellipsis in original). 
1024
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 The Court illustrated its point about the nature of contraband.  Id. at 298 (“It would be an odd constitutional 




antitrust law violations. Visual depictions of child pornography, whether commercial in nature or 
not, are excluded from First Amendment protection and may be proscribed by the government 
based “on the principle that offers to give or receive what it is unlawful to possess have no social 
value and thus, like obscenity, enjoy no First Amendment protection.”
1028
  The Williams Court 
then proceeded to buttress its conclusion by surrounding its analysis of the government 
prohibition on pandering in child pornography with the language of, and examples from, the 
criminal law generally: 
Many long established criminal proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, 
incitement and solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is 
intended to induce or commence illegal activities.  Offers to provide or requests to 
obtain unlawful material, whether as part of a commercial exchange or not, are 




The Williams Court was careful to distinguish between proposals to engage in illegal activity, 
which are unprotected by the First Amendment, and advocacy of illegality, which is 
constitutionally protected: 
To be sure, there remains an important distinction between a proposal to engage 
in illegal activity and the abstract advocacy of illegality.  The Act before us does 
not prohibit advocacy of child pornography, but only offers to provide or requests 
to obtain it.  There is no doubt that this prohibition falls well within constitutional 
bounds.  The constitutional defect we found in the pandering provision at issue in 
Free Speech Coalition was that it went beyond pandering to prohibit possession of 




Because pandering to obtain child pornography is constituitionally unprotected speech incidental 
to the criminal conduct of possessing child pornography, the Williams Court held “that offers to 
provide or requests to obtain child pornography are categorically excluded from the First 
Amendment.”
1031
   




 Id. (citations omitted). 
1030
 Id. at 298-99 (citations omitted). 
1031
 Id. at 299. 
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The Williams Court then further elaborated on its analysis of categorically excluded 
speech that is integral to criminal conduct.  The unprotected speech in the Williams case differed 
from the protected speech in the Free Speech Coalition case because the government’s focus in 
Williams was on the intent and conduct of the person who intended to engage in an illegal 
transaction, not on whether the transaction itself was illegal.  On the facts of Williams, “[a] crime 
is committed only when the speaker believes or intends the listener to believe that the subject of 
the proposed transaction depicts real children.”
1032
   
Offers to deal in illegal products or otherwise engage in illegal activity do not 
acquire First Amendment protection when the offeror is mistaken about the 
factual predicate of his offer.  The pandering and solicitation made unlawful by 
the Act [challenged in Williams] are sorts of inchoate crimes—acts looking 
toward the commission of another crime, the delivery of child pornography.  As 
with other inchoate crimes—attempt and conspiracy, for example—impossibility 





Thus, unlike in Free Speech Coalition, the actual content of the images in Williams is not what 
the government sought to punish:  Rather, the punishment is directed at the criminal intent of the 
participant, who believes he is acting as part of the marketplace for illegal materials and intends 
to do so—a marketplace of visual depictions of real children engaged in child pornography.  The 
Williams Court then connected its distinction between permissible government regulation of 
intended participation in the marketplace for child pornography depicting real children with its 
general criminal-law analysis of the Williams case and the notion that the visual depictions that 
Mr. Williams intended to obtain were inherently illegal ‘contraband’: 
We fail to see what First Amendment interest would be served by drawing a 
distinction between two defendants who attempt to acquire contraband, one of 
whom happens to be mistaken about the contraband nature of what he would 
acquire.  Is Congress prohibited from punishing those who attempt to acquire 
what they believe to be national-security documents, but which are actually fakes?  
                                                          
1032
 Id. at 303. 
1033
 Id. at 300. 
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To ask is to answer.  There is no First Amendment exception from the general 
principle of criminal law that a person attempting to commit a crime need not be 




* * * 
 
A quarter century after first declaring in Ferber that child pornography falls into the 
“First Amendment Free Zone” of speech outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the 
Constitution, the Supreme Court in Williams clearly anchored its analysis to the reasoning of 
Giboney.  Visual depictions of pornography depicting real children may be proscribed by the 
government because they are speech incidental to the crime of child sexual abuse.    
The state of the law after Williams, therefore, may be summarized this way:  Visual 
depictions of pornography depicting real children fall within a category of speech excluded from 
First Amendment protection.  The category of proscribable child pornography is “related and 
overlapping”
1035
 with the Roth/Miller category of proscribable obscenity, but it really is an 
outgrowth of the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press category of speech proscribable because it is an 
integral part of criminal conduct.  For that reason, the government must prove criminal intent in a 
prosecution arising from possession or distribution of visual depictions of child pornography. 
Because criminal intent is an essential element of any prosecution involving child 
pornography, it is permissible for the government to prohibit and punish both the actual and 
intended creation, dissemination and possession or visual depictions of child pornography 
involving images of real children because the images are contraband.  The government may 
constitutionally declare such depictions to be contraband because any de minimis social benefit 
derived from them is far outweighed by the substantial societal interest in preventing the grave 
harm to children caused by the making of child pornography.   
                                                          
1034
 Id. at 303-04. 
1035
 Id. at 288. 
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To the extent the government wishes to suppress the creation or dissemination of images 
of virtual child pornography—images created without involvement of any real children—it may 
do so only if such images rise to the level of obscenity.  However, if the government wishes to 
punish a person for attempting to participate in the market for child pornography it may do so 
based on the intent of the person to obtain images of real children regardless of whether such 
images actually exist. 
Although the Supreme Court continues to describe “child pornography” as a separate and 
distinct category of proscribable speech, the authority to ban visual depictions of pornography 
depicting real children is better understood as a specific application of the general and 
longstanding Giboney principle that speech that is itself an integral part of criminal conduct may 
be proscribed.  Understood this way, “child pornography” is not a new category with 
characteristics—such as an absence of any “tradition of proscription”—inconsistent with all 
others.  To the contrary, it is wholly consistent with the long tradition of enacting laws 
criminalizing conduct that harms the well-being of children.  
In the years since Chaplinsky and Giboney, the Supreme Court has developed a second 
group of cases specifically applying the Giboney principle that speech incidental to criminal 






Part D:  True threats 
 
The Chaplinsky Court posited that speech may be constitutionally proscribable if it is “no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas” and is “of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”
1036
  Imagine how the Supreme Court in 1942 might have expounded on that principle 
if Walter Chaplinsky had added but ten small words to his diatribe against Marshal Bowering:  
“‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist and the whole government of 
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists’ [and I am going to punch you in the nose].”
1037
  Or 
even more starkly, imagine that Mr. Chaplinsky had punctuated his actual statement with only 
seven added words:  “and I am going to kill you.”  May the government punish a person for 
threatening to harm another or is a verbal threat a form of speech protected by the First 
Amendment? 
On the one hand, the answer seems obvious from a long history of widely accepted and 
enforced prohibitions.  The Supreme Court long has accepted, without much analysis, that at 
least certain threats may be punished by the government: 
[T]he First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such 
cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every 
possible use of language.  We venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor 
Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever supposed that to 
make criminal the counselling of a murder within the jurisdiction of Congress 




The principle that threats may be punished by the government without running afoul of the First 
Amendment, therefore, has “never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
1039
  In 
                                                          
1036
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. 
1037
 Id. at 569 (words in italics added). 
1038
 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (citation omitted). 
1039
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
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modern practice, examples abound.  Every state has one or more laws prohibiting forms of 
“criminal threat.”
1040
  There also are numerous specific examples that have become the lore of 
modern life—for example, it is widely understood that uttering at an airport, even in jest, words 
indicating that one has a bomb with intent to carry it on an airplane will result in a visit from 
federal law enforcement and potential prosecution.
1041
 
On the other hand, analyzing why the government may punish threats without running 
afoul of the First Amendment is more difficult.
1042
  Threats need not be false—indeed, to be truly 
threatening they likely need to be true—so they are not intellectually akin to fraud or libel.  They 
also need not involve the commission of an actual crime so, in that sense, they differ from the 
“speech acts” integral to otherwise criminal conduct and considered by the Supreme Court on the 
facts presented in Giboney and Pittsburgh Press.  Nor are they evidence that a crime has been 
committed or an essential part of an illicit marketplace that the government has a legitimate 
interest in quashing and so, in that sense, they differ from “child pornography.”  They also are 
not intended to, or likely to, incite violence or criminal conduct by another—rather, they 
typically foreshadow acts the speaker himself intends to undertake in violation of the law—so 
they are in that sense dissimilar from “incitement.” 
                                                          
1040
 The State of Kansas, for example, on January 14, 2015, obtained a verdict of guilty against an individual 
charged with making criminal threats to harm or kill individuals working in the legal system in Cheyenne County. 
See St. Francis man found guilty of threatening Cheyenne County courthouse officials, Office of the Attorney 
General news release (January 15, 2015), available at http://ag.ks.gov/media-center/news-releases/2015/01/15/st.-
francis-man-found-guilty-of-threatening-cheyenne-county-courthouse-officials. 
1041
 Cases determining whether the First Amendment permits prosecution of particular speakers who have threatened 
various persons abound.  One oft-discussed example is United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 423 (2
nd
 Cir. 2013), in 
which the court held that a blogger who, distressed by a federal appeals court’s upholding of a Chicago gun-control 
ordinance, posted a “lengthy discussion of killing the three judges, his reference to the killing of Judge Lefkow’s 
family, and his update the next day with detailed information regarding how to locate Judges Easterbrook, Bauer, 
and Posner” had provided “powerful evidence of a true threat” sufficient to sustain a conviction.  Another current 
example is United States v. Dillard, ___ F.3d ___ (2015 WL 4540551)(10
th
 Cir. 2015), in which the court held that 
whether an abortion protester’s letter to a prospective abortion provider constituted a proscribable “true threat” or 
protected political speech was a fact question for a jury that precluded summary judgment for the author of the 
letter. 
1042
 See, e.g., Nina Petraro, Harmful Speech and True Threats:  Virginia v. Black and the First Amendment in an Age 
of Terrorism,” 20 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 531 (2006). 
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 The Supreme Court has from time to time confronted this question of the application of 
the First Amendment to threatening speech.  Declaring “I’m going to kill you,” or even “I am 
going to punch you in the nose,” with the criminal intent to actually do so is a punishable offense 
in every state, and that the First Amendment permits such prohibitions is not seriously 
questioned.  But why is that sort of speech proscribable, and how does that fit into the doctrines 
of categorically excluded speech?  In the decades since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has 
developed a specific application of the general Giboney-Pittsburgh Press doctrine to speech such 
as this—an application known as the “true threats” doctrine.  It has been developed in a line of 
cases from Watts to Rankin to Black and, during the most recent concluded term of the Supreme 
Court, Elonis. 
 While the concept that threats are unprotected is old, only in 1969 did the Supreme Court 
first address the reasoning behind that widely accepted notion and began to define the 
boundaries of what appeared to be a categorical exclusion.   
Watts v. United States (1969):
1043
  The dispute arose when 18-year-old Robert Watts, a 
man who objected to the Vietnam War draft, participated in a protest near the base of the 
Washington Monument on August 27, 1966.  After it was suggested by a person near the protest 
“that the young people present should get more education before expressing their views,” Mr. 
Watts responded:   
“They always holler at us to get an education.  And now I have already received 
my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to report for my physical this 
Monday coming.  I am not going.  If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man 





                                                          
1043
 394 U.S. 705. 
1044
 Id. at 706 (emphasis added) 
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Unfortunately for Mr. Watts, an investigator for the Army Counter Intelligence Corps was 
present and overheard the comment.
1045
  Mr. Watts was arrested and charged with violating, by 
virtue of having uttered the italicized words quoted above, a World War I-era federal law that 
made it a felony to threaten the President of the United States.
1046
  He was convicted by a jury, 
and his conviction was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit.
1047
  The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Watts Court began with an implicit adoption of the long-accepted proposition that 
threats are not constitutionally protected speech by summarily concluding:  “Certainly the statute 
under which petitioner was convicted is constitutional on its face.”
1048
  But because the statute in 
question sought to punish “pure speech,” the Supreme Court concluded, in effect, that it must be 
construed as applied to the specific utterances of the defendant.  “What is a threat,” the Supreme 
Court explained, “must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech.”
1049
  To 
that end, the Watts Court then held that in order to sustain a conviction under the statute, the 
government must “prove a true ‘threat.’”
1050
  Although the Watts Court, as evidenced by its 
placement of quotation marks, may not have considered the two-word term as a singular phrase, 
this is nonetheless the first use by the Supreme Court of the phrase “true threat.”  That phrase 
apparently was intended to distinguish speech that falls outside the First Amendment’s 




 Id. at 705.  The federal statute provided:  “Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail 
or for a delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document 
containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the 
President-elect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office off President of the 
United States, or the Vice President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the 
President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to the office of President, or 
Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.’”  Id. at 
705 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)).   
1047
 Id. at 706.  
1048
 Id. at 707 (“The Nation undoubtedly has a valid, even an overwhelming, interest in protecting the safety of its 




 Id. at 708. 
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protection—namely, “true threats”—from other, constitutionally protected speech that may be 
threatening in nature but that “taken in context”
1051
 did not in fact convey an actual intent to 
cause harm.   
In the case of Mr. Watts, the Supreme Court concluded that his speech was “political 
hyperbole” and not a “true threat” and that, therefore, the First Amendment barred the 
government from prosecuting him for his utterance.
1052
  A minority of the Court led by Justice 
Douglas, recounting the deep historical roots of the statute under which Mr. Watts was 








 Id. (“We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory 
term [the term ‘threat’].  For we must interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and 
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.  The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputes, is often vituperative, abusive, 
and inexact.  We agree with petitioner that his only offense here was ‘a kind of very crude offensive method of 
stating a political opposition to the President.’  Taken in context, and regarding the expressly conditional nature of 
the statement and the reaction of the listeners, we do not see how it could be interpreted otherwise.” (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1053
 Id. at 709-12 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The charge in this case is of an ancient vintage.  The federal statute 
under which petitioner was convicted traces its ancestry to the Statute of Treasons which made it a crime to 
‘compass or imagine the Death of . . . the King.’  It is said that one Walter Walker, at 15
th
 century keeper of an inn 
known as the ‘Crown,’ was convicted under the Statute of Treasons for telling his son:  ‘Tom, if thou behaves 
thyself well, I will make thee heir to the CROWN.’  He was found guilty of compassing and imagining the death of 
the King, hanged, drawn, and quartered.  In the time of Edward IV, one Thomas Burdet who predicted that the king 
would ‘soon die, with a view to alienate the affections’ of the people was indicted for ‘compassing and imaging of 
the death of the King—the crime of constructive treason with which the old reports are filled.  In the time of Charles 
II, one Edward Brownlow was indicted ‘for speaking these words, that he wished all the gentry in the land would 
kill one another, so that the commonalty might live the better.’  In the same year (1662) one Robert Thornell was 
indicted for saying ‘that if the Kinge did side with the Bishops, the Divell take Kinge and the Bishops too.’  While 
our Alien and Sedition Laws were in force, John Adams, President of the United States, en route from Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania, to Quincy, Massachusetts, stopped in Newark, New Jersey, where he was greeted by a crowd and by a 
committee that saluted him by firing a cannon.  A bystander said, ‘There goes the President and they are firing at his 
ass.’  Luther Baldwin was indicted for replying that he did not care ‘if they fired through his ass.’  He was convicted 
in the federal court for speaking ‘sedicious words tending to defame the President and Government of the United 
States’ and fined, assessed court costs and expenses, and committed to jail until the fine and fees were paid.  The 
Alien and Sedition Laws constituted one of our sorriest chapters; and I had thought we had done with them forever.  
Yet the present statute has hardly fared better.  Like the Statute of Treasons, [the statute at issue in this case] was 
passed in a relatively calm peacetime spring, but has been construed under circumstances when intolerance for free 
speech was much greater than it normally might be.  Convictions under [this statute] have been sustained for 
displaying posters urging passersby to ‘hang (President) Roosevelt’; for declaring that ‘President Wilson ought to be 
killed.  It is a wonder some one has not done it already.  If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself.’; for declaring 
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The Watts Court’s as-applied approach did not disturb prior district court rulings 
upholding prosecutions under the same statute for the making of threatening statements about 
Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt.
1054
 Watts, therefore, confirmed the 
existence of a category of speech known as “true threats” that fall outside the protection of the 
First Amendment, but the boundaries of the category were left undefined. The Supreme Court 
would have its next opportunity to clarify its “true threats” doctrine years later when the protests 
against Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnam War draft were a fading memory and a new President, 
Ronald Reagan, had recently assumed office. 
 Rankin v. McPherson (1987):
1055
  On March 30, 1981, John Hinckley, Jr., shot and 
attempted to kill President Reagan outside the Washington Hilton.  The news traveled fast, and it 
reached 19-year-old Ardith McPherson while she was on break at her new job in Harris County, 
Texas.  Ms. McPherson was a clerical employee in the office of Constable Walter H. Rankin, the 
elected constable of Harris County.  She was a new hire, still within the 90-day probationary 
period.  Ms. McPherson was in a break room at the constable’s office with several other 
employees, including her co-worker and boyfriend Lawrence Jackson, when news came over the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
that ‘Wilson is a wooden-headed son of a bitch.  I wish Wilson was in hell, and if I had the power I would put him 
there’.  In sustaining an indictment under the statute against a man who indicated that he would enjoy shooting 
President Wilson if he had the chance, the trial court explained the thrust of [the statute]:  ‘The purpose of the statute 
was undoubtedly not only the protection of the President, but also the prohibition of just such statements as those 
alleged in this indictment.  The expression of such direful intentions and desires, not only indicates a spirit of 
disloyalty to the nation bordering upon treason, but is, in a very real sense, a menace to the peace and safety of the 
country. . . . It arouses resentment and concern. . .’  Suppression of speech as an effective police measure is an old, 
old device, outlawed by our Constitution.”   (citations, footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1054
 Id. at 711 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing United States v. Apel, 44 F. Supp. 592, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1942) 
(sustaining a conviction for displaying posters urging passersby to “hang” President Roosevelt); United States v. 
Stickrather, 242 F. 151, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1917) (sustaining a conviction for declaring “President Wilson ought to be 
killed.  It is a wonder some one has not done it already.  If I had an opportunity, Iwould do it myself.”); Clark v. 
United States, 250 F. 449 (5th Cir. 1918) (sustaining a conviction for declaring “Wilson is a wooden-headed son of a 
bitch.  I wish Wilson was in hell, and if I had the power I would put him there.”)). 
1055
 483 U.S. 378. 
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radio that President Reagan had been shot.
1056
  She then had a brief conversation with Mr. 
Jackson, which she later recounted in undisputed testimony as follows: 
Well, we were talking—it’s a wonder why they did that [shot President Reagan].  
I felt like it would be a black person that did that, because I feel like most of my 
kind is on welfare and CETA, and they use Medicaid, and at the time, I was 
thinking that’s what it was. . . . But then after I said that, and then Lawrence said, 
yeah, he’s cutting back Medicaid and food stamps.  And I said, yeah, welfare and 




Another employee heard Ms. McPherson’s comment in the break room and reported it to 
Constable Rankin, who confronted Ms. McPherson about it.
1058
  Ms. McPherson admitted she 
made the comment, and the evidence differed on what her expressed intent was.
1059
  In any 
event, Constable Rankin fired her, and Ms. McPherson brought at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit in 
federal district court claiming she had been unlawfully fired for uttering constitutionally 
protected speech.  The district court held that Ms. McPherson’s speech “had been unprotected” 
by the Constitution and granted summary judgment to Constable Rankin.  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1060
 
 The Supreme Court’s majority quickly, and without much analysis, concluded that Ms. 
McPherson’s comment was not the sort of threat that was wholly outside the First Amendment’s 
protection.  Although the Rankin Court never used the phrase “true threat,” it implicitly 
acknowledged that existence of a category of threatening speech that would be fall outside the 
First Amendment’s scope: 
While a statement that amounted to a threat to kill the President would not be 
protected by the First Amendment, the District Court concluded, and we agree, 
                                                          
1056
 Id. at 380-81. 
1057
 Id. at 381 (emphasis added). 
1058
 Id. at 381-82. 
1059
 Compare Ms. McPherson’s version of events, id. at 382 (“McPherson readily admitted that she had made the 
statement, but testified that she told Rankin, upon being asked if she made the statement, ‘Yes, but I didn’t mean 
anything by it.’”), with Mr. Rankin’s version, id. at 382 n.4 (“Rankin testified that, when he asked McPherson 
whether she meant the remark, she replied, ‘I sure do.’”). 
1060
 Id. 382-83. 
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that McPherson’s statement did not amount to a threat punishable under 





In reaching the conclusion that Ms. McPherson’s comment was not categorically excluded from 
First Amendment protection, the Supreme Court considered several factors: 
Considering the statement in context . . . discloses that it plainly dealt with a 
matter of public concern.  The statement was made in the course of a conversation 
addressing the policies of the President’s administration.  It came on the heels of a 
news bulletin regarding what is certainly a matter of heightened public attention:  




Having easily, and without much explanation, reached the conclusion that Ms. McPherson’s 
comments were not the sort of “true” threat that is categorically unprotected speech, the Supreme 
Court then devoted its analysis to a balancing test under the First Amendment to determine 
whether a public employee’s speech is protected.
1063
 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent
1064
 in Rankin is only slightly more helpful than the majority 
opinion in shedding light on the category of unprotected threats.  While the dissent generally 
accepts the majority’s framework of analyzing Ms. McPherson’s comments under a First 
Amendment balancing test, Justice Scalia also devotes considerable verbiage to analysis 
suggesting that, in his view, it was a close call as to whether Ms. McPherson’s comment was 
deserving of First Amendment protection at all because it is: 
                                                          
1061
 Id. at 386-87 (emphasis added). 
1062
 Id. at 386 (footnote omitted).  
1063
 The balancing test applicable, at the time, to public employees’ speech was set forth in Rankin.  Because it is a 
test for analyzing speech that falls within the First Amendment, not without, it is not applicable for purposes of this 
dissertation.  See id. at 384 (“The determination whether a public employer has properly discharged an employee for 
engaging in speech requires ‘a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public 
services it performs through its employees.’  Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Connick v. 
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).  This balancing is necessary in order to accommodate the dual role of the public 
employer as a provider of public services and as a government entity operating under the constraints of the First 
Amendment.”).   
1064
 The decision in Rankin was 5-4.  Justice Powell, who joined the majority, apparently had misgivings about 
deciding the case at all and filed a concurring opinion that began:  “It is not easy to understand how this case has 
assumed constitutional dimensions and reached the Supreme Court of the United States.”  Rankin, 483 U.S. at 392 
(Powell, J., concurring). 
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only one step removed from statements that we have previously held entitled to 
no First Amendment protection even in the nonemployment context—including 
assassination threats against the President; ‘fighting’ words; epithets or personal 
abuse; and advocacy of force or violence.  A statement lying so near the category 
of completely unprotected speech cannot fairly be viewed as lying within the 




Harkening back to the Watts Court’s analysis, Justice Scalia found persuasive the district court’s 
findings that Ms. McPherson’s comment was not “hyperbole” that would have been deserving of 
First Amendment protection.
1066
  However, the dissent, like the majority, goes no further in 
articulating what the test is to determine whether any given threatening comment is of the sort 
categorically excluded from First Amendment protection or is one that is to be analyzed under 
some type of First Amendment framework.  It would be five more years before the Supreme 
Court would again grapple with the Constitution’s approach to government efforts to regulate 
threats and 15 years before the Supreme Court would attempt to better define the boundaries of 
the “true threats” category of unprotected speech. 
* * * 
 
During the 15 years after deciding Rankin, the Supreme Court expressly or implicitly 
acknowledged the existence of a category of unprotected speech involving threats but said little 
to illuminate the nature or scope of that category.  For example, even as it struck down a St. Paul, 
Minnesota, ordinance prohibiting certain cross-burnings as an impermissible content-based 
                                                          
1065
 Id. at 397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
1066
 Id. at 396(“The statement for which she [Ms. McPherson] was fired—and the only statement reported to the 
Constable—was, ‘If they go for him again, I hope they get him.’  It is important to bear in mind the District Judge’s 
finding that this was not hyperbole.  The Court’s opinion not only does not clarify that point, but beclouds it by a 
footnote observing that the District Judge did not explicitly resolve the conflict in testimony as to whether 
McPherson told the Constable that she ‘meant’ what she had said.  He did not.  But he assuredly found that, whether 
McPherson later said she meant it or not, and whether she even meant it at the time or not, the idea she expressed 
was not just an exaggerated expression of her disapproval for the President’s policies, but a voicing of the hope that, 
next time, the President would be killed.  The District Judge rejected McPherson’s argument that her statement was 
‘mere political hyperbole,’ finding, to the contrary, that it was, ‘in context,’ ‘violent words.’  ‘This is not,’ he said, 
‘the situation where one makes an idle threat to kill someone for not picking them [sic] up on time, or not picking up 
their [sic] clothes.  It was more than that.’  He ruled against McPherson at the conclusion of the second hearing 
because ‘I don’t think it is a matter of public concern to approve even more to [sic] the second attempt at 
assassination.’” (citations omitted)). 
292 
 
regulation of speech—even speech that was within a category wholly proscribable under the 
First Amendment—the Supreme Court acknowledged that “threats of violence are outside the 
First Amendment . . . .”
1067
  Similarly, in striking down a 300-foot judicially imposed buffer zone 
around a Florida abortion clinic, the Supreme Court stated:   
Clearly, threats to patients or their families, however communicated, are 
proscribable under the First Amendment.  But rather than prohibiting the display 
of signs that could be interpreted as threats or veiled threats, the state court 
[prohibition on placard images went much further].
1068
    
 
In the same Florida case, the Supreme Court then reasoned that the buffer zone provision might 
have satisfied constitutional requirements had there been “evidence that the protesters’ speech is 
independently proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with violence as to 
be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm . . . .”
1069
  Later, in applying this same 
reasoning in upholding a judicially imposed fixed buffer zone around the entrance to a New 
York abortion clinic, the Supreme Court was mindful that a justification for the challenged 
injunction was that protesters “threatened the safety of entering patients and employees”;
1070
 any 
First Amendment protection the protesters might have been able to assert was lost as “the result 
of their own previous harassment and intimidation of patients.”
1071
 
These tangential assertions and acknowledgement did little to further explain how the 
unprotected category of “true threats” was to be applied in practiced.  By 2003, however, the 
Supreme Court found itself squarely confronted by another case that required greater explanation 
of the “true threats” doctrine and the placement of threatening speech either within the “freedom 
of speech” or without it in the “First Amendment Free Zone.” 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388. 
1068
 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 (1994). 
1069
 Id. at 774. 
1070
 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357, 380 (1997). 
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 Id. at 385.  
293 
 
* * * 
 
Virginia v. Black (2003):
1072
  The analysis in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul left open the 
question whether the government could constitutionally prohibit cross-burning that was 
conducted with criminal intent and that did not discriminate among groups of persons who might 
be the target of intimidation.  That question reached the Supreme Court in response to two 
separate cross-burnings in Virginia, resulting in three separate prosecutions.  In the first case, 
Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan rally in Carroll County, Virginia, on August 22, 1998, during 
which speakers made various bigoted statements, including one, by a speaker who stated “he 
would love to take a .30/.30 and just random[ly] shoot the blacks,” that left an uninvolved 
listener “very . . . scared.”
1073
 In the second case, Richard Elliott and Jonathan O’Mara of 
Virginia Beach, Virginia, attempted to burn a cross in the yard of Mr. Elliott’s next-door 
neighbor, James Jubilee, who was African American.  Mr. Jubilee had expressed some concern 
about shots being fired on Mr. Elliott’s property, which Mr. Elliott’s mother had explained as 
part of Mr. Elliott’s hobby of target practice.  On May 2, 1998, Mr. Elliott and Mr. O’Mara 
attempted to burn a cross in Mr. Jubilee’s yard to “get back” at him for complaining about the 
shooting.  When Mr. Jubilee saw the partially burned cross the next morning, he “was ‘very 
nervous’ because he ‘didn’t know what would be the next phase,’ and because ‘a cross burned in 
your yard . . . tells you that it’s just the first round.’”
1074
 
 All three cross-burners were prosecuted separately for violating a Virginia statute that 
prohibited burning a cross “with the intent of intimidating any person.”
1075
  Barry Black was 
                                                          
1072
 538 U.S. 343. 
1073
 Id. at 349 (alterations in original). 
1074
 Id. at 350. 
1075
 Id. at 348.  At the time, the Virginia statute read, in pertinent part, as follows:  “It shall be unlawful for any 
person or persons, with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a 
cross on the property of another, a highway or other public place.  Any person who shall violate any provision of 
this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.”  Id. (quoting Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1996)). 
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convicted after a jury trial.
1076
  Jonathan O’Mara pleaded guilty.
1077
  Richard Elliott was 
convicted by a jury.
1078
  All three appealed, and their cases were consolidated by the Virginia 
Supreme Court into a facial challenge to the Virginia cross-burning statute as violating the First 
Amendment.  The Virginia Supreme Court found the statute at issue constitutionally similar to 
the one struck down in R.A.V. and held the Virginia cross-burning law to violate the First 
Amendment, but three Justices dissented on the basis that the Virginia law fell outside the First 
Amendment because it prohibited only unprotected “true threats.”
1079
  The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
 A badly splintered Supreme Court found the Virginia statute facially valid but ultimately 
overturned the convictions because of faulty jury instructions.
1080
  While no opinion garnered a 
majority of the Court, language used throughout contributes to the understanding of the “true 
threats” doctrine.  The plurality, led by Justice O’Connor, recounted at length the historical roots 
of cross-burning, first in ancient Scottish rites and later throughout its long use by the Ku Klux 
Klan in the post-Civil War United States.  The plurality noted that throughout the history of the 
Ku Klux Klan, “cross burnings have been used to communicate both threats of violence and 
messages of shared ideology.”
1081
  Since the former fell outside the First Amendment while the 
latter enjoyed its protection, the Black plurality found it necessary to distinguish between the 
two; in that regard, it was struggling with the same problem confronted by the Watts Court and 
the Rankin Court.  The long history of violence associated with the Klan made drawing this 
distinction even more critical in this case: 
                                                          
1076
 Id. at 350. 
1077
 O’Mara reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted.  Id. 
1078




 While the fault in the jury instruction arose from First Amendment violations, it is not important here for 
purposes of Black’s contribution to our understanding of categorical analysis and so is not discussed. 
1081
 Id. at 354. 
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[W]hile cross burning sometimes carries no intimidating message, at other times 
the intimidating message is the only message conveyed.  For example, when a 
cross burning is directed at a particular person not affiliated with the Klan, the 
burning cross often serves as a message of intimidation, designed to inspire in the 
victim a fear of bodily harm.  Moreover, the history of violence associated with 
the Klan shows that the possibility of injury or death is not just hypothetical.  The 
person who burns a cross directed at a particular person often is making a serious 
threat, meant to coerce the victim to comply with the Klan’s wishes unless the 
victim is willing to risk the wrath of the Klan. . . .  
 
In sum, while a burning cross does not inevitably convey a message of 
intimidation, often the cross burner intends that the recipients of the message fear 
for their lives.  And when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any 




Unlike its precedent cases, the Black plurality then set about articulating—for the first time—a 
test for determining whether a particular utterance is an unprotected “true threat” or was speech 
subject to some level of First Amendment protection: 
“True threats” encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful 
violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.  The speaker need not 
actually intend to carry out the threat.  Rather, a prohibition on true threats 
protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear 
engenders, in addition to protecting people from the possibility or that the 
threatened violence will occur.  Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable 
sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a 





Applying that test to the case before it, the Black plurality was mindful that “the history of cross 
burning in this country shows that cross burning is often intimidating, intended to create a 
pervasive fear in victims that they are a target of violence.”
1084
  It then distinguished the case 
before it from the situation in R.A.V., characterizing that prior holding as not prohibiting all types 
of content-based discrimination within a proscribable category of speech; to the contrary, the 
R.A.V. Court “stated that some types of content discrimination did not violate the First 
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Amendment” and “that it would be constitutional to ban only a particular type of threat.”
1085
  
“[T]he First Amendment permits content discrimination ‘based on the very reasons why the 
particular class of speech at issue . . . is proscribable.’”
1086
  Therefore, what distinguished and 
saved the Virginia law from the R.A.V. rule that had invalidated the Minnesota ordinance was 
that the Virginia law required the government to prove that a defendant burned a cross “with 
intent to intimidate,”
1087
 and intimidation itself could constitutionally be made criminal by the 
government and was the “very reason” why “true threats” as a category of speech are 
“proscribable”: 
The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the 
intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of 
intimidation.  Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may 
choose to regulate this subset of intimidating messages in light of cross burning’s 
long and pernicious history as a signal of impending violence. . . . A ban on cross 
burning carried out with the intent to intimidate is fully consistent with our 




While that was the view of the four-justice plurality, the result also was consistent with the view 
of other Justices.  Justice Stevens, who was part of the plurality, also wrote separately to make 
clear his categorical view that “Cross burning with ‘an intent to intimidate’ unquestionably 
qualifies as the kind of threat that is unprotected by the First Amendment.”
1089
  Justices Scalia 
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 Id. at 361-62. 
1086
 Id. at 362 (ellipses in original). 
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 Id. at 362-63 (“Similarly, Virginia’s statute does not run afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross 
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internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1088
 Id. at 363. 
1089





 joined in that portion of the plurality opinion that concluded the Virginia statute, 
because it was limited to cross-burning with ‘an intent to intimidate,’ applied only to speech that 
was categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.
1091
  Thus, six Justices shared the 
view that the Virginia statute was saved from a facial constitutional challenge by application of 
the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion to “true threats.”
1092
 
Elonis v. United States (2015):
1093
  In 2010, Anthony Douglas Elonis’s wife left him, 
taking with her the couple’s two children.
1094
  Mr. Elonis thereafter began posting on the social 
networking site Facebook a variety of “crude, degrading, and violent material about his soon-to-
be ex-wife,” including this statement:   
“Did you know that it’s illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife? . . .  
 
It’s one of the only sentences that I’m not allowed to say. . . .  
 
Now it was okay for me to say it right then because I was just telling you that it’s 
illegal for me to say I want to kill my wife. . . . 
 
Um, but what’s interesting is that it’s very illegal to say I really, really think 
someone out there should kill my wife. . . .”
1095
   
 
After viewing some of Mr. Elonis’s online posts, his wife became “extremely afraid for [her] 
life” and obtained from a state court a protection-from-abuse order against Mr. Elonis.
1096
  Soon 
thereafter, Mr. Elonis posted online again:  “Fold up your [protection-from-abuse order] and put 
it in your pocket. Is it thick enough to stop a bullet?  Try to enforce an Order that was improperly 
                                                          
1090
 In addition to joining Justice Scalia’s concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissent explaining that he 
would have held cross burning to be conduct, not speech, and thus entirely outside the First Amendment.  Id. at 388-
95 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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 Id. at 368 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I agree with the Court that, under our decision in [R.A.V.], a State may, 
without infringing the First Amendment, prohibit cross burning carried out with the intent to intimidate.”). 
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unconstitutional.  Id. at 380-87 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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 135 S. Ct. 2001. 
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 Id. at 2004.  
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 Id. at 2005 (ellipses in original).  
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 Id. at 2006. 
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granted in the first place. Me thinks the Judge needs an education on true threat jurisprudence . . 
. .”
1097
  Mr. Elonis continued to post similar sorts of statements online. 
 A federal grand jury indicted Mr. Elonis for violating a federal criminal statute that 
prohibits the “transmit[ting] in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing 
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another . . . .”
1098
  Mr. Elonis 
was convicted by a jury, and he appealed on the basis that he never actually intended to inflict 
harm on his wife.  The Third Circuit upheld the conviction.
1099
  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and was presented with these questions:  “[W]hether the statute [under which Mr. 
Elonis was convicted] also requires that the defendant be aware of the threatening nature of the 
communication, and—if not—whether the First Amendment requires such a showing.”
1100
 
 The Elonis Court’s majority disposed of the case through statutory interpretation and thus 
did not reach any of the First Amendment issues.
1101
  For purposes of this section, however, 
Elonis is significant because of language in the concurrence of Justice Alito and the dissent of 
Justice Thomas.  Citing Watts, R.A.V. and Black, Justice Alito flatly confirmed that “[i]t is settled 
that the Constitution does not protect true threats.”
1102
  He then proceeded to explain the 
reasoning behind that categorical exclusion: 
[T]here are good reasons for that rule:  True threats inflict great harm and have 
little if any social value.  A threat may cause serious emotional stress for the 
person threatened and those who care about that person, and a threat may lead to a 
violent confrontation.  It is true that a communication containing a threat may 
include other statements that have value and are entitled to protection.  But that 
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For Justice Alito, the fact that Mr. Elonis uttered words that his wife reasonably construed as 
threatening to cause physical harm to her was sufficient to exclude those threats from 
constitutional protection.  Thus even if Mr. Elonis’ intent were, as he asserted, to create a 
“therapeutic or cathartic” benefit to himself by posting those words, the Constitution still should 
not have afforded protection to his written utterances.  It appears that Justice Alito was 
principally concerned with the effect of Mr. Elonis’ threatening speech on his estranged wife, 
and whatever benefit Mr. Elonis claimed from its utterance “cannot convert such hurtful, 
valueless threats into protected speech.”
1104
  
In dissent, Justice Thomas concluded that “the communications transmitted by Elonis 
were ‘true threats’ unprotected by the First Amendment . . . .”
1105
  Justice Thomas then 
proceeded to articulate the test that, in his view, should be applied to determine whether a 
threatening statement constitutes a constitutionally unprotected “true threat”:   
[T]he First Amendment requires that the term “threat” be limited to a narrow class 
of historically unprotected communications called “true threats.”  To qualify as a 
true threat, a communication must be a serious expression of an intention to 
commit unlawful physical violence, not merely political hyperbole; vehement, 
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks; or vituperative, abusive, and 
inexact statements.  It also cannot be determined solely by the reaction of the 
recipient, but must instead be determined by the interpretation of a reasonable 
recipient familiar with the context of the communication, lest historically 
protected speech be suppressed at the will of an eggshell observer.  There is thus 
no dispute that, at a minimum, [the statute at issue] requires an objective showing:  
The communication must be one that a reasonable observer would construe as a 
true threat to another.  And there is no dispute that the posts at issue here meet 
that objective standard.
1106
     
 
After an extensive discussion of what mental state the Constitution might require in order to 
permit criminal liability of a defendant for uttering threatening statements, Justice Thomas 
pointed out that, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has “not required a heightened mental 
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300 
 
state under the First Amendment for historically unprotected categories of speech” and to do so 
with respect to threats would “make threats one of the most protected categories of unprotected 
speech” and would “sow[] tension throughout our First Amendment doctrine.”
1107
  For example: 
Had Elonis mailed obscene materials to his wife and a kindergarten class, he 
could have been prosecuted irrespective of whether he intended to offend those 
recipients or recklessly disregarded that possibility.  Yet when he threatened to 
kill his wife and a kindergarten class, his intent to terrify those recipients (or 
reckless disregard of that risk) suddenly becomes highly relevant.  That need 




Thus, Justice Thomas would have adopted for “true threats” the same constitutional requirement 
of mere general intent that the New Hampshire Supreme Court long ago had applied in 
upholding Walter Chaplinsky’s conviction for uttering fighting words:  “[T]he only intent 
required for conviction . . . was an intent to speak the words.”
1109
  Justice Thomas could discern 
“no reason why we should give threats pride of place among unprotected speech” by finding in 
the Constitution a heightened requirement for the intent of the speaker before the utterances 
could be held outside the protection of the First Amendment.
1110
 
*  *  * 
 
Thus, in the post-Chaplinsky era—and particularly since Giboney—the Supreme Court 
generally has looked favorably upon legitimate government efforts to prohibit and punish 
criminal conduct even when that government action results in incidental suppression of speech 
integral to the illegal conduct.  The illegal combinations sought by Mr.Giboney and his fellow 
picketers, the unlawful gender-based employment discrimination intertwined with the Pittsburgh 
Press Company’s classified advertisements, the real harm to sexually abused children from Mr. 
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Ferber’s enabling of the production of child pornography, and the harm caused to recipients of 
Mr. Black’s racially charged “true threats” whether or not violence actually ensued, all proved 
sufficient to place the regulated speech in the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the 
“freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution.   
But within the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, there exist limits to the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to countenance burdens on speech in the name of suppressing unlawful 
conduct.  Part E will review a case study of one of those limits:  The Supreme Court’s approach 






Part E:  A burning issue: Expressive criminal conduct may be protected 
 
 Although the Supreme Court has found speech incidental to criminal conduct to be 
proscribable by the government because it is unprotected by the First Amendment, the Court also 
has found that when the opposite is true—when the illegal conduct is incidental to the message 
the speech is supposed to convey—the First Amendment applies.
1111
  Therefore, the Supreme 
Court’s “expressive conduct” jurisprudence functions as an outer boundary of the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion as applied to speech integral to criminal conduct.  But as explained in one 
of the flag-burning cases discussed in this Part E, the Supreme Court generally declines to apply 
that boundary in a manner that would obviate the general rule of categorical exclusion for speech 
incidental to criminal conduct: 
One may not justify burning a house, even if it is his own, on the ground, however 
sincere, that he does so as a protest.  One may not justify breaking the windows of 
a government building on that basis.  Protest does not exonerate lawlessness.  And 
the prohibition against flag burning on the public thoroughfare being valid, the 




This Part E is not intended as anything akin to a comprehensive analysis of the Supreme 
Court’s “expressive conduct” jurisprudence;
1113
 such an assessment would itself fill volumes.  
Rather, this Part E discusses a particular type of expressive conduct—the burning of symbolic 
items such as the American flag—for the limited purpose of demonstrating how the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in that “well-defined and narrowly limited”
1114
 area interrelates with its 
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broader jurisprudence of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  To illustrate how the Supreme 
Court has, in practice, imposed that boundary on the overall category of speech that is 
unprotected under the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press rule because it is “incidental to criminal 
conduct,” this Part considers three incendiary cases involving the burning of personal property as 
a form of expressive conduct.  United States v. O’Brien is selected, despite being unrelated to the 
American flag, because it offers a sense of the starting point for the Supreme Court’s modern 
expressive conduct analysis.  Street v. New York and Texas v. Johnson are selected, despite the 
numerous other cases that have reached the Supreme Court related to flag desecration,
1115
 
because they tend to effectively illuminate the relationship of the Supreme Court’s flag burning 
jurisprudence to the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, in particular the excluded category of 
speech integral to criminal conduct. 
United States v. O’Brien (1968):
1116
 David Paul O’Brien objected to the War in Vietnam.  
Distressed at being subject to the draft, on March 31, 1966, he burned his draft registration card 
before a crowd on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse
1117
 as a “demonstration against the 
war and against the draft.”
1118
  He unwisely did so in the presence of several Federal Bureau of 
Investigation agents, who witnessed the event and arrested him for violating a federal law 
prohibiting destruction of draft cards.
1119
  He was prosecuted in federal district court and 
convicted of violating a federal statute that made criminal the conduct of any person “who 
forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such 
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certificate . . . .”
1120
  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found the underlying statute 
unconstitutional as an abridgement of free speech because it “singl[ed] out persons engaged in 
protests for special treatment.”
1121




The Supreme Court ruled the statute constitutional, both on its face and as applied to Mr. 
O’Brien, and reinstated Mr. O’Brien’s conviction.  As a threshold matter, the O’Brien Court 
found the statute: 
plainly does not abridge free speech on its face . . . [because it] deals with conduct 
having no connection with speech.  It prohibits the knowing destruction of 
certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing 
necessarily expressive about such conduct.  The [relevant statute] does not 
distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only 
destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views.  A law prohibiting 
destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its 
face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers’ licenses, or a 




 The O’Brien Court then turned its attention to developing an as-applied test that could 
distinguish any unprotected expressive conduct, which could be punished without the First 
Amendment, from protected expressive conduct that would enjoy constitutional protection.  It 
rejected “the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ 
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”
1124
  To invoke 
First Amendment protection for expressive conduct, therefore, the mere intent of the “speaker” 
to convey an idea or point of view, however worthy, is insufficient.  But what more must be 
shown? 
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 Acknowledging that a balancing test was necessary to separate protected speech from 
unprotected speech in this context, the Supreme Court characterized its approach as follows:  
“[W]hen ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify 
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”
1125
  In other words, while speech 
incidental to criminal conduct may be categorically proscribed, criminal conduct incidental to 
speech does not result in the speech becoming proscribable and thus in that circumstance the 
First Amendment still applies.  But how to know the difference?  Half the balance requires an 
assessment of whether the “governmental interest” in prohibiting the expressive conduct is 
“sufficiently important,” and the O’Brien Court noted previous cases that had characterized the 
weight of governmental interest required for this purpose in potent terms such as “compelling, 
substantial, subordinating, paramount, cogent [and] strong.”
1126
  The O’Brien Court then offered 
a test for assessing the governmental interest side of the balance: 
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the 
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 




Applying that test, the Supreme Court found the substantial governmental interest in raising and 
supporting armies, a power that is “beyond question,”
1128
 to justify the prohibition on draft-card 
burning and any incidental limitation on Mr. O’Brien’s expressive rights.  The O’Brien majority 
focused intently on measuring one-half of the balancing test—namely, the determination whether 
the “governmental interest” is “sufficiently important”—but it offered no analysis of the other 
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half of the balance—namely, the determination whether the limitation on Mr. O’Brien’s First 
Amendment freedom was “incidental.”  That point was noted by Justice Harlan, who made clear 
that a restriction on expressive conduct even in support of an important government interest 




O’Brien, therefore, opened the door to future claims that expressive conduct may indeed 
by proscribed by the government, a conclusion consistent with Giboney principles and with the 
long American tradition of categorically excluding certain speech incidental to unlawful acts 
from First Amendment protection.  This, of course, makes sense:  The Speech Clause does not 
permit one to punch the President in the nose and expect to be shielded from prosecution by 
concurrently yelling, “Incidentally, I object to your declining Medicaid coverage for 
reconstructive nasal surgery!”  Neither can one invoke the First Amendment to avoid prosecution 
for selling prohibited pictures of child pornography as an incidental means to communicate even 
weighty and valuable ideas about, say, the nature of children.
1130
  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in subsequent cases declined to apply this balancing test 
broadly in favor of the government and instead has generally limited it to narrow facts such as 
those in O’Brien.   
Street v. New York (1969):
1131
 Mr. Sidney Street, an African American male, was in his 
Brooklyn, New York, apartment on June 6, 1966, when he heard a report on the radio that James 
Meredith had been shot and killed by a sniper in Mississippi.  Distressed, and saying to himself, 
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foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an ‘incidental’ restriction upon 
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“They didn’t protect him,” Mr. Street took from a drawer an American flag that he personally 
displayed on national holidays, went to the street corner outside, and lit the flag on fire with a 
match.  When police arrived, Mr. Street was talking to a small group of people who had gathered 
at the scene.  The officer heard Mr. Street state:  “We don’t need no damn flag.”  After 
confirming to the officer that the burning flag was owned and ignited by him, Mr. Street further 
stated:  “If they let that happen to Meredith we don’t need an American flag.”
1132
  Mr. Street was 
charged in New York municipal court with “Malicious Mischief” in violation of an ordinance
1133
 
that prohibited both the physical desecration of an American flag and also the verbal defiling of a 
flag.
1134
  He was convicted.  The conviction was sustained by the Appellate Term and 




The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the ground that the New York ordinance, 
as applied in this case, impermissibly infringed upon constitutionally protected speech.  Notably, 
the Court went to lengths to make clear that it did not reach the question whether the symbolic 
act of burning the American flag constituted protected speech; instead, the Supreme Court based 
its decision on that portion of the ordinance and prosecution that rested upon Mr. Street’s spoken 
words about the American flag.
1136
  Based solely and narrowly on the attempt by New York to 
criminally punish Mr. Street’s verbal comments about the American flag, the Supreme Court 
reversed the conviction and stated:    
                                                          
1132
 Id. at 578-79.  
1133
 The violated ordinance, in pertinent part, made it a misdemeanor “publicly (to) mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, 
trample upon, or cast contempt upon either by words or act (any flag of the United States)” Id. at 577-78. 
1134
 Id. at 578. 
1135
 Id. at 579. 
1136
 The pertinent portion of the city ordinance made it a crime “publicly (to) defy . . . or cast contempt upon (an 




We have no doubt that the constitutionally guaranteed freedom to be intellectually 
. . . diverse or even contrary, and the right to differ as to things that touch the heart 
of the existing order, encompass the freedom to express publicly one’s opinions 
about our flag, including those opinions which are defiant or contemptuous.  
 
. . . . 
 
We add that disrespect for our flag is to be deplored no less in these vexed times 
than in calmer periods of our history.  Nevertheless, we are unable to sustain a 
conviction that may have rested on a form of expression, however distasteful, 
which the Constitution tolerates and protects.
1137
    
 
By its narrow holding in this case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its existing jurisprudence 
regarding protected verbal expression but left for another day the question of whether the 
symbolic act of burning the flag constituted protected speech within the scope of the First 
Amendment.
1138
  The dissent, however, criticized the Street majority for avoiding the obvious 
and difficult question of whether the act of igniting the flag, separate and apart from any 
associated verbal utterances, might have enjoyed constitutional protection.  In a passage 
foreshadowing the eventual clash on that underlying question, Justice Abe Fortas expressed his 
view: 
If a statute provided that it is a misdemeanor to burn one’s shirt or trousers or 
shoes on the public thoroughfare, it could hardly be asserted that the citizen’s 
constitutional right is violated.  If the arsonist asserted that he was burning his 
shirt or trousers or shoes as a protest against the Government’s fiscal policies, for 
example, it is hardly possible that his claim to First Amendment shelter would 
prevail against the State’s claim of a right to avert danger to the public and to 
avoid obstruction to traffic as a result of the fire.  This is because action, even if 
clearly for serious protest purposes, is not entitled to the pervasive protection that 
is given to speech alone.  It may be subjected to reasonable regulation that 
appropriately takes into account the competing interests involved.  
 
                                                          
1137
 Id. at 593-94 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
1138
 Id. at 595 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Warren lamented that the Court “declined to meet and resolve 
the basic question presented in the case.”  Id.  In his view, the question the Court should have addressed was 
“whether the deliberate act of burning an American flag in public as a ‘protest’ may be punished as a crime.”  Id.  
The Supreme Court would not reach that fundamental question for another 20 years.  See generally Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
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 As support for the emphasized sentence in the quoted passage above, Justice Fortas cited 
to both O’Brien and Giboney.  Thus, the Supreme Court in deciding Street was aware of the 
constitutional tension between categorically proscribable speech incidental to criminal conduct 
and constitutionally protected expressive conduct that is incidental to the speech or message it 
conveys.  The Street majority elected to expressly avoid addressing that tension, but the dissent, 
concerned about the direction the jurisprudence was headed, chose to lay down a clear marker of 
its views. 
 Twenty years later, the question would again reach the Supreme Court, and this time it 
would be answered. 
Texas v. Johnson (1989):
1140
  During the 1984 Republican National Convention in 
Dallas, a group of protesters who objected to policies of President Reagan’s administration 
marched in the streets and staged “die-ins” to express their concern about the consequences of 
nuclear war.  One of these protesters was Gregory Lee Johnson, who at one point during the 
march was handed an American flag by another protester, who had removed it from a building in 
the area.
1141
  Mr. Johnson carried the flag until the march ended in front of Dallas City Hall, 
                                                          
1139
 Street, 394 U.S. at 616 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
1140
 491 U.S. 397.  
1141
 This information raises two interesting points.  First, unlike Sidney Street, who had burned a flag that was his 
own property, the flag burned by Mr. Johnson was not his and he could claim no property interest in it.  Thus, the 
First Amendment issue in Texas v. Johnson was even more squarely presented because no claim of separate 
authority to destroy one’s own property could lie.  Second, it is an interesting—and unanswered—question whether 
the government might have defeated Mr. Johnson’s First Amendment objections if the prosecution here had been 
either for his participation in the theft of this flag, his knowing acceptance of stolen property, or for his knowing 
criminal destruction of the property of another.  The Johnson majority does suggest that one reason the specific 
Texas statute barring flag desecration, under which Mr. Johnson was prosecuted, failed to serve a sufficient 
government interest is that the separate, generally applicable Texas statute proscribing breach of the peace might be 
sufficient to protect any state interest maintaining law and order.  Thus, one may find in the reasoning of the 
majority support for the notion that a prosecution of Mr. Johnson under the more generally applicable proscriptions 
on theft, on acceptance of stolen property, or on criminal destruction of the property of another might have survived 
First Amendment challenge. 
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where he doused the flag with kerosene and ignited it while protesters chanted:  “America, the 
red, white, and blue, we spit on you”
1142
 along with other slogans and epithets.  Of about 100 
protesters involved in the matter, only Mr. Johnson was charged with a crime, and the only crime 
with which he was charged was desecration of a venerated object.
1143
  He was convicted, and on 
appeal the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction as violating the First 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Johnson Court found Mr. Johnson’s flag burning to be constitutionally protected 
expressive conduct
1144
 and found that the state impermissibly sought to regulate it precisely 
because it was expressive.
1145
  The Johnson majority explained: 
The government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than 
it has in restricting the written or spoken words.  It may not, however, proscribe 
particular conduct because it has expressive elements.  [W]hat might be termed 
the more generalized guarantee of freedom of expression makes the 
communicative nature of conduct an inadequate basis for singling out that 
conduct for proscription.  A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct 
must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of 
need that the First Amendment requires.
1146
   
 
But the Johnson majority’s determination that the Texas statute at issue should be judged 
as if it were regulating speech, not merely conduct, left open the important question whether Mr. 
                                                          
1142
 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399. 
1143
 Id. at 400.  The pertinent provision of the Texas statute stated as follows:  “Desecration of Venerated Object.  (a) 
A person commits the offense if he intentionally or knowingly desecrates:  (1) a public monument; (2) a place of 
worship or burial; or (3) a state or national flag.  (b) For purposes of this section, ‘desecrate’ means deface, damage, 
or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offens one or more persons likely to 
observe or discover his action.”  Id. at 400 n.1 (quoting Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989)).  Violation of the 
section was a misdemeanor.  
1144
 Id. at 406 (“Johnson burned an American flag as part—indeed, as the culmination—of a political demonstration 
that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its renomination of Ronald Reagan for President.  
The expressive, overtly political nature of this conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent.  At his 
trial, Johnson explained his reasons for burning the flag as follows:  ‘The American Flag was burned as Ronald 
Reagan was being renominated as President.  And a more powerful statement of symbolic speech, whether you 
agree with it or not, couldn’t have been made at that time.’”).   
1145
 Id. at 411 (“Johnson was prosecuted because he knew that his politically charged expression would cause 
‘serious offense.’  If he had burned the flag as a means of disposing of it because it was dirty or torn, he would not 
have been convicted of flag desecration under this Texas law:  federal law designates burning as the preferred means 
of disposing of a flag ‘when it is in such condition that it is no longer a fitting emblem for display,’ . . . and Texas 
has no quarrel with this means of disposal.”). 
1146
 Id. at 406 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Johnson’s speech/conduct in burning the American flag was entitled to constitutional protection.  
The Supreme Court’s analysis on this point goes to the heart of the relevance of this case to the 
broader Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion. 
First, the Johnson majority distinguished O’Brien: 
[A]lthough we have recognized that where ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are 
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on 
First Amendment Freedoms, we have limited the applicability of O’Brien’s 
relatively lenient standard to those cases in which the governmental interest is 




Second, the Johnson majority rejected categorical exclusion for Mr. Johnson’s flag 
desecration through its express finding that the flag-burning here did not tend to incite a breach 
of the peace,
1148
 did not constitute proscribable “incitement,”
1149
 and did not constitute 
proscribable “fighting words” within the categorical exception to the First Amendment’s 
protection.
1150
  Having found the flag burning in this case to fall outside the existing “fighting 
words” exclusion from First Amendment protection, the Johnson majority then stated, in effect, 
that no historical basis for excluding flag burning from First Amendment protection existed: 
If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society 
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.   
 





 The Johnson majority then expressly refused to recognize flag burning as a type of 
speech categorically excluded from constitutional protection: 
                                                          
1147
 Id. at 407 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
1148
 Id. at 401.  
1149
 Id. at 409. 
1150
 Id. (“Nor does Johnson’s expressive conduct fall within that small class of ‘fighting words’ that are likely to 
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.  No reasonable onlooker would 
have regarded Johnson’s generalized expression of dissatisfaction with the policies of the Federal Government as a 
direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1151
 Id. at 414 (citations omitted). 
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There is, moreover, no indication—either in the text of the Constitution or in our 
cases interpreting it—that a separate juridical category exists for the American 
flag alone. . . . We decline, therefore, to create for the flag an exception to the 




The Johnson Court, therefore, considered but rejected the notion that flag burning could 
be properly included in one of the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the 
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”
1153
  It did so by rejecting efforts to include flag burning within existing, recognized 
categories such as “incitement” or “fighting words,” and in went further to consider but reject the 
creation of a new category that would exclude flag burning alone.  Instead, the Johnson majority 
found that Mr. Johnson’s expressive conduct of burning the American flag, on the facts of this 




 The dissent saw matters differently.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices White 
and O’Connor, argued that flag desecration was precisely the type of conduct that was 
historically considered outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment.  “For 
more than 200 years, the American flag has occupied a unique position as the symbol of our 
Nation, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning in the way 
respondent Johnson did here.”
1155
  Noting that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic,”
1156
 
                                                          
1152
 Id. at 417-18. 
1153
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72. 
1154
 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 417 (“To conclude that the government may permit designated symbols to be used to 
communicate only a limited set of messages would be to enter territory having no discernible or defensible 
boundaries.  Could the government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of state flags?  Of copies of the Presidential 
seal?  Of the Constitution?  In evaluating these choices under the First Amendment, how would we decide which 
symbols were sufficiently special to warrant this unique status?  To do so, we would be forced to consult our own 
political preferences, and impose them on the citizenry, in the very way that the First Amendment forbids us to 
do.”). 
1155
 Id. at 422 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
1156
 Id. at 421. 
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the dissent offered a lengthy recitation of the historical importance and profound meaning of the 
American flag in American society.
1157
  
 Chief Justice Rehnquist then traced the long history of state and federal laws prohibiting 
flag desecration, which he noted extended at least as far back as a uniform state law proposed in 
1917
1158
 and a Supreme Court case from 1907
1159
 that upheld a Nebraska statute barring use of 
the flag in advertising.  Drawing upon reasoning that seven years earlier the Supreme Court had 
used to justify recognition of “child pornography” as an unprotected category,
1160
 he also set 
forth the widespread acceptance of laws barring flag desecration, as evidenced by their adoption 
in 48 states and by federal law. Summarizing his argument that both historical practice and 
widespread acceptance should lead the Supreme Court to recognize flag desecration as an 
unprotected category of speech, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
The American flag, then, throughout more than 200 years of our history, has come 
to be the visible symbol embodying our Nation.  It does not represent the views of 
any particular political party, and it does not represent any particular political 
philosophy.  The flag is not simply another “idea” or “point of view” competing 
for recognition in the marketplace of ideas.  Millions and millions of Americans 
regard it with an almost mystical reverence regardless of what sort of social, 
political, or philosophical beliefs they may have.  I cannot agree that the First 
Amendment invalidates the Act of Congress, and the laws of 48 of the 50 States, 




The dissent then proceeded to analyze Mr. Johnson’s conduct under the Chaplinsky framework: 
 
The [Chaplinsky] Court could not, and did not, say that Chaplinsky’s utterances 
were not expressive phrases—they clearly and succinctly conveyed an extremely 
low opinion of the addressee.  The same may be said of Johnson’s public burning 
of the flag in this case; it obviously did convey Johnson’s bitter dislike of his 
country.  But his act, like Chaplinsky’s provocative words, conveyed nothing that 
could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forcefully in a dozen 
                                                          
1157
 Id. at 422-27. 
1158
 Id. at 428. 
1159
 Id. at 429 (citing Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34 (1907)). 
1160
 Chief Justice Rehnquist did not cite to or expressly reference New York v. Ferber; however, that case had 
justified recognition of child pornography as a new, unprotected category of speech even absent any demonstrated 
historical practice of exclusion.  See Chapter 6, Part C, supra (“Visual depictions of child pornography”).   
1161
 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 429 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
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different ways.  As with “fighting words,” so with flag burning, for purposes of 
the First Amendment:  It is “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] 
of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from [it] is clearly outweighed” by the public interest in avoiding a probable 




In the view of the Johnson dissenters, the Supreme Court should have recognized “flag 
desecration” as a category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment. 
* * * 
 
 Thus, these flag-burning and draft card-burning cases, particularly Johnson, provide a 
useful snapshot of the Supreme Court’s struggle to apply its longstanding doctrine that “speech 
integral to criminal conduct” falls into the “First Amendment Free Zone” that is outside the 
“freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution.  In that way, they illuminate the outer 
boundaries of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  For the Johnson majority, the burning of 
the American flag was a powerful symbol of protest, the expressive elements of which far 
outweighed any governmental interest in enforcing a restriction.  The facts of this case, in their 
view, did not support the notion that Mr. Johnson’s conduct constituted proscribable 
“incitement” or “fighting words.”  The fact that the statute under which Mr. Johnson was 
prosecuted specifically and narrowly prohibited flag desecration was a critical factor in the 
majority’s reasoning, and indeed it is unclear how they might have viewed this case had Mr. 
Johnson instead been prosecuted under more generally applicable laws forbidding theft of 
property, knowingly accepting stolen property, causing criminal damage to the property of 
another, or even breach of the peace. 
 For the dissent, however, the very fact that the Texas statute was narrowly targeted to 
prohibit flag desecration is precisely why it should have been saved.  The long history of 
government prohibitions on flag desecration, the widespread acceptance of such proscriptions, 
                                                          
1162
 Id. at 431 (alterations in original). 
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and the very nature of flag burning, in their view, renders flag burning a “well-defined and 
narrowly limited class[] of speech”
1163
 that the government may proscribe through a narrowly 
targeted prohibition.  Prohibitions on flag desecration are historically justified by the long history 
of  
uniquely deep awe and respect for our flag . . . . [T]he government has not 
established this feeling; 200 years of history have done that. The government is 
simply recognizing as a fact the profound regard for the American flag created by 





That is the sort of language the Supreme Court employs when it recognizes a category of speech 
that has a tradition of proscription but that has not previously been recognized.  Because that 
language was deployed here by only three Justices, flag desecration is not governed by the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion and instead falls within the protection of the First 
Amendment. 
 In modern application, the Supreme Court has often recognized the general Giboney-
Pittsburgh Press principle that speech integral to criminal conduct is categorically excluded from 
the protection of the First Amendment.  The various acts of applying, or declining to apply, that 
general principle to specific, modern circumstances has resulted in the Supreme Court 
developing what might be considered “sub-doctrines” of how this category is to be applied in 
certain circumstances.  That is why it can be said with certainty that “child pornography” and 
“true threats” fall within the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press line of cases and are unprotected while 
“flag desecration” falls without and must be analyzed under the First Amendment. 
 Have all of the specific applications of the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press principle been 
recognized by the Supreme Court?  Or, to put the question differently, might there be other “sub-
                                                          
1163
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72.  
1164
 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 434 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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doctrines” or “subcategories” that later will be recognized?  Perhaps, or perhaps not.  It is, of 
course, impossible to know the future.  But it may be useful to consider, in Part F, several other 
circumstances in which the Supreme Court has at least contemplated or signaled that a specific 
application of Giboney-Pittsburgh Press might be considered. 







Part F:  Other Giboney applications not fully developed? 
 
The specific examples discussed above—fraud, visual depictions of child pornography, 
and true threats—are the most-clearly articulated applications of the general Giboney-Pittsburgh 
Press principle that the Constitution does not protect speech integral to unlawful conduct.
1165
  
There are, of course, other examples of that principle in concept and application, both in the 
academic literature
1166
 and in the case law.  This Part F mentions four of them that have drawn 
the Supreme Court’s attention over the years.  On the whole, it cannot be said with certainty that 
the Supreme Court has declared these examples to fall within the “First Amendment Free Zone” 
that is beyond the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution, but the courts have hinted 
as much.   
It is of course possible these examples may be further developed in the future as 
appropriate cases present themselves.  Needless to say, the examples in this Part F are illustrative 
and are not represented to be an exhaustive list of possible applications of the Giboney-
Pittsburgh Press principle. 
Lying to the government, perjury and false impersonation 
Even while rejecting the Government’s invitation to establish a new unprotected category 
for lies told about receiving military honors, the Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez
1167
 
                                                          
1165
 For a general discussion of the interaction of the First Amendment with speech integral to criminal conduct, see 
generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095 (2005). 
1166
 See, e.g., Chelsea Norell, Note, Criminal Cookbooks:  Proposing a New Categorical Exclusion for the First 
Amendment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 933 (2011) (proposing a “crime plans exclusion” “for speech that specifically 
details how to commit a crime and, as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); see also Samantha H. Scheller, Comment, A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words:  The 
Legal Implications of Revenge Porn, 93 N.C. L. REV. 551 (2015) (exploring whether First Amendment permits 
government regulation of the public posting of sexually explicit images of former intimate partner); David Crump, 
Desecration: Is it Protected Speech?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1021 (2011) (proposing that speech constituting 
“desecration” be categorically unprotected). 
1167
 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
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described three additional categories of lies that traditionally could subject the speaker to 
punishment by the government without First Amendment concerns. 
First, the First Amendment does not shield from liability a person who provides false 
information to a government official.  The government may punish such lies because of the 
legitimate interest in preventing falsehood in “communications concerning official matters” even 
though that conclusion “does not lead to the broader proposition that false statements are 
unprotected when made to any person, at any time, in any context.”
1168
 
Second, the statutes prohibiting and punishing perjury are of “unquestioned 
constitutionality”
1169
 because perjured testimony “is at war with justice” since it can result in a 
legal “judgment not resting on truth.”
1170
  Thus, “[t]o uphold the integrity of our trial system . . . 
the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.”
1171
 
 Third, the First Amendment does not prohibit government from proscribing “false 
representation that one is speaking as a Government official or on behalf of the government.”
1172
  
Such proscriptions are permitted because of the important interest in “maintain[ing] the general 
good repute and dignity of . . . government . . . service itself.”
1173
  “The same can be said for 
prohibitions on the unauthorized use of the names of federal agencies such as the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation in a manner calculated to convey that the communication is approved or using 
words such as ‘Federal’ or ‘United States’ in the collection of private debts in order to convey 
that the communication has official authorization.”
1174
 
                                                          
1168
 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545-46 (plurality opinion). 
1169
 Id. at 2546 (quoting United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978)). 
1170
 Id. (quoting In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227 (1945)). 
1171
 Id. (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (2012)). 
1172
 Id. at 2545. 
1173
 Id. at 2546 (quoting United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943)) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
1174
 Id. (citations omitted). 
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As Justice Kennedy explained, each of these examples of permissible proscription on 
speech differed from the lies told about military honors in Alvarez and “to the extent that they 
implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal conduct, [they] are inapplicable here.”
1175
   
Similarly, while not limited solely to speech impeding government activities, “[m]any 
long-established criminal proscriptions - such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and 
solicitation—criminalize speech (commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence 
illegal activities.”
1176
  The Supreme Court long has acknowledged, without squarely addressing, 
that speech constituting “perjury, . . . solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, 
conspiracy, and the like”
1177
 is constitutionally unprotected.  
The clear implication of these analyses is that these examples are established applications 
of the Giboney-Pittsburgh Press principle that speech integral to criminal conduct, as well as 
fraud, are unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Speech uttered with criminal intent 
Courts long have recognized that the First Amendment does not operate as a bar to the 
prosecution of otherwise generally applicable criminal laws merely because part of the crime, or 
evidence thereof, is verbal in nature.  As one federal circuit court neatly put the principle: 
The reasons of ordinary penal policy for covering communicative efforts to carry 
out ordinary crimes are obvious, and the criminal law sensibly draws no 
distinction between communicative and other acts.  Although assertions of fact 
generally fall within a principle of freedom of speech, what these sorts of factual 
statements contribute to the general understanding of listeners is minimal, and the 
justifications for free speech that apply to speakers do not reach communications 








 Williams, 553 U.S. at 298. 
1177
 Konigsburg, 366 U.S. at 49 n.10. 
1178
 Rice v. Paladin Enterprise, Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, 
AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE, 85 (1989)) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, the Supreme Court has held that “solicitation to enter into an [illegal] agreement . . . 
remains in essence an invitation to engage in an illegal exchange for private profit, and may be 
properly prohibited.”
1179
  Similarly, “aiding and abetting” an illegal act is not protected by the 
First Amendment.
1180
  The key to distinguishing protected speech about criminal acts from 
unprotected speech that is punishable as part of a criminal act often is the intent of the speaker: 
[T]he First Amendment is quite irrelevant if the intent of the actor and the 
objective meaning of the words used are so close in time and purpose to a 
substantive evil as to become part of the ultimate crime itself.  In those instances, 
where speech becomes an integral part of the crime, a First Amendment defense is 




This is because “speech is not protected by the First Amendment when it is the very vehicle of 
the crime itself.”
1182
  Thus, the “First Amendment poses no bar to the imposition of civil (or 
criminal) liability for speech acts which the plaintiff (or the prosecution) can establish were 




While a “true threat” to inflict harm is unprotected by the First Amendment, what about a 
false threat?  For example, federal law prohibits false statements about threats to aircraft or 
aircraft facilities.
1184
  When George Rutherford falsely (and foolishly) stated to a flight attendant, 
                                                          
1179
 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 55 (1982). 
1180
 See Rice, 128 F.3d 233; National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 F.3d 646, 656 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (“That ‘aiding and abetting’ of an illegal act may be carried out through speech is no bar to its illegality.”); 
United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982) (“The first amendment does not provide a defense to a 
criminal charge simply because the actor uses words to carry out his illegal purpose.  Crimes, including that of 
aiding and abetting, frequently involve the use of speech as part of the criminal transaction.”). 
1181
 United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir. 1986).  Then Circuit Judge Kennedy was the author of 
this decision. 
1182
 United States v. Varani, 435 F.2d 758, 762 (6th Cir. 1970). 
1183
 Rice, 128 F.3d at 248.  
1184
 United States v. Rutherford, 332 F.2d 444, 445 n.1 (1964) (“§ 35. Imparting or conveying false information. (a) 
Whoever imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the information to be 
false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which would be a crime 
prohibited by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title shall be fined not more than $1,000, or 
imprisoned not more than one year, or both.  (b) Whoever willfully and maliciously, or with reckless disregard ffor 
the safety of human life, imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the 
information to be false, concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which 
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“I have to sit near the back [of the airplane] because I have a bomb,” he was prosecuted under 
that federal statute.
1185
  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that conviction because 
“there could be little doubt that the giving of the false information would be beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment.”
1186
 
Lawyer professional misconduct 
The application of the First Amendment to lawyer misconduct is an oft-decided issue at 
the Supreme Court.  In general, perhaps because of the Supreme Court’s sensitivity to the 
necessity in the legal system of veracity by members of the bar, the Supreme Court has had a 
lower tolerance for false or misleading representations by lawyers than it has for falsehood or 
misleading speech generally.
1187
   
For example, the Supreme Court has denied a claim that the First Amendment prohibits a 
state bar association from demanding applicants disclose prior affiliation with a political 
organization such as the Communist Party as part of the bar’s investigation of “character 
qualifications.”  While the decision in Konigsburg v. State Bar of California
1188
 rested on 
analysis within the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, the Konigsburg Court did 
consider, but did not decide, whether categorical analysis should be applied in the case of bar 
applicants.
1189
  Obviously mindful of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, the Konigsburg 
Court listed as examples of unprotected speech “libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
would be a crime prohibited by this chapter or chapter 97 or chapter 111 of this title—shall be fined not more than 
$5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 35)).  
1185
 Id. at 445. 
1186
 Id. at 446. But see Elonis, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (concluding that threatening statements not actually intended to 
threaten harm were not actionable). 
1187
 See generally Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (demonstrating the unusual conclusion that 
a speech-burdening Florida Bar regulation of the legal profession satisfied strict scrutiny). 
1188
 Konigsburg, 366 U.S. 36.  
1189
 Id. at 49-51. 
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perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by encouragement, conspiracy, and 
the like . . . .”
1190
   
The Supreme Court long has acknowledged that the “unique features” of certain methods 
of lawyer advertising, such as in-person solicitation of clients, may be proscribed because such 
advertising is “a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise 
of undue influence, and outright fraud,”
1191
 an assessment it has applied in evaluating 
disciplinary actions within the First Amendment.  However, the Supreme Court also has 
suggested, without deciding, that the underlying interest of distinguishing false or deceptive 
lawyer advertising, which is proscribable regardless of its form, from lawyer advertising that is 
neither false nor deceptive, may properly subjected lawyer advertising to a “prophylactic rule . . . 
[to prevent advertising] statements that are at best ambiguous and at worst outright false.”
1192
  In 
effect, such a “prophylactic rule”—if recognized by the Supreme Court—would operate as a de 
facto categorical exclusion from First Amendment review of the speech falling within it.   
Even while acknowledging that some application of the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion may lurk in the regulatory world applied to lawyer advertising, in actual application 
the Supreme Court has continued to regulate lawyer solicitation within First Amendment 
doctrines, not as categorically excluded.
1193
  It has, however, at least considered the notion that 
some sort of categorical exclusion relying upon the reasoning of Pittsburgh Press may exist: 
[T]here would be no impediment to a rule forbidding attorneys to use 
advertisements soliciting clients for nuisance suits—meritless claims filed solely 
to harass a defendant or coerce a settlement.  Because a client has no legal right to 
                                                          
1190
 Id. at 49 n.10.  
1191
 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985). 
1192
 Id. at 644. 
1193
 Compare, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (general public advertising to solicit legal clients 
protected by the First Amendment), with Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (lawyer may, 
consistent with First Amendment commercial speech doctrine, be subject to discipline for in-person solicitation of 
clients for compensated representation), and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyer’s personal solicitation by 
letter of client for non-profit organization is protected political speech not subject to discipline). 
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file such a claim knowingly, advertisements designed to stir up such litigation 




Thus, one is left to wonder how the Supreme Court might address a circumstance in 
which the client’s payment for legal services is itself in violation of law.  Consider, for example, 
a hypothetical case presenting a lawyer who is disciplined for soliciting a client to pay and retain 
a non-profit organization to provide otherwise lawful legal representation if that non-profit 
organization were one properly identified by the government as providing material support for a 
terrorist organization—itself a crime.
1195
  
* * * 
 
 The principle that speech so integrated with criminal conduct, which the government may 
lawfully prohibit or punish, may itself be constitutionally proscribed is well-established.  
Overall, it may be fairly said that this principle applies when the proscribed speech is incidental 
to the crime, not the other way around. 
In some circumstances, such as allowing the government to prosecute and punish perjury, 
solicitation or conspiracy, the principle is so widely accepted that it has never been directly and 
successfully challenged and, thus, the Supreme Court has lacked occasion to squarely address its 
status.  In other circumstances, such as those involving true threats or fraud, there is long 
acceptance of the principle allowing government proscription of the integrated speech, and the 
Supreme Court has expressly recognized that specific application of the categorical exclusion.  In 
still other circumstances, so far limited to the unique matter of child pornography, there is no 
deep historical tradition of proscription, but the Supreme Court has nonetheless expressly 
                                                          
1194
 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 645 n.12. 
1195
 See generally Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (government may, consistent with the 
First Amendment, prohibit or punish the speech of those who provide financial contributions and other material 
support to terrorist organizations). But see Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015) (restrictions on 
judicial fundraising solicitations satisfy strict scrutiny within First Amendment). 
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acknowledged that application of this principle means the First Amendment affords no protection 
to the possession or trade in visual depictions of the underlying crime of child abuse. 
 In light of the relative frequency of litigation in this area since Chaplinsky, it seems likely 
that other specific applications of this general principle allowing government to proscribe speech 
integrated with criminal conduct will in the future be recognized by the Supreme Court.
1196
  But 
against that relative willingness to recognize the unprotected nature of speech integrated with 
criminal conduct, one must consider the competing tension—the Supreme Court’s general 
reluctance to acknowledge new categories of unprotected speech and the overall trend toward 











                                                          
1196
 Another category of speech that some suggest might be excluded from First Amendment protection is harassing 
speech that contributes to a hostile work environment.  As one writer has argued, “at least some expression in all 
workplaces lies beyond the First Amendment, because the expression accomplishes some end that does not 
implicate First Amendment values.”  Miranda Oshige McGowan, Certain Illusions about Speech: Why the Free-
Speech Critique of Hostile Work Environment Harassment Is Wrong, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 391, 397 (2002); 
accord, e.g., In re Stonegate Sec. Servs., Ltd., 56 B.R. 1014, 1018 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (“It is not unconstitutional to 
prohibit harassing conduct, even if that conduct involves verbal components. . . . It is constitutional to prohibit such 
conduct, even though it involves speech, because (1) the speech is not highly protected; (2) the speech is ‘speech-
plus,’ that is, it involves action beyond speech; and (3) countervailing interests, such as an individual’s right to 
privacy, are involved.”); Curry v. Dep’t of Navy, 11 M.S.P.B. 573, 576 (1982) (“[D]ismissal for certain speech, not 
constitutionally protected, may be in accordance with law in the employment context and may promote the 
efficiency of the service.”).  But see Saxe v. State College Area School Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3rd Cir. 2001) (“We 
simply note that we have found no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’ speech, as defined by federal anti-
discrimination statutes, of First Amendment protection.”). 
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CHAPTER 7: Patrolling the boundaries of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion 
 
Since Chaplinsky, the Supreme Court has characterized the categories of unprotected 
speech as “well-defined and narrowly limited.”
1197
  The Supreme Court has acknowledged it has 
on occasion “narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions” but reaffirmed that “a 
limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First Amendment 
jurisprudence.”
1198
  Chapters 3 through 6, supra, have discussed the Supreme Court’s 
voluminous work from Chaplinsky in 1942 until Stevens in 2010 to ensure that recognized 
categories of unprotected speech are “well-defined,” and Chapters 8 (United States v. Stevens) 
and 9 (United States v. Alvarez) will describe the Supreme Court’s most recent approaches to 
that task.   
But that leaves open the omnipresent question, upon application of the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion to a given set of facts, whether the challenged government regulation “has 
gone beyond the categorical exception.”
1199
  One author has aptly described this “categorization 
paradox”: 
On the one hand, it is important that courts maintain categorization as a tool for 
discerning those rare categories of speech that can be deemed unprotected.  If this 
tool is to mean anything, it is important that legislatures have substantial leeway 
to regulate within these categories.  Such categories can be legislated against in 
their entirety.  In addition, reasonable leeway should exist for legislatures to 
legislate within subcategories of these categories.  On the other hand, the 
categorization paradox tells us that we have to expect misjudgments, even abuse 
in the definition and regulation of these speech categories.  Misjudgments by 
courts are inevitable, both as to which speech categories should be unprotected 
and also as to whether and when speech falls within such categories.  Abuse by 
legislatures and law enforcement personnel who use such categories to chill or 
prosecute protected speech also are inevitable.  Thus, some limits on the use of 
unprotected speech categories are called for.  The limits should be geared toward 
minimizing the impact of categorization doctrine on free speech value in two sets 
                                                          
1197
 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571. 
1198
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (citations omitted). 
1199
 Williams, 553 U.S. at 299. 
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of cases:  first, in cases where speech is unprotected but has significant value and 
thus reflects a flaw with the unprotected speech category itself; and second, in 




This chapter discusses four of the principal methods employed by the Supreme Court to 
ensure that the unprotected categories remain “narrowly limited” and that the “First Amendment 
Free Zone” remains tightly contained. 
  
                                                          
1200
 Heidi Kitrosser, Containing Unprotected Speech, 57 FLA. L. REV. 843, 874 (2005). 
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Part A:  Most proposed new categories are rejected 
 
The Supreme Court’s first, and most direct, method of keeping the unprotected categories 
“narrowly limited” is to decline invitations to recognize additional unprotected categories.
1201
  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it may from time to time “adjust the boundaries of an 
existing category of unprotected speech,”
1202
 and that is observable from the evolution of the 
four Chaplinsky categories in Chapters 3 through 6.  But recognizing new categories is 
disfavored.
1203
  The Supreme Court has articulated the showing necessary for it to consider 
recognizing a new category as requiring “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content 
is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription . . . .”
1204
  It has rejected 
adoption of a “free-floating test for First Amendment coverage” in evaluating proposed new 
unprotected categories because “[t]he Constitution is not a document ‘prescribing limits, and 
declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.’”
1205
 
The disfavored status of new categories was evident from the experiment with categorical 
exclusion of commercial speech.
1206
  Similarly, the Supreme Court took a step toward 
                                                          
1201
 This Part will discuss and illustrate its analysis through reference to judicial decisions. However, a larger 
universe of proposed new categorical exclusions has been advocated by litigants in various cases but has not caught 
the Court’s attention even sufficiently to justify judicial rejection of the proposed new category.  See, e.g., Brief of 
Family Research Council et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States of America v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (No. 98-1682), 1999 WL 592027 (advocating judicial recognition that 
“nuisance speech” is categorically without First Amendment protection). Of course, advocates usually draw upon 
some precedent when urging the Supreme Court to recognize a new category of excluded speech; the Family 
Research Council brief drew its proposed “nuisance” speech phrase from a passage in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 
77, 89 (1949) (loud noises from sound truck could be regulated because it “is not enough to call forth constitutional 
protection for what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a nuisance . . . .”).  
1202
 EMA, 131 S. Ct. at 2735. 
1203
 Moreover, in some cases the Supreme Court has appeared to lay the groundwork for recognizing a new category 
of unprotected speech but then stopped short of formally doing so.  An illustrative example is the speech of public 
employees on matters within the scope of their employment, which the Supreme Court in 2006 determined regulable 
by the government but stopped short of identifying it as an unprotected category.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410 (2006); see also Sheldon H. Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique 
of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008).  
1204
 EMA, 131 S. Ct. at 2734.  
1205
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 470 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)). 
1206
 See Chapter 5, supra. 
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recognizing flag-burning as unprotected conduct but then stopped short of recognizing such a 
category.
1207
  More frequently, however, the Supreme Court has just said ‘no’ when presented 
with an invitation to recognize an additional category of speech as unprotected.  A list of 
proposed additional categories the post-Chaplinsky Court has considered but rejected over the 
years includes: 
Racially charged speech 
In 1965, Julian Bond, an African American, was elected to a seat in the Georgia House of 
Representatives.  Before being seated, he made public comments sharply criticizing the Vietnam 
War and expressing solidarity with the anti-war statements of a group called the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.  Some of the anti-war statements he endorsed were 
characterized as racially charged, such as: 
“We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of a supposedly ‘free’ society where 
responsibility to freedom is equated with the responsibility to lend oneself to 
military aggression.  We take note of the fact that 16 per cent of the draftees from 
this country are Negroes called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam, to preserve 
a ‘democracy’ which does not exist for them at home.   
 




 Mr. Bond’s numerous critics accused him of holding views that rendered him incapable 
of fulfilling his oath to support the United States Constitution.  As evidence, they pointed to his 
extensive anti-war comments.  After legislative investigation, a majority of members of the 
Georgia House of Representatives voted not to seat Mr. Bond as a member.
1209
  They claimed 
authority under the qualifications clause of the Georgia state constitution.  Mr. Bond filed suit in 
federal court alleging that his disqualification was impermissibly based upon his statements, 
which were protected by the First Amendment. 
                                                          
1207
 See Chapter 6, Part E, supra. 
1208
 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
1209
 The vote was 184-12.  See Bond, 385 U.S. at 125. 
329 
 
Upon review, the Supreme Court held that although legislators could be compelled to 
swear the oath required by the United States Constitution, “this requirement does not authorize a 
majority of state legislators to test the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator can 
swear to uphold the Constitution.”
1210
  The Supreme Court then considered “whether Bond’s 
disqualification because of his statements violated the free speech provisions of the First 
Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”
1211
  The answer: Yes.  
In its analysis, the Supreme Court quickly concluded that Mr. Bond’s statements did not qualify 
as unprotected incitement and were instead protected by the First Amendment; the Bond Court 
then noted that the fact Mr. Bond’s statement may “have racial overtones [does not] constitute a 
reason for holding it outside the protection of the First Amendment.”
1212
 
Thus, the Bond Court rejected an invitation to place speech with “racial overtones” that 
falls short of incitement into the “First Amendment Free Zone” that falls outside the “freedom of 
speech” protected by the Constitution. 
Privacy of a rape victim 
In 1983, B.J.F. was raped in Florida.  Her full name was listed on a police report, which 
subsequently was inadvertently released to the news media.  The Florida Star, a newspaper, 
obtained the name and, because of poor training of junior staff members, published it in violation 
of company policy in a routine “police reports” column.  B.J.F. sued the newspaper for tortious 
invasion of her privacy, and judgment was awarded to her and affirmed by the state appellate 
court.  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
1213
 
                                                          
1210
 Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 
1211
 Id. at 131-32. 
1212
 Id. at 134-35. 
1213
 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 526-29 (1989). 
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The Supreme Court set aside the judgment against The Florida Star as a violation of the 
First Amendment.  The Florida Star v. B.J.F.
1214
 Court’s analysis was conducted within the First 
Amendment, but the Florida Star majority considered—and declined—an invitation from B.J.F. 
to establish “a categorical rule that publication of the name of a rape victim never enjoys 
constitutional protection.”
1215
  The three Justices in dissent, led by Justice White, would have 
established such a “categorical” rule that such publication “constitutes an unwarranted invasion 
of privacy” and falls outside the protection of the First Amendment.
1216
 
Thus, the Florida Star Court rejected an invitation to place speech that publicizes the 
name of a rape victim without consent into the “First Amendment Free Zone” that falls outside 
the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution.   
Speech generating financial profits from crime 
In the 1980s, New York enacted a “Son of Sam” law, named after the notorious serial 
killer, intended to secure for use in victim compensation any proceeds from the sale of criminals’ 
memoirs or similar publications.  Mr. Henry Hill was a notorious criminal who turned state’s 
evidence and, while in the federal witness protection program, wrote a book titled “Wiseguy” 
about his criminal endeavors.  It sold more than one million copies, and eventually the award-
winning movie “Goodfellas” was based upon it.
1217
 
 Pursuant to New York’s Son of Sam law, the state Crime Victims Compensation Board 
demanded that proceeds from sales of the book be turned over to it.  Simon & Schuster brought 
suit challenging that demand on First Amendment grounds. 
                                                          
1214
 491 U.S. 526. 
1215
 Id. at 531-32. 
1216
 Id. at 552 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks). 
1217
 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108-15 (1991). 
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The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Son of Sam law violated the First 
Amendment as a content-based restriction on speech.  While the analysis was conducted within 
the First Amendment, the Court implicitly rejected an invitation to categorically exclude speech 
such as that at issue from First Amendment protection.  The majority in Simon & Schuster v. 
Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board
1218
 noted approvingly a lower court’s 
conclusion that the government could not justify “content-based discrimination . . . by simply 
observing that the state is anxious to regulate the designated category of speech”
1219
—a 
construction implying that no such unprotected category operated to permit the regulation in this 
case.  Justice Kennedy, writing separately, would have resolved the case solely through 
categorical analysis and concluded that no unprotected category applied here.
1220
 
Thus, the Simon & Schuster Court rejected an invitation to place speech generating 
financial profits from crime into the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the “freedom 
of speech” protected by the Constitution. 
Virtual child pornography 
As discussed in Chapter 6, Part C, supra, depictions of virtual child pornography—those 
which have not captured any actual act of child abuse—are protected by the First Amendment.  
The Free Speech Coalition Court declined to recognize a new unprotected category for virtual 
child pornography. 
 
                                                          
1218
 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
1219
 Id. at 120.  
1220
 Id. at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There are a few legal categories in which content-based regulation has 
been permitted or at least contemplated.  These include obscenity, defamation, incitement, or situations presenting 
some grave and imminent danger the government has the power to prevent.  These are, however, historic and 
traditional categories long familiar to the bar, although with respect to the last category it is most difficult for the 
government to prevail.  While it cannot be said with certainty that the foregoing types of expression are or will 
remain the only ones that are without First Amendment protection, as evidenced by the proscription of some visual 
depictions of sexual conduct by children, the use of these traditional legal categories is preferable to the sort of ad 
hoc balancing that the Court henceforth must perform in every case if the analysis here used becomes our standard 




As discussed in Chapter 6, Part E, supra, the Johnson Court declined to recognize a new 
unprotected category for protesting by means of the expressive conduct of burning the American 
flag.  
Depictions of animal cruelty 
As discussed at length in Chapter 8, infra, images of acts of cruelty to animals are 
protected by the First Amendment.  The Stevens
1221
 Court declined to recognize a new 
unprotected category for images of animal cruelty. 
Violent video games 
The Supreme Court held unconstitutional a California statute intended to restrict the 
marketing of violent video games to minors.  The Brown v. Entertainment Merchants 
Association
1222
 (“EMA”) majority rejected efforts to characterize the California restrictions on 
video games with violent content as an outgrowth of the categorical exclusion of obscenity from 
First Amendment protection
1223
 and then correctly characterized what the law truthfully sought:  
“[I]t wishes to create a wholly new category of content-based regulation that is permissible only 
for speech directed at children.”
1224
  The Supreme Court declined to do so.  Noting the violent 
content of many traditional children’s stories—from Snow White to Hansel and Gretel to 
Homer’s Odysseus to Lord of the Flies
1225
—the EMA majority found no “longstanding tradition 
in this country of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of violence . . . .”
1226
 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito agreed that “[t]here is no similar history [of 
                                                          
1221
 Stevens, 559 U.S. 460. 
1222
 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2010). 
1223
 Id. at 2735 (“[V]iolence is not part of the obscenity that the Constitution permits to be regulated.”) 
1224
 Id. at 2735. 
1225
 Id. at 2736-37. 
1226
 Id. at 2736.  
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government proscription] regarding expression related to violence.”
1227
  Therefore, the EMA 
majority declined to recognize a new category that would permit the California regulation. 
 Notably, Justice Thomas would have recognized a new unprotected category in this case 
precisely because, in his view, it had long historical precedent.  The category would not have 
excluded violent speech but instead would have excluded from First Amendment protection all 
“speech to minor children bypassing their parents.”
1228
  After an extensive tracing of the 
Founding Generation’s understanding that the First Amendment did not convey a right to speak 
to another’s children with the parent or guardian’s permission,
1229
 Justice Thomas concluded: 
In light of this history, the Framers could not possibly have understood ‘the 
freedom of speech’ to include an unqualified right to speak to minors.  
Specifically, I am sure that the founding generation would not have understood 





Therefore, in Justice Thomas’s view, the EMA Court should have sustained the California 
regulation by recognizing a new unprotected category of speech with long historical roots: 
We have recently noted that this Court does not have ‘freewheeling authority to 
declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.’  But 
we also recognized that there may be ‘some categories of speech that have been 
historically unprotected [and] have not yet been specifically identified or 
discussed as such in our case law.’  In my opinion, the historical evidence here 




The EMA decision is notable as the only case in which members of the Supreme Court 
agreed that a “tradition of proscription” is necessary to support recognition of a “heretofore 
unrecognized” category of unprotected speech but disagreed on the existence of that history.  
The difference in this case principally involved the terms in which the proposed new category 
                                                          
1227
 Id. at 2746 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
1228
 Id. at 2752 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1229
 Id. at 2752-59. 
1230
 Id. at 2759. 
1231
 Id. (citations omitted); see also Erick D. Reitz, Children and Categorization: Maintaining a Standard for 
Recognizing Speech Categories in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011), 91 NEB. L. 
REV. 998 (2013) (arguing for recognizing as an unprotected category speech that harms children).   
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was presented:  No member of the EMA Court disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that no 
history supported declaring messages of violence directed toward children as an unprotected 
category, but Justice Thomas conveyed extensive history that, in his view, supported the 
conclusion that the First Amendment does not reach the category of speech to minor children 
bypassing their parents. 
In any event, the majority prevails.  Thus, the EMA Court rejected an invitation to place 
the speech contained in violent video games into the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies 
outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution. 
Lies about military service 
As discussed at length in Chapter 8, infra, lies about an individual’s military service, 
unless told for financial or other concrete gain, are protected by the First Amendment.  The 
Alvarez Court declined to recognize a new unprotected category for lies about military service. 
* * * 
The post-Chaplinsky Supreme Court has declined more invitations to recognize 
additional unprotected categories than it has accepted.  This reluctance is one tool the Supreme 
Court has used to ensure the universe of unprotected categories remains “limited.”  There exist 
other tools used by the Supreme Court to ensure further that each individual category remains 





Part B:  Overbreadth:  Regulation must stay “substantially” within the excluded category 
 
Assuming an unprotected category exists and the speech subject to regulation is alleged 
to fall within it, how does the Supreme Court ensure that the regulation itself stays within the 
boundary of the unprotected category?  How does the Supreme Court ensure the statute 
regulating unprotected speech remains “narrowly drawn and limited”?
1232
   
The Supreme Court long has recognized the problem of regulating speech that straddles a 
constitutional line, partially proscribable and partially not.  As long ago as 1904, the Supreme 
Court rejected what was in effect an early challenge to the overbreadth of a federal statute, 
alleging that a particular statute impermissibly allowed the Postmaster General to seize not only 
letters containing material related to an illegal lottery but all letters sent to or from a particular 
addressee.
1233
  In 1931, the Supreme Court held that a statute punishing speech for any of three 
alternate reasons is unconstitutional if any one of the reasons violates the Constitution and it is 
impossible to determine which of the reasons for liability was relied upon by the jury;
1234
 that 
                                                          
1232
 Karlan v. City of Cincinnati, 416 U.S. 924, 926 n.3 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. 
at 311). Dissenting from the remand of four cases for reconsideration in light of Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 
(1974), Justice Douglas expressed frustration that state courts often ignored the First Amendment’s requirements as 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court, thereby allowing overbroad regulation of protected speech to stand:  
“The decisions of this Court are to guide state courts in the exercise of this duty.  But experience has shown that 
such guidance is often unheeded.  The duty of the States in this area has long been clear.  After Chaplinsky, federal 
intervention in Terminiello should have been unnecessary.  After Chaplinsky and Terminiello, Gooding should have 
been unnecessary.  Yet after them all, the State Supreme Court in Lewis, o[n] reconsideration in light of Gooding, 
again failed to narrow the ordinance and affirmed a conviction which we found necessary to reverse.  The principle 
in Lewis was not new; it was not new in Gooding, nor in Terminiello, nor even in Chaplinsky [citing Cantwell]. 
State courts, however, have consistently shown either inability or unwillingness to apply its teaching.  I thus see 
nothing to be gained by state court reconsideration in light of Lewis.  I would reverse these judgments out of hand.” 
Id. at 928(footnote omitted). 
1233
 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 510 (1904) (“It is true [the Postmaster General’s fraud order] 
may occasionally happen that he would detain a letter having no relation to the prohibited business; but where a 
person is engaged in an enterprise of this kind, receiving dozens and perhaps hundreds of letters every day, 
containing remittances or correspondence connected with the prohibited business, it is not too much to assume that, 
prima facie at least, all such letters are identified with such business.  A ruling that only such letters as were 
obviously connected with the enterprise could be detained would amount to practically an annulment of the law, as it 
would be quite impossible, without opening and inspecting such letters, which is forbidden, to obtain evidence of the 
real facts.”). 
1234
 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), narrowed by Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 (1991) 
(“[T]he holding of Stromberg[] do[es] not necessarily stand for anything more than the principle that, where a 
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same reasoning has carried through to more modern times.
1235
  In modern application, the 
Supreme Court often relies on what has come to be called the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine
1236
 for the purpose of ensuring that government regulation of speech remains 
substantially within the unprotected category. “The purpose of the overbreadth doctrine is to 
excise statutes which have a deterrent effect on the exercise of protected speech.”
1237
  The 
Supreme Court has succinctly summarized the doctrine: 
According to our First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially 
invalid if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech.  The doctrine seeks 
to strike a balance between competing social costs.  On the one hand, the threat of 
enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in constitutionally 
protected speech, inhibiting the free exchange of ideas.  On the other hand, 
invalidating a law that in some of its applications is perfectly constitutional—
particularly a law directed at conduct so antisocial that it has been made 
criminal—has obvious harmful effects.  In order to maintain an appropriate 
balance, we have vigorously enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth 
be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to the statute’s 





The Supreme Court has expressly recognized the overbreadth doctrine as a tool used to 
police the boundaries of the categories of speech excluded from First Amendment protection: 
The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the 
use of words or language not within ‘narrowly limited classes of speech.’
1239
  
Even as to such a class, however, because ‘the line between speech 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a 
general verdict that may have rested on that ground.”). 
1235
 See Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 571 (1970) (“[S]ince petitioners’ convictions may have rested on an 
unconstitutional ground, they must be set aside.”).  
1236
 See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). 
1237
 Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 908 (1972)  (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 
907 (“[The overbreadth doctrine] results often in the wholesale invalidation of the legislature’s handiwork, creating 
a judicial-legislative confrontation.  In the end, this departure from the normal method of judging the 
constitutionality of statutes must find mustification in the favored status of rights to expression and association in the 
constitutional scheme.” (quoting Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 852 
(1970))).  
1238
 Williams, 553 U.S. at 292-93 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Washington State Grange 
v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008) (“[A] law may be overturned as impermissibly 
overbroad because a substantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1239
 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571). 
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unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, 
suppressed, or punished is finely drawn,’
1240
 ‘(i)n every case the power to regulate 
must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 
protected freedom.’
1241
  In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be 
authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible 
of application to protected expression.  “Because First Amendment freedoms need 





For the purpose of illustrating the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine in operation to 
enforce the boundaries of categorically unprotected speech, this Part B will consider how the 
Supreme Court has handled application of the First Amendment to state efforts to prevent 
fraudulent charitable solicitations by enacting various regulations on telemarketers.  The Court 
has consistently held that fraudulent speech falls within the “First Amendment Free Zone” and 
thus may be proscribed by the government.  To illustrate the role of overbreadth analysis in the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, consider how the Supreme Court has interpreted the  
First Amendment’s “freedom of speech” to apply to state regulation of telemarketers that is 
aimed at combating fraud but that also burdens a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
non-fraudulent speech by telemarketers. 
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment (1980):
1243
  To “protect[] 
the public from fraud, crime and undue annoyance,”
1244
 the Village of Schaumberg, Illinois, a 
northern suburb of Chicago, enforced an ordinance barring door-to-door charitable solicitation 
by any organization that used less than 75 percent of its collections for the underlying charitable 
purpose.  The Citizens for a Better Environment, an organization engaged in charitable 
solicitation, challenged the ordinance as facially invalid because it proscribed lawful solicitations 
                                                          
1240
 Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958)). 
1241
 Id. (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304). 
1242
 Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
1243
 444 U.S. 620. 
1244
 Id. at 636. 
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as well as fraudulent ones.  The Supreme Court agreed, and in so doing articulated two aspects of 
its First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 
  First, the doctrine permits standing to challenge a government regulation as overbroad 
even by a person who could be properly regulated within an application of the regulation that is 
constitutionally permissible.  The Supreme Court described the reason for this permissive 
standing rule as follows: 
In these First Amendment contexts, the courts are inclined to disregard the normal 
rule against permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited to challenge 
the proscription as it applies to others because of the possibility that protected 





In other words, because the very existence of a facially overbroad regulation may chill 
constitutionally protected speech, the Supreme Court has opened wider the courthouse door to 
allow more plaintiffs to bring overbreadth challenges. 
 Second, the overbreadth doctrine requires that government regulations of speech be 
“narrowly drawn . . . [and] designed to serve those [important governmental] interests without 
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms.”
1246
  In this case, the Supreme Court 
concluded, that meant “[t]he Village’s legitimate interest in preventing fraud can be better served 
by measures less intrusive than a direct prohibition on solicitation.”
1247
  The prevention of fraud 
is “only peripherally promoted by the 75-percent requirement and could be sufficiently served by 
measures less destructive of First Amendment interests.”
1248
  “Broad prophylactic rules in the 
area of free expression are suspect.  Precision of regulation must be the touchstone.”
1249
 
                                                          
1245
 Id. at 634. 
1246




 Id. at 636. 
1249
 Id. at 637 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 438). 
339 
 
Thus, the Supreme Court struck down the Village of Schaumburg’s 75-percent 
requirement as “unconstitutionally overbroad.”
1250
 
Secretary of State of Maryland v. Munson (1984):
1251
  For the stated purpose of 
preventing fraud, the State of Maryland enforced a law that, similar to the ordinance in 
Schaumburg, limited fundraising expenses in charitable solicitations to not more than 25 percent 
of the contributions raised.  Maryland’s statute, and the key facts in this case, differed from 
Schaumburg and its unconstitutional ordinance in three important regards:  First, the challenge 
here was brought by a for-profit fundraising company, not by any charity itself.  Second, the 
Maryland law applied to all charitable solicitations, not just door-to-door solicitations.  Third, the 
Maryland law contained a provision by which the government could waive the percentage 
limitation upon a proper showing.  “The issue in the present case is whether a Maryland statute 
with a like percentage limitation, but with provisions that render it more ‘flexible’ than the 
Schaumburg ordinance, can withstand constitutional attack.”
1252
 
The answer was no.  The Munson Company was a professional for-profit fundraising 
company based in Indiana, which was hired to raise money on behalf of various Maryland 
charities, including the Fraternal Order of Police.  It brought suit in Maryland state court 
challenging the state law that included the 25 percent limitation.  On appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court struck down the Maryland law and addressed the three issues set forth above. 
First, the Supreme Court reiterated that for purposes of the First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, rules for standing were sufficiently permissive to allow a for-profit fundraising 
company to bring the suit regardless of “whether or not its own First Amendment rights are at 
                                                          
1250
 Id. at 639. 
1251
 467 U.S. 947. 
1252





  The Munson Court explained in greater detail than had the Schaumburg Court the 
reason for the more-permissive standing rule in overbreadth cases: 
Within the context of the First Amendment, the Court has enunciated other 
concerns that justify a lessening of prudential limitations on standing.  Even 
where a First Amendment challenge could be brought by one actually engaged in 
protected activity, there is a possibility that, rather than risk punishment for his 
conduct in challenging the statute, he will refrain from engaging further in the 
protected activity.  Society as a whole then would be the loser.  Thus, when there 
is a danger of chilling free speech, the concern that constitutional adjudication be 





Second, the broader application of the Maryland statute—applying to all charitable 
solicitations and not just door-to-door sales—was of no First Amendment significance. 
The distinction made in Schaumburg was between regulation aimed at fraud and 
regulation aimed at something else in the hope that it would sweep fraud in during 
the process.  The [Maryland] statute’s aim is not improved by the fact that it fires 




Third, the waiver provision in the Maryland law could not save it from constitutional 
infirmity.  In analyzing this point, the Munson Court went beyond Schaumburg and injected the 
concept that any overbreadth of a statute must be “substantial” in order for a First Amendment 
violation to attach: 
“Substantial overbreadth” is a criterion the Court has invoked to avoid striking 
down a statute on its face simply because of the possibility that it might be 
applied in an unconstitutional manner.  It is appropriate in cases where, despite 
some possibly imperimissible application, the remainder of the statute covers a 




 The “substantial overbreadth” requirement is an important aspect of the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine.  Unfortunately for Maryland, it did not operate in this case to save the 
state’s 25 percent requirement even when the waiver was taken into account: 
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 Id. at 958. 
1254
 Id. at 956. 
1255
 Id. at 969-70. 
1256
 Id. at 964-65 (ellipses and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Here there is no core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable 
conduct that the statute prohibits. . . . The flaw in the statute is not simply that it 
includes within its sweep some impermissible applications, but that in all its 
applications it operates on a fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation 
costs are an accurate measure of fraud.  That the statute in some of its applications 
actually prevents the misdirection of funds from the organization’s purported 




 The important contribution of Munson to the understanding of the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine is its detailed articulation of the connection the Constitution requires 
between the speech or conduct actually proscribed by the government and that which is 
categorically proscribable under the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  The correlation need not 
be exact, but any “substantial” spillover of the regulation from categorically proscribable speech 
into speech that is constitutionally protected will render the government regulation, like the 
Maryland law challenged in Munson, “unconstitutionally overbroad.”
1258
 
Riley v. National Federation of the Blind (1988):
1259
  Presumably mindful of both 
Schaumburg and Munson, the North Carolina legislature took a somewhat different approach to 
regulating charitable solicitions.  The novel provision of its law required that charitable solicitors 
affirmatively disclose during the course of the solicitation what portion of any money 
contributed would go to fundraising and administrative expenses.  While not expressly invoking 
its First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the Supreme Court found this requirement “unduly 
burdensome and not narrowly tailored.”
1260
   
In contrast to the prophylactic, imprecise, and unduly burdensome rule the State 
has adopted to reduce its alleged donor misperception, more benign and narrowly 
tailored options are available.  For example, as a general rule, the State may itself 
publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires professional fundraisers 
to file. . . . Alternatively, the State may vigorously enforce its antifraud laws to 
prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false pretenses or by 
                                                          
1257
 Id. at 966 (footnotes omitted). 
1258
 Id. at 970. 
1259
 487 U.S. 781. 
1260
 Id. at 798. 
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making false statements.  These more narrowly tailored rules are in keeping with 
the First Amendment directive that government not dictate the content of speech 




The constitutional concern underlying the Riley Court was, once again, that in an attempt 
to prohibit categorically proscribable speech—specifically, fraudulent solicitations—the State of 
North Carolina had enacted a statute that burdened a significant amount of protected speech.  
“This chill and uncertainty might well drive professional fundraisers out of North Carolina [or at 
least] ultimately reduce the quantity of expression. . . . [T]he restriction is undoubtedly one on 
[protected] speech, and cannot be countenanced here.”
1262
 
 Thus, the North Carolina statute was overbroad and could not survive a First Amendment 
challenge. 
Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (2003):
1263
  The States’ quest to identify how 
far they could go in efforts to prohibit charitable solicitation fraud without running afoul of the 
First Amendment ended where it began—with an Illinois regulation challenged before the United 
States Supreme Court.
1264
  The Illinois attorney general brought a fraud action against a 
charitable solicitor based on specific misrepresentations made during solicitations for money.  In 
upholding the state’s authority to do so without violating the First Amendment, the Supreme 
Court stated: 
The Court has not previously addressed the First Amendment’s application to 
individual fraud actions of the kind at issue here.  It has, however, three times 
considered prophylactic statutes designed to combat fraud by imposing prior 
restraints on solicitation when fundraising fees exceeded a specified reasonable 




                                                          
1261
 Id. at 800. 
1262
 Id. at 794. 
1263
 538 U.S. 600. 
1264
 Compare Schaumburg, 444 U.S. 620, with Madigan. 
1265
 Madigan, 538 U.S. at 612. 
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As the Supreme Court acknowledged, this case was different from Schaumburg, Munson 
and Riley.  Here, the state’s enforcement action did not target charitable solicitation generally—
instead, it targeted fraudulent solicitations specifically. This more narrowly targeted approach 
“need not impermissibly chill protected speech.”
1266
  In contrast to the state statutes invalidated 
in Schaumburg, Munson and Riley, the Madigan Court was confronted with “a properly tailored 
fraud action targeting fraudulent representations themselves . . . .”
1267
  That targeted approach 
was constitutionally permissible because “[l]ike other forms of public deception, fraudulent 
charitable solicitation is unprotected speech.”
1268
 
Thus, the Illinois anti-fraud statute and prosecution were upheld in Madigan because, 
unlike those charitable solicitation statutes invalidated in the three previous cases, they were not 
overbroad.   
* * * 
 
The four cases in this Part B, read together, effectively illustrate the Supreme Court’s 
approach to First Amendment overbreadth and how it applies that doctrine to police the 
boundaries of unprotected categories of speech within the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  In 
Schaumburg, Munson and Riley, government regulations on speech were invalidated because, 
although they did suppress fraudulent speech as was constitutionally permissible, they also 
applied to a substantially broader body of speech than that within the unprotected category of 
fraud; thus, they proscribed, or at least burdened, a significant amount of protected speech.  By 
contrast, the statute upheld in Madigan specifically targeted fraudulent solicitations and did not 
burden speech except that which fell within the proscribable category of fraud. 
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 Id. at 612. 
344 
 
 The government shoulders a heavy burden when its regulations on speech straddle the 
line between the the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution and the unprotected 
“First Amendment Free Zone.”  Regulations on speech that encroach too far on the former will 
be stricken on their face even though they may operate permissibly when applied to the latter. 
 To be sure, it is indeed “strong medicine”
1269
 to facially invalidate a statute, despite its 
undoubted constitutional validity in some applications, on the basis that its overbreadth chills a 
substantial amount of protected speech.   
The scope of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, like most exceptions to 
established principles, must be carefully tied to the circumstances in which facial 
invalidation of a statute is truly warranted.  Because of the wide-reaching effects 
of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own conduct 
may be punished despite the First Amendment, we have recognized that the 
overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” and have employed it with hesitation, 
and then “only as a last resort.”  We have, in consequence, insisted that the 
overbreadth involved be “substantial” before the statute involved will be 




For those reasons, the Supreme Court also employs other tools to patrol the boundaries of the 
unprotected categories—tools that are, themselves, more narrowly tailored than is the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine.  The next Part C will discuss one of those precision tools:  
Placing the burden of proof always on the government. 
   
  
                                                          
1269
 Williams, 553 U.S. at 293. 
1270
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 (citation omitted) (quoting Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613). 
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Part C:  Burden of proof:  Government must prove challenged speech is unprotected 
 
The Supreme Court requires that the government bear the burden of proving the speech it 
wishes to proscribe fits within a categorical exclusion from First Amendment protection.  “[T]he 
Constitution ‘demands that content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid . . . and that 
the Government bear the burden of showing their constitutionality.’”
1271
  The Supreme Court 
long has recognized: 
[T]he duty our system places on this Court to say where the individual’s freedom 
ends and the State’s power begins.  Choice on that border, now as always delicate, 
is perhaps more so where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced 
by the preferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable 
democratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment.  That priority gives these 
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.  And it is the 





Unlike overbreadth analysis, the Supreme Court employs this tool for patroling the 
categorical boundaries in every case in which a categorical exclusion is alleged.  Overbreadth is a 
tool for facially invalidating a statute; the Supreme Court’s burden of proof doctrine, in this 
context, is a process that ensures the government, not any speaker, carries the load of proving the 
validity of the restrictive regulation.  Thus, the burden of proof doctrine in this context is 
simultaneously both a more widely applicable and a more precise tool than the overbreadth 
doctrine. 
The burden of proof doctrine is simple and clear:  “The Court has long cautioned that, to 
avoid chilling protected speech, the government must bear the burden of proving that the speech 
it seeks to prohibit is unprotected.”
1273
  In other words, if the government claims that the 
Constitution allows it to proscribe speech, it must affirmatively demonstrate that the speech it 
                                                          
1271
 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. at 660) (ellipses in original). 
1272
 Collins, 323 U.S. at 529-30 (citations omitted). 
1273
 Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620 n.9.  
346 
 
seeks to regulate fits within one of the proscribable categories and thus lies within the “First 
Amendment Free Zone” and outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution. 
“When the Government seeks to restrict speech based on its content, the usual 
presumption of constitutionality afforded congressional enactments is reversed.  Content-based 
regulations are presumptively invalid, and the Government bears the burden to rebut that 
presumption.”
1274
  That rule is opposite the ordinary approach of presuming a statute’s 
constitutionality, and it is required because: 
[W]ere we to give the Government the benefit of the doubt when it attempted to 
restrict speech, we would risk leaving regulations in place that sought to shape our 
unique personalities or to silence dissenting ideas.  When First Amendment 
compliance is the point to be proved, the risk of nonpersuasion—operative in all 




Of course, any attempt to preserve a government regulation on the basis that the 
proscribed speech falls within one of the unprotected categories necessarily involves an 
assessment of the content of the speech so it may be categorized.  Therefore, in every case 
involving application of the doctrine of categorical exclusion, the government regulation is 
“presumptively invalid”
1276
 and the “government must bear the burden of proving” the regulated 
speech is “unprotected.”
1277
  To do otherwise—that is, to place the burden of proof on the 
defendant to show that his regulated speech was not within an unprotected category—would 
“raise[] serious constitutional difficulties.”
1278
 
                                                          
1274
 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468. 
1275
 Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. at 818 (citation omitted). 
1276
 Id. at 817. 
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 Madigan, 538 U.S. at 620 n.9. 
1278
 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 255. 
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Thus, the Supreme Court employs this shifting of the traditional burden of proof onto the 
government in every case involving First Amendment categorical analysis as a means of 




Part D:  Categories of proscribable speech are not really “First Amendment Free Zones” 
 
Chief Justice Roberts’ famous reference to the unprotected categories of speech as “First 
Amendment Free Zone[s]”
1279
 is perhaps the most stark exposition of the concept in the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence.  But is that really what the unprotected categories are? 
The Supreme Court long has suggested that even speech falling within one of the 
unprotected categories may be subject to some amount of protection under the First Amendment.  
This may be true even if the government regulation affects only speech wholly within one of the 
proscribable categories and, thus, cannot be overbroad:  “Overbreadth challenges are only one 
type of facial attack.  A person whose activity may be constitutionally regulated nevertheless 
may argue that the statute under which he is convicted or regulated is invalid on its face.”
1280
 
While the absolutist “First Amendment-Free Zone” analysis finds much support in the 
Supreme Court’s precedent, there also exist examples of the Supreme Court viewing the 
categories as less absolute. 
For example, in Cox v. Louisiana,
1281
 the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to a 
Louisiana statute barring picketing “in or near”
1282
 a courthouse.  Relying on Giboney, the Cox 
Court found that in this case the “conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or prohibited.”
1283
  
This was true because of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion for speech integral to criminal 
                                                          
1279
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469. 
1280
 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 768 n. 21.  In this footnote, the Supreme Court cited to Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 5, and, in 
this context, appears to mean that within an analysis of speech integral to criminal conduct it is possible to challenge 
the regulation affecting speech by arguing that the underlying definition of criminal conduct, while proscribable 
overall, is too broad to coexist with the First Amendment when used to suppress speech.  However, the point the 
Court is making has broader applicability. 
1281
 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
1282
 Id. at 560   The statute read:  ‘Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the 
administration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any judge, juror, witness, or court officer, in the discharge 
of his duty pickets or parades in or neaer a building housing a court of the State of Louisiana . . . shall be fined not 
more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.’” Id. (quoting L.S.A. Rev. Stat. § 
14:401 (Cum. Supp. 1962)). 
1283
 Id. at 563. 
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conduct as established by Giboney.  But the Cox Court did not stop there.  It proceeded to 
analyze the challenged statute as being “narrowly drawn to punish specific conduct that infringes 
a substantial state interest in protecting the judicial process,”
1284
 an analysis that sounds 
remarkably similar to the modern strict scrutiny test applied in First Amendment cases.  One 
might view the dual analysis of the Cox Court—the first as speech without the First Amendment, 
the second as speech within—as having been applied merely out of an abundance of caution (a 
sort of belt-and-suspenders approach).  But one might also view it as an early indication that the 
Supreme Court, in some circumstances, chooses to apply First Amendment analysis even to 
speech it has concluded fits squarely within one of the “unprotected” categories. 
Perhaps the high-water mark for the notion that “categorically excluded” does not really 
mean either “excluded” or cast into a “First Amendment-Free Zone” came in R.A.V.  In that case, 
the Supreme Court held that even a government regulation constituting “fighting words” would 
be subject to First Amendment scrutiny to determine whether it impermissibly discriminated 
among types of fighting words based on content.  Even if the ordinance regulating racially 
motivated cross-burning “is proscribable under the ‘fighting words’ doctrine, we nonetheless 
conclude that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted 
speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses.”
1285
  The R.A.V. Court proceeded 
to explain that the doctrine of categorical exclusion did not really mean that speech in the 
unprotected categories was excluded from review under the First Amendment: 
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are “not within the 
area of constitutionally protected speech” or that the “protection of the First 
Amendment does not extend” to them.  Such statements must be taken in context, 
however, and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated 
shorthand characterizing obscenity “as not being speech at all.”  What they mean 
is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
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regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, 
defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content discrimination 
unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.  Thus, the government may 
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of 




The R.A.V. majority found this new approach of applying the First Amendment even within an 
excluded category to be consistent with the original Chaplinsky formulation: 
It is not true that “fighting words” have at most a “de minimis” expressive content 
or that their content is in all respects “worthless and undeserving of constitutional 
protection”; sometimes they are quite expressive indeed.  We have not said that 
they constitute “no part of the expression of ideas,” but only that they constitute 




The R.A.V. dissent found the majority’s new approach to categorical doctrine illogical 
and baffling: 
Today . . . the Court announces that earlier Courts did not mean their repeated 
statements that certain categories of expression are not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech.  The present Court submits that such clear 
statements “must be taken in context” and are not “literally true.”   
 
To the contrary, those statements meant precisely what they said:  The categorical 




The R.A.V. dissent continued unrelentingly: 
 
It is inconsistent to hold that the government may proscribe an entire category of 
speech because the content of that speech is evil but that the government may not 
treat a subset of that category differently without violating the First Amendment; 





Whatever its intellectual peculiarities, R.A.V. remains operable precedent.  Even within a 
proscribable category, there are some sorts of government regulation that the Supreme Court will 
not permit.  “The point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be expressed in 
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 Id. at 384-85 (citation omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
1288
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some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.”
1290
  Thus, “[t]he politicians 
of St. Paul are entitled to express . . . hostility [toward racial bias]—but not through the means of 
imposing unique limitations upon speakers who (however benightedly) disagree.”
1291
  After 
R.A.V., Justice Thomas dabbled with describing the categories as having “reduced constitutional 
protection” and asserting that the Supreme Court has “never held that the government may 
regulate speech within those categories in any way that it wishes.”
1292
   
If the holding in R.A.V. were literally true, then Chaplinsky would have been effectively 
(though not expressly) overruled, and the graphic depiction of the Doctrine of Categorical 
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Figure 3: If R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul were literally interpreted, the protected "Freedom of Speech" would expand to 
wholly overtake the "First Amendment Free Zone," which would cease to exist. 
 
However, further reflection on Justice Scalia’s analysis for the R.A.V. majority suggests 
something rather less stark, in constitutional terms, was afoot.  The distinction in R.A.V. between 
speech categories containing “constitutionally proscribable content” and the notion that certain 
speech categories are “entirely invisible to the First Amendment” makes greater logical sense 
when considered in light of the sharp and nearly dismissive disagreements of the majority and 
dissent in the much more recent case upholding the Florida Supreme Court’s prohibition on 
judicial candidates personally soliciting campaign contributions.  In that recent case, the majority 
led by Chief Justice Roberts dismissed Justice Scalia’s dissent as wholly off the mark, stating: 
The principal dissent observes that bans on judicial candidate solicitation lack a 
lengthy historical pedigree.  We do not dispute that fact, but it has no relevance 
here.  As the precedent cited by the principal dissent demonstrates, a history and 
tradition of regulation are important factors in determining whether to recognize 
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“new categories of unprotected speech.”  But nobody argues that solicitation of 




However, in dissent, Justice Scalia took the majority’s upholding of the state ban on 
judicial candidates soliciting campaign funds to task for “purport[ing] to reach this destination by 
applying strict scrutiny, but it would be more accurate to say that it does so by applying the 
appearance of strict scrutiny.”
1294
  Justice Scalia began his analysis by citing to Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association for this proposition:  
The first axiom of the First Amendment is this:  As a general rule, the state has no 
power to ban speech on the basis of its content. . . . Our cases hold that speech 
enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment unless a widespread and 




Thus, the contrast in the Justices’ competing verbage in describing the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion was starkly expressed.  For Chief Justice Roberts, the author who applied the “First 
Amendment Free Zone” description to the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association was a case about “whether to recognize new categories of 
unprotected speech” and, therefore, was of “no relevance here.”
1296
  But for Justice Scalia, the 
author who in R.A.V. had insisted the excluded categories could “be regulated because of their 
constitutionally proscribable content” but are not “categories of speech entirely invisible to the 
Constitution,”
1297
 EMA was a case requiring “that speech enjoys the full protection of the First 
Amendment unless a widespread and longstanding tradition ratifies its regulation.”
1298
  For Chief 
Justice Roberts, unprotected speech was excluded from the First Amendment entirely; for Justice 
Scalia, unprotected speech was subject to “regulation” and to “relaxing the rules that normally 
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 Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666-67 (2015) (citation omitted). 
1294
 Id. at 1677 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
1295
 Id. at 1676. 
1296
 Id. at 1667 (majority opinion). 
1297
 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (emphasis omitted). 
1298
 Williams-Yulee, 135 S.Ct. at 1676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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apply to laws that suppress speech because of content.”
1299
  The language used reflects the two 
Justices’ approaches but is in fact more similar than it may at first blush appear.  “Regulation” of 
speech is not the same as “proscription;” “relaxing” the constitutional rules is not the same as 
establishing a “First Amendment Free Zone.”  Yet, the two concepts are structurally similar.  For 
Justice Scalia, as for Justice Roberts, there is a core of speech for which the constitutionally 
protected freedom of speech requires that “the state has no power to ban . . . on the basis of its 
content.”
1300
 Beyond that, there is an area of speech for which greater “regulation” may be 
permissible because the constitutional rules are “relax[ed].”
1301
  Under Justice Scalia’s view, the 
difference between the two areas can be determined by applying strict scrutiny, not “the 
appearance of strict scrutiny.”  Thus, the excluded categories are a sort of “prepackaged strict 
scrutiny” or “shortcut application[n] of strict scrutiny,”
1302
 and from Justice Scalia’s vantage 
point, the post-R.A.V. framework of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion would look like this: 
  















As is apparent, it is remarkably similar to the Doctrine’s view from where Chief Justice Roberts 
sits.  The material difference between the Chief Justice’s “First Amendment Free Zone” and 
Justice Scalia’s area of “relaxed rules” governing content-based laws is one of mere verbage, or 
perhaps one of degree, but not one of nature.    
* * * 
 
 Thus, the Supreme Court employs a variety of tools to ensure that the categories of 
speech within the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion remain narrow.  It disfavors attempts to 
recognize new categories of unprotected speech.  It facially invalidates statutes that sweep too 
Area of "relaxed" constitutional protection:  
Neutral government regulation  (absent 
viewpoint discrimination) presumed to have 
survived strict scrutiny  
Application of strict scrutiny presumed to 
invalidate content-based government 
regulation 
Figure 4: Post-R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul distinction from the standpoint of Justice Scalia.  
There is no “First Amendment Free Zone,” but there is a zone of “relaxed” constitutional 
protection. 
Outer circle represents both 
the universe of all speech 
under the broadest possible 
definition and the “freedom 




much protected speech within its proscription, even if the statute in some applications properly 
affects proscribable speech.  It shifts the traditional presumption and requires the government to 
prove a regulatory statute is constitutional because it applies to categorically excluded speech, 
not the other way around.  And, as a final saving measure, it reserves the authority to extend 
constitutional protections even to speech otherwise within an “unprotected” category. 












CHAPTER 8: Lessons from United States v. Stevens:  Six categories as of 2010 
 
For almost seven decades after deciding Chaplinsky in 1942, the Supreme Court grappled 
with specific discrete aspects of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  From time to time, the 
Supreme Court would reference the Doctrine in a more general sense and occasionally would 
articulate lists of categories in a manner clearly not intended to be a comprehensive list.
1303
  By 
2010, on the eve of the Supreme Court’s consideration of United States v. Stevens, the continued 
viability of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion was in doubt.  After all if the Supreme Court 
meant what it said in R.A.V., that the unprotected categories were not really “invisible to the First 
Amendment,”
1304
 then nothing really remained of the “First Amendment Free Zone.”  
Even if one did not accept that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion had been effectively 
dismantled by 2010, its framework was in doubt.  Disregarding the R.A.V. analysis, the best 
effort to graphically depict the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion by assembling the Supreme 
Court’s various pronouncements since Chaplinsky would have looked something like this: 
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Figure 5: Uncertain relationship between protected "Freedom of Speech" and unprotected "First Amendment Free 
Zone" on the eve of United States v. Stevens (2010). This figure assumes that the “First Amendment Free Zone” continues 
to exist after R.A.V. 
 
However, even this depiction is somewhat dissatisfying because the Supreme Court’s articulation 
of the categories in the “First Amendment Free Zone” had been less than entirely precise during 
the 68 years between Chaplinsky and Stevens.  For example, it was clear that the Supreme Court 
considered “incitement,” “child pornography,” “fraud” and “true threats” to be speech 
unprotected by the First Amendment, but it was unclear how those “categories” related to each 
other or to the broader concept of “speech integral to unlawful conduct.” Thus, by 2010, the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion was in need of clarity:  Would the Supreme Court reaffirm the 
The "First Amendment Free Zone" includes the following 
categories:  (1) "obscene" speech, (2) defamatory speech only if 
uttered with "actual malice," (3) "fraud," (4) "true threats," (5) 
"child pornography," and (6) other ill-defined "speech integral 
to criminal conduct" 
The "Freedom of Speech" protected by the First Amendment 
includes, but is not limited to, "lewd" speech, "profane" speech, 
"commercial" speech (unless otherwise excluded), most libel 




Doctrine’s existence, or confirm its demise?  If the Doctrine continued to exist, what were its 
boundaries, and what categories of speech were relegated to the “First Amendment Free Zone”? 
In 2010, the Supreme Court was presented with a case that gave it occasion to attempt a 
comprehensive articulation of the excluded categories for the first time since Chaplinsky.  It 
accepted that opportunity and opened a five-year period of unprecedented attention to the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion. 
Abhorred by the phenomenon of “animal crush videos,”
1305
 Congress had enacted a 
criminal statute essentially prohibiting certain depictions of animal cruelty in interstate 
commerce.
1306
  Robert Stevens, of Pennsylvania, operated a business called “Dogs of Velvet and 
Steel” selling various dogfighting videos.
1307
  Mr. Stevens ran afoul of the law when in the 
course of his business he sold videos of dogfights that the government concluded violated the 
prohibition on depictions of animal cruelty in interstate commerce.  While Mr. Stevens did not 
engage in any conduct involving “animal crush videos,” the government nonetheless indicted 
                                                          
1305
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465-66 (drawing upon the legislative history of the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. § 48, the 
Supreme Court described this type of video as follows:  “[S]uch videos feature the intentional torture and killing of 
helpless animals, including cats, dogs, monkeys, mice, and hamsters.  Crush videos often depict women slowly 
crushing animals to death with their bare feet or while wearing high heeled shoes, sometimes while talking to the 
animals in a kind of dominatrix patter over the cries and squeals of the animals, obviously in great pain.  Apparently 
these depictions appeal to persons with a very specific sexual fetish who find them sexually arousing or otherwise 
exciting.  The acts depicted in crush videos are typically prohibited by the animal cruelty laws enacted by all 50 
States and the District of Columbia.  But crush videos rarely disclose the participants’ identities, inhibiting 
prosecution of the underlying conduct.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1306
 Id. at 464-66.  The statute read:  “Sec. 48.  Depiction of animal cruelty.  (a) CREATION, SALE, OR 
POSSESSION. ‘ Whoever knowingly creates, sells, or possesses a depiction of animal cruelty with the intention of 
placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial gain, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.  (b) EXCEPTION.—Subsection (a) does not apply to any depiction that 
has serious religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.  (c) DEFINITIONS.—
In this section—(1) the term ‘depiction of animal cruelty’ means any visual or auditory depiction, including any 
photograph, motion-picture film, video recording, electronic image, or sound recording of conduct in which a living 
animal is intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if such conduct is illegal under Federal law 
or the law of the State in which the creation, sale, or possession takes place, regardless of whether the maiming, 
mutilation, torture, wounding, or killing took place in the State; and (2) the term “State’ means each of the several 
States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, 
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the 
United States.” Id. at 465 n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 48). 
1307
 Id. at 466. 
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him for violating the statute by selling his dogfighting videos.  Mr. Stevens moved to dismiss the 
indictment on the ground that the statute was facially invalid as a violation of the First 
Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech.  
In denying the motion to dismiss, the federal district court held that the depictions of 
animal cruelty regulated by the statute “like obscenity or child pornography, are categorically 
unprotected by the First Amendment.”
1308
  The trial proceeded, and the jury convicted Mr. 
Stevens.  In considering Mr. Stevens’ appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals “rejected the 
Government’s analogy between animal cruelty depictions and child pornography” and “declined 
to recognize a new category of unprotected speech for depictions of animal cruelty . . . .”
1309
  
Thus, at the point the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the case squarely presented the question 
“whether the prohibition in the statute is consistent with the freedom of speech guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.”1310  
At the Supreme Court, the government argued that the statute should survive facial attack 
because the depictions of animal cruelty subject to its regulation constituted speech outside the 
scope of the First Amendment.
1311
  The Supreme Court rejected that position,
1312
 and in so doing 
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 Id. at 464. 
1311
 Id. at 468 (“The Government’s primary submission is that § 48 necessarily complies with the Constitution 
because the banned depictions of animal cruelty, as a class, are categorically unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”); id. at 1585 (“The claim is not just that Congress may regulate depictions of animal cruelty subject to 
the First Amendment, but that these depictions are outside the reach of that Amendment altogether—that they fall 
into a ‘First Amendment Free Zone.’” (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574)). 
1312
 The eight-member majority declined the government’s invitation to establish a new category of unprotected 
speech and then proceeded to apply a traditional First Amendment analysis to the statute, ultimately concluding that 
it was overbroad and thus unconstitutional.  In dissent, Justice Alito criticized the majority for allowing a facial 
challenge to the statute to succeed, arguing instead that the regulation should be found constitutionally sound in 
some applications though perhaps not in others. Justice Alito does not reach the question whether it would be proper 
for the Supreme Court to recognize a new category of unprotected speech regarding depictions of animal cruelty; 
thus, it is not clear that even a single Justice would accept the Government’s invitation to recognize a new category 
of unprotected speech. 
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framed its doctrine related to categories of speech excluded from First Amendment protection as 
follows: 
From 1791 to the present, however, the First Amendment has permitted restrictions upon 
the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never included a freedom to 
disregard these traditional limitations.  These historic and traditional categories long 
familiar to the bar—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech 
integral to criminal conduct—are well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 





The Stevens Court then characterized these categories of speech as “fully outside the protection 
of the First Amendment” and went on to acknowledge that the Supreme Court also has 
“classified child pornography as such a category.”
1314
 
Taken together, the Stevens passages cited immediately above articulate six categories of 
speech—obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, speech integral to criminal conduct, and child 
pornography—that, as identified by the Supreme Court’s own nomenclature, were recognized as 
falling into a “First Amendment Free Zone”1315 that is “fully outside the protection of the First 
Amendment”
1316
 as of 2010.  This marked the Supreme Court’s first attempt since Chaplinsky to 
articulate in a comprehensive manner the categories of speech recognized as categorically 
excluded from First Amendment protection.  This articulation proved sufficient for the Court to 
decide the dispute before it in Stevens (which is, after all, the proper role of the judiciary), but in 
a more academic sense it leaves the student of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion dissatisfied. 
                                                          
1313
 Id. at 468 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
1314
 Id. at 471.  It is notable, however, that the Supreme Court’s exposition of how child pornography fits as a 
category is somewhat unclear.  On the one hand, the Court characterizes its decision in Ferber as having declared 
child pornography as “such a category.” Id. at 471 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763).  On the other hand, the Stevens 
Court then immediately proceeds to explain that child pornography really is an outgrowth of the long-recognized 
category of unprotected speech integral to criminal conduct and that Ferber “grounded its analysis in a previously 
recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech. . ..” Id.; see also discussion in Chapter 6, Part C, 
supra. 
1315
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469 (quoting Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 574). 
1316
 Id. at 471.  
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For example, the Chaplinsky Court articulated four categories of unprotected speech
1317
 
and the Stevens Court almost seven decades later articulated either five
1318
 or six categories, 
depending on whether one counts child pornography as a category separate and distinct from the 
category of speech integral to criminal conduct.
1319
  That simple comparison would suggest at 
first blush that the Supreme Court had found occasion to discover either one or two previously 
undiscovered categories during the intervening seven decades and merely added them to the list 
it had articulated in Chaplinsky in 1942. 
But that is not what happened.  The Chaplinsky list from 1942 does not fit neatly within 
the Stevens list from 2010 such that merely adding to the Chaplinsky list would result in the 
Stevens list.  For example, the two cases use different terms for similar concepts such as 
Chaplinsky’s reference to “lewd and obscene” compared with Stevens’s reference only to 
“obscenity.”  Each case also asymmetrically includes concepts not found in the other such as 
Chaplinsky’s reference to “the profane” compared with no similar concept existing in Stevens, or 
Stevens’s reference to child pornography with no similar concept in Chaplinsky.  Even the 
listings within each case itself can seem internally redundant.  For example, Chaplinsky separates 
“lewd” and “profane” into separate categories although they seem quite similar concepts, and 
Stevens seems internally redundant including three categories regarding speech that is part of a 
criminal act and therefore quite similar in concept:  “fraud,” “speech integral to criminal 
conduct,” and “child pornography.” 
                                                          
1317
 See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. 572 (listing the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 
‘fighting’ words). 
1318
 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (listing “obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech integral to criminal 
conduct” (citations omitted)). 
1319
 The Stevens Court states by nomenclature that child pornography is “such a category” but then through analysis 
explain why it isn’t.  Id. at 471.  
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The Stevens Court expressed a strongly negative reaction to the Government’s ill-fated advocacy 
for adoption of a balancing test by which new categories of unprotected speech could be 
identified or discovered
1320
 and to the Government’s suggestion that “historical evidence about 
the reach of the First Amendment is not a necessary prerequisite for regulation today and that 
categories of speech may be exempted from the First Amendment’s protection without any long-
settled tradition of subjecting that speech to regulation.”
1321
  Recognizing the open-ended nature 
of that proposed test, the Stevens Court would have none of it. While acknowledging that its own 
precedents might have invited the Government’s confusion,
1322
 the Supreme Court not only 
emphatically rejected the invitation to establish a balancing test for identifying new categories 
untethered to historical roots
1323
 but did so with stern language resorting to the nation’s Founding 
principles and seemingly designed to drive a rhetorical stake in the very heart of the “startling 
and dangerous” notion.
1324
  It made clear that its prior cases  
do not set forth a test that may be applied as a general matter to permit the 
Government to imprison any speaker so long as his speech is deemed valueless or 
unnecessary, or so long as an ad hoc calculus of costs and benefits tilts in a 
statute’s favor.   
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 Id. at 470 (“The Government thus proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered under a 
simple balancing test:  ‘Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon a 
categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.’” (quoting Brief for United States at 8, 
2009 WL 1615365). 
1321
 Id. at 469 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
1322
 Id. at 470 (“To be fair to the Government, its view did not emerge from a vacuum.  As the Government correctly 
notes, this Court has often described historically unprotected categories of speech as being of such slight social 
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.  In [Ferber], we noted that within these categories of unprotected speech, the evil to be restricted 
so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication 
is required because the balance of competing interests is clearly struck.  The Government derives its proposed test 
from these descriptions in our precedents.” (citations, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)). 
1323
 Id. at 472 (“Our decisions in Ferber and other cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to 
declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”). 
1324
 Id. at 470 (“As a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence [the Government’s proposed 
balancing test] is startling and dangerous.  The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits.  The First Amendment 
itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the 
costs.  Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis that some speech is not 
worth it.  The Constitution is not a document ‘prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at 




When we have identified categories of speech as fully outside the protection of 





The Stevens Court was careful to leave open the possibility that it might in the future 
identify additional categories of speech that have historically fallen outside the protection of the 
First Amendment,
1326
 but in this case it “decline[d] to carve out from the First Amendment any 
novel exception for [the animal cruelty law at issue].
1327
 
Thus, Stevens leaves overall understanding of the Supreme Court’s approach to 
articulating and applying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion little improved.  It is quite clear 
the Supreme Court has little appetite for any approach to categorical exclusion that expands the 
scope of speech falling outside the First Amendment’s protection, preferring instead to address 
government power to regulate speech under various other doctrines that fall within the First 
Amendment’s scope.  But it also is clear that even the Supreme Court itself is, at best, imprecise 
in its articulation of what categories of unprotected speech actually have been recognized and, on 
an important related matter, how the excluded categories it has articulated interrelate with each 
other. 
Even as it declined to apply a categorical exclusion to decide the case before it, the 
Stevens Court reaffirmed the existence of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  Indeed, the 
Stevens Court implied that categorical exclusions may be an even stronger firewall against First 
                                                          
1325
 Id. at 471. 
1326
 Id. (“Maybe there are some categories of speech that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been 
specifically identified or discussed as such in our case law.  But if so, there is no evidence that ‘depictions of animal 
cruelty’ is among them.  We need not foreclose the future recognition of such additional categories to reject the 
Government’s highly manipulable balancing test as a means of identifying them.”). 
1327
 Id. at 472.  Having rejected any application of categorical analysis to resolve the Stevens case, the Court then 
proceeded to decide the case under a First Amendment overbreadth analysis.  Further discussion of that analysis is 
unnecessary for purposes of this paper. However, for discussion of how the statute stricken in Stevens might be 
modified to serve its intended purpose while conforming with established First Amendment parameters, see Andrew 
A. Beerworth, United States v. Stevens: A Proposal for Criminalizing Crush Videos Under Current Free Speech 
Doctrine, 35 VT.L.REV. 901 (2011).  
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Amendment encroachment on states’ police powers than previously suggested because the “First 
Amendment . . . has never included a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations [on the 
reach of the First Amendment].”
1328
   
Sixty-eight years elapsed between the Supreme Court’s first attempt at comprehensively 
listing the recognized unprotected categories, in Chaplinsky in 1942, and its second attempt, in 
Stevens in 2010.  But after Stevens, only two more years would elapse before the Supreme Court 
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 Id. at 468 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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CHAPTER 9: Lessons from United States v. Alvarez:  Twelve categories as of 2012 
 
 After deciding Stevens in 2010, the Supreme Court the next year decided two more cases 
that once again invoked the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion:  Snyder v. Phelps and Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Association.  So the Doctrine, having been lightly and only 
episodically used for the sixty-eight years between Chaplinsky and Stevens, had suddenly 
returned front-and-center in the Supreme Court’s focus.  Then along came Alvarez.  For critics of 
the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, this renewed reliance upon it by the Supreme Court was 
troubling: 
Alvarez is the latest example of why the categorical approach of Chaplinsky 
works so poorly.  Alvarez is, in my view, a very close and difficult case.  Under 
any plausible doctrinal standard, the outcome would be difficult to predict, 
because each side had strong arguments, with logical and policy heft, and solid 
precedential support.  In both resolving the actual case before the Court in Alvarez 
and in attempting to puzzle out what Alvarez means for future cases involving 
false statements about military honors, the invocation of a Chaplinsky-style 




Of course, the critics don’t decide doctrine:  The Supreme Court does.  So the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion remains alive and well, which means the essential questions associated 
with the Doctrine remain pertinent:  What speech falls within the “First Amendment Free Zone” 
that lies outside the “freedom or speech” protected by the Constitution, and how do we know the 
answer to that question?   
After the Stevens listing of unprotected categories, neither Snyder nor EMA attempted 
anything resembling a comprehensive listing.  But the next case did.  Against that backdrop of 
reinvigorated use of the Doctrine, the Supreme Court accepted review of Alvarez, a case 
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 Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech Doctrine and Principle:  A 
Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. REV. 499, 503 (2012) (footnote omitted). 
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presenting for the first time
1330
 the question whether lies told for no purpose except to “puff up” 
the liar were protected by the First Amendment.  The case, challenging the constitutionality of 
the federal Stolen Valor Act, which made criminal the telling of lies about whether one had 
received certain military honors, invited the Supreme Court to more fully articulate the Doctrine 
of Categorical Exclusion as it existed in 2012.  Justice Kennedy, writing for a four-justice 
plurality, accepted that invitation. 
In United States v. Alvarez, the Supreme Court plurality led its opinion with this 
attention-catching opening paragraph: 
Lying was his habit.  Xavier Alvarez, the respondent here, lied when he said that 
he played hockey for the Detroit Red Wings and that he once married a starlet 
from Mexico.  But when he lied in announcing he held the Congressional Medal 
of Honor, respondent ventured onto new ground; for that lie violates a federal 




The case reached the Supreme Court after Mr. Alvarez became a member of a local California 
water district board and in 2007 introduced himself for his new position by declaring: “I’m a 
retired marine of 25 years.  I retired in the year 2001.  Back in 1987, I was awarded the 
Congressional Medal of Honor.  I got wounded many times by the same guy.”
1332
 
The Supreme Court characterized Mr. Alvarez’s statements as an “intended, undoubted 
lie,”
1333
 and noted “[n]one of this was true” but was instead was a “pathetic attempt to gain 
respect that eluded him.  The statements do not seem to have been made to secure employment 
or financial benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned the Medal.”
1334
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 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2545 (plurality opinion) (“Our prior decisions have not confronted a measure, like the 
Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing more.”). 
1331









For lying about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor, Mr. Alvarez was indicted 
by the federal government for violating the Stolen Valor Act.
1335
 He pled guilty in district court, 
reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality of the Stolen Valor Act, and the Ninth 




Seven of the nine Justices decided the case based upon application of the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion, but they divided on how the facts of the case fit within the framework of 
excluded categories.  The four-justice plurality, led by Justice Kennedy, applied categorical 
analysis but concluded that Mr. Alvarez’s lies did not fall into any unprotected category.  The 
three-justice dissent, led by Justice Alito, concluded that the sort of lies told by Mr. Alvarez 
should have been categorically excluded from First Amendment protection.  Only Justices 
Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment, rejected application of a “strict categorical 
analysis.”
1337
  It is revealing, therefore, to turn attention to contrasting the approaches of the 
plurality and the dissent. 
Plurality view:  The plurality led its opinion with an attempt seemingly aimed at 
comprehensively articulating nine recognized categories as of 2012: 
[C]ontent-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a general matter, 
only when confined to the few historic and traditional categories of expression 
long familiar to the bar.  Among these categories are advocacy intended, and 
                                                          
1335
 Id. at 2543.  The Stolen Valor Act, in pertinent part, read as follows:  “(b) FALSE CLAIMS ABOUT RECEIPT 
OF MILITARY DECORATIONS OR MEDALS.—Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally or in 
writing, to have been awarded any decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of the United 
States . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than six months, or both.  (c) ENHANCED PENALTY 
FOR OFFENSES INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR. (1) IN GENERAL.—If a decoration or 
medal involved in an offense under subsection (a) or (b) is a Congressional Medal of Honor, in lieu of the 
punishment provided in that subsection, the offender shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 1 year, 
or both.” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) and (c)). 
1336
 Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542. 
1337
 Id. at 2551 (Breyer, J., concurring).  The concurrence would have applied a balancing test:  “Ultimately the 




likely, to incite imminent lawless action; obscenity; defamation; speech integral to 
criminal conduct; so-called ‘fighting words’; child pornography; fraud; true 
threats; and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government 




It then rejected the Government’s attempt to analogize Mr. Alvarez’s lies to other 
proscribable forms of false statements and, in so doing, effectively recognized three other 
unprotected categories.  The Alvarez Court acknowledged that perjury had a long historical 
tradition of proscription and that prohibitions against perjury had been upheld against First 
Amendment challenge.
1339
  It also implicitly accepted that the Government could constitutionally 
prohibit and punish “false statement[s] to a Government official” and “false representation that 
one is speaking as a Government official or on behalf of the Government.”
1340
 
Thus, the Alvarez plurality effectively recognized twelve categories of unprotected 
speech—the most extensive listing ever presented by the Supreme Court.  It then concluded, 
after analysis, that Mr. Alvarez’s speech fit into none of them, ultimately because of the 
plurality’s conclusion that Mr. Alvarez’s lies were not “made to secure employment or financial 
benefits or admission to privileges reserved for those who had earned”
1341
 military honors but 
instead were “simply intended to puff up oneself.”
1342
  “Absent from those few categories where 
the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general exception to the First 
Amendment for false statements.”
1343
 
Having concluded that none of the existing unprotected categories operated to permit the 
Government to punish Mr. Alvarez’s lies, the plurality then repeatedly rejected establishing an 
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 Id. at 2544 (plurality opinion) (citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). 
1339
 Id. at 2546 (citing United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54 (1978)) (confirming the “unquestioned 
constitutionality of perjury statutes”) and United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 97 (1993) (“To uphold the 
integrity of our trial system . . . the constitutionality of perjury statutes is unquestioned.”)). 
1340
 Id. at 2545-46.  
1341
 Id. at 2542.  
1342
 Id. at 2546. 
1343
 Id. at 2544. 
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additional unprotected category that would do so:  “The Court has never endorsed the categorical 
rule the Government advances:  that false statements receive no First Amendment 
protection.”
1344
  Precedent “rejects the notion that false speech should be in a general category 
that is presumptively unprotected.”
1345
  “The Government has not demonstrated that false 
statements generally should constitute a new category of unprotected speech on this basis.”
1346
  
The plurality was particularly concerned about the breadth of any newly recognized category: 
Permitting the government to decree this speech to be a criminal offense, whether 
shouted from the rooftops or made in a barely audible whisper, would endorse 
government authority to compile a list of subjects about which false statements 
are punishable.  That government power has no clear limiting principle. . . . Were 
this law to be sustained, there could be an endless list of subjects the National 




 Falling back, then, upon a familiar theme, the Alvarez plurality suggested that the better 
response to Mr. Alvarez’s lies was additional, truthful speech to contest them, not a punishment 
by the government of their utterance: 
“The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is true.  This is the ordinary 
course in a free society.  The response to the unreasoned is the rational; to the 
uninformed, the enlightened; to the straightout lie, the simple truth. . . .  
 
. . . . 
 
. . . Only a weak society needs government protection or intervention before it 
pursues its resolve to preserve the truth.  Truth needs neither handcuffs nor a 




Dissenting view:  The Alvarez dissent shared the plurality’s inclination to decide the case 
based upon the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  The fundamental difference between the 
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 Id. at 2550-51.  
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plurality and the dissent lay in their sharply distinct views of the nature of the statute.  For Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality the Stolen Valor Act was “sweeping, quite unprecedented”: 
Here, the lie was made in a public meeting but the statute would apply with equal force to 
personal whispered conversations within a home.  The statute seeks to control and 
suppress all false statements on this one subject in almost limitless times and settings. . . . 
  





By sharp contrast, Justice Alito’s dissent characterized the Stolen Valor Act as “a narrow statute 
that presents no threat to the freedom of speech.  The statute reaches only knowingly false 
statements about hard facts directly within a speaker’s personal knowledge.  These lies have no 
value in and of themselves, and proscribing them does not chill any valuable speech.”
1350
  
Moreover, for Justice Kennedy’s plurality the constitutional line was to be drawn at whether the 
false statement was connected to any attempt by the speaker at “material gain.”
1351
   
[A]bsent any evidence that the speech was used to gain a material advantage, [a 
categorical prohibition on lying] would give government a broad censorial power 
unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional tradition.  The mere potential 
for the exercise of that power casts a chill, a chill the First Amendment cannot permit if 




But for Justice Alito’s dissent, the “real harm” caused by false statements need not be material so 
long as it is articulable.  The Stolen Valor Act “was enacted to stem an epidemic of false claims 
about military decorations.  These lies, Congress reasonably concluded, were undermining our 
country’s system of military honors and inflicting real harm on actual medal recipients and their 
families.”
1353
  Justice Alito viewed the Stolen Valor Act as sufficiently narrow
1354
 and targeted to 
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 Id. at 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
1351
 Id. at 2547 (plurality opinion). 
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 Id. at 2548. 
1353
 Id. at 2556 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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 of false claims that the Supreme Court could allow its suppression 
of false speech without opening the floodgates to the Orwellian censorship Justice Kennedy 
feared.  Equally important, the Alito dissenters found in the historical record a “long tradition” 
dating to General George Washington of efforts to protect the integrity of military honors 
including through requiring that falsely claiming to have earned them resulted in being “severely 
punished.”
1356
  For the dissenters, this historical “tradition of proscription”
1357
 meant that 
“prevent[ing] and punish[ing]” lies such as Mr. Alvarez’s had “never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”
1358
 Thus, the Alvarez dissenters would have recognized a narrow 
“heretofore unrecognized”
1359
 category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment barring 
Mr. Alvarez’s lies about military honors because “[t]he lies covered by the Stolen Valor Act 
have no intrinsic value and thus merit no First Amendment protection . . . .”
1360
 
* * * 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Government maintains, and both the plurality and the concurrence seemingly accept, a conviction under the Act 
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the speaker actually knew that the representation was false.  Fourth, 
the Act applies only to statements that could reasonably be interpreted as communicating actual facts; it does not 
reach dramatic performances, satire, parody, hyperbole, or the like.  Finally, the Act is strictly viewpoint neutral.  
The false statements proscribed by the Act are highly unlikely to be tied to any particular political or ideological 
message.  In the rare cases where that is not so, the Act applies equally to all false statements, whether they tend to 
disparage or commend the Government, the military, or the system of military honors.” (citations and footnotes 
omitted)). 
1355
 Id. at 2556, 2558 (“For example, in a single year, more than 600 Virginia residents falsely claimed to have won 
the Medal of Honor.  An investigation of the 333 people listed in the online edition of Who’s Who as having 
received a top military award revealed that fully a third of the claims could not be substantiated.  When the Library 
of Congress compiled oral histories for its Veterans History Project, 24 of the 49 individuals who identified 
themselves as Medal of Honor recipients had not actually received that award.  The same was true of 32 individuals 
who claimed to have been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and 14 who claimed to have won the Navy 
Cross.  Notorious cases brought to Congress’ attention included the case of a judge who falsely claimed to have 
been awarded two Medals of Honor and displayed counterfeit medals in his courtroom; a television network’s 
military consultant who falsely claimed that he had received the Silver Star; and a former judge advocate in the 
Marine Corps who lied about receiving the Bronze Star and a Purple Heart.” (emphasis and footnotes omitted). 
1356
 Id. at 2557-58. 
1357
 EMA, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. Notably, Justice Scalia—who wrote the “tradition of proscription” phrase into 
the EMA majority but found no such “tradition of proscription” for the violent video games at issue in EMA, joined 
Justice Alito in the Alvarez dissent arguing that such a “tradition of proscription” allowed the government to punish 
Mr. Alvarez’s lies about his military honors. 
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While the Alvarez plurality and dissent differed over whether Mr. Alvarez’s lies could be 
proscribed by the government without offending the First Amendment, they were in harmony on 
the continuing vitality of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  While the plurality 
acknowledged twelve categories of unprotected speech—ten of which had been properly 
recognized by the Supreme Court—the dissent expressly acknowledged that fraud, perjury and 
defamation
1361
 were categorically unprotected as were certain torts that arise from false 
speech
1362
 and more than 100 federal statutes that “punish false statements made in connection 
with areas of federal agency concern.”
1363
  Thus, by 2012, the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion 
was firmly embedded in the approach of seven of nine Justices in deciding a difficult First 
Amendment case. 
The four Justices in the plurality noted their reasoning that the unprotected categories 
involving false statements, such as defamation or fraud, have involved speech connected with 
“some other legally cognizable harm associated with the false statement, such as an invasion of 
privacy or the costs of vexatious litigation” meaning “the falsity of the speech at issue was not 
irrelevant to our analysis, but neither was it determinative.”
1364
  For that reason, the plurality 
declined to categorically exclude speech “that targets falsity and nothing more.”
1365
  The three 
Justices in dissent would not quarrel with the premise of the plurality’s rule, but would slightly 
enlarge the categories of unprotected speech to include false representations of military honor 
because of the long, historical tradition of proscription of such speech. 
                                                          
1361
 Id. at 2561 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Laws prohibiting fraud, perjury, and defamation, for example, were 
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1362
 Id. (“The right to freedom of speech has been held to permit recovery for the intentional infliction of emotional 
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Essentially, the difference between the plurality and the dissent is one of degree and is 
fact-specific.  They were in overall agreement that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion remains 
vibrant and applicable in modern jurisprudence. 
  
CHAPTER 10: A proposal for three categories of unprotected speech  
 
Despite ample scholarly and intellectual criticism, the Supreme Court has persisted in its 
reliance on categorical exclusion to conclude that certain types of speech are not subject to 
protection under the First Amendment.  This is not surprising because for the Justices, like for all 
observers of Speech Clause jurisprudence, the essential question remains unchanged:  What 
speech (if any) falls within the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the “freedom of 
speech” protected by the Constitution, and how do we know the answer to that question? 
This chapter argues that the Supreme Court’s bold movement since 2010 toward renewed 
Speech Clause absolutism calls for a similarly bold effort to formalize and clarify the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion.  This is necessary to promote order in an otherwise increasingly chaotic 
body of law surrounding the Speech Clause. To harken back to the two-step analysis inherent in 
all Speech Clause cases, the importance of the binary threshold question (does the Speech Clause 
protect this speech at all) is magnified as the Supreme Court’s tendency toward the variable 
tertiary question (how does the Speech Clause apply to this speech) trends toward more speech-
protective outcomes. 
The Supreme Court on three occasions—Chaplinsky, Stevens and Alvarez—has 
attempted what appears to be an intended comprehensive listing, more or less, of the judicially 
recognized categories of speech unprotected by the First Amendment.  On six other occasions, 
the Supreme Court listed multiple unprotected categories apparently by way of illustrating the 
point of their existence but not in a manner that appears calculated to set forth something 
375 
 
approximating the entire scope of the unprotected categories that compose the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion. 
To be sure, in each case the Supreme Court made clear that the universe of unprotected 
categories “included” the list it then offered, acknowledging the possibility that its list might not 
be a complete exposition of all the unprotected categories its cases had identified.  Moreover, the 
Supreme Court consistently has acknowledged that “[m]aybe there are some categories of speech 
that have been historically unprotected, but have not yet been specifically identified or discussed 
as such in our case law.”
1366
 
The Supreme Court’s reliance upon excluded categories has gone well beyond mere 
labels to attach to an otherwise-sought conclusion.  As described in Chapter 1, supra, the 
Supreme Court also has articulated characteristics common to the various unprotected categories, 
thereby embedding in the jurisprudence not only the language of categorical exclusion but its 
reasoning and analysis as well.  The excluded categories themselves are “well-defined and 
narrowly limited.”
1367
  They contain speech “the prevention and punishment of which has never 
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”
1368
  They are “no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may 
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”
1369
  
Within a category, “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is required.”
1370
  These are 
“historic and traditional categories long familiar to the bar.”
1371
  Before recognizing a category as 
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 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64. 
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 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 127 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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unprotected, the Supreme Court requires “persuasive evidence that a novel restriction on content 
is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition of proscription.”
1372
  The Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence related to excluded categories cannot be construed as “establishing a freewheeling 
authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”
1373
    
Thus, in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, it appears the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion—even if not named and not precisely defined—is here to stay.  But it could benefit 
from some significant structural overhaul and an injection of linguistic and analytical precision.  
Thus, this chapter will argue in three parts for a synthesizing of the Supreme Court’s use of 
categorical analysis to exclude speech from Speech Clause protection.  Part A will argue that the 
Supreme Court should “formalize” its case law in this area into a precisely articulated, and 
named, Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  Part B will review the wide-ranging terminology the 
Supreme Court has actually used since Chaplinsky to describe the unprotected categories.  Part C 
will propose that the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion be organized into a rational grouping of 




                                                          
1372
 EMA, 131 S. Ct. at 2734. 
1373
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. 
377 
 
Part A:  The Roberts Court’s move toward First Amendment absolutism calls for 
formalizing the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion 
 
The Supreme Court is accelerating its reliance on, and articulation of, a de facto 
comprehensive Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion.  Since 2010, Supreme Court decisions in five 
cases have drawn upon categorical exclusion, and two of the Supreme Court’s three attempts at a 
comprehensive articulation of the categories have come during this short period of time.
1374
  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, supra, this development is a natural outgrowth of the Roberts Court 
moving in the direction of First Amendment absolutism, at least in relation to the Speech Clause.  
It also is desirable from a speech-protection standpoint because “[t]he vast realm of free speech 
and thought always protected in our tradition can still thrive, and even be furthered, by adherence 
to those categories and rules.”
1375
 
While some have argued that the categorical exclusion of certain groupings of speech 
from First Amendment protection is a “threat to First Amendment values,”
1376
 the predicate 
question that underlies the Roberts Court’s movement toward First Amendment absolutism is 
more fundamental:  What values is the Speech Clause of the First Amendment designed to 
protect? 
The academic literature is replete with scholarly analyses of the purpose and meaning of 
the First Amendment.  For example, one scholar has articulated four theories of the First 
Amendment’s Speech Clause, each with deep roots in Western Civilization’s liberal tradition, 
that compete for properly explaining the First Amendment’s purpose and meaning.
1377
 But these 
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 See Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, First Amendment Theories and Press Responsibility: The Work of Zechariah 
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sorts of academic theories, while interesting, are unlikely explanations of what actually motivates 
the Justices; these theories may help explain to observers what the Supreme Court is seen to do, 
but they do not explain why the Justices have moved sharply to develop the excluded categories 
in the past five years. 
The more likely explanation for what has animated the Roberts Court’s reinvigorated 
First Amendment jurisprudence is the fundamental philosophical bent of the Supreme Court’s 
current majority.  “Conservative constitutional jurisprudence in the United States has an 
important libertarian dimension. . . . This libertarian streak . . . can be seen in [Supreme Court] 
decisions on freedom of speech and association. In several leading cases, conservative judges 
have used the First Amendment in a libertarian manner to invalidate regulations that reflected 
liberal or progressive values.”
1378
 
For the Roberts Court, the free-speech values protected by the First Amendment need 
not—and should not—be listed as articulations in terminology foreign to the Speech Clause 
itself.  Rather, the very fact the Constitution commands government not regulate the freedom of 
speech is in itself a sufficient value to justify the Doctrine.  In that sense, the approach of the 
conservative majority on the Roberts Court harkens back to the simple but famous declaration of 
Justice Black, the First Amendment absolutist, that “no law means no law.”
1379
 
That important understanding of the conservative majority’s Speech Clause philosophy 
was outlined by one scholar in 2010, soon after the Roberts Court embarked on its extensive 
recent Speech Clause jurisprudence (and corresponding discussion of the excluded categories) 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
described as “The Affirmative Theories—Zechariah Chafee and the Hutchins Commission,” “The Affirmative 
Theories—Thomas Emerson,” “The Checking Value—Vincent Blasi,” and “The Liberty Theory—Edwin Baker.” 
1378
 Steven J. Heyman, The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 
231, 233 (2014). This article contains an excellent extended discussion of the philosophical approach of the Roberts 
Court to interpreting the Speech Clause. 
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ushered in by Citizens United, and brought into focus by contrasting it with the dissent of Justice 
Stevens in that case.  In describing the Citizens United dissent of Justice Stevens, Professor 
Stanley Fish explained: 
The idea that you may have to regulate speech in order to preserve its First 
Amendment value is called consequentialism.  For a consequentialist like 
[Justice] Stevens, freedom of speech is not a stand-alone value to be cherished for 
its own sake, but a policy that is adhered to because of the benign consequences it 
is thought to produce, consequences that are catalogued in the usual answers to 
the question, what is the First Amendment for?  
 
Answers like the First Amendment facilitates the search for truth, or the First 
Amendment is essential to the free flow of ideas in a democratic polity, or the 
First Amendment encourages dissent, or the First Amendment provides the 
materials necessary for informed choice and individual self-realization.  If you 
think of the First Amendment as a mechanism for achieving goals like these, you 
have to contemplate the possibility that some forms of speech will be subversive 
of those goals because, for instance, they impede the search for truth or block the 
free flow of ideas or crowd out dissent.  And if such forms of speech appear along 
with their attendant dangers, you will be obligated—not in violation of the First 
Amendment, but in fidelity to it—to move against them, as Stevens advises us to 




On the other hand, Professor Fish explains, the prevailing view on the Roberts Court has become 
unconcerned with the First Amendment as a protector of underlying values but instead views the 
Speech Clause as an end in itself: 
The opposite view of the First Amendment—the view that leads you to be wary of 
chilling any speech even if it harbors a potential for corruption—is the principled 
or libertarian or deontological view.  Rather than asking what is the First 
Amendment for and worrying about the negative effects a form of speech may 
have on the achievement of its goals, the principled view asks what does the First 
Amendment say and answers, simply, it says no state abridgement of speech.  Not 
no abridgement of speech unless we dislike it or fear it or think of it as having low 
or not value, but no abridgement of speech, period, especially if the speech in 
question is implicated in the political process.   
 
. . . .  
In other words, forget about what speech does or does not do in the world; just 
take care not to restrict it.  This makes things relatively easy.  All you have to do 
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is determine that it’s speech and then protect it, as [Justice] Kennedy does when 
he observes [in the Citizens United majority opinion that the challenged law is] “a 
ban on speech.”  That’s it.  Nothing more need be said, although Kennedy says a 
lot more, largely in order to explain why nothing more need be said and why 
everything Stevens says—about corruption, distortion, electoral integrity and 




Thus, in this modern era of First Amendment absolutism, like the similar era from Justice 
Black’s time, the use of categorical exclusions is an important tool for the Justices who tend 
toward free-speech absolutism.  As described in Chapter 1, supra, in times of First Amendment 
absolutism, categorical exclusions are vitally important tools that allow the Supreme Court to 
continue finding limits in the First Amendment.  Without these limits, there would be no 
predictable way—and, perhaps, no principled way—to prevent the First Amendment from 
invalidating all government actions that could reasonably be claimed to burden speech of any 
sort—a result rarely asserted to be desirable even by the most ardent free speech absolutist.  
Moreover, without categorical exclusions, during times of Speech Clause absolutism there would 
be no distinction between “speech” and the constitutionally protected “freedom of speech,” and 
the Supreme Court’s suggestions that there is would have been meaningless. 
Reinvigorating and clarifying the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, therefore, would 
bring greater certainty to the law in this era of absolutism.  Clarity begins with a name:  Thus, the 
Supreme Court should adopt the “Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion” to describe this body of its 
jurisprudence.  Knowing with greater certainty what categories of speech fall outside the 
“freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment, and thus into a “First Amendment Free 
Zone,” would tend to help practitioners advise clients, help speakers avoid inadvertent missteps 
and the chilling effect of self-censorship, and help lower courts apply the First Amendment in a 
somewhat consistent fashion.  In short, greater clarity in the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, 
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including what categories are in fact excluded from First Amendment protection and what their 
boundaries are, would help lend predictability to the modern law of free speech in a time of 
jurisprudential change. 
* * * 
Thus, the Roberts Court should formalize the more than 70 years of ad hoc rulings that 
have implemented categorical exclusions in the post-Chaplinsky era.  The inconsistencies that 
have developed during that era, such as the basic notion that excluded categories are indeed 
“excluded” and the tension brought to that concept by R.A.V.’s declaration that even excluded 
categories are not “invisible to the First Amendment,” should be harmonized.  The Supreme 
Court should give this body of law the respectful recognition of a formal name—the Doctrine of 
Categorical Exclusion—and within that name should synthesize seven decades of wide-ranging 
rulings into a coherent whole that can provide certainty and predictability for the law. 
But that has not happened.  To the contrary, as shown in Part B, the language actually 
used by the Supreme Court to describe the excluded categories during those seven post-





Part B:  The Supreme Court’s inchoate articulations 
 
This Part B notes and aggregates the terminology the Supreme Court has used in nine key 
cases to set forth the categories of unprotected speech.  These nine cases are selected because 
they are the nine examples in which the Supreme Court has set forth multiple categories of 
speech that it represents to be excluded from First Amendment protection.  This Part will refer to 
this collection of terms as the “sum-of-all-words approach” to identifying the categories that 
each case either expressly recognized or implied exist.  This is, of course, a literalist approach 
that strictly assumes the Supreme Court means precisely what it said in each case.  While it will 
not render a definitive list, this approach will generate a complete universe of terms from which 
patterns may be ascertained, similarities and distinctions noted, and analysis made. 
  In its three attempts at what appear to be a rather comprehensive articulation, the 
Supreme Court described the excluded categories as follows: 
Chaplinsky (1942):  In this foundational case, the Supreme Court described the 
unprotected categories to include “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the 
insulting or ‘fighting’ words.”
1382
  From that quoted passage, it often is said—including in 
Chapter 3, supra, that Chaplinsky recognized four categories of unprotected speech.  But of 
course, the Chaplinsky Court actually mentioned five words denoting distinct concepts in that 
quoted phrase because it referenced both the “lewd and obscene”; as discussed in Chapter 4, Part 
A, supra, subsequent decisions would make clear that lewdness and obscenity are 
constitutionally different concepts subject to different treatment by the First Amendment.   
In addition, the Chaplinsky Court also quoted favorably from New Hampshire state court 
decisions relied upon by the court below, which stated:   
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The statute, as construed, does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words 
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee, words whose 
speaking constitute a breach of the peace by the speaker—including ‘classical 
fighting words’, words in current use less ‘classical’ but equally likely to cause 
violence, and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and 
threats.
1383
   
 
The Chaplinsky Court, therefore, indirectly acknowledged the existence of “threats” as an 
unprotected category of speech even though that decision’s oft-quoted formulation makes no 
such mention; as described in Chapter 6, Part D, supra, the unprotected nature of “true threats” 
has remained litigated even to the most recent concluded term of the Supreme Court. 
Thus, if one views Chaplinsky in the traditional way, it articulates four categories of 
unprotected speech—the “lewd and obscene,” the “profane,” the “libelous,” and “fighting 
words.”  But if one takes a sum-of-all-words approach to reading Chaplinsky, that decision is 
seen to include six categories of unprotected speech—the “lewd,” the “obscene,” the “profane,” 
the “libelous,” various “fighting words,” and “threats.” 
Stevens (2010): The Stevens articulation also describes six categories of unprotected 
speech, but they are not the same six referenced in Chaplinsky.  Stevens mentions five “historic 
and traditional categories long familiar to the bar—including obscenity, defamation, fraud, 
incitement, and speech integral to criminal conduct.”
1384
  Stevens also later acknowledges that 
child pornography also is a category recognized as unprotected.
1385
   
Thus, the sum-of-all-words approach reveals six categories of unprotected speech set 
forth in Stevens—“obscenity,” “defamation,” “fraud,” incitement,” “speech integral to criminal 
conduct,” and “child pornography.” 
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Alvarez (2012):  By the time 2012 arrived, the Supreme Court was prepared to be more 
thorough in articulating the established universe of recognized categories.  Its principal listing 
included nine:   
Among these categories are advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent 
lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, so-
called “fighting words,” child pornography, fraud, true threats, and speech 
presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the power to 
prevent, although a restriction under the last category is most difficult to 
sustain.
1386
   
 
But the Alvarez Court also recognized three other types of speech, potentially separate 
categories, that enjoy no constitutional protection.  For example, statutes prohibiting perjury are 
of “unquestioned constitutionality”
1387
  Prohibitions on making false statements to the 
government “concerning official matters” may “implicate fraud or speech integral to criminal 
conduct” and thus be proscribable.
1388
  Similarly, “falsely representing that one is speaking on 
behalf of the Government” or “impersonating a Government officer” can be prohibited because 
such a prohibition would “protect the integrity of Government processes” and “implicate fraud or 
speech integral to criminal conduct.”
1389
  For the first of these three groupings, perjury, the 
Alvarez Court cited precedent that had held perjured statements unprotected by the First 
Amendment; for the other two groupings, prohibitions on making false statements to the 
government and on impersonating the government, the Alvarez Court offered dicta reasoning that 
they would be unprotected and analogizing them to other, establish categories, “fraud” and 
“speech integral to criminal conduct.” 
Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of Alvarez reveals a list of twelve categories— 
“incitement,” “obscenity,” “defamation,” “speech integral to criminal conduct,” “fighting 
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words,” “child pornography,” “fraud,” “true threats,” “speech presenting some grave and 
imminent threat the government has the power to prevent,” “perjury,” “making false statements 
to the government concerning official matters,” and “impersonating a Government officer.” 
* * * 
 
In the years since Chaplinsky, in addition to the three rather comprehensive articulations 
described above, the Supreme Court has on six other occasions set forth lists of categories of 
proscribable speech that give no appearance of being intended as a complete recitation.  Rather, 
they have been mentioned, sometimes off-handedly, apparently for the purpose of illustrating the 
concept of categorical exclusion for the needs of the particular case.  Nonetheless, considering 
these six additional examples sheds further light on excluded categories the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged, or at least considered to exist. 
Konigsburg (1961):  In a footnote, the Konigsburg Court implied, but did not expressly 
state, that the following categories of unprotected speech exist:  “libel, slander, 
misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by 
encouragement, conspiracy, and the like . . . .”
1390
  It subsequently noted favorably that 
categorical exclusion would  “justify punishing persuasion to murder” and that “the United 
States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and 
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”
1391
  The former of these is derived from the prior 
footnote’s “solicitation of crime,” and the latter, in context, appears intended to reinforce the 
prior footnote’s references to “complicity by encouragement” or “conspiracy.” 
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Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of Konigsburg results in this list of nine categories:  
“libel,” “slander,” “misrepresentation,” “obscenity,” “perjury,” “false advertising,” “solicitation 
of crime,” “complicity by encouragement,” and “conspiracy.”  
Simon & Schuster (1991):  The Simon & Schuster Court struck down the New York 
statute at issue because it did not fit within a proscribable category, and Justice Kennedy 
explained the reasoning as follows:  
Here, a law is directed to speech alone where the speech in question is not 
obscene, not defamatory, not words tantamount to an act otherwise criminal, not 
an impairment of some other constitutional right, not an incitement to lawless 
action, and not calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the 
substantive power to prevent.  No further inquiry is necessary to reject the State’s 




Read in the context of the case, that final sentence emphasized above appears to suggest that the 
list of unprotected categories in that paragraph is exhaustive, not merely illustrative.  Thus, if the 
regulated speech did not fit one of those enumerated categories, it must be protected, which 
implies no other unprotected categories exist.  This cannot, however, be what the Supreme Court 
intended by that passage, because elsewhere within Simon & Schuster Justice Kennedy 
explained:  “There are a few legal categories in which content-based regulation has been 
permitted or at least contemplated.  These include obscenity, defamation, incitement, or 
situations presenting some grave and imminent danger the government has the power to 
prevent.”
1393
  In addition, the Simon & Schuster Court cited Ferber for the proposition that 
“some visual depictions of sexual conduct by children” have been declared proscribable.
1394
  
Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of Simon & Schuster results in the following list of 
seven categories:  “obscenity,” “defamation,” “tantamount to an act otherwise criminal,” “an 
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 Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added). 
1393





impairment of some other constitutional right,” “incitement to lawless action,” “calculated or 
likely to bring about imminent harm the State has the substantive power to prevent,” and “child 
pornography.” 
R.A.V. (1992):  The R.A.V. Court collected three unprotected categories into an 
illustrative list parenthetically incorporated into a collection of cases.
1395
 Thus, a sum-of-all-
words reading of R.A.V. results in this list of three categories:  “defamation,” “fighting words,” 
and “obscenity.” 
Free Speech Coalition (2002): The Free Speech Coalition Court wrote that “[t]he 
freedom of speech . . . does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, 
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.”
1396
  That Court also wrote 
that “[t]he government may suppress speech for advocating the use of force or a violation of law 
only if such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action”
1397
 and it implied, without actually stating, that “attempt, 
incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy”
1398
 for criminal conduct would be proscribable. 
Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of Free Speech Coalition produces the following list of 
seven categories:  “defamation,” “incitement,” “obscenity,” “pornography produced with real 
children,” “attempt,” “solicitation,” and “conspiracy.” 
Williams (2008):  The Williams majority noted that “[m]any long established criminal 
proscriptions—such as laws against conspiracy, incitement, and solicitation—criminalize speech 
(commercial or not) that is intended to induce or commence illegal activities,”
1399
 implying that 
speech within those categories is unprotected.  In addition, the Williams dissent noted that “the 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383. 
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 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 245-46. 
1397




 Williams, 553 U.S. at 298. 
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First Amendment does not categorically protect offers to engage in illegal transactions” and also 
recognized the “unprotected status of fraud.”
1400
 
Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of Williams results in the following list of five 
categories:  “conspiracy,” “incitement,” “solicitation,” “offers to engage in illegal transactions,” 
and “fraud.” 
EMA (2011):  The EMA majority referenced “limited areas” of proscribable speech “such 
as obscenity, incitement, and fighting words.”
1401
  The EMA dissent also acknowledged that 
“child pornography” is an unprotected category.
1402
 
Thus, a sum-of-all-words reading of EMA produces a list of four categories:  “obscenity,” 
“incitement,” “fighting words,” and “child pornography.” 
* * * 
If one merely aggregates the categories identified by the Supreme Court in the nine cases 
above, the resulting sum-of-all-words list contains 25 categories: “lewd,” “obscene,” “profane,” 
“libelous,” “fighting words,” “threats,” “defamation,” “fraud,” “incitement,” “speech integral to 
criminal conduct,” “child pornography,” “preventing some grave and imminent threat the 
government has the power to prevent,” “perjury,” “false statements to the government,” 
“impersonating a government officer,” “slander,” “misrepresentation,” “false advertising,” 
“solicitation of a crime,” “complicity by encouragement,” “conspiracy,” “tantamount to an act 
otherwise criminal,” “impairment of some other constitutional right,” “attempt,” and “offers to 
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 Id. at 312 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
1401
 EMA, 131 S. Ct. at 2733 (citations omitted). 
1402
 Id. at 2763 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
1403
 Even this list of 25 categories reflects the application of a certain amount of judgment. The Supreme Court has 




























































































































1. Lewd X         
2. obscene/obscenity X X X X X  X X X 
3. Profane X         
4. Libel X X        
5. fighting words X   X    X X 
6. threats/true threats X        X 
7. Slander  X        
8. Misrepresentation  X        
9. Perjury  X       X 
10. false advertising  X        
11. solicitation of crime  X   X X    
12. complicity by encouragement  X        
13. Conspiracy  X   X X    
14. Defamation   X X X  X  X 
15. tantamount to act otherwise criminal   X       
16. impairment of some other constitutional 
right 
  X       
17. Incitement   X  X X X X X 
18. prohibit imminent harm/prevent grave & 




  X      X 
19. child pornography/with real children   X  X  X X X 
20. Attempt     X     
21. offers to engage illegal transactions      X    
22. Fraud      X X  X 
23. speech integral to criminal conduct       X  X 
24. impersonating a government officer         X 
25. making false statements to the 
government concerning official matters 
        X 
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 In Simon & Schuster, the Supreme Court used the phrase “calculated or likely to bring about imminent harm the 
State has the substantive power to prevent,” Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124, but in Alvarez it used the phrase 
“preventing grave and imminent threat the government has the power to prevent,” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.  Both 
harken back to the reference in pre-Chaplinsky reference to “substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”  




That long list not only is unwieldy, but it simply cannot be a correct reflection of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence constituting the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, particularly 
because only “a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence.”
1405
  If there really were 25 categories of speech unprotected by the 
First Amendment, then why has the Supreme Court never mentioned more than twelve of them 
together at the same time, as it did in Alvarez?  Indeed, if this list were presented to the Supreme 
Court, the likely reaction would be a strong expression of aversion to such a “freewheeling”
1406
 
interpretation of its Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion. 
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 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383 (emphasis added). 
1406
 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 472. 
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Part C:  A proposal for a concise Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion with three categories 
 
It is apparent the sum-of-all-words approach above, which yields a cumbersome and 
imprecise list of 25 unprotected categories, cannot be correct.  It also is apparent the list of 
categories recognized as unprotected may vary depending on the facts of a given case; to borrow 
an old phrase, some categories may be more excluded from First Amendment protection than 
others.
1407
  One can, however, begin to draw conclusions from analyzing the sum-of-all-words 
list. 
First, at least two of those terms—“lewd” and “profane”—have subsequently been 
rejected or abandoned by the Supreme Court.  
Second, “fighting words” as a term appeared to have been abandoned by the time of 
Stevens in 2010 in favor of the narrower “incitement,” but it was resurrected in Alvarez in 2012.   
Third, “misrepresentation,” without more, does not qualify as unprotected after Alvarez.   
Fourth, at least one category from this massive list—“preventing some grave and 
imminent threat the government has the power to prevent”—really never has been considered an 
excluded category but instead has traditionally been analyzed within the First Amendment.  
Moreover, this phrase appears more nearly to describe the reasoning that underlies or explains a 
category, such as speech integral to criminal conduct, not the category itself.  
Fifth, an outlier category—“impairment of some other constitutional right”—was 
mentioned only once by the Supreme Court, without explanation, and does not appear to be 
sufficiently developed as a concept to enable evaluation. 
                                                          
1407
 See generally Chapter 7, Part D, supra, demonstrating that the Supreme Court takes into account the individual 
circumstances of government regulation in each case in determining how much deference to allow even in the 
government’s regulation of categorically unprotected speech.  See also Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions:  
Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (2012) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court does, and should, take into account the severity of the government-imposed sanction in determining 
whether speech is unprotected).  
392 
 
Sixth, many of these terms are closely related to each other as all being inchoate offenses.  
For example, “conspiracy,” “solicitation,” “attempt,” “complicity by encouragement,” all are 
specific examples of inchoate crimes which, in turn, are closely related to the Giboney-
Pittsburgh Press principle that speech integral to criminal conduct is proscribable. 
Seventh, “slander” and “libel” are subsets of “defamation.” 
Eighth, “fraud” and “false advertising” really are part and parcel of the same concept.  
“False advertising” is a form of fraudulent “soliciting” of a person to engage in a transaction.  
Ninth, “threats” and “child pornography” really are specific applications of the broader 
Giboney-Pittsburgh Press rule that “speech integral to criminal conduct” is proscribable.  So 
would be “perjury” and “offers to engage in illegal transactions.”  “Fraud” is a close cousin, and 
the statement that speech “tantamount to an act otherwise criminal” is proscribable really merely 
rephrases the rule that “speech integral to criminal conduct” may be prohibited. 
One analyst has argued that the state of the modern law is best described as the Supreme 
Court having interpreted the First Amendment to exclude only three categories of speech from its 
protection:  Obscenity, child pornography and “fighting words or true threats.”
1408
  While not 
prepared to accept those same three categories verbatim, the proposal here also recommends 
condensing to only three categories. 
In light of those nine observations about the interrelationships among the 25 words and 
phrases the Supreme Court has used to describe categories of unprotected speech, a succinct, 
simple and more coherent articulation of the categories could look like this: 
 
 
                                                          
1408
 See Kathleen Ann Ruane, Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment, 2-3 (Cong. 
Research Serv., CRS Report for Congress, Sept. 8, 2014). 
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Category I:  Obscenity 
The Supreme Court has consistently included “obscenity” in lists of proscribable 
categories, and the extensive body of case law on the subject makes clear the Supreme Court has 
seriously considered this excluded category and approves of it.  However, the category described 
as “obscenity” includes, well, only “obscenity.”  It does not include speech that is lewd, indecent 
or profane.  Nor does it operate to exclude from the First Amendment depictions, whether verbal 
or visual, of violence.  Rather, to fit within this unprotected category—and, therefore, to be 
proscribable by the government, “obscene” speech must satisfy a three-pronged test: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:  (a) whether the average person, 
applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a 
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, 
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable 
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 




If and only if speech meets that test, it is obscene and falls within the “First Amendment Free 
Zone” and outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution. 
Category II:  Speech integral to conduct otherwise illegal 
This general category includes offers to engage in illegal transactions.  It also includes 
the various inchoate offenses traditionally and widely recognized in the criminal law, including 
attempts, solicitations and conspiracies.  
This general category also has been specifically applied by the Supreme Court to various 
specific types of speech integral to criminal conduct.  One might think of these as 
“subcategories,” but however one references them, they are circumstances in which the Supreme 
Court has expressly stated that the general rule that speech integral to criminal conduct applies in 
these cases:  Child pornography, true threats, fraud, and perjury.  For these particular types of 
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 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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“speech integral to criminal conduct,” it is unnecessary to analyze or guess to determine whether 
they are proscribable.  They are. 
This category also includes whatever remains of the “fighting words” doctrine, 
specifically including “incitement,” defined as speech that is intended, and likely, to produce 
imminent lawless action. 
The key to this category of excluded speech is the mens rea of the speaker.  The speaker 
must have a guilty mind sufficient to establish criminal liability, or at least sufficient to establish 
the criminal intent to cause or contribute to lawless actions, and if so then the utterance—the 
speech—may merely be evidence of that guilty mind.  Courts are unlikely to allow the 
punishment of innocent utterances even if they somehow contribute to otherwise unlawful acts.  
As Justice Thomas asserted in his Elonis dissent, “Our default rule in favor of general intent 
applies with full force to criminal statutes addressing speech,”
1410
 and while the precise mens rea 
constitutionally required for a criminal statute that punishes speech to survive a First 
Amendment challenge has not been settled,
1411
 “[a]t a minimum, there is not historical practice 
requiring more than general intent when a statute regulates speech.”
1412
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 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2019 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1411
 The Supreme Court generally has been reluctant to decide what level of mens rea is constitutionally required to 
defeat a First Amendment challenge to a criminal statute that punishes speech, opting instead to rely on statutory 
construction to find within the various statutory texts a mens rea requirement deemed sufficient to resolve the 
dispute before the Court without reaching the constitutional question.  See id. at 2013 (majority opinion) (collecting 
cases that decline to decide the constitutional question in this context).  That reluctance was the subject of Justice 
Alito’s critique of the majority opinion in his Elonis concurrence.  Id. at 2013-14 (Alito, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“But the Court refuses to explain what type of intent was necessary.  Did the jury need to find 
that Elonis had the purpose of conveying a true threat? Was it enough if he knew that his words conveyed such a 
threat? Would recklessness suffice? The Court declines to say. Attorneys and judges are left to guess.”).  It is clear, 
however, that despite the absence of a controlling pronouncement by the Supreme Court about what the Constitution 
requires, courts generally do insist on the presence of some proof of a “guilty mind” before permitting criminal 
liability to attach and will seek it through construction whenever possible.  See discussion id. at 2009 (majority 
opinion) (“The fact that the statute does not specify any required mental state, however, does not mean that none 
exists.  We have repeatedly held that mere omission fro a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent 
should not be read as dispensing with it.  This rule of construction reflects the basis principle that wrongdoing must 
be conscious to be criminal.  As Justice Jackson explained, this principle is as universal and persistent in mature 
systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to 
choose between good and evil.  The central thought is that a defendant must be blameworthy in mind before he can 
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Other similar types of “subcategories,” or specific applications of the general rule, likely 
would be recognized by the Supreme Court if ever a proper case were presented to it.  This is 
known because the Supreme Court has signaled as much.  These include making false statements 
to the government about official business and impersonating a government official. 
Speech that is integral to conduct otherwise unlawful, including criminal conduct, falls 
within the “First Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the “freedom of speech” protected by 
the Constitution.  Caution is warranted, however, to ensure this category not be expanded to 
allow punishment of protected speech or expressive conduct to which associated criminal 
conduct, such as the burning of an American flag, is a mere incident. To put the concept another 
way, the government may punish speech that merely enables underlying criminality, but it may 
not punish criminality that is merely a byproduct of speech.  
Category III:  Defamation uttered with ‘actual malice’ 
This category, of course, includes both libel and slander.  As the law of defamation has 
been constitutionalized since the 1960s, the unprotected category of defamation has been 
significantly narrowed over the years, and it is unclear much remains of the excluded category 
other than the Supreme Court’s persistent reference to it.  The one clear type of defamatory 
speech that continues to fall outside the First Amendment’s protection is defamation uttered with 
“actual malice.”  If the government can prove the speaker acted with actual malice—knowing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be found guilty, a concept courts have expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea, scienter, malice 
aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like.  Although there are exceptions, the general rule is that a guilty mind is 
a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime.  We therefore generally interpret criminal statutes to 
include broadly applicable scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not contain them.” 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. X-citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 
(1994) (interpreting criminal statute punishing possession of child pornography to include a requirement possessor 
knows the depicted children are minors).  Given this general approach and the overall inclination by the judiciary to 
interpret the First Amendment in a speech-protective manner, it is likely the Supreme Court would—if ever the 
question were squarely presented and decided—find within the First Amendment a scienter requirement for criminal 
statutes that punish speech.  Justice Thomas already has concluded that a general intent criminal statute is sufficient 
for a criminal statute punishing speech to survive a First Amendment challenge. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2024-28 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
1412
 Id. at 2021. 
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defamatory speech was false or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity—then courts 
continue to allow the government to punish that speech without otherwise satisfying the limits of 
the First Amendment.   
Notably, proof of “actual malice” is closely akin to the sort of mens rea the government 
must demonstrate in order to invoke a categorical exclusion for speech incidental to conduct 
otherwise criminal.  In that sense, what remains of the excluded category of defamation is similar 
to the excluded category of speech incidental to conduct otherwise criminal—it may be punished 
without First Amendment limitations only when (and perhaps only because) the speaker intended 
it to cause harm to another. To describe in a phrase the core of any remaining unprotected 
category of defamatory speech, it is only the “calculated falsehood”
1413




* * * 
As demonstrated in Table 2, infra, a regrouping in this manner would be true to the 
principles the Supreme Court appeared to be expressing in the nine cases analyzed in Chapter 10, 
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 Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75. 
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 The “calculated falsehood” is unprotected in all applications.  As discussed above, mere “negligent” defamations 
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(understood to 
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a “calculated 
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X X X  X X X X X 
 
 
Each of these three proposed groupings would have been recognized by eight of the nine 
cases that have attempted comprehensive, or somewhat comprehensive, listings of the 
unprotected categories.  This suggests a significant correlation between this proposed framework 
and what the Supreme Court actually was doing in these nine cases, even though no such 
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framework was articulated by the Supreme Court itself. Under this proposal, the delineation 
between the constitutionally protected “freedom of speech” and the excluded speech in the “First 




Figure 6: Relationship between constitutionally protected “Freedom of Speech” and unprotected “First Amendment Free 
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This proposal for three categories is rational, understandable, and consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s actual decisions and articulations over the past 75 years.  It provides a 
framework that can assist judges, practitioners and speakers in understanding both what speech is 
excluded from First Amendment protection and why it is excluded.  It provides a useful tool for 
addressing the fundamental and persistent question:  What speech falls within the “First 
Amendment Free Zone” that lies outside the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution, 
and how do we know the answer to that question? 
The requirement for the government to prove a speaker’s mens rea also is consistent with 
the broad notion that the First Amendment protects a free exchange in ideas, and only when the 
speech itself is intended to harm others, or to be part of conduct otherwise criminal or unlawful, 
might the First Amendment not apply.  This is intellectually consistent with the notion that 
obscenity may be proscribed only if possessed outside the privacy of one’s own home,
1416
 which 
implies that the exposure of the obscene material to others is a factor in the Supreme Court’s 
analysis. 
For all these reasons, the Supreme Court should adopt this three-part framework for 
organizing the unprotected categories of speech and should name this framework and its 









                                                          
1416











This dissertation ends where it began:  With the pertinent text of the First Amendment. 
 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”
1417
  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence long has drawn a proper distinction between the freedom of speech 
protected by the First Amendment and any other speech that is unprotected and thus falls within 
a “First Amendment Free Zone.”  Whether the speech at issue in any particular situation falls 
within the Speech Clause at all is a binary determination—speech is either within or without the 
First Amendment’s protected freedom; there is no straddling the line.
1418
 Therefore, this binary 
determination necessarily must be made, either explicitly or implicitly, as a threshold matter in 
every Speech Clause case.  If the First Amendment applies to the speech at issue, then and only 
then is the challenged government regulation subject to variable tertiary analysis under whatever 
separate, judicially crafted rules for applying the Speech Clause may govern the speech being 
regulated. If the First Amendment does not apply, then the judicial inquiry typically is at an end 
after disposition of the threshold question because the speech at issue is excluded from the 
freedom protected by the Speech Clause and consequently is excluded from judicial 
protection.
1419
 In that latter circumstance, it follows that the government’s proscription of the 
speech is permissible without offense to the First Amendment.  
The Supreme Court should expressly adopt that two-step analysis in its Speech Clause 
cases.  The necessary and recurring binary threshold determination required by the plain text of 
                                                          
1417
 U.S. CONST. amend I.  
1418
 Except, of course, under analysis like Justice Scalia’s in R.A.V.  But that is the exception, not the rule, in the 
Supreme Court’s cases that apply categorical exclusion. 
1419
 If the speech at issue falls within the “First Amendment Free Zone,” then the judicial inquiry is at an end from a 
Speech Clause standpoint.  Obviously, other limitations, including constitutional limitations, might apply to the 
government’s challenged regulatory action. 
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the Speech Clause is this:  What speech lies in the “First Amendment Free Zone” that is outside 
the “freedom of speech” protected by the Constitution?   
The essential companion to that threshold question, of course, is, “How do we know the 
answer to it?”  In the almost 75 years since it first attempted in Chaplinsky to synthesize a 
framework to guide that recurring threshold determination, the Supreme Court has developed an 
increasingly discernible set of rules for that purpose.  These various rules have become 
sufficiently numerous and comprehensive as to properly constitute a “doctrine.”  The Supreme 
Court should expressly recognize that reality by describing its jurisprudence in this regard as the 
Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion, an apt naming since the purpose of this doctrine is to assist 
with identifying the categories of speech that are excluded from the freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment and thus are constitutionally unprotected and subject to proscription by 
the government.   
Coining this new terminology also would lend greater precision to the Supreme Court’s 
free speech jurisprudence:  If a particular judicially determined rule or holding helps guide the 
threshold determination of whether speech at issue falls within or without First Amendment 
protection, then it is part of the Doctrine of Categorical Exclusion; by contrast, if the rule or 
holding directs how speech is to be protected by applying the First Amendment to the speech at 
issue, then it does not.  This clearer linguistic distinction would tend to ameliorate confusion that 
arises from the Supreme Court’s enduring tendence to refer generally to a “categorical approach” 
and discuss “categories of speech” interchangeably when addressing both the binary threshold 
question in Speech Clause cases (does the Speech Clause apply at all to the speech at issue?) and 
also to the open-ended, or “variable,” tertiary question (if the Speech Clause does apply, then 
how so?).   
403 
 
 Coupled with the greater linguistic precision of naming the Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion, clarity in this area of the law would be enhanced were the Supreme Court also to 
bring greater precision to its description of the excluded categories.  Greater certainty would 
promote First Amendment values by tending to diminish self-censorship and the chilling of 
protected expression; when speakers clearly know the constitutional boundaries, they are less 
likely to inadvertently transgress them and thus more likely to speak freely when operating near 
the constitutional limits.  The three-category solution advocated in Chapter 10, supra, would 
advance the purpose of clarity and thus serve First Amendment values, but of course other 
combinations or structures are possible and could suffice as well. 
 In the law, the natural companion of clarity is certainty.  As the Supreme Court has 
recognized in a different context, an “important value[] of a rational system of law” is “the 
certainty of legal principles.”
1420
  The principle that the Speech Clause of the First Amendment 
applies to some, but not all, speech is settled law—that much is certain.  Nearly three-quarters of 
a century after Chaplinsky—and in light of the renewed focus by the Supreme Court since 2010 
on applying principles of categorical exclusion from the Speech Clause in its cases—the time is 
ripe for the Court to make this area of law more “rational.” The Supreme Court should give 
practitioners, speakers and others who focus on understanding and applying the ten words of the 
Speech Clause greater certainty in answering the essential threshold, binary question: Does (or 
does not) the clause apply at all to the speech at issue? The proposed Doctrine of Categorical 
Exclusion would advance the “clarity that the First Amendment demands.”
1421
  The Supreme 
Court should adopt it. 
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 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 709 n.6 (1978). 
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